Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) Section 32 – Acquittal of accused -- Multiple Dying declaration -- Second dying declaration rejected completely by the High Court, is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other accused – First dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured state to the hospital – Focus of the first dying declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire -- Second dying declaration, alone elaborates acts of cruelty -- That is the only piece of incriminating evidence against the accused -- Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/s 498-A IPC set aside.

(Para 20,21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of complaint – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- For the quashing of a criminal complaint, the Court, when it exercises its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 11)

B. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Manufacturing of drugs without license – Quashing of complaint -- Appellants purchased pyridoxal-5-phosphate, 75 kg (as 3 x 25kg packets), however, no stock was found on the premise of the Appellants -- Alleged breaking up of the impugned substance into smaller packages and further distribution of the same is being classified by the Respondent/ complainant as “manufacturing”

-- The impugned substance, has been categorized as a bulk food substance falling under the definition of food as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

-- The impugned substance has specifically been mentioned as a food ingredient in Serial No.4(ii) of the Schedule-I of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2016.

Alleged substance is not included as a drug in the Indian Pharmacopoeia -- Impugned substance does not require a specific license -- No explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-29)

C. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Manufacturing of drugs without license – Delay in complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.

(Para 25)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Leave to appeal -- Granting of special leave to appeal against acquittal is a discretionary power.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452, 506, 166, 167 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 12 -- Rape -- Cancellation report in FIR –  Ld. JMIC dismissed the complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Applicant/ prosecutrix was alleged to be raped on 07.01.2016 and 10.02.2016 – She opted to remain silent after alleged incident of 07.01.2016 and approached police on 10.02.2016 i.e. after second incident -- There is gap of one month between first incident and second incident -- Applicant attempted to implicate police officials who did not agree with her complaint -- MLR was not supporting the case of the applicant -- No injury was found over the body of the applicant -- Complainant/applicant failed to make out prima facie case warranting summoning of alleged accused – There is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has dismissed the complaint -- Permission for special leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – Consent of complainant – Requirement of -- Section 147 of NI Act coupled with inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C., in the interest of justice, High Court is not precluded from compounding the case in absence of consent of complainant where complainant is duly compensated as Section 138 of the NI Act does not provide that it is mandatory for the Court to sentence for imprisonment in all eventualities but there is option to the Court to impose sentence of imprisonment or fine or both.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – No-consent case -- Petitioner is 52% handicapped and has deposited in the Court 10% over and above the amount of compensation – Held, complainant has been compensated adequately and therefore, substantive sentence of imprisonment is not necessary -- Accordingly complaint filed by the respondent compounded, impugned judgments/ orders set-aside and petitioner acquitted of the offence charged.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Cheating and forgery -- Forged sale deed – Quashing of Complaint – Mockery of investigation – Civil dispute pending -- When it is the specific case of the original complainant that at no point of time he had executed the disputed sale deed and his signature on the disputed sale deed has been forged, then the;  

-- first thing the police should have done was to obtain the specimen hand writings of the complainant so as to be compared with the disputed signature on the sale deed through a hand writing expert.

-- second thing which the investigating agency ought to have done is to investigate whether the sale consideration had been paid to the purchaser of the disputed plot or not and if the sale deed consideration had been paid, then in what manner.

-- If it is the case of the original complainant that a conspiracy was hatched, then in such circumstances why did the police drop the purchaser and the other individuals from the charge sheet stating that they are the bona fide purchasers of the plot in question for value without notice.

No convincing legal evidence on record to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences -- Since the purchaser of the plot in question and others have not been arrayed as accused, the entire theory of criminal conspiracy collapses like a pack of cards -- Civil Court seized of the question as regards the legality and validity of the disputed sale deed -- The matter is sub judice in the Civil Court -- It will not be proper to permit the criminal prosecution to proceed further on the allegation of the sale deed being forged – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Civil dispute – Criminal texture – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court -- A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture -- But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence -- In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of conviction u/s 308/ 34 IPC -- Complainant is husband of petitioner No.1 and father of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 -- Dispute between family members on account of mis-understanding amicably settled -- Judgment and order vide which petitioners have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment set aside.

(Para 7-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 278(3) -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused by Trial Court -- Leave to appeal -- Prosecution case that recovery of the contraband from the stolen scooter being driven by the respondent – Scooter was stolen on 26.08.2012 whereas the alleged recovery was made on 30.10.2012 i.e. after a period of 2 months.

-- It is highly improbable that a person would not record DDR or FIR if his vehicle is lost -- Very basis of prosecution case that the scooter from which contraband was recovered not proved with cogent evidence -- This fact is a material fact, however the evidence of the prosecution on this material fact is doubtful and shaky

-- Representative sample drawn by the Judicial Magistrate was not sent for chemical examination -- No explanation given by the IO as to why the representative sample was not sent for chemical examination

-- Form No. 29 stated to be prepared at the spot by ASI bears the signatures of the officiating SHO, when he has not stated that he was present at the spot -- He categorically stated case property as well as the accused were produced before him in the police station.

Held, it is the cardinal principal of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond shadow of doubts – Opinion expressed by the trial court is not only a possible view, but also it is fair and reasonable and cannot be termed as perverse in any manner, thus, it does not warrant interference – There is always presumption of innocence and in case of acquittal, there is double presumption -- Leave to appeal as well as appeal dismissed.

(Para 8-16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Conspiracy – Quashing of FIR -- Rs.15,000/- received by the co-accused was never ever handed over to the petitioner, recovery was effected from his co-accused – Petitioner was repeatedly asking his co-accused, Kanungo to explain as to why the said amount had not been deposited, letters would conclusively establish that the petitioner had absolutely no role to play in the defalcation of the said amount – It was his co-accused alone who had received the money and not deposited the same – Absolutely no evidence on record to establish conspiracy between the petitioner and his co-accused – FIR qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Sanction for prosecution -- For the commission of an offence u/s 409 IPC, sanction for prosecution u/s 197 Cr.P.C. is not required.

(Para 20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver -- Cross-examination of PW-1/ injured (complainant) would clearly establish that he had seen the driver of the offending vehicle when after the accident he came out and ran away leaving the vehicle at the spot -- Merely because the owner of the vehicle was not examined does not in any manner detract from the testimony, who has clearly identified the accused not only at the time of the occurrence but also in the Court -- Thus, by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the identity of the petitioner was not established – PW1 stated that the car was being driven in a rash and negligent manner -- Minor contractions in fact would show that the witnesses in question are not tutored witnesses – Held, the prosecution has established its case against the petitioner beyond any reasonable doubt – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver – Reduction of sentence -- Since the petitioner is a first-time offender and the occurrence is almost 11 years old, the sentence of 01 year imposed by the Lower Appellate Court reduced to a period of 09 months but subject to a payment of Rs.25,000/- as fine to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 384, 323, 506, 34, 457, 458 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Lurking house trespass or house breaking – Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties have entered into compromise voluntarily and without any undue influence – FIR and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom quashed qua petitioners.

(Para 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Cheque by Trust -- Trust not impleaded as party in complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act -- Maintainability of the complaint – Petitioner is admittedly neither the signatory of the cheque nor is there any averment made by the complainant in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of and was responsible to the trust for the conduct of its business -- Mandate of Section 141 of NI Act not pleaded and established remotely -- Further proceeding in the complaint is nothing but an abuse of process of Court –Complaint as a whole being unsustainable in the eye of law needs to be quashed and accordingly quashed.

(Para 6-10)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – State appeal against acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Delay of 303 days -- Condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of lethargic working of Government -- Delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot be mechanically condoned, in the absence of 'sufficient cause' for delay -- No explanation put forth for explaining the delay for filing the application -- Reason given is that the file moved at a leisure pace -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed -- Consequently, the application u/s 378 (3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed as time barred.

(Para 5-8)

Public Gambling Act, 1867 (3 of 1867), Section 5, 13-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR / Charge under Gambling Act -- Non-compliance of Section 5 of the Gambling Act and section 155(2) Cr.P.C -- Even no independent witness joined – Proceedings initiated against the petitioner are untenable, especially when the raid leading to lodging of FIR itself was from the threshold marred by procedural irregularity -- Same is a ground sufficient to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of law and secure of ends of justice.

(Para 18-20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 454 – Theft in dwelling house – Lurking house trespass -- Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- State does not dispute the fact that offence punishable u/s 454 IPC is not stand alone offence and after acquittal of the petitioner of offence punishable under Section 380 IPC, 454 IPC cannot be maintained – Conviction u/s 454 IPC set aside.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 411 – Theft in dwelling house – Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- Recovery from the co-accused -- Petitioner was never charged for offence punishable u/s 411 IPC -- There is no order on record to show that the Trial Court ever exercised power u/s 216 Cr.P.C. to alter the charge -- Thus, the Courts below erred in holding the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 411 IPC in the absence of charge -- Conviction u/s 411 IPC set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279, 427 – Death  by rash and negligent driving -- Conviction u/s 304-A, 279, 427 IPC – Agony of protracted trial -- Reduction of sentence – Petitioner has undergone the sentence of 6 months and 12 days out of the total sentence of 1 year -- Petitioner facing the agony of protracted trial for the last 09 years approximately, ends of justice would be suitably met, if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone – Sentence reduced already undergone – Apart from fine, petitioner directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased.

(Para 11-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 – NDPS case -- Recovery of 500 grams opium – Conviction for 6 months and fine of Rs.5,000/- by trial court -- Reduction of sentence -- One appellant has undergone substantive sentence of 4 months, 17 days whereas, other has undergone 4 months, 4 days – Both the appellants are not involved in any other case -- It seems that the appellants have mended their ways of life and joined the mainstream of society -- Considering the age of accused, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, while maintaining balance between deterrence against crime viz-a-viz re-formative approach of punishment, sentence reduced to the period already undergone -- Sentence of fine is ordered to remain intact.

(Para 17, 18)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 – NDPS case -- Protracted trial – Reduction of sentence -- Recovery of 4 kgs 200 grams of poppy straw – Sentenced for a period of 2½ years and fine of Rs.40,000/- by trial court -- Appellant is 70 years old man and facing the agony of protracted trial for about 9 years -- Appellant not involved in any other criminal case -- Appellant has mended his way of life and joined the mainstream of the society -- Sentence of the appellant reduced to the period already undergone i.e. 7 months, 29 days -- Sentence of fine is ordered to remain intact.

(Para 1, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B -- Punjab Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2000 (9 of 2000), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Evasion of VAT – FIR under General Acts – Quashing of FIR -- Provisions of the VAT Act only provide for mandatory penalty -- If a special provision has been made qua a particular subject (Value Added Tax), the said subject is excluded from the general provisions (Indian Penal Code) -- Since the provisions of the VAT Act do not provide for the registration of the FIR and the said Act is a Code in itself, the provisions of the IPC also cannot be invoked -- FIR could not have been registered against a person who was said to have evaded tax -- Petition allowed, FIR, the report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Quashing of FIR -- De-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime -- They are neither concerned with the sale deed nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question – It appears that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute – Held, High Court ought to have exercised its power u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants – Appeals allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.

(Para 18-23)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372 – Acquittal of accused – Victim’s right of appeal -- Right to appeal given to a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code is prospective in nature and has been made enforceable w.e.f. 31.12.2009 -- A victim has a right to prefer appeal in respect of three types of the orders referred to in the proviso 2 Section 372 Cr.P.C., if such order has been passed on or after 31.12.2009 and no such right was available to the complainant/victim prior to 31.12.2009.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Constitution of India, Article 19(1), 21 – Life and liberty – Arrest of accused -- Object of arrest is neither punitive nor preventive -- It has become very common to put criminal law in motion even though dispute involved is purely contractual or civil in nature -- Many times arrest entails deprivation of source of income of entire family besides forever stigma in a closely knit society like ours -- There is neither mechanism to compensate a man who is later on found innocent nor acquittal can return valuable time, energy, status, future of family members especially children which is lost on account of incarceration of bread earner of the family -- Detention or arrest not only deprives a person from his fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 but also freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1) of our Constitution --  Life of every human being is most precious gift of God and everyone has very limited span of life which cannot be spoiled on account of incompetence, personal grudge, vengeance of someone; or brutal, illegal, unethical action of the State machinery.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 365, 302, 328, 201, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 446, 482 -- Constitution of India,  Section 21 – Murder trial -- Jump of bail – Quashing of Non-bailable warrants/ Cancellation of bail bond. Held,

i) The object of cancellation of bond or declaration of anyone as proclaimed offender/person is to secure his presence. The petitioner has come forward to face trial and undertakes to appear before trial court on each and every date, thus, his presence would meet ends of justice;

ii) The Petitioner for wasting valuable time and energy of courts as well prosecution is willing to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/-;

iii) The Petitioner is ready to furnish bond/surety to the satisfaction of the trial court;

iv) The petitioner is resident of Jagraon and trial is pending at Ludhiana, thus jurisdictional court and police authorities have direct access over the activities of the petitioner.

v) The petitioner was initially granted regular bail by this Hon'ble High Court;

vi) Trial is pending since 2017 and petitioner is ready to face trial, thus, no prejudice is going to cause to prosecution or complainant;

Petition allowed, petitioner directed to appear before Trial Court on 09.12.2022 and furnish fresh bail bond/surety bond to its satisfaction.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating with bank -- Sale of mortgaged property -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Matter amicably resolved amongst the parties, as per the compromise policy, the entire amount has been paid by the petitioners to the bank and bank as of now has no claim qua them and has closed the account – Considering the reply by State and the fact that the entire amount has been paid back, it is a fit case for quashing of the FIR on the basis of compromise -- Petitions allowed and FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- PW-3-daughter in her cross examination stated that her mother have said something to her father on which the father started beating her mother -- Immediately her father had dressed up and moved her mother to the Hospital where the other family members have gone -- These aspects would indicate that there was no pre-mediation to cause the death and the incident had occurred at the spur of the moment – If these aspects are kept in view as mitigating circumstances, conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be justified -- Hence, appellant held guilty of the offence u/s 304 Part II of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more 12 years of sentence, period undergone will be sufficient punishment -- Sentence modified, the appellant ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

(Para 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- Recovery of 10 kg of poppy husk – Conviction for 6 months by Ld. Trial court – Agony of trial for 20 years -- Reduction of sentence -- FIR was registered on 16.04.2002 -- Recovery of the contraband is non-commercial in nature -- Appellant had undergone an actual period of 13 days -- One more case bearing FIR No. 176 dated 17.12.2002 u/s 15 of the NDPS Act was also registered against the appellant, however, the appellant had already undergone the sentence on 27.05.2006 -- In the period of last 20 years, no other case under the NDPS Act has been registered against the appellant -- Ends of justice would be suitably met, if his substantive sentence is reduced to the one already undergone by him -- Conviction maintained, substantive sentence of imprisonment reduced to the one already undergone by him.

(Para 11,12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 307, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Appellant and co-accused acquitted u/s 323, 307, 34 IPC, however convicted u/s 25 of Arms Act -- In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumersinbh Umedsinh Rajput @ Sumersinh’s case 2008 (1) Crimes 57, charge u/s 25 of Arms Act is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence convicting the appellant u/s 25 of Arms Act  set aside and the appellant acquitted of the charge u/s 25 of Arms Act.

(Para 3, 11, 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding after conviction -- Parties have settled the dispute and complainant had accepted the sum towards the full and final settlement of the cheque, on the satisfaction of the complainant -- Sentence awarded to the petitioner for offence u/s 138 of NI Act is liable to be set aside -- Petitioner directed to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- -- Conviction and sentence of imprisonment set aside on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5, 6)

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 7, 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 472, 482 – Delay in FIR – Limitation – Quashing of FIR -- District Town Planner reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, vide letter dated 27.09.2011 with a clear averment that the petitioner by way of sub-dividing his land into plots for residential/industrial/commercial purpose without obtaining the licence from the Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana, as required u/s 3 of the Act, has contravened the provisions of Section 7 of the Act which constitutes an offence punishable u/s 10 of the Act -- FIR was registered on 30.09.2016, challan report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. presented on 21.05.2018 and only thereafter, the cognizance was taken by the trial Court – Arguments of State that it is a continuing offence within the meaning of Section 472 Cr.P.C and therefore, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of time during which the offence continues, will not apply as the nature of offence do not make it continuing offence -- Petition allowed, FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed, qua the petitioner.

(Para 6-9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Conviction u/s 138 of N.I. Act -- Compounding at revisional stage – Waiver of 15% cost -- Petitioner is stated to be a Class IV employee and his whole family including his wife and children are completely dependent upon him and the poor status of the financial condition of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that the complainant agreed to accept Rs.3.70 lacs instead of the cheque amount of Rs.4 lacs, as the full and final settlement in the year 2022 -- In view of the said special circumstances, the petitioner exempted from depositing the costs amounting to 15%.

(Para 15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Conviction u/s 138 of N.I. Act -- Compounding at revisional stage – Setting aside of conviction – It is settled law that High Court has the power to set aside the judgement of conviction against the petitioner on the basis of a valid compromise -- Compromise is genuine and valid -- Judgment of conviction and sentence set aside and the petitioner acquitted of the charges framed against him.

(Para 16-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 304-B, 406, 302, 34, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Conviction u/s 306 IPC -- Appeal by complainant seeking conviction for dowry death/ murder -- A young girl expired in less than 02 years after her marriage by suicide -- The mental state of the father can very well be imagined -- However, this alone would not be sufficient to put the blame on respondents No.2 and 3 (husband and mother-in-law) and to fasten criminal liability, the prosecution would be required to prove its case against them beyond reasonable doubt – No complaint was ever made to any authority with regard to the torture being meted out to deceased, no Panchayat was ever convened and no other step was taken – Showed feigned ignorance in cross-examination about her medical condition which was disclosed by DW1/ Doctor, as per whom deceased remained admitted in hospital till 27.07.2018 on account of pregnancy in her fallopian tube for which she had to undergo surgery -- Expenses for the surgery were borne by respondent No.3 and his family -- The ld. trial Court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the ingredients of Sections 304-B or 302 IPC and even those of Sections 406 and 498-A IPC did not stand fulfilled – No perversity in the view taken by the trial Court either on facts or on law and the impugned judgment is well reasoned -- It is now well settled that Courts have to be extremely careful while hearing appeals against acquittal and the judgments of acquittal should not be interfered with lightly – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 8-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise after conviction – Parties have decided to bury their inter-se dispute and further decided to live in peace, appeal partly allowed -- Sentence modified and reduced to the period already undergone by the appellants.

(Para 1,7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Illegal activity -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal – Ld. Trial Court dismissed the complaint as Rs.3 lakhs paid to respondent/accused for getting job in the Department of Railway which is a Government Department as it was for illegal activities and it cannot be called as legally enforceable liability -- No infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has acquitted the respondent -- Leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 3-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269 SS – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Rs. 5 lac payment in cash -- Financial capacity of the appellant to pay Rs.5 lakhs was doubtful, the entire payment was made in cash, Section 269 SS of Income Tax Act prohibits acceptance of deposit/loan in cash in excess of Rs.20,000/, different pen was used to sign and fill columns of cheque and no document was executed at the time of alleged payment of Rs.5 lakhs in cash – Trial court acquitted the accused -- Leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 29, 45, 47 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession – Handwriting expert -- When the extra judicial confession is not duly proved, or does not inspire confidence or is not corroborated by any other reliable evidence, the conviction could not be based solely on such weak piece of evidence -- Prosecution having not examined the handwriting expert for proving the handwritings of the accused no.1 contained in the Inland letter allegedly addressed to the PW-19, nor any expert’s opinion having been obtained, the High Court had rightly discarded the said piece of evidence.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Identification of accused after 6 months –When there was huge time gap of about more than six months between the date of the incident and the date of recording of statements of witnesses by the Investigating Officer, the Test Identification Parade would have assisted the police in identifying the accused seen by the PW-7, however no such TI Parade was held by the Investigating Officer -- Therefore, identification of the accused nos. 2 to 5 at the instance of these witnesses becomes very doubtful.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – It is well settled that if there is considerable time gap between the persons seeing together and the proximate time of the crime, the circumstances of last seen together, even if proved cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt of the accused.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Failure of the accused, in a case based on circumstantial evidence which included “last seen together theory”, to explain u/s 313 Cr.PC as to under what circumstances the victim suffered death, would also not be a ground to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the accused were involved in the commission of the alleged crime.

(Para 12)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),Section 45 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Identification of dead body -- Super-imposition report -- Since the super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the super-imposition test -- Dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.

(Para 13)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

(Para 14)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 8, 24, 29, 45, 47, 106 – Murder -- Acquittal of accused -- Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession not corroborated by handwriting expert opinion – Last-seen theory after six months of incident without Test Identification parade by I.O. becomes doubtful – Super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report of dead body – Witness to whom car of deceased sold become hostile – Evidence did not complete the chain to dispel the hypothesis of innocence of the appellants-accused -- Prosecution failed to establish through clinching, clear, cogent and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellants-accused could be established – Judgements and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 8-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 356, 379, 411, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, voluntary, without any undue influence or pressure – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners only.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa) – Dishonour of cheque -- Complainant – Victim -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is not a victim as defined U/s 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Acquittal – Appeal -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of NI Act is not entitled to file an appeal against acquittal according to the provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C rather he may prefer an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court invoking the provision of Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cause of action – Demand Notice – Presumption of service -- Incorrect address -- Mere issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, same would arise only when the notice has been communicated to the drawer of the cheque and who fails to liquidate the cheque amount within the stipulated period -- Presumption of receipt of notice by drawer of the cheque can be raised only if the notice has been dispatched through registered post, to his correct address and such inference cannot be drawn if the notice has been sent on the incorrect address of the drawer of the cheque.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Demand Notice – Service of – Ground of -- Whether the notice of demand has been actually received by the petitioner/accused can be determined only during the trial of the case -- Argument that the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid ground is, therefore, without any merit.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Wrong mentioning of particulars of cheques and Memos -- Errors made by the ld. trial Magistrate in recording the particulars of the cheques and the memos cannot be termed as typographical in nature -- These errors are relating to essential aspects of the case and the same clearly reflects that the learned trial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has approached the case in a mechanical and negligent manner -- Impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate clearly reflects non-application of mind on his part and, as such, is not sustainable in law -- Impugned order, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to pass a fresh order of cognizance on the basis of the material available before him after hearing the complainant/ respondent.

(Para 13-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A (Section 420, 406, 506, 120-B) – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Cheating -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Since the matter has been settled between the parties and the petitioners have been acquitted in the proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and also in FIR u/s 420, 406, 506, 120-B IPC, no fruitful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings under Section 174-A of IPC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 174-A of IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10,11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 376, 377, 406, 498-A, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 376 IPC/ Rape – Section 377 IPC/ Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR  -- Court is conscious of the fact that Sections 376/ 377 I.P.C. are heinous offences and non-compoundable -- But in the peculiar facts and circumstances and in the larger interest of both the parties and to secure the ends of justice, Court deemed it appropriate to use its discretion u/s 482 Cr.P.C in favour of the parties – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Proclaimed person –Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Offence u/s 406/420 of IPC compounded by ld. JMIC – No fruitful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings under Section 174-A of IPC -- Petition allowed and FIR under Section 174-A of IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed and also the orders whereby petitioner has been declared as a proclaimed person also set aside.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 379-B, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR – Compromise found to be genuine, without any pressure or undue influence – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise, ordered to be quashed.

(Para 4, 10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused -- Seal of sample -- Scribe/witness of consent memo -- Independent witness – Sample was drawn in the presence of the learned JMIC on which seal was put, seal was never sent to the forensic laboratory -- Prosecution has, therefore, not been able to prove that there was a recovery of any contraband from the appellant -- No justification as to why two material witnesses ASI/scribe and HC/witness of consent memo were not examined -- Police party did not even care to join the witnesses, who were the shopkeepers of the vicinity and employees of the PRTC workshop which was only 200-300 yards from the place of occurrence, would also cast a shadow upon the prosecution story -- Evidence adduced by the defence through 4 DWs have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and there was no reason to discard the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses especially in view of the fact that the allegations were pertaining to the false implication of the appellant – Appellant, therefore, deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17,18)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by husband – Quashing of complaint -- Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act against wife/ petitioner – Cheque not from joint account -- The three accused do not constitute a Company or a firm or Association of individuals as contemplated u/s 141 of N.I. Act -- Hence, petitioner cannot be made accused for dishonor of the cheque issued by her husband and he alone can be prosecuted for the same – Proceedings qua petitioner/ wife quashed.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Reduction in sentence – Cheque amount was Rs.70,000/- -- Sentence was to pay twice the amount of cheque and to suffer imprisonment for one month -- Amount of fine of Rs.1,40,000/- paid, sentence modified to Rs.1,40,000/- apart from the litigation expenses of Rs.50,000/- by setting aside the order of imprisonment for one month.

(Para 1-3

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Goods purchased by petitioner and cheque was also issued by him – Change in management by agreement and previous liability taken over by someone – Petitioner seeking quashing on the ground of change in management – Held, shifting of liability after issuance of the cheque has no significance, since penal provisions would attack against the person who issued the cheque -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 3-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)