***

NDPS -- Bail -- Long incarceration coupled with non-commencement of trial and the petitioner's prospects of rehabilitation justified grant of regular bail despite recovery of commercial quantity of heroin.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37 -- Regular bail -- Commercial quantity -- Long incarceration -- Delay in trial -- Prospects of rehabilitation -- Despite criminal antecedents and recovery of commercial quantity of heroin, regular bail was granted as the petitioner had remained in custody for more than one year and four months, none of the 21 prosecution witnesses had been examined and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future -- The subsequent marriage of the victim in an earlier POCSO case with the petitioner and their settled family life, though having no bearing on the merits of the NDPS case, was a relevant circumstance indicating the petitioner's prospects of rehabilitation -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 6, 10 & 11)

***

Interim custody of seized property -- Scope of jurisdiction -- While exercising powers under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC, the Court determines only prima facie entitlement to interim possession and not title or ownership -- Registration certificate is a relevant but not conclusive factor for grant of interim custody.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 451 and 457 -- Interim custody of seized property -- Nature and scope of jurisdiction -- Subject vehicles, though registered in the name of the appellant's company, were seized during investigation into allegations of criminal trespass and misappropriation of company funds -- High Court granted interim custody to the respondent company -- Held, Sections 451 and 457 CrPC confer wide judicial discretion upon the Criminal Court to entrust interim custody of seized property to the person found prima facie entitled to its possession -- The enquiry under the said provisions is confined to interim possession and does not extend to adjudication of title or ownership, which falls within the domain of the competent civil forum.

(Para 2-11, 27, 30)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 451 and 457 -- Interim custody of seized vehicles -- Registration Certificate -- Evidentiary value -- Continued possession -- Payment of hypothecation instalments -- Registration certificate, though a relevant piece of evidence, is not decisive of the question relating to interim custody -- There exists no inflexible principle that interim custody must invariably follow the registration certificate irrespective of other relevant circumstances -- Held, where the respondent company was in continued possession of the vehicles, had admittedly discharged the hypothecation instalments from its own account and the appellant had executed an undertaking permitting continued use of the vehicles by the respondent company, such circumstances outweighed the evidentiary value of the registration certificates and justified grant of interim custody in favour of the respondent company.

(Para 32-37)

***

Service Law -- Estoppel by participation -- A candidate who participates in a selection process without objection cannot ordinarily challenge the process after being declared unsuccessful -- However, where arbitrariness or illegality in the selection process is writ large and vitiates the selection, participation would not preclude the candidate from questioning the process and seeking appropriate relief.

***

Shortlisting of candidates -- Rule providing only one mode of shortlisting -- Selection Committee could not prescribe qualifying or cut-off marks not contemplated by the Rules -- Once the rule-making authority consciously provided only one mode of shortlisting, it was not open to the Selection Committee to superimpose an additional eligibility threshold -- The rules of the game could not have been changed mid-way to the detriment of eligible candidates.

***

Relief -- Arbitrary exclusion from selection -- Passage of time -- Where candidates establish that they were subjected to arbitrary treatment and sufficient vacancies continue to exist, relief cannot be denied merely because they have grown in age.

***

A. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014, Rules 9(B), 16(3)(a)(iii) and 17(3) -- Selection process -- Estoppel by participation -- Arbitrariness in State action -- Appellants participated in the recruitment process with full knowledge that CITS certificate had been made a preferential qualification and without challenging the Rules or the advertisements prior to the examination -- Though a candidate cannot ordinarily challenge a selection process after participating therein, such principle has no application where arbitrariness or illegality in the process is writ large -- Failure of the Selection Committee/State of Uttar Pradesh to follow the recruitment procedure prescribed under the 2014 Rules, by introducing an arbitrary qualifying/cut-off mark not contemplated by the Rules, vitiated the process of selection -- Participation by the appellants could not validate such illegality or disentitle them from relief.

(Paras 9-11, 19)

B. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2014, Rule 16(3)(b)(i) -- Direct recruitment -- Shortlisting of candidates -- Prescription of qualifying/cut-off marks -- Rule 16(3)(b)(i) envisages shortlisting only where applications are received in large numbers by restricting candidates called for interview to four times the number of vacancies -- Rule does not contemplate exclusion of eligible candidates from the zone of consideration on the basis of qualifying or cut-off marks secured under Rule 16(3)(a) -- Selection Committee, having no authority to superimpose an additional eligibility threshold, acted contrary to the recruitment procedure prescribed under the Rules -- Prescription of qualifying/cut-off marks resulted in exclusion of eligible candidates and substantial vacancies remaining unfilled -- Such action was arbitrary and amounted to changing the rules of the game mid-way.

(Para 12, 16-19)

C. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Direct recruitment -- Service Law -- Relief -- Available vacancies -- Passage of time -- More than a decade having elapsed since issuance of the advertisements and the appellants having advanced in age, relief could not be denied solely on that ground -- Appellants having established arbitrary exclusion from the selection process and sufficient vacancies being available for their accommodation, denial of relief would result in injustice -- Direction issued to consider the appellants for appointment against existing vacancies after interview in accordance with the Rules, with prospective effect.

(Para 20-23)

***

Declaration of law -- Dismissal of Special Leave Petition expressly reserving question of law does not constitute binding precedent.

***

A. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 5 and 8 – Guards in Indian Railways -- Promotions carrying the same Grade Pay -- A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the promotee's Grade Pay does not change -- Characteristic elements of a promotion are the formal process by which it is granted, the enhanced responsibilities of the higher post, and the structural hierarchy within which it is situated -- Promotions within the Guard cadre continue to retain their promotional character notwithstanding convergence of Grade Pay after the Sixth Central Pay Commission -- Such promotions satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 8 of the MACPS and are liable to be counted for grant of financial upgradations.

-- Paragraph 8 of the MACPS applies to the Guard cadre. The posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard are distinct posts in the promotional hierarchy as per the applicable Recruitment Rules, carrying the same Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2. The functional promotions earned within the Guard cadre constitute "promotions" within the meaning of Paragraph 8. An employee who has traversed the Guard cadre up to Mail/Express Guard has earned three promotions counted under Paragraph 8 (with the Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard movement ignored under Paragraph 5) and has thereby exhausted all three financial upgradation slots under the MACPS. He is not entitled to any further financial upgradation.

-- The illustration to Paragraph 5, correctly understood, is a transitional provision addressing the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions and upgradations. It does not override Paragraph 8 in respect of the post-01.09.2008 MACPS period. The Guard cadre's pre-revised pay scales correspond to those in the illustration, but the illustration directs only that pre-MACPS promotions be ignored for the purpose of the MACPS starting count; it does not direct that all subsequent promotions earned within the MACPS period, or all promotions earned before the MACPS period but counted under Paragraph 8, are similarly to be ignored.

(Para 5, 6, 40, 41, 44, 46, 65(i), 65(iii))

B. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2 and 8 -- Financial Stagnation -- Meaning of 'Promotion' -- Mere absence of change in Grade Pay does not divest a promotion of its Promotional character -- Promotions within the Guard cadre carrying the same Grade Pay nevertheless entitle the employee to promotional increments, enhanced basic pay, running-duty allowances and post-specific emoluments -- An employee who has received successive promotions with corresponding financial benefits cannot be regarded as having suffered financial stagnation within the meaning of the MACPS and is, therefore, not entitled to further financial upgradation.

(Para 38, 40, 62, 65(ii))

C. Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraph 2 -- Grade Pay Ceiling -- Binding nature of executive clarifications -- Departmental clarifications issued by the DoPT are integral to the Scheme and binding on all authorities -- RBE Nos. 76/2011 and 142/2012 clarify that financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the Grade Pay ceiling of the promotional hierarchy -- An employee cannot be granted Grade Pay higher than what he may get on actual promotion in the hierarchy applies to the MACPS and governs the present case.

(Para 48, 50, 54, 65(iv), 65(v))

D. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 141 — Dismissal of Special Leave Petition — An order dismissing a Special Leave Petition while expressly leaving the question of law open does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 or a binding precedent — Reliance thereon by the High Court as determinative of the legal position held, erroneous.

(Para 57, 65(vi))

***

Cyber Fraud -- Bail -- Clean antecedents, completion of investigation and prolonged custody, coupled with doubtful evidentiary value of the co-accused's disclosure statement, justified grant of regular bail.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483, 23 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 318(4) and 61(2) -- Regular bail -- Cyber fraud -- Clean antecedents -- Completion of investigation -- Disclosure statement of co-accused -- Admissibility -- Speedy trial -- Petitioner granted regular bail as he had remained in custody for more than five and a half months, investigation qua him stood completed, nothing remained to be recovered and trial was not likely to conclude in the near future -- The only material against the petitioner was the disclosure statement of a co-accused, prima facie hit by Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, no recovery or discovery having been effected pursuant thereto -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 13 to 19)

***

Constitution of India -- Article 338 -- Powers of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) -- Legislature has prescribed for the NCSC a role that is recommendatory and advisory, but certainly not adjudicatory.

***

National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) -- Scope of powers -- NCSC can record a factual finding and then ask the concerned Government, either the Centre or the State, to act thereupon -- It certainly does not have adjudicatory power.

***

A. Constitution of India, Article 338 -- Powers of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) -- Adjudicatory vs. recommendatory role -- Legislature has prescribed for the NCSC a role that is recommendatory and advisory, but certainly not adjudicatory -- NCSC is not meant to be a body taking over adjudicatory functions -- Directions issued by the NCSC directing implementation of its order and payment of arrears held contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and, as such, non est in law.

(Para 4, 13, 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 338(8) -- Powers of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) -- Powers of Civil Court -- Limited scope -- Legislature has been categorical in the powers of the Civil Court extended to the NCSC -- Use of the expression "namely" while enumerating such powers indicates their limited scope -- Though the NCSC has power to requisition documents and receive evidence, it does not have the power to make an order in furtherance of such evidence -- NCSC can record a factual finding and then ask the concerned Government, either the Centre or the State, to act thereupon -- Such provision certainly does not confer adjudicatory power.

(Para 9)

***

Consent decree -- Article 142 cannot be employed to supplant the concluded and acted upon terms of a consensual arrangement between the parties.

***

Execution of consent decree -- Scope of enquiry remains a limited one -- It cannot be made a vehicle for rewriting the terms of a settlement which the parties themselves arrived at and acted upon.

***

A. Constitution of India, Articles 136, 142 -- Scope of interference -- Concurrent findings -- Creation of corpus -- Family Court and the High Court, on a concurrent appreciation of the same material, placed upon the settlement a construction which is natural, harmonious and fortified by the conduct of the parties -- No interference warranted -- Prayer for creation of a corpus towards higher education in exercise of powers under Article 142 cannot be acceded to, as issuance of such a direction would, in substance, amount to recasting a settlement which stands performed and discharged and undertaking, in execution, a fresh determination of the quantum of maintenance -- The jurisdiction under Article 142, wide as it is, cannot be employed to supplant the concluded and acted upon terms of a consensual arrangement between the parties.

(Para 33 and 34)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 10 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Sections 13-B and 28-A -- Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 7 -- Execution of consent decree -- Scope of executing court -- Where an execution petition is instituted for enforcement of a specific covenant of a concluded consent decree, the enquiry remains a limited one, namely, whether on a true construction of the settlement, the obligation stated to have been left unsatisfied subsists and remains enforceable, and not whether a larger or a different provision ought now to be made -- Where, on its true construction, the covenant stands satisfied, a general obligation to maintain cannot be invoked in execution to revive a discharged term or to substitute therefor a fresh and larger provision -- The general principle, whatever be its content, cannot be made a vehicle for rewriting the terms of a settlement which the parties themselves arrived at and acted upon.

(Paras 24 and 32)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 10 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Execution of decree -- Conduct of parties -- Relevance of delay -- Held, where the entire amount under Clause 8 stood paid and no demand was raised towards payment of twenty per cent of the annual income during the intervening period of nearly five years, such silence reinforces the construction that the income-linked obligation stood discharged -- Delay was noticed not as a ground of limitation but as a circumstance illuminating the common understanding of the parties with regard to the meaning and operation of the settlement.

(Para 28 and 29)

D. Interpretation of Deeds -- Canons of construction -- Harmonious construction -- Rule of repugnancy -- Held, an interpretation which renders an express clause otiose is to be eschewed in favour of the one which gives effect to the instrument as a whole -- The rule of construction that an earlier clause prevails over a later one is attracted only where two clauses are so repugnant to each other that they cannot possibly be reconciled.

(Paras 26 and 31)

***

Juvenile Justice Act -- Classification of Offences -- Heinous offence -- Offence punishable under Section 302 IPC carries life imprisonment as its minimum punishment by necessary implication and therefore falls within definition of "heinous offence".

***

Juvenile Justice Act -- Appeal -- Section 101(2) -- Expression "may" is enabling and discretionary and does not oblige Appellate Court to obtain expert assistance in every appeal arising from Section 15.

***

Juvenile Act -- Preliminary Assessment -- JJ Board must independently apply its mind to all available materials, including the Social Investigation Report (SIR) and Social Background Report (SBR).

***

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Sections 2(33) and 2(54) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 433A -- Classification of Offence – Murder -- Heinous Offence -- The juvenile appellant, aged above 16 years, was apprehended for allegedly slitting the throat of the deceased -- The appellant contended that Section 302 IPC does not prescribe a minimum punishment and should therefore fall under the definition of a "serious offence" under Section 2(54)(b) – Held that a court convicting an accused of an offence under Section 302 of the IPC cannot impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life -- Life imprisonment constitutes the minimum punishment by necessary implication -- The disjunctive "or" between "death" and "imprisonment for life" merely confers discretion to choose between the two punishments, but does not open any avenue for a lesser imprisonment -- Section 21, which prohibits imprisonment for life without possibility of release, operates only at the stage of sentencing and has no bearing on classification of the offence -- Categorized as a "heinous offence".

(Paras 8, 14, 32, 33, 39, 40, 85)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Sections 15 and 101(2) -- Appeal -- Mandatory or directory nature of expert assistance -- Preliminary assessment -- JJ Board disposed of the case by relying solely on the expert's preliminary assessment report, ignoring the Social Investigation Report (SIR) and Social Background Report (SBR) -- Appellate Court reversed the decision and directed that the appellant be tried as an adult without obtaining fresh expert assistance -- Held, the word "may" in Section 101(2) does not mandate the Appellate Court to seek expert assistance in every appeal arising from an order under Section 15 -- The expression "may" is enabling and permissive, conferring discretion upon the Appellate Court -- SIR and SBR are not supplementary material but constitute pertinent inputs which must be accorded due weight alongside the expert opinion -- JJ Board must independently apply its mind to all material available before arriving at its conclusion.

(Paras 49, 50, 56, 79, 84, 85)

***

Service Law -- Minor Penalty -- Effective Date -- Promotion -- Minor penalty imposed in substitution of termination relates back to the date of the original termination -- Promotion granted pursuant to Review DPC must carry all consequential benefits and cannot be restricted to notional promotion alone.

***

Quashing of Contempt Proceedings -- Contempt proceedings quashed on the condition of payment of costs of Rs. 10 lacs to defray prolonged litigation, considering the appellant's promising career was cut short due to the authorities' callous indifference and apathetic pen-pushing.

***

A. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 -- Disciplinary Proceedings -- Minor Penalty -- Effective Date -- Relation Back -- Promotion -- Appellant, an Assistant Commandant in the Central Reserve Police Force, was removed from service on 10.07.1995 -- Pursuant to prolonged litigation, the Division Bench set aside the second order of termination dated 16.10.2018 and directed imposition of the minor penalty already determined by the Disciplinary Authority, namely, reduction by one stage in the time scale of pay for three years, without cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension -- Held, the direction to impose the minor penalty necessarily related back to the date of the original termination, i.e. 10.07.1995, and the penalty stood exhausted on 10.07.1998 -- Consequently, promotion as Deputy Commandant, granted pursuant to the Review Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC), could not be confined to notional promotion but carried all consequential service benefits from the date the appellant became entitled to promotion under the original DPC -- Appellant held entitled to entire back wages from the date of entitlement to promotion as Deputy Commandant -- If such date of promotion fell after 30.11.2012, the date on which the Division Bench directed reinstatement, the appellant would be entitled to entire back wages from such date till retirement -- If the date of promotion fell prior to 30.11.2012, the period prior thereto would remain notional and back wages would be payable from 30.11.2012 onwards, with consequential refixation of pay, increments, retirement benefits and arrears of pension.

(Paras 12,14, 17-22)

B. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Sections 12 and 19 -- Quashing of Contempt Proceedings -- Imposition of Costs -- Appellant's promising career was cut short, rendering him unemployed for more than two decades due to the authorities' callous indifference to the repeated directions of the High Court and apathetic pen-pushing -- Contempt proceedings are quashed on the condition of payment of Rs. 10 lakhs as costs to the appellant defraying the costs of the prolonged litigation.

(Paras 18, 23)

***

"Dead Rent" and "Royalty" -- Dead Rent depends on the area of the mine and is fixed whereas the royalty relates to the quantity of minerals extracted only and is variable.

***

Mining Lease -- Stamp Duty -- Determination -- Stamp duty on execution of a mining lease is payable on the basis of anticipated royalty and not dead rent.

***

A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), Sections 9 & 9A -- Dead Rent and Royalty -- Distinction -- Dead rent is the minimum amount payable by the lessee to the lessor irrespective of whether mining operations are undertaken and is determined with reference to the area leased -- Royalty is payable on the quantity of minerals extracted or removed from the leased area and varies according to such extraction -- Thus, dead rent is fixed, whereas royalty is variable.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 26 -- Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, Rule 31 & Form K -- Stamp Duty -- Mining Lease -- Computation -- Anticipated Royalty -- Appellant applied for a lease to mine limestone -- Dispute arose whether the determinant for the rate at which stamp duty for the agreement was to be calculated would be the "dead rent" or the "anticipated royalty" -- With respect to mining, actual value can only be determined once mining operations commence and, therefore, the value of the subject-matter is indeterminate on the date of execution of the agreement -- Parties consciously executed the lease deed in the statutory Form K, which clearly stipulates that anticipated royalty is the yardstick for computation of stamp duty -- Proviso to Section 26 is not inconsistent with the main provision -- Stamp duty is to be computed on the basis of anticipated royalty and not dead rent.

(Para 2, 10-14)

***

FERA -- Cognizance of offence -- Mandatory opportunity notice -- Service of an adequate and meaningful opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) is a mandatory statutory prerequisite for instituting a complaint under Section 56 or 57.

***

CrPC -- Section 482 vis-à-vis Section 397 -- In order to do substantive justice, the High Court can always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 as one under Section 397, and vice versa

***

Right to a speedy trial is an essential component of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 397 and 482 -- Inherent powers of High Court -- Maintainability of -- Quashing Petition -- Availability of an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not, by itself, operate as a bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. -- Issuance of a summons is not an interlocutory order for the purposes of Section 397 -- The two provisions operate in distinct spheres, and the mere existence of a revisional remedy cannot be treated as ousting the jurisdiction preserved under Section 482, which is available wherever there is an abuse of the process of the court or where the ends of justice so require -- In order to do substantive justice, a High Court may always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 as one under Section 397, and vice versa, rather than non-suiting a party on a hyper-technical ground of maintainability.

(Paras 11, 13 and 14)

B. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), Sections 56(1), 57 and 61(2) proviso -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cognizance of offences -- Mandatory requirement of opportunity notice -- Principle of natural justice – Quashing of summoning order -- Under the proviso to Section 61(2)(ii), where the alleged contravention consists of doing an act without permission, no complaint shall be made unless the person accused of the offence has first been given an opportunity of showing that he had such permission -- Adherence to the principles of natural justice must be read into the statute -- Service of an opportunity notice is a mandatory requirement without which no complaint under Section 56 or 57 can validly be instituted, and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance -- This opportunity must be meaningful and adequate, and not a mere technical or notional compliance -- The burden lies upon the prosecution that such notice was issued and served --  Where the complainant neither stated the date of the opportunity notice nor placed a copy or proof of service on record and the Magistrate took cognizance in a mechanical manner without recording satisfaction of compliance with Section 61(2), the order taking cognizance and issuing summons cannot be sustained in law, liable to be quashed.

(Paras 16-23)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Right to speedy trial -- Protracted delay in trial -- Unexplained inaction by prosecution -- Quashing of proceedings -- The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is implicit in the fair, just, and reasonable procedure guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, extending to every stage of a criminal proceeding including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, and revision -- Complaint was instituted in 2002 for a transaction dating back to 1991-1992 --The prosecution failed to collect summons for service for nearly two years -- Despite express time-bound directions from the High Court to conclude the trial within one month (later extended to six months), the complainant refused to collect notices and remained absent right up to the filing of the appeals -- Such persistent and unexplained inaction spanning over 23 years reflects a complete want of diligence -- Permitting the prosecution to continue in such circumstances would unjustly leave the accused in a state of suspended animation indefinitely -- Criminal complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Paras 25, 26, 30-35)

***

NDPS -- Bail involving commercial quantity -- Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial without fault of the accused -- The fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 dilutes the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

***

Second/successive regular bail petition -- Maintainable in law -- Requires substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances to succeed.

***

Bail -- Criminal antecedents -- Involvement of the accused in other FIRs cannot be the sole ground to decline the concession of regular bail if a case is otherwise made out on the merits of the present FIR.

***

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Maintainability of -- Second/successive regular bail petition -- A second/successive regular bail petition is maintainable in law whether the earlier petition was dismissed on merits, dismissed as withdrawn, dismissed as not pressed or dismissed for non-prosecution -- For the second/successive regular bail petition to succeed, the petitioner is required to show substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.

(Para 6.1)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 15(c) and 37 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Bail in commercial quantity -- Delay in trial -- Petitioner was found in alleged possession of 70 Kgs. of poppy husk and had suffered incarceration for 01 year, 01 month and 21 days -- Charges had been framed, but none of the 29 prosecution witnesses had been examined -- Trial was procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon the petitioner -- The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 -- Where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted -- Grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act -- Bail granted.

(Paras 2, 6, 6.2, 6.3 and 7)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Bail -- Criminal antecedents -- Petitioner was stated to be involved in three other FIRs -- The antecedents of a person are required to be accounted for while considering a regular bail petition -- However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail upon ratiocinating the facts and circumstances of the said FIR.

(Para 6.4)

***

NDPS -- An uncorroborated disclosure statement holds limited evidentiary value and cannot be the sole basis for implication.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21(b), 27(a) and 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Regular Bail – Recovery of 15.17 grams of heroin and Rs. 2,110/- pleaded to be drug money from co-accused -- Evidentiary value of disclosure statement -- Petitioner was nominated in the FIR on the basis of the disclosure statement of a co-accused -- No recovery was effected from the petitioner -- Petitioner was not present at the spot -- Such disclosure statements, in the absence of corroborative evidence, hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be the sole basis for implicating the petitioner -- The veracity and weightage to be attached to the disclosure statement is a matter for trial -- Mere involvement of the petitioner in other FIRs cannot, by itself, be a sufficient ground to decline regular bail when a case is otherwise made out -- Further detention as an undertrial not warranted -- Bail granted.

(Para 1, 6-7)

***

Clog on equity of redemption -- Right to redeem cannot be postponed -- A mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgaged property accrues on the date the term postponing redemption is read down as a clog on redemption.

***

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 60 -- Mortgage -- Clog on equity of redemption -- Right to redeem -- Defendants challenged a clause in the mortgage deed postponing redemption for 99 years as a clog on the right of redemption -- Held, the right to redeem cannot be postponed -- A mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgaged property accrues on the date the term postponing redemption is read down as a clog on redemption -- Consequently, limitation for redemption begins to run from that date.

(Paras 5-7)

***

Commercial Disputes -- A party cannot invoke the procedural doctrine of "relation back" of amended pleadings to bypass the mandatory document disclosure requirements under the Commercial Courts Act.

***

Disclosure of documents -- A continuing obligation -- Every document in a party's power, possession, control or custody as on the date of filing the amended written statement must be disclosed.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 11Rule 1(10) (as applicable to commercial disputes) -- Disclosure of documents -- Doctrine of relation back -- Once amendment of the written statement is permitted, the amended written statement becomes the operative pleading and the foundation of the defence -- Consequently, the obligation of disclosure extends to all documents in the party's power, possession, control or custody on the date the amended written statement is filed -- Permitting a party to withhold documents available at that stage by relying on the doctrine of relation back would encourage piecemeal disclosure and defeat the legislative object of ensuring early, complete and candid disclosure in commercial litigation.

(Paras 3.3, 9, 12-16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 11 Rule 1(10) -- Stage of proceedings -- Diligence -- The disclosure obligations under Order XI are intended to prevent surprise and ensure certainty in trial -- Where the plaintiffs had already concluded their evidence and the matter had reached the stage of defence evidence, greater diligence was expected from the defendant in establishing sufficient cause for non-disclosure of documents.

(Para 20)

***

Filing of additional documents -- A "stop and go" or piecemeal approach cannot be permitted -- Evidence, however voluminous, cannot water down the statutory intent and rigours of the Commercial Courts Act.

***

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 -- Transfer of pending suits -- Upon transfer of a suit or application, the procedures prescribed under the Act apply thereto.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 11 Rule 1(4) and (5) (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) -- Filing of additional documents -- Delay and Reasonable Cause -- Appellant filed an application to bring voluminous emails and backend data on record five years after the suit had been converted into a commercial suit, during the stage of the plaintiff's evidence, on the ground that certain new facts had emerged during cross-examination -- The documents had always been in the appellant's possession since the filing of the plaint -- A plaintiff, while leading evidence, is expected not only to produce all relevant documents but also to anticipate the questions likely to arise in cross-examination -- Permitting production of voluminous documents after five years would condone a "stop and go" or piecemeal approach -- Evidence, however voluminous, cannot water down the statutory intent and rigours of the statute, which seeks the expeditious resolution of high-stakes commercial disputes.

(Para 12-14.1, 16)

B. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 15 -- Transfer of pending suits -- Section 15 mandates transfer of all suits and applications of specified value to the Commercial Division or Commercial Court, as the case may be -- Upon such transfer, the procedures prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act apply to the transferred proceedings.

(Para 14.2)

***

Rent laws -- Bonafide need -- Alternate accommodation is used for storing waste material does not negate the landlord's bona fide requirement to use the demised premises for a business.

***

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949), Section 13 -- Eviction -- Bona fide requirement -- Alternate accommodation -- Landlady sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for herself and her son -- Rent Controller and Appellate Authority concurrently ordered eviction -- High Court, in revision, reversed the findings holding that the landlady had concealed the existence of another vacant shop used for storing waste material -- Held, the mere fact that another shop was being used for storing waste material does not negate the landlord's bona fide requirement to use the demised premises for business -- Once the requirement is found to be genuine, the landlord's subjective choice of premises must ordinarily be respected and the Court cannot substitute its own view as to which premises should be used -- High Court erred in interfering with concurrent findings -- Eviction decree restored.

(Para 2, 6.1, 9, 11)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949), Section 15 (5) -- Eviction -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Scope -- High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact merely because another view of the evidence is possible -- Interference is permissible only where findings suffer from jurisdictional error, perversity or material illegality -- High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction.

(Para 10, 11)

***

Estoppel -- Developer is estopped from resiling from a Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) after obtaining vacant possession, demolishing the old premises and completing redevelopment.

***

Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement --  PAAA is a statutory contract regulated and enforceable by MHADA, not merely a private arrangement.

***

Occupier -- Status -- Developer having accepted possession pursuant to the PAAA cannot subsequently dispute the appellant's status as an occupier.

***

A. Contract Law -- Redevelopment of cessed buildings -- Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) -- Estoppel -- Conduct of developer -- Resiling from agreement -- Developer obtained consent of occupants, secured vacant possession, demolished the old building and completed redevelopment on the promise of allotting alternate accommodation under the PAAA -- Thereafter sought to dispute the appellant's status as an occupant and challenged the PAAA -- Held, developer having acted upon the PAAA and obtained possession pursuant thereto is estopped from denying the appellant's entitlement under the agreement -- Mere non-utilisation of the entire fungible area is no ground to resile from the agreement or deny allotment of the agreed premises -- Civil suit challenging the PAAA after an undertaking before the High Court held misconceived and mala fide -- High Court directed not to proceed with Civil Suit -- Developer directed to execute the PAAA and hand over possession of the agreed apartments within two months, failing which appellants entitled to damages at the prevailing monthly rental value.

(Paras 19 - 21, 24 - 25)

B. Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991, Regulation 33(7) -- Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (28 of 1977) --- Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) -- Nature -- Statutory contract -- Jurisdiction of MHADA -- High Court erred in treating the PAAA as a mere private arrangement -- PAAA executed under the statutory redevelopment scheme framed under the MHAD Act and Development Control Regulations is regulated by the statute and enforceable by MHADA, under whose NOC the redevelopment project is undertaken -- Orders directing execution of the PAAA and handing over possession held valid and sustainable.

(Paras 8 and 22)

C. Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (28 of 1977), Section 2(25) -- Occupier -- Meaning -- Distinction from statutory tenant -- Rights on redevelopment -- 'Occupier' includes a person liable to pay rent, a rent-free tenant, a licensee in occupation or a person liable to pay damages for use and occupation -- Occupancy is distinct from statutory tenancy and does not depend upon continuation of tenancy rights -- Even a person in possession liable to pay damages may qualify as an 'occupier' for the purposes of redevelopment and re-allotment -- Public notice and contemporaneous records consistently showed appellant as joint occupant of the old premises -- Consequently, appellant was entitled to allotment under the PAAA irrespective of probate, which was obtained only by way of abundant caution -- Developer could not subsequently dispute appellant's status as an occupier after having accepted possession pursuant to the redevelopment scheme.

(Paras 12 - 15, 19 and 22)

***

Property Law -- Ancestral estate -- Where several settlements and consolidations have intervened, plaintiffs claiming a share in the ancestral estate must establish that the suit property was allotted in lieu of the estate left by the common ancestor -- Failure to establish such nexus warrants dismissal of the suit.

***

Revenue records -- Excerpt prepared by Special Kanungo or Patwari Muharrir -- Proof -- Excerpt is not evidence unless duly proved -- Admissibility of a document and its mode of proof are distinct issues -- Mere exhibition of a document without objection does not dispense with the requirement of proving it -- Reliance on an unproved excerpt raises a substantial question of law.

***

A. Property Law -- Ancestral estate -- Identification of suit property -- Plaintiffs filed a suit claiming a share in the estate of an ancestor who died in 1906, seeking a share out of 514 kanals 13 marlas of land. -- Several settlements and consolidations of holdings had taken place in the village since the ancestor's death -- It was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to connect the present suit property to the estate left by the ancestor to discharge their onus -- Although the plaintiffs proved themselves to be legal heirs, they failed to connect the suit property to the ancestor's estate -- Courts below erred in decreeing the suit without recording any finding on whether the suit land was actually allotted in lieu of the estate left by the ancestor.

(Paras 14, 16, 20 - 21)

B. Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, Chapter 9 -- Procedure for obtaining excerpts -- Special Kanungo or Patwari Muharrir -- Excerpt from revenue records -- Proof -- Chapter 9 provides that an excerpt prepared by a Special Kanungo or Patwari Muharrir is not evidence unless proved -- Author must produce the original revenue records, be put on oath and state that the excerpt is a true copy of the original records -- PW-1, who prepared the excerpt, admitted in cross-examination that he could neither read nor write Urdu -- Consequently, the excerpt remained unproved -- Held, admissibility of a document and the mode of proof thereof are two different issues -- Though the excerpt was admitted in evidence without objection, the plaintiffs were not absolved of their duty to prove the document in accordance with law -- Judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are found to be unsustainable and are hereby set aside. Suit filed by the plaintiffs is ordered to be dismissed.

(Paras 17-22)

***

NDPS -- Evidentiary Value of Official Witnesses -- The testimony of official witnesses cannot be disregarded or distrusted merely on account of their official status or for want of corroboration by independent witnesses.

***

NDPS -- Personal Search -- Section 50 applies to the personal search of the accused and has no application where the recovery is effected from an article carried by him.

***

NDPS -- Drawing representative samples at the spot of seizure without the presence of a Magistrate is merely a procedural irregularity which neither vitiates the trial nor renders the primary evidence inadmissible, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused.

***

       A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) -- Evidentiary Value of Official Witnesses -- Independent Witnesses to the seizure turned hostile -- Examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and their non-support or absence is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case -- Testimony of the official witnesses inspired confidence and there was no reason to disbelieve or discard it -- Conviction may be based on the testimony of official witnesses.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 50 – Personal Search -- Applicability of Section 50 to search of articles -- The appellant was apprehended carrying a water bottle containing 100 grams of smack -- He alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act -- Protection under Section 50 is confined to the "personal search" of the accused and has no application where the search is of an article, such as a bag or water bottle, carried by him.

(Paras 3, 12, 13)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 52A -- Representative Samples were not drawn in the presence of the Magistrate -- Mere procedural non-compliance does not, by itself, entitle the accused to claim acquittal – Appellant failed to demonstrate serious prejudice caused due to non-compliance -- Primary evidence like the panchnama or seizure memo cannot be overlooked.

(Para 14, 15)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Amendment Act, 2001 (9 of 2001), Section 41 -- Quantity-based sentencing regime -- Retrospective effect -- The amended provisions would only apply to cases which were pending before the Trial Courts or under investigation as on 02.10.2001 -- Specifically excludes cases where the trial had concluded, and the matter was pending in appeal -- Appellant already been convicted by the Trial Court on 07.04.1997 and appeal pending -- The benefit of Section 21 cannot be extended.

(Para 18)

***

Market value of acquired land — While adjudicating a reference under Section 64, the Authority/Court possesses full and independent jurisdiction to determine the true market value on the basis of the entire evidence on record and is not bound by the parameters prescribed under Section 26.

***

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 54 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Sections 26, 64 & 69 -- Determination of market value -- Scope of jurisdiction of Authority/Court -- Criteria prescribed under Section 26 are intended exclusively for the Collector while determining market value and are merely guiding factors for the Authority or Court -- While adjudicating a reference under Section 64, the Authority/Court possesses full and independent jurisdiction to determine the true market value on the basis of the entire evidence on record and is not bound by the parameters prescribed under Section 26.

(Paras 10 to 20)

B. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Sections 26 & 69 -- Interpretation of statute -- Legislature having consciously used the expression "Collector" in Section 26 and omitted the expressions "Authority" or "Court", the provision cannot be interpreted to extend its applicability to the Authority or Court while determining compensation under Section 64.

(Paras 12 to 14.1.2)

C. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 26(1)(a) -- Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) -- Collector rate/Guideline value --  Collector rate prescribed for registration of instruments represents only the minimum value for revenue purposes and cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of the prevailing market value for determination of compensation in land acquisition proceedings.

(Paras 16 to 16.2)

D. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 26(1)(b) -- Market value -- Sale exemplars -- Highest bona fide sale instance ordinarily constitutes the safest guide for determination of market value -- Averaging of sale transactions is permissible only where the exemplars fall within a narrow price bandwidth and are otherwise comparable.

(Paras 17 to 17.7)

***

Surplus Area -- Banjar Qadim land not liable to be included in surplus area.

***

Revenue Record -- Non-reflection of surplus declaration -- Cannot prejudice rights of a bona fide purchaser.

***

A. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 2(8) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12 -- Surplus Area -- Banjar Qadim land -- Inclusion of -- Validity of -- Banjar Qadim land not being liable to be taken into consideration while determining permissible or surplus area, its inclusion renders the order declaring surplus area without jurisdiction -- Such an order cannot be sustained merely because no objection was raised by the landowner during surplus proceedings.

(Paras 14 to 17)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 41 -- Bona fide purchaser -- Protection of -- Revenue record continued to depict vendor as owner in possession despite alleged declaration of surplus area -- Purchaser having acted in good faith after making due enquiry from official revenue record is entitled to protection under Section 41 -- State cannot defeat rights of such purchaser by relying upon an order never reflected in public revenue record.

(Paras 18 & 19)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 100 -- Second Appeal -- Interference with judgment of First Appellate Court -- First Appellate Court ignored settled legal position excluding Banjar Qadim land from determination of surplus area and upheld an order suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction -- Judgment and decree set aside -- Judgment and decree of Trial Court restored.

(Paras 20 to 23)

***

Rejection of plaint -- Where the plea of statutory bar depends upon adjudication of disputed facts, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(d) -- Rejection of plaint -- Scope -- While deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Court is required to confine itself exclusively to the averments contained in the plaint and documents relied upon by the plaintiff -- Defence taken by the defendant and disputed questions of fact cannot be considered -- Rejection under clause (d) is permissible only where the statutory bar is apparent from the plaint itself.

(Para 4)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(d), Order 23 Rule 1(4) -- Rejection of plaint -- Earlier suit withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit -- Plaintiff specifically pleaded that earlier suit was withdrawn on the assurance of defendants that the electricity transformer installed over the suit land would be shifted and that such assurance was subsequently breached -- Applicability of the bar under Order XXIII Rule 1(4) dependent upon adjudication of disputed questions of fact -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.

(Paras 5, 6 & 8)

***

Rejection of plaint -- Disputed questions requiring evidence or founded on incomplete extraneous material cannot form the basis for rejecting the plaint at the threshold.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- Scope -- While deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Court is required to examine the averments contained in the plaint as a whole -- Written statement or any kind of evidence cannot be looked into at that stage -- Suit cannot be held to be barred by law on the basis of disputed or incomplete extraneous material.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(d), Order 23 Rule 1(4), Order 2 Rule 2 -- Rejection of plaint -- Plea that subsequent suit was barred on account of withdrawal of an earlier suit without liberty -- Defendant relied only upon the first page of the alleged earlier plaint and the withdrawal order -- Complete plaint not available and record of earlier suit admittedly untraceable -- Held, it could not be concluded at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4) or Order II Rule 2 CPC.

(Paras 4 & 5)

***

Partition suit -- Co-sharers reflected in the revenue record are not required to be impleaded where the suit relates to a constructed house situated in an abadi area and such co-sharers have no concern with the property in dispute.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties -- Necessary party -- Partition suit -- House situated in abadi area -- Other co-sharers reflected in Jamabandi having no concern with the house in dispute -- Merely because they are recorded as co-owners in the revenue record, they are not required to be impleaded as defendants for effective adjudication of the suit.

(Para 4)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Trial Court allowed impleadment of all co-sharers without appreciating the admitted nature of the suit property -- Order held not justified and set aside in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.

(Para 4)

***

Rent laws -- A tenant cannot enlarge the scope of eviction proceedings by seeking impleadment of a third party inducted into possession without the landlord's consent or nay internal arrangements or arbitral disputes with such person.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties -- Necessary and proper party -- Plaintiff is dominus litis and cannot ordinarily be compelled to sue a person against whom no relief is claimed -- A person can be impleaded only if he is a necessary party, without whom no effective decree can be passed, or a proper party whose presence is necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the issues involved -- A stranger claiming an independent or collateral right cannot insist upon impleadment merely because his interest may incidentally be affected.

(Paras 5 to 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 Eviction petition -- Landlord and tenant -- Impleadment of third party -- Tenancy originally created in favour of petitioner -- Subsequent partnership deed, internal arrangement or arbitral award inter se partners cannot alter contractual relationship between landlord and tenant or compel landlord to implead a person whom he has never recognised as tenant -- Proposed party held neither necessary nor proper party.

(Paras 8 to 11)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) -- Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Eviction petition -- Arbitral award between tenant with his partners -- Award determining rights and liabilities between partners inter se -- Does not bind landlord, who was not a party to arbitration -- Cannot modify or prejudice independent contractual rights arising under tenancy.

(Para 9)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 Eviction petition -- Impleadment -- Tenant cannot by his unilateral act of inducting a third person into possession without landlord's consent, compel the landlord to implead such person or enlarge the scope of eviction proceedings -- Inter se disputes between tenant and third party are alien to landlord's claim for eviction.

(Paras 10 & 11)

E. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Interference with discretionary orders -- Power under Article 227 confined to cases of jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity or manifest failure of justice -- High Court cannot exercise supervisory jurisdiction as an appellate court merely because another view is possible -- Order refusing impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, being based on settled principles and free from jurisdictional error, calls for no interference.

(Paras 12 to 14)

***

Interrogatories are intended to secure admissions on material facts and not to satisfy curiosity or conduct a fishing enquiry; leave to administer them is discretionary and will not be granted unless necessary for fair adjudication or saving costs.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 11 Rules 1 & 2 -- Interrogatories -- Leave to administer interrogatories -- Not a matter of right -- Leave can be granted only where Court is satisfied that proposed interrogatories are necessary for fair disposal of the suit or for saving costs -- Every question cannot be permitted merely because it is framed as an interrogatory.

(Para 4)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 11 Rules 1 & 2 -- Interrogatories -- Scope and object -- Intended to obtain admissions regarding material facts directly in issue or relevant to matters in controversy -- Cannot be employed for a roving or fishing enquiry -- Cannot be used for collecting evidence, conducting advance cross-examination or eliciting facts having no nexus with determination of substantive issues.

(Para 5)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 11 Rule 2 -- Interrogatories -- Relevancy -- Proposed interrogatories sought to ascertain whether written statement signed by one defendant had been filed with authority and knowledge of other defendants -- Written statement admittedly presented through common counsel -- Such procedural aspect having no direct bearing on rights of parties or issues involved in the suit not a proper subject-matter for interrogatories -- Leave rightly refused.

(Paras 6 to 8)

D. Constitution of India, Article 227 – Leave to administer Interrogatories -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Interference with discretionary orders -- Grant or refusal of leave to administer interrogatories is a matter of judicial discretion of the Trial Court -- High Court will not interfere unless discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or contrary to settled legal principles -- Impugned order reflected due application of mind and suffered from neither jurisdictional error nor patent illegality -- No interference warranted.

(Paras 9 & 10)

***

Street vendors -- Relocation to vending zones must be accompanied by adequate public amenities.

***

A. Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (7 of 2014) -- Street vendors -- Relocation -- Vending zones must be fully operational with basic civic amenities and proper signage -- Authorities directed to issue smart cards to vendors, install CCTV cameras, maintain vendor database, provide public amenities and establish helpline to ensure safety, transparency and effective regulation.

(Paras 1, 6)

B. Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (7 of 2014), Section 11 & 20 -- Appeals and applications -- Expeditious disposal -- Pending applications/appeals to be decided within 60 days after affording opportunity of hearing -- Fresh applications/appeals to be decided within 30 days, subject to provisions of the Act and Bye-laws.

(Para 6)

C. Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (7 of 2014) -- Essential Service Providers -- Notification dated 17.07.2020 expanding definition of Essential Service Providers and extending vending hours beyond original Bye-laws -- Issued during COVID-19 pandemic -- Having outlived its purpose, notification quashed and earlier notification restored.

(Para 7)

***

Compromise decree -- Compromise must be in writing and signed by parties -- Counsel cannot bind client without express authority or exigent circumstances.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3 -- Compromise decree -- Validity -- Compromise must be in writing and signed by parties -- Signature of counsel without express authority or exigent circumstances is insufficient to bind party -- Voluntary consent of parties is mandatory -- Compromise decree passed without compliance with mandatory requirements of Order 23 Rule 3, not sustainable -- Decree rightly set aside.

(Paras 5.1 to 5.6)

***

Committal in complaint case -- Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session -- Section 244 has no application at pre-committal stage -- Magistrate is not required to record pre-charge evidence before committing case.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 209 & 244 -- Complaint case -- Committal of case -- Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session -- Recording of pre-charge evidence under Section 244 -- Not mandatory -- Magistrate is only required to comply with Sections 207/208 and commit the case under Section 209 -- Section 244 has no application at pre-committal stage -- Magistrate is not required to hold inquiry or record prosecution evidence before committing case to Court of Session -- High Court erred in remanding matter for compliance with Section 244 -- Impugned order set aside.

(Paras 6, 9-14)

***

MACT -- Functional disability prevails over medical disability in determining just compensation.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Motor accident compensation -- Permanent disability -- Functional disability vis-à-vis medical disability -- Assessment of compensation -- Skilled worker -- Carpenter -- Amputation of right leg above knee -- Functional disability to be assessed with reference to nature of occupation and impact on earning capacity -- Carpenter unable to perform work requiring sitting position -- Functional disability assessed at 100% despite 70% permanent physical disability -- Accident occurred in November 2004, monthly income of skilled carpenter assessed at Rs.9,000/- -- Future prospects payable even in injury cases involving permanent disability -- Compensation towards prosthetic limb, future replacement and maintenance, attendant charges, transportation charges, loss of amenities and loss of income during laid-up period awarded -- Compensation enhanced from Rs.11,51,423/- to Rs.35,95,923/- with interest @ 6% per annum.

(Paras 5.2 to 10)

***

Adverse possession -- State cannot claim adverse possession over private property without acquisition or payment of compensation.

***

Constitution of India, Article 300-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Sections 26 and 27 -- Adverse possession -- State as welfare State -- Suit for possession based on title -- Land utilised for distributary without acquisition -- Compensation not paid -- State cannot dispossess citizen of property except by authority of law -- Right to property a constitutional and human right -- State cannot perfect title by invoking doctrine of adverse possession over citizens' land -- Limitation under Article 65 not attracted where State remains in illegal possession without due process of law -- Land used for public purpose cannot be retained without payment of compensation -- Landowners entitled to fair market value with all statutory benefits by treating acquisition as deemed acquisition.

(Paras 17 to 26)

***

Defamation -- Truthful reporting/publication of an FIR cannot be criminalised merely because it affects the reputation of the person named therein.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 499, 500 & 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal defamation -- Quashing of complaint -- Publication of news item based on First Information Report (FIR) -- Complaint made to police protected under Eighth and Ninth Exceptions to Section 499 -- Accurate and fair publication of contents of FIR does not constitute defamation -- Joint complaint by two complainants arising from same cause of action maintainable -- Editor not a necessary party where reporter himself authored the impugned publication -- Contents of FIR made to police protected and publication thereof by newspaper also protected -- -- Complaint, summoning order and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Paras 13 to 25)

***

Service Law -- Deputation -- Borrowing organisation liable to release leave salary and recover reimbursement from parent organisation.

***

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 7(3-A) -- Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations, Schedule XVIII, Rule 12(a), Article 240-BB, 185-B -- Government Instructions -- Employee resigned after serving on deputation -- Gratuity and leave encashment withheld due to dispute between parent and borrowing organisations regarding liability -- Held, Rule 12(a) makes the parent organisation responsible for disbursement of leave-related benefits during deputation, while Government Instructions below Article 185-B require the borrowing organisation to sanction and initially release leave salary and thereafter seek reimbursement from the parent organisation -- Gratuity remains the exclusive liability of the parent organisation under Article 240-BB -- Administrative correspondence between departments cannot deprive an employee of statutory retiral benefits -- Delay in payment of gratuity attracts interest under Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act at 10% per annum, while leave salary directed to carry 6% interest from the date of filing of the writ petition till realization.

(Paras 10 to 17)

***

Rejection of plaint -- Adverse Possession -- Whether property was privately partitioned and title perfected by adverse possession are triable issues not liable to be decided under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(a) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 -- Title by adverse possession -- Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- Co-owners -- Plaint rejected on the ground that plaintiffs, being co-owners, could not claim title by adverse possession -- Plaint specifically pleaded private partition pursuant to an arbitral award and exclusive, open, peaceful, continuous and hostile possession since 1982, maturing into adverse possession in 1994 -- Whether the property stood privately partitioned and whether plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession are triable issues involving mixed questions of fact and law requiring evidence -- While considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(a), Court is required to examine only the averments contained in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs to ascertain whether a cause of action is disclosed -- Even if the plea of adverse possession ultimately fails, the suit for permanent injunction to protect admitted possession remains maintainable -- A plaint cannot be rejected partially -- Order rejecting plaint set aside and matter remanded for trial.

(Paras 11 to 19)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- If it is shown from the averments made in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiff, which are to be taken as true at their face value, that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree as prayed in the suit, the plea of a defendant for rejection of the plaint has to be turned down.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(a) – Rejection of plaint -- While dealing with an application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts have to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by carefully scrutinizing the averments made in the plaint together with the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs.

(Para 11)

***

Prevention of Corruption Act -- Mere recovery of tainted money without proof of demand and acceptance cannot sustain conviction, and presumption under Section 20 does not arise.

***

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) & 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Illegal gratification -- Demand and acceptance -- Criminal conspiracy -- Appeal against acquittal -- Respondents acquitted by High Court of offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B IPC -- Mere recovery of tainted money held insufficient in absence of proof of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification -- Presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of demand and acceptance are established -- Prosecution failed to prove criminal conspiracy as there was no cogent evidence of meeting of minds between accused -- Withholding of material electronic evidence justified adverse inference against prosecution -- High Court's appreciation of evidence held to be a plausible view warranting no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution -- Appeals dismissed.

(Paras 11 to 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Conspiracy cannot be inferred merely on the basis of suspicion or association and that there must be cogent material indicating meeting of minds between the accused persons -- To establish a charge of conspiracy, knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary.

(Para 21)

***

Quashing of FIR -- Matrimonial dispute -- Mere matrimonial discord not sufficient to constitute offence under Section 498-A IPC -- Proceedings quashed.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 406 & 34 -- Quashing of FIR -- Divorce by mutual consent -- Absence of allegations of dowry demand or statutory cruelty -- Mere matrimonial discord not sufficient to constitute offence under Section 498-A IPC -- Allegations that the complainant was not taken back to the matrimonial home and that the matrimonial house was subsequently sold did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC -- Parties had categorically stated before the Family Court that nothing remained due or payable inter se after dissolution of marriage -- Inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS can be exercised even after filing of the charge-sheet where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court and would not serve the ends of justice -- Proceedings quashed.

(Paras 16 to 24)

***

Section 304 Part II IPC -- Sentence -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Long lapse of time -- Period already undergone -- Conviction maintained -- Sentence modified.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304 & 34 -- Sentence -- Alteration of sentence – Conviction under Section 304/34 IPC for causing death during a sudden altercation by pushing the deceased into a dry canal -- Evidence disclosed that fatal injuries were sustained due to the fall into the rock-bed canal and not by the alleged stone blows -- Case fell under Part II of Section 304 IPC as the act was committed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death -- Incident occurred in 1997 -- Appellant was over 60 years of age by the time of disposal of appeal and had already undergone imprisonment for more than one and a half years -- Considering the prolonged lapse of nearly three decades, age of the appellant and overall facts and circumstances, while maintaining the conviction, substantive sentence reduced to the period already undergone.

(Paras 11 to 18)

***

Electrocution death -- Absolute liability -- Electricity transmission company liable irrespective of negligence of deceased -- Compensation upheld.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Electricity -- Electrocution -- Compensation -- Electricity transmission company -- Death due to electrocution from high-voltage transmission line passing through tree branches -- Defence of contributory negligence rejected -- Electricity being an inherently hazardous activity, electricity company under statutory obligation to maintain transmission lines and ensure public safety -- Principle of absolute liability applicable -- Liability to compensate not dependent upon proof of negligence and cannot be avoided by alleging negligence of deceased -- Decree awarding compensation upheld and appeal dismissed.

(Paras 9 to 16)

***

Dowry harassment -- Cognizance under Section 319 Cr.P.C. -- General and omnibus allegations against sister-in-law (Jethani) -- Mere relationship with husband not sufficient to sustain cognizance in absence of specific allegations -- Cognizance quashed.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498A, 406 & 323 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Sections 4 & 6 -- Cognizance -- Matrimonial dispute -- Sister-in-law (Jethani) summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. after police filed charge-sheet only against husband -- Petitioner residing separately and no material showing involvement in demand of dowry or matrimonial affairs -- Allegations against petitioner found to be general, vague and omnibus -- No specific overt act attributed showing cruelty, harassment or demand of dowry -- Mere relationship with husband not sufficient to prosecute in absence of specific allegations -- Order taking cognizance and revisional order quashed.

(Paras 9 to 13)

***

NI Act -- Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation -- Requirement not absolute -- Appellate Court must exercise judicial discretion and consider exceptional circumstances before imposing condition of deposit.

***

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 -- Suspension of sentence -- Appeal against conviction under Section 138 -- Deposit of 20% of compensation -- Appellate Court directed appellant to deposit 20% of compensation while suspending sentence without examining whether the case fell within the exceptions recognised by the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the High Court -- Requirement of deposit under Section 148 is not absolute and may be reduced below 20% or waived altogether in exceptional circumstances by assigning reasons -- Failure to exercise judicial discretion rendered the impugned order unsustainable -- Matter remanded to the Appellate Court for fresh consideration after affording opportunity to the appellant to establish exceptional circumstances warranting reduction or waiver of deposit.

(Paras 5 & 6)

***

Pay Commission -- National Health Mission (NHM) employees -- 7th Pay Commission -- Denial of revised pay scales despite approved Service Bye-laws and parity with HSSPP employees held arbitrary -- Revision of pay scales with arrears and interest directed.

***

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 226 & 227 -- National Health Mission (NHM) -- Contractual employees -- 7th Pay Commission -- Legitimate expectation -- Service Bye-laws, 2018 -- Contractual NHM employees claimed revised pay scales under the 7th Pay Commission on the basis of approved Service Bye-laws framed on the pattern of Haryana School Shiksha Pariyojana Parishad (HSSPP) -- State had already extended benefits of the 6th Pay Commission under the same framework -- Having consistently implemented the Service Bye-laws and maintained parity, State could not arbitrarily deny revised pay scales under the 7th Pay Commission -- Administrative delay or inter-departmental indecision could not defeat rights flowing from approved Service Bye-laws -- Denial of revised pay scales held arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 -- State, being a model employer, could not approbate and reprobate after acting upon the Bye-laws for years -- Respondents directed to grant revised pay scales under the 7th Pay Commission with effect from 01.01.2016, together with arrears restricted to 38 months preceding institution of the writ petitions and interest @ 6% per annum.

(Paras 20 to 39)

***

Sentence -- Forgery -- Use of forged document in judicial proceedings -- Principle of proportionality -- Long lapse of time -- Absence of criminal antecedents -- Conviction maintained -- Sentence reduced to period already undergone.

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Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 -- Sentence -- Appellant convicted for producing forged land rights document to furnish surety in bail proceedings -- Though offences involving use of forged documents before Court are serious and undermine the administration of justice, sentence must satisfy the principle of proportionality -- Occurrence of 2014 -- Appellant faced criminal proceedings for over a decade -- No criminal antecedents or subsequent involvement in similar offences -- Forged document detected at the threshold without causing irreversible pecuniary or proprietary consequences -- Appellant had already undergone more than two years' incarceration -- Conviction maintained -- Substantive sentence reduced to period already undergone -- Fine maintained.

(Paras 17 to 27)

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Specific performance – Unexplained delay -- Mere filing of suit within limitation not sufficient for specific performance -- Readiness and willingness mandatory.

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A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16(c) -- Specific performance -- Continuous readiness and willingness -- Delay in filing suit -- Plaintiff failed to establish availability of balance sale consideration during the relevant period, as the Fixed Deposit Receipts relied upon were created several years after institution of the suit -- Suit for specific performance filed after two years and nine months from refusal though within the prescribed period of limitation -- Held, continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent for grant of specific performance and mere filing of the suit within limitation does not entitle a plaintiff to equitable relief -- Unexplained delay coupled with failure to prove financial readiness disentitled plaintiff to decree for specific performance.

(Paras 29 to 44)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16(c) -- Specific performance -- Readiness and willingness -- Readiness refers to the financial capacity, while willingness reflects the conduct and intention of the party seeking enforcement of the contract -- Both conditions must be established cumulatively for grant of a decree for specific performance.

(Para 30)

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Second appeal -- High Court cannot substitute decree for mandatory injunction with compensation in absence of pleadings or consent.

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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 and Order 21 -- Mandatory injunction -- Removal of encroachment -- Modification of decree -- Scope of second appeal -- Trial Court decreed removal of illegal encroachment and lintel, which was affirmed in first appeal -- High Court, instead of deciding the second appeals on merits, set aside the decrees and directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction and grant monetary compensation to the plaintiffs in lieu of removal of encroachment -- Held, in absence of any prayer for damages or compensation and without consent of the plaintiffs, the High Court could not compel acceptance of monetary compensation in substitution of the decree for mandatory injunction -- Executing Court could not be directed to undertake valuation without any decree authorising such exercise under Order XXI CPC -- Impugned judgment set aside and matter remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with Section 100 CPC.

(Paras 5 and 6)

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Regular bail -- Attempt to murder -- Mere lalkara without attribution of injury -- Bail granted.

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Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 109(1), 115(2), 126(2), 3(5), 54 and 351(3) -- Regular bail -- Attempt to murder -- Sole allegation against petitioner was that he raised a lalkara, pursuant to which co-accused allegedly inflicted a hockey blow on the head of the victim -- No injury attributed to petitioner -- Petitioner in custody since 20.03.2026 -- Investigation complete and challan presented -- Petitioner had clean antecedents and was not involved in any other criminal case -- Held, further custodial detention not warranted -- Bail granted.

(Paras 2 to 7)

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MACT -- Assessment of income on educational and professional prospects upheld -- Parents of unmarried deceased entitled to filial consortium.

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Sections 166 and 140 -- Compensation in fatal accident claim -- Assessment of income -- Deceased was pursuing CA (Final) and undergoing articleship -- Though actual stipend ranged between Rs.3,595/- and Rs.14,410/- per month, Tribunal assessed monthly income at Rs.55,500/- by considering educational advancement, professional prospects and likely career progression -- High Court rightly upheld such methodology -- Supreme Court held that determination of just compensation is not a matter of mathematical precision and further enhancement cannot rest on speculation regarding future professional success -- Parents of deceased unmarried son held entitled to filial consortium of Rs.40,000/- each under conventional heads -- Compensation enhanced from Rs.81,21,900/- to Rs.82,01,900/-.

(Paras 19 to 30)

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MACT -- Physical disability not conclusive -- Functional disability determines loss of earning capacity -- Mason suffering above-knee amputation held to have 100% functional disability despite 70% physical disability.

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in injury claim -- Functional disability -- Assessment -- Injured aged 30 years suffered above-knee amputation -- Physical disability assessed at 70% -- Claimant was a mason dependent entirely on manual labour -- Functional disability required to be assessed at 100% as injury rendered claimant incapable of pursuing his avocation -- Loss of earning capacity to be computed by treating functional disability at 100% and not on the basis of physical disability -- Monthly income of Rs.12,000/- with addition of 40% towards future prospects and multiplier of 17 applied for recalculation of compensation -- Future medical expenses for artificial limb/prosthesis enhanced from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.2,00,000/- -- Total compensation enhanced from Rs.29,01,570/- to Rs.40,29,730/-.

(Paras 20 to 29)

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Cancellation of bail -- Addition of aggravated offence -- Bail granted for bailable offences cannot continue on addition of graver non-bailable offence -- Cancellation upheld.

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 436 and 439(2) -- Cancellation of bail -- Addition of graver/non-bailable offence during investigation -- Accused initially granted bail by police when only bailable offences were found established -- Subsequently, non-bailable offence under Section 452 IPC added during further investigation -- Held, liberty granted in relation to minor/bailable offences cannot continue after addition of graver and non-bailable offence -- Court competent to direct custody/cancel bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. -- Order cancelling bail upheld.

(Paras 7 to 10)

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Compromise in rape case -- FIR cannot be quashed merely on basis of compromise -- Prosecutrix at liberty to appear before Investigating Officer.

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Quashing of FIR -- Compromise between accused and prosecutrix -- Allegation of rape -- Prosecutrix expressed unwillingness to pursue proceedings and entered into compromise with accused -- Held, offence of rape is a heinous crime and not a private dispute -- Criminal proceedings for such offence cannot be quashed merely on basis of compromise between parties -- Offence has serious impact on society -- Petition seeking quashing of FIR dismissed -- Matter at investigation stage -- Prosecutrix at liberty to make statement before Investigating Officer -- Investigating Officer free to submit appropriate report upon completion of investigation.

(Paras 3 to 8)