National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3(A to G) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Acquisition of land by NHAI -- Alteration of award in Execution petition – Permissibility of -- Award passed by the Arbitrator clearly reveals that a specific finding was given by the Arbitrator stating that one marla was equivalent to 207 sq. ft. -- Said finding has been given in bold in the award hence it is not a case where the same could have been missed by either of the parties -- It does not now lie in the mouth of judgment debtors i.e. petitioners herein to say that one marla is equivalent to 272 sq. ft.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13, Order 21 Rule 26 -- Execution of ex-parte decree – Application for stay of execution declined -- Application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC pending consideration -- Application for setting aside ex parte as well as the execution application is to be heard by the same Court and same Presiding Judge – Revision petition disposed of with the direction to learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) to decide the application moved by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC within a period of two months and then proceed further with execution proceedings.

(Para 1-6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Permanent disability of 10% – Functional disability -- Future loss of income – A malunited fracture of the foot -- Permanent physical disability is not synonymous with loss of earning capacity -- Appellant unable to demonstrate that the 10% permanent disability of the foot has translated into any functional disability so as to impair the claimant’s earning capacity as a Manager – Rs.1,71,000/- has been awarded towards permanent disability by the Ld. Tribunal -- Assessment does not suffer from any perversity or misapplication of law warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 4-9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  No fault in DDR – Effect of -- Contention raised by the appellant–Insurance Company regarding the effect of the Daily Diary Report (DDR), wherein it was mentioned that no one was at fault, is concerned, the same does not hold any merit in the eyes of law -- The learned Tribunal has rightly and correctly observed that the contents of the DDR are not conclusive so as to dislodge the otherwise cogent oral and documentary evidence adduced before it.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Standard of proof -- It is well-settled law that the standard of proof applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal trials.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Father of the deceased – Dependency -- Ld. Tribunal rightly concluded that the father of the deceased was financially dependent upon him -- In view of the number of dependents, the deduction of one-fifth (1/5) of the income of the deceased towards personal expenses has been correctly applied while computing the loss of dependency -- Said approach is in consonance with the settled principles governing assessment of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Para 14)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Father as dependent -- In a case of aged father, it cannot be held that he was not dependent upon deceased accordingly, father is to be taken as dependent of deceased.

(Para 9)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased was 23 years old at the time of his death and working as driver on the truck thereby earning Rs.6,000/-+100/- per day as diet money, however no evidence led – In absence of any cogent evidence, monthly salary of deceased taken as Rs.2,400/- taking him to be driver on the basis of minimum wages payable to driver -- Since deceased was 28 years old, multiplier of 17 would be applicable -- 40% of monthly income added to the income of the deceased as future prospects -- Since, there are 4 claimants including 60 years old father, claimants-appellants are entitled to compensation after applying 1/4^th deduction – Compensation made as Rs.5,89,080 (Assessed by Tribunal Rs.2,30,400/-) – Enhanced compensation of Rs.3,58,680/- payable with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing of claim petition till realization.

(Para 6-12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 209 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174A IPC/ 209 BNS – Quashing -- When the petitioner came to know about the fact he surrendered before the learned trial Court and got the benefit of bail in the case -- Complaint has already been disposed of -- Once the main case stands decided, the FIR u/s 209 BNS (Section 174-A) amounts to abuse of process of law and deserves to be quashed – FIR quashed.

(Para 9-11)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Non-bailable warrants – Anticipatory bail – Maintainability of -- Since the petitioner has been summoned in a bailable offence, therefore, the provisions of Section 482 of BNSS are not attracted  -- Petition disposed of -- Petitioner on his surrender before the learned trial Court will be admitted to bail subject to the conditions being imposed upon him by the learned trial Court.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing – Cheque from Joint account -- In the complaint there is no specific allegation that the petitioner was signatory to the cheque or that she had been instrumental or responsible for the day to day business of the firm on whose behalf the cheques were issued by the husband of the petitioner -- Taking into consideration the fact that the respondent has failed to aver and lead preliminary evidence qua the fact that the petitioner was in any way responsible for the day to day affairs of the company, on whose behalf the cheques were issued or that she had signed the same, order for her summoning to face trial for the commission of offence punishable u/s 138 of NI Act is perverse and deserves to be quashed -- Impugned order quashed, qua petitioner.

(Para 13-20)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence – Jump of bail -- Due to non-appearance of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court, his bail order was cancelled -- Warrant of arrest issued -- Reason for his absence is that his father was seriously ill and got hospitalized on the same day -- Petition disposed of, impugned order set aside subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Divorce petition through attorney – Transfer of petition -- Tarantaran to Gurdaspur -- Balancing of convenience/ inconvenience of the parties is required to be done -- Amicable settlement, earlier reached forms the basis of the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, which is still pending in the Courts at Gurdaspur -- 7 years old child is in the care and custody of the applicant, who herself is not having any source of earning -- Respondent is residing at Malaysia -- Convenience of his attorney-holder cannot be placed, above the convenience of the applicant – Petition transferred from Tarn Taran to Gurdaspur.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Cybercrime complaint – Freezing of Bank Account – Permissibility of -- Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Bank to keep the disputed amount (the amount which was transferred illegally in the bank account of the petitioner) frozen and allow the petitioner to make transactions from his bank account from the remaining balance – The bank directed to send a communication to the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police, to indicate the amount to be earmarked for lien -- In case, the respondent-Bank does not receive any reply from the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police within the stipulated period, then Bank directed to de-freeze the bank account of petitioner.

(Para 1-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37, 50, 52A – NDPS – Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Judicial Magistrate who issued the certificate u/s 52-A was not made a witness -- Gazetted Officer was not produced during trial -- As the prosecution is unable to show that the said 80 packets seized by them during raid were properly classified weighed and sampled and as the said drugs appear to have been mixed up without the order of the competent authority -- Rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act cannot stand in the way in view of such materials on record in favour of the appellants – Sentence suspended.

(Para 18-20)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 31, 32 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Fee waiver to disabled student  -- 5% quota earmarked for persons with disabilities has already been filled, and the fee waiver has been pre-approved, only in respect of those candidates – Held, when the intention of the State is to provide fee waiver to persons with disabilities, its implementation cannot be clubbed with reservation -- Persons with disabilities require both reservation and welfare measures so as to provide them with equal opportunities to complete their education along with other candidates -- Petitioner held eligible for the waiver of fees.

(Para 7-9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 (1) -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- There shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e. at the pre-cognizance stage -- Trial Court proceeded to issue notice to accused at the pre-cognizance stage in purported adherence to the first proviso to sub-section [1] of Section 223, BNSS – Impugned Order passed by the Trial Court set aside and quashed to the afore-stated extent -- Learned Trial Court directed to take a fresh decision on the matter of cognizance and issuance of process to the accused persons. Sanjabij Tari’s case 2025 INSC 1158 = (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20758 relied.

(Para 8-12)

A. Insurance policy/ claim – Repudiation -- Subsequent discovery of damage or corrosion cannot be used to repudiate claim -- Boiler in question was certified and registered; the insurance policy was issued after the certificate of registration was provided; and the accident occurred while the certificate of registration was subsisting -- Burden was heavy on the insurer to prove that the boiler was not worthy of insurance cover or that such cover was obtained by misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or by playing fraud -- Nothing of the kind has been pleaded or proved by the insurer -- Cannot  repudiate the claim as it would defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract.

(Para 39)

B. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A contract of insurance is a contract based on utmost good faith, and if utmost good faith is not observed by either party the contract may be avoided by the other party -- This principle is of universal application to all types of insurance contracts -- The principle of utmost good faith imposes positive obligations of disclosure -- In its practical application the principle permits either party to avoid the contract altogether if it is established against the other party either that: (1) there has been a failure by the other party to disclose a material fact; or (2) the other party has made an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact, since statements made in a contract must be true in fact -- Further, the onus of proving that the insured has failed to perform the duty of disclosure or has broken a condition relating to disclosure lies on the insurer.

(Para 24)

C. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A proposer is under a duty to disclose to the insurer all material facts as they are within its knowledge -- The proposer is presumed to know all the facts and circumstances concerning the proposed insurance -- Whilst the proposer can only disclose what is known to him the proposer’s duty of disclosure is not confined to his actual knowledge -- Rather, it also extends to those material facts which, in the ordinary course of business, he ought to know -- However, the proposer is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time.

(Para 25)

D. Insurance policy/ claim – General principles -- Repudiation -- A fact is material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take risk -- Whether a fact is material will depend on the circumstances, as proved in evidence, of the case -- If a fact, although material, is one which the proposer did not and could not in the circumstances have been expected to know, or if its materiality would not have been apparent to a reasonable man, his failure to disclose it is not a breach of his duty -- The proposer need not disclose matters already known to the insurer or matters as to which the insurer has waived information -- An insurer is deemed to know of matters of common knowledge and matters of which he ought to be aware as an insurer in that line of business -- Further, if the insurer while accepting the proposal form does not ask the insured to clarify any ambiguities then the insurer after accepting the premium cannot urge that there was a wrong declaration made by the insured.

(Para 26, 27)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cognizance without condoning delay – Quashing of complaint -- Power to take cognisance of a belated complaint is subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within time -- The satisfaction in that regard, resulting in condonation of the delay, must therefore precede the act of taking cognizance -- Respondent made a categorical statement in her complaint that it was filed within time, when it was not – Held, Ld. Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the respondent’s complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, even before the delay of two days in its presentation was condoned – Complaint quashed.

(Para 14, 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Transfer of complaint -- It cannot be said that merely because the relative of the wife is a Head Constable and another is working in the District Court, there would be a bias against the husband, especially when the adjudication is carried out by the Judge – No bias found on the Judge – Transfer order set aside – Complaint restored back.

(Para 8, 10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 403, 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 362, 482 – Cheque bounce complaints -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act – Compounding of offence can be at any stage/ after conviction also – Not amounting to review/ alteration of judgment -- Act of permitting compounding u/s 147 does not partake the character of a “review” or “alteration” of the judgment on merits, as contemplated by Section 362 CrPC -- Cases under of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would not strictly fall under the restriction provided as per Section 362 Cr.P.C. -- Offence punishable u/s 138 of the NI Act is amenable to compounding at any stage of the proceedings, including after conviction, during appeal or revision and even subsequent to the dismissal thereof, provided the settlement between the parties is voluntary, lawful and bona fide.

(Para 24-26, 31)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 403, 528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 362, 482 – Cheque bounce complaints -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act – Nature of – Compounding of -- Cheque dishonour cases are predominantly compensatory in nature -- The penal provision is intended as a deterrent to ensure the credibility of negotiable instruments and the smooth functioning of commercial transactions and not as a means of retributive incarceration -- Once the monetary liability stands discharged, the continuation of criminal proceedings would neither advance public interest nor subserve the ends of justice -- On the contrary, it would frustrate the very legislative policy of de-clogging courts and encouraging early resolution of commercial disputes.

(Para 32)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Earlier the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 18,000/- per month but now she claims to be earning only Rs. 12,200/- per month, which appears highly improbable -- This conduct clearly reflects an attempt to abuse the process of law merely to keep the respondent-husband entangled in continuous litigation and to extract money at her own convenience by misusing the judicial process.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Dire need of financial assistance/ maintenance must – Otherwise held to be misuse of process of law -- Concept of grant of maintenance has been introduced to protect the dignity of women; however, it can’t be permitted to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment -- Petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court and abuse the process of law -- In the absence of any material to demonstrate that the petitioner is in dire need of financial assistance or maintenance, the very filing of the petition amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Nature of -- Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. is payable only when the wife is unable to maintain herself -- A wife having sufficient independent income or means is not entitled to maintenance -- Full disclosure of income and assets is must -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure to prevent destitution and not a source of unjust enrichment -- Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been enacted with a specific purpose to protect women and children and to prevent vagrancy and destitution among them -- It provides speedy remedy to the destituted and helpless women to establish their claim, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that she is unable to maintain herself and her child.

(Para 12, 13)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance to wife u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Concealment of income -- Petitioner/ wife concealed her employment and claimed his husband is earning handsome amount – She suppressing relevant information from the Court and she is not only qualified but is capable of earning good money -- When a person approaches a Court, he/ she should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective -- Petitioner also failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to demonstrate that she was living separately from her husband on account of any situation created by the respondent-husband – Order of Ld. Family Court dismissing the maintenance application, upheld.

(Para 1, 13, 14)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Service matter -- Disproportionate punishment -- If punishment is disproportionate to alleged offence, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226, 227 – Disciplinary action – Enquiry officer found petitioner innocent – Without disagreement note, major penalty of forfeiture of 5 increment imposed -- Two charges, misbehaving with HC and taking away motorcycle from Police Station despite being transferred -- Inquiry Officer found him innocent qua both the charges -- Without recording disagreement note, show cause notice proposing punishment was issued -- Petitioner was having service of 14 years to his credit -- There was no bad entry in his character role or service record -- In the absence of disagreement note, there was no occasion to punish the petitioner -- It is a case of casualty and miscarriage of justice on the part of departmental authorities – Punishment order set aside -- Costs of Rs.1,10,000/- imposed upon respondent  -- Petitioner held entitle to arrears alongwith interest @ 6% per annum.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- No income proof – Accident occurred on 11.06.2016 – Tribunal assessed income @ Rs. 9,258/- per month considering deceased as an unskilled labourer -- Minimum wages can be yardstick but not absolute, some guess work also required -- Deceased 30 years of age at the time of accident -- Social status of the deceased needs to be kept in mind -- A person working as electrician who had acquired his requisite technical qualification from ITI, Hisar would have a reasonable and steady source of income, sufficient to maintain himself and contribute to his family -- Monthly income of the deceased assessed at (Rs. 400 x 30) Rs. 12,000 per month.

(Para 6-6.2)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Bachelor deceased aged 30 years – ITI qualified – Rs.12000/- taken as monthly income -- Deduction of 50% not absolute (1/3 deducted) – Deceased survived by aged parents -- Being the sole earning member of the family, the deceased was under moral and social obligation to contribute some amount towards the maintenance of his aged parents, in discharge of his filial and pious obligation -- Though, as per the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case, (2009) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 12247, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased comes out to be half (1/2nd), but keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case, the deduction assessed at one-third (1/3rd) of the income – Total compensation assessed as Rs. 24,16,800/-.

(Para 7)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Loss of consortium – Parents -- Rs. 96,000/- (Rs. 48,000 x 2) assessed -- Parents of deceased are also entitled for filial consortium.

(Para 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Settlement in cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Quashing -- Original offence u/s 138 of NI Act, alleged to have been committed in the year 2019 -- Subject matter of the original offence settled amicably between the parties and the criminal complaint withdrawn -- Impugned FIR u/s 174A IPC, as also all proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Application filed u/s 163A of the MV Act, however, the compensation claimed was Rs.7,40,000/- and the averments itself indicates that the accident occurred because of the rash and negligent manner in which the bus of the Corporation was being driven – Held, though Section 163A of the MV Act was mentioned in the application, the claim is held to field u/s 166 of the MV Act.

(Para 5)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case -- 60% disability -- Income of a Coolie at Rs.4,500/- per month in the year 2004 -- Computing a nominal increase, even a Coolie would be entitled to an income of Rs.5,000/- per month in the year 2005 when the accident occurred -- Income of the appellant computed at Rs.5,000/- per month and the appellant being of the age of 27 years, the multiplier applicable would be 17 -- Future prospects of an addition of 40% -- Tribunal taken disability at 50% -- High Court without any appeal by the Insurance Company reduced the disability to 40%, which was improper -- Loss of income assessed as Rs.5000 x 12 x 17 x 140% x 50% = Rs.7,14,000/- -- Interest at the rate of 7.5% payable.

(Para 5-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Matter remanded back – If, the Ld. Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the convict is not in a position to deposit and likely to forego his liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided, the Appellate Court must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeal and decide the same preferably within next sixty days of passing of fresh order, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions – Till the time application for suspension of sentence is decided afresh, the condition of deposit of 20% of the compensation amount, as directed by the Appellate Court in its earlier order, shall remain inoperative and the bail shall not be cancelled in consequence thereof.

(Para 7-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Inherent power u./s 482 of Cr.P.C. -- Nature of -- High Court must avoid usurping the function of a trial court or conducting a mini-trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint --  While examining any FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made -- High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.

(Para 22, 24)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 417, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B --  Cheating/ Forgery -- Quashing of FIR – Civil liability as well as criminal liability -- It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed -- Adjudication in civil matters and criminal prosecution proceed on different principles -- Decree passed by the Civil Court neither records findings on criminal intent nor on the existence of offences such as forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents -- Therefore, civil adjudication cannot always be treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment.

(Para 26, 27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Quashing -- Appellant acquitted in main case which means that there is no case for which his presence is required to be secured -- Original offence pertains to the year 2010; the money subject matter of dispute stands paid -- All criminal proceedings, inclusive of the FIR u/s 174A IPC, closed -- Appellant’s status, as a ‘proclaimed person’ stands quashed.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Offence u/s Section 174A IPC – Nature of -- Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished -- It is a stand-alone offence.

(Para 8)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 16(c), 22(1)(2) – Suit for specific performance -- Readiness and willingness -- Appellant could not demonstrate necessary financial wherewithal to make the balance payment of Rs. 5.21 crores on 10.05.2008, the due date -- In addition to that, he did not even visit the office of the Sub-Registrar on the above date -- Respondents too did not fulfil their contractual obligations, particularly with respect to obtaining mutation and securing conversion of the suit property from leasehold to freehold – Appellant failed to prove his readiness and willingness -- In light of the facts of the case, and bearing in mind the passage of more than seventeen years since the execution of agreement, grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief at this stage -- To do complete justice and adjust the equities between the parties, respondents directed to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores only) to the appellant, within four weeks.

(Para 5-8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 --  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 278 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Cheque bounce complaints -- Compounding of offence – Release on probation -- Not only a voluntary compromise can bring the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act to an end, but the accused under the said offence are entitled to benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Guidelines of compounding given in Damodar S. Prabhu’s case (2010) 5 SCC 663 modified :-

(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the accused.

(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may compound the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 10% of the cheque amount.

If the Accused is willing to pay in accordance with the aforesaid guidelines, the Court may suggest to the parties to go for compounding. If for any reason, the financial institutions/complainant asks for payment other than the cheque amount or settlement of entire loan or other outstanding dues, then the Magistrate may suggest to the Accused to plead guilty and exercise the power under Section 255(2) and/or 255(3) of the Cr.P.C. or 278 of the BNSS, 2023 and/or give the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the Accused.

(Para 35-39)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 --  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 278 -- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Cheque bounce complaints -- Compounding of offence – Massive backlog – Directions issued :-

-- In all cases filed under Section 138 of the NI Act, service of summons shall not be confined through prescribed usual modes but shall also be issued dasti i.e. summons shall be served upon the accused by the complainant in addition -- Trial Courts shall further resort to service of summons by electronic means  -- Complainant shall, at the time of filing the complaint, provide the requisite particulars including e-mail address, mobile number and/or WhatsApp number/messaging application details of the accused, duly supported by an affidavit verifying that the said particulars pertain to the accused/respondent.

-- The complainant shall file an affidavit of service before the Court. In the event such affidavit is found to be false, the Court shall be at liberty to take appropriate action against the complainant in accordance with law.

-- In order to facilitate expeditious settlement of cases under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Principal District and Sessions Judge of each District Court shall create and operationalise dedicated online payment facilities through secure QR codes or UPI links. The summons shall expressly mention that the Respondent/Accused has the option to make payment of the cheque amount at the initial stage itself, directly through the said online link. The complainant shall also be informed of such payment and upon confirmation of receipt, appropriate orders regarding release of such money and compounding/closure of proceedings under Section 147 of the NI Act and/or Section 255 of Cr.P.C./278 BNSS, 2023 may be passed by the Court in accordance with law. This measure shall promote settlement at the threshold stage and/or ensure speedy disposal of cases.

-- Each and every complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act shall contain a synopsis in the given format.

-- There shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage.

-- Since the object of Section 143 of the NI Act is quick disposal of the complaints under Section 138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code, the Court reiterated the direction given in In Re: Expeditious Trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act (supra) that the Trial Courts shall record cogent and sufficient reasons before converting a summary trial to summons trial. To facilitate this process, the Trial Court shall be at liberty (at the initial post cognizance stage) to ask questions, it deems appropriate, under Section 251 Cr.P.C. / Section 274 BNSS, 2023 including the following questions:-

(i) Do you admit that the cheque belongs to your account? Yes/No

(ii) Do you admit that the signature on the cheque is yours? Yes/No

(iii) Did you issue/deliver this cheque to the complainant? Yes/No

(iv) Do you admit that you owed liability to the complainant at the time of issuance? Yes/No

(v) If you deny liability, state clearly the defence:

(a) Security cheque only;

(b) Loan repaid already;

(c) Cheque altered/misused;

(d) Other (specify).

(vi) Do you wish to compound the case at this stage? Yes/No

-- The Court shall record the responses to the questions in the order-sheet in the presence of the accused and his/her counsel and thereafter determine whether the case is fit to be tried summarily under Chapter XXI of the Cr.P.C. / Chapter XXII of the BNSS, 2023.

-- Wherever, the Trial Court deems it appropriate, it shall use its power to order payment of interim deposit as early as possible under Section 143A of the NI Act.

-- Since physical courtrooms create a conducive environment for direct and informal interactions encouraging early resolution, the High Courts shall ensure that after service of summons, the matters are placed before the physical Courts. Exemptions from personal appearances should be granted only when facts so warrant. Clarified that prior to the service of summons the matters may be listed before the digital Courts.

-- Wherever cases under Section 138 of the NI Act are permitted to be heard and disposed of by evening courts, the High Courts should ensure that pecuniary limit of the cheque amount is realistic. For instance, in Delhi, the jurisdiction of the evening courts to hear and decide cases of cheque amount is not exceeding Rs.25,000/-. Said limit is too low. The High Courts should forthwith issue practice directions and set up realistic pecuniary benchmarks for evening Courts.

-- Each District and Sessions Judge in Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta shall maintain a dedicated dashboard reflecting the pendency and progress of cases under Section 138 of the NI Act. The dashboard shall include, inter alia, details regarding total pendency, monthly disposal rates, percentage of cases settled/compounded, average number of adjournments per case and the stage-wise breakup of pending matters. The District and Sessions Judges in aforesaid jurisdictions shall conduct monthly reviews of the functioning of Magistrates handling NI Act matters. A consolidated quarterly report shall be forwarded to the High Court.

-- The Chief Justices of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta requested to form Committee on the Administrative side to monitor pendency and to ensure expeditious disposal of Section 138 of the NI Act cases. These Committees should meet at least once a month and explore the option of appointing experienced Magistrates to deal with Section 138 of the NI Act cases as well as promoting mediation, holding of Lok Adalats and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Section 138 NI Act cases.

(Para 36)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Matter required to be sent back to the Appellate Court, for decision afresh on the application for suspension of sentence of the appellant/ petitioner in consonance with the order passed by the Larger Bench/Division Bench (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750 (P&H HC) (DB) in the case of M/s Coromandel International Limited &  Shivam Jindal (supra) cases relied.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Appellate court suspended the sentence of petitioner, subject to his depositing 20% of the compensation amount with the trial Court -- Appellate Court was firstly required to consider as to whether the instant case falls within the exceptions warranting grant of suspension of sentence without imposing condition of deposit of 20% of compensation amount/fine – Matter remanded back for deciding the same afresh after re-examining the case by granting an opportunity to the petitioner to make submissions regarding exceptional circumstances warranting waiver of requirement of depositing 20% of the compensation. Jamboo Bhandari’s case (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 90 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509.

(Para 3-5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – In M/s Coromandel International Limited v. Shri Ambica Sales Corporation, (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750, the Larger Bench/Division Bench has given cumulative answers, which summarized law as under :

*The offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is bailable, and after summoning of the accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, bail is a right subject to the furnishing of bonds.

*In the event of conviction and sentence, fine, and compensation, it is for the convict to decide whether to undergo the sentence or to challenge it before the Appellate Court by filing an Appeal.

*In the cases of juristic persons, these can only be fined, and in the absence of a substantive sentence of imprisonment, there is no need for these entities to seek suspension of sentence.

*Section 148 of the NI Act neither restricts right of the convict to challenge the conviction, sentence, or compensation by filing an appeal, nor does it permit the Appellate Court to impose any prerequisites for the appeal to be admitted or decided.

*Section 148 of the NI Act, due to its non-compliance, does not explicitly prohibit the suspension of sentence or the hearing of the appeal.

*Neither Section 148 nor any other provision of the NI Act prescribes any provisions for the suspension of sentence. Therefore, Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023 shall apply.

*Neither Section 148 of the NI Act nor Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023 places any specific restrictions on suspension of sentence. Instead, Section 430 of the BNSS has carved out a separate, most lenient category, and in cases where the sentence prescribed is up to three years of imprisonment, or when the offences in which an accused is convicted are bailable offences, the sentence is suspended by the trial Court/convicting Court.

*The very purpose of Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023, which corresponds to Section 389 Cr.P.C., is to restore the liberty curtailed post-conviction until the decision of the appeal challenging such conviction and sentence.

*Appellate Court assumes the jurisdiction to order a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act only if the convict files an appeal before it, challenging the conviction and sentence, and the jurisdiction stays only during the pendency of such an appeal, and jurisdiction of the Appellate Court would eclipse on the decision of the appeal.

*In the absence of specific provision in the language of Section 148 of the NI Act, that in the absence of deposit of 20% of compensation, neither shall any appeal be entertained nor the sentence shall be suspended, it shall be re-writing Section 148 of NI Act and Section 430 of the BNSS, 2023, to treat the deposit of 20% as a prerequisite for filing an appeal or for suspending the sentence.

*During pendency of an appeal, the Appellate Court is also competent to direct a deposit upon the filing of an application by the complainant.

*The words, “(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.”, used in Section 148(2) of the NI Act are significant, because sixty days extendable by another thirty days, are granted to a convict to deposit only if the appeal is pending, because of the words, “in an appeal by the drawer against conviction” used in Section 148 of the NI Act. In case, before the expiry of said period (sixty days + thirty days), the appeal itself is decided, then the Appellate Court shall also lose its jurisdiction to order such deposit.

*If the appeal is not decided within 60 days, with a possible extension of 30 days, then the convict must comply with the directions, if any, to deposit the compensation amount.

*When the convict challenges the conviction, sentence, or compensation by filing an appeal, the requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra), it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

*When a convict challenges the judgment of conviction by filing an appeal, then during the pendency of appeal, i.e. if the appeal is not decided within 60 days, extendable by 30 days, then the convict might be compelled to deposit the amount as was directed, by taking recourse to Section 395 BNSS, 2023.

*Deposit of a minimum 20% amount is not an absolute rule.

*Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided, the Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions under Section 148 NI Act and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions. However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

In view above, matters sent back to the Appellate Courts, for decision afresh on the application(s) for suspension of sentence of the appellant(s)/petitioner(s) herein, in consonance with the order passed by the Larger Bench/Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Coromandel International Limited.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Appellate Courts must make efforts to decide the appeal within 60 days of the filing and not later than 90 days, where the appellant is not in a position to deposit the compensation amount as ordered by the Appellate Court -- Petition disposed of with direction to the learned Appellate Court concerned to hear the appeal of the petitioner and decide the same within a period of 60 days and not later than 90 days. M/s Coromandel International Limited, (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20750 (P&H HC) D.B. relied.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 --  Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person -- Bail cancelled due to non-appearance – Petitioner suffering from HIV+ (AIDS) -- When the petitioner came to know about passing of the impugned order, he immediately moved the petition, showing his inclination to submit himself before the trial Court -- Petitioner can be given one chance to appear before the trial Court, so that proceedings may restart and continue in smooth manner --  Impugned order set aside, petitioner directed to be released on bail, in the eventuality of surrender by him before the trial Court on or before 09.01.2026.

(Para 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528, 491 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Jump of bail – Cancellation – Warrant of arrest issued -- As per, the petitioner, he had instructed his counsel to move an application for exemption, but he forgot to move the same – Held, learned trial Court was left with no option but to cancel the bail order, forfeit the bail bonds and issue warrant of arrest against the petitioner -- No illegality -- Petition disposed of with a direction to petitioner to surrender before the learned trial Court and if he surrenders and moves an application for bail, the learned trial Court to dispose of the bail application on the same day -- Learned trial Court in the exercise of its discretion shall be at liberty to impose penalty u/s 491 of BNSS.

(Para 4)

A. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2, 20 – Disability during service -- Supernumerary post with all consequential benefits till retirement – Right of employee -- Petitioner suffered a brain haemorrhage, assessed as 70% disabled -- Petitioner clearly falls within this definition, as he is unable to perform the duties of his post of Painter, cannot walk or stand properly, and is severely restricted in daily activities -- Certificate issued by the competent Medical Board clearly records 70% disability and specifies its validity up to 29.04.2029 --  Contention of the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to benefits due to the absence of a “permanent” disability certificate rejected -- Petitioner will attain the age of 60 years in 2029, validity of the certificate, for the entire remaining period of his service – Petitioner held entitled to accommodation on a supernumerary post with all consequential benefits -- Respondents directed to release all consequential monetary benefits, including arrears of salary, along with interest @ 6% per annum.

(Para 12-14, 20)

B. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2, 20 – Disability during service -- Supernumerary post with all consequential benefits till retirement – Right of employee -- An employee who acquires disability during service deserves empathy, institutional support, and reasonable accommodation, and not suspicion, indifference, or punitive action -- State, being a model employer, is expected to rise above technicalities and to act with compassion, sensitivity, and a sense of moral responsibility by making genuine efforts to adjust such an employee within the department rather than marginalising him or pushing him out of service -- Any approach that treats disability as a ground for denial of service protection would undermine human dignity and would erode the very letter and spirit of the Act, 2016.

(Para 16)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided -- Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions -- However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

(Para 76)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – The words, “Whether sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants to persuade the Sessions Court not to order any deposit is left entirely to its discretion and satisfaction.”, used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, would include a reduction of the amount below 20%, because if the Appellate Court can exempt the entire 20%, it can also reduce the deposit below 20% depending upon the convict’s financial capacity -- Any other interpretation would imply that even if a convict is willing to pay some amount, e.g., 15%, 10%, or 5%, and the Appellate Court exempts the entire amount, thereby preventing the complainant from collecting whatever the convict can afford to pay.

(Para 22)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation :

First proposition -- “Whether imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable or not, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation?”

Answer to the first proposition is that the imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation.

(Para 16-36)

Second proposition -- “Whether the right of the convict-appellant being on bail in pending appeal, can be subjected to the compliance of direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act?

Answer to the second proposition was once addressed by Surinder Singh Deswal supra [Second case] (2020) 2 SCC 514, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when an Appellate Court suspends the sentence on a condition, then the failure to comply with that condition adversely affects the continuation of the suspension.

The Appellate Court that has suspended the sentence on a condition, after observing non-compliance, could reasonably hold that the suspension stood vacated due to the non-compliance, and it is the responsibility of the said Appellate Court, which granted the suspension, to consider the non-compliance and make an appropriate decision. Nonetheless, non-compliance with the suspension condition is enough to declare that the suspension has been vacated.

(Para 37-41)

Third proposition -- “Whether the right of bail can be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance of the direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act, for any justifiable or un-justifiable reason, as discussed in the cases of Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises ?

Answer to the third proposition is that the right of bail cannot be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance with the direction of paying 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act. Whenever an Appellate Court directs a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act and imposes conditions on the suspension of sentence, such conditions must be just conditions.

Here it requires to be understood that once the issue regarding deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount, payable under Section 148 of NI Act, is decided by the concerned Appellate Court by following the spirit of the observations made in the judgments of Jamboo Bhandari (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, and condition, if any, is imposed while suspending the sentence, the same would be deemed to be just and fair, and undoubtedly such condition requires its fulfillment at the end of the appellant, who seeks suspension of sentence.

(Para 42-52)

Fourth proposition -- “Whether it is a pre-condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, for getting an appeal decided?

From the judgments of Noor Mohammed (2002) 9 SCC 23: 2022 and Vijay D. Salvi (2007) 5 SCC 741), it is clear that non-deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount would not disentitle the accused from availing any of his substantive rights, including the right of appeal. The case of Vijay D. Salvi, (2007) 5 SCC 741, clearly answers the fourth proposition of law. Thus, to get the appeal decided, there cannot be any precondition for depositing the amount ordered under Section 148 of the NI Act by the Appellate Court. The fourth question is answered accordingly.

(Para 53-57)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari, (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

(65-72)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Income Tax Return – Reliance upon latest ITR – Deceased aged 46 years as on date of accident i.e. 22.03.2010 -- Last three income tax returns, show income of Rs. 1,06,961.88, Rs. 1,08,745 and Rs. 1,48,974, respectively -- When the income tax returns themselves disclosed that the deceased did not maintain regular books of account, insistence upon balance sheets and other business documents was unnecessary -- Tribunal’s finding that the income of the deceased was to be assessed on the basis of minimum wages of an unskilled worker set aside -- Loss of dependency should, be computed on the basis of the declared income of Rs.1,48,974/- in the deceased’s ITR for the Assessment Year 2009-10 -- Impugned award enhanced by a sum of Rs.9,97,369/-, from Rs. 7,78,182/- to Rs. 17,75,551/- -- Entire award will carry interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum.

(Para 8-27, 34)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Harassment -- Mens-rea -- To attract offence of abetment to suicide, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish proof of direct or indirect act(s) of instigation or incitement of suicide, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide -- Such instigation or incitement should be reflective of clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide -- Act of abetment must be explicitly demonstrated through action or behaviour of the accused and it should also be brought on record that such conduct directly contributed to the victim’s decision to take his or her own life -- Harassment, in itself, does not suffice unless it is accompanied by deliberate acts of incitement or facilitation.

(Para 20-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Extra-marital affair of husband -- Mere existence of extramarital affair is not sufficient to attract Section 306 IPC -- There is no material indicating any immediate or direct instigation or conduct of a nature, compelling wife to commit suicide – Appeal against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 36-38)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22(1)(2) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Suit for specific performance – Amendment in prayer clause to seek refund of earnest money at Appellate Stage – Limitation taken as ground – Ld. Appellate Court allowed the amendment -- Held, as per provisions of Section 22 (1) and (2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963, the application for amendment of the plaint seeking a relief regarding the refund of earnest money or deposit made has to be allowed at any stage of the proceedings -- In original plaint, plaintiff has specifically sought the decree for recovery of Rs.20,00,000/- double the amount of earnest money in the alternative though inadvertently, the same could not be sought in the prayer clause -- No illegality or perversity committed by learned First Appellate Court  -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 2-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 439(2) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Settlement/ compromise between parties – Terms of compromise not complied with – It is nowhere mentioned in the order that if respondent No.2 failed to comply with the terms of the settlement, his bail order was liable to be cancelled -- Petitioner himself had given no objection despite the fact that some terms of the settlement were not complied with -- Once bail granted, should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner – Petition dismissed.

(Para 9, 10)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 14 -- Divorce -- Adultery -- Reliance upon photographs – Divorce by Family court -- Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Wife not denying that she was not there on photographs, stated that said photographs have been created by using some trick; who has created these false photographs and by what method, has not been stated, only a general statement has been made to avoid confrontation with said photographs – Husband had evidence of wife's adultery on her mobile phone -- He transferred said pictures in his mobile phone -- Photographer who developed photographs was also examined in Court -- No error in the judgment passed by Family Court by placing reliance on the photographs.

(Para 4-6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 438, 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 148, 149, 302 – Murder – Summoning of additional accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. – Regular bail – Cancellation of anticipatory bail – Three accused summoned, two are on anticipatory bail -- While considering bail, Court should weigh factors like the nature of the offence, the quality of the evidence against the new accused and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence -- Court must be satisfied that there is strong and cogent evidence of the person’s complicity at the threshold i.e. much higher than that required for framing charges against the original accused -- Other two co-accused appearing before the trial court on all dates – No case made out for cancellation of anticipatory bail of two accused – Bail allowed to third accused.

(Para 13-19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent powers of High Court – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint -- High Court must avoid usurping the function of a Trial Court or conducting a mini trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint -- Power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, and only where the complaint, even if accepted in full, discloses no offence or continuation would amount to abuse of process of law -- Though the powers u/s 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent -- While examining any complaint or FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made -- Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not.

(Para 26-28)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Multiple cheques – Multiple complaints – Maintainability of – Inherent powers of High Court for quashing of Complaints – Under section 138 of the NI Act, a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque -- Multiple cheques arise from one transaction will not merge them into a single cause of action -- Scheme of Section 138 of the NI Act does not bar prosecution in such circumstances -- Whether those cheques were issued as alternative or supplementary instruments, or represented fresh undertakings, is a disputed question of fact requiring evidence at the time of trial and cannot be resolved at the threshold -- Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 482 of the Cr.PC cannot be used to decide such disputed issues.

(Para 33, 34)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Presumption of liability – Disputing the liability – Inherent powers of High Court for quashing of Complaints – Burden of proving whether there exists any debt or liability is something which must be discharged in trial -- Where the accused approaches the Court seeking quashing of proceedings even before the commencement of trial, the Court must exercise circumspection and refrain from prematurely stifling the prosecution at the threshold, particularly by overlooking the legal presumption that operates in favour of the complainant – Complaints prima facie discloses the ingredients of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and must proceed to trial.

(Para 43)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part II – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Convict 80 year old – Sentenced to already undergone -- Appellant was arrested on 19.12.1992, High Court granted bail to him on 05.08.1998 – Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant on 05.08.2011 -- Appellant underwent total period of incarceration of the appellant comes to six years and three months -- Appellant is more than 80 years of age at present --  Held, the appellant is an old and aged person, and in the December of his life, it would be harsh and inadvisable to send him behind the bars again at this stage -- Courts are not supposed to be insensitive -- In view of the advanced age of the appellant and considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, while upholding the conviction of the appellant u/s 304, Part II, IPC, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to what is already undergone.

(Para 6)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Memorandum of family settlement / family arrangement – Registration of – Requirement of -- Document produced by the plaintiff, as a memorandum of family settlement / family arrangement does not require mandatory registration and payment of stamp duty. Kale’s case AIR 1976 SC 807 relied.

(Para 9)

Mutation – Scope of -- Mutation of name in revenue records is done for fiscal purposes, i.e. for collection of land revenue, and mutation neither creates nor extinguishes title.

(Para 2)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 -- Notice for arbitration – Mandate of -- Section 21 is concerned only with determining the commencement of the dispute for the purpose of reckoning limitation -- There is no mandatory prerequisite for issuance of a Section 21 notice prior to the commencement of Arbitration -- Issuance of a Section 21 notice may come to the aid of parties and the arbitrator in determining the limitation for the claim -- Failure to issue a Section 21 notice would not be fatal to a party in Arbitration if the claim is otherwise valid and the disputes arbitrable.

(Para 16)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 21 --– Non-giving of notice for arbitration -- Scope of Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction – Arbitral Tribunal was appointed at the request of the respondent-State to adjudicate on dispute no. (1) alone out of (4) -- By conduct of parties, the entire dispute have been thrown at large before the Arbitral Tribunal – No reason to set aside the award on the basis that the appointment of the Tribunal was only to adjudicate dispute No.1 -- Non-issuance of notice under Section 21 of the A&C Act by the appellant with regard to dispute no. 2 to 4 not fatal – Arbitral Tribunal not exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the entire dispute.

(Para 14, 16)

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (25 of 1987), Section 2(j), 14, 24 -- Death of tenant – Subsequently death of Successor – Right of other Legal heirs -- Wife is alive and living with her husband upto the date of his death and therefore, she was only entitled for succession of tenancy -- On the death of said successor/ wife tenancy will not devolve upon his any legal heirs -- Other respondents have no justifiable claim for continuing in possession of the property under the garb of tenancy created in favour of Tenant, which was succeeded by his wife after his death -- Respondents are liable not only to be evicted and also to pay use and occupation charges for their unauthorized possession on the prevailing market rate.

(Para 43, 44)

Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (4 of 1994), Section 28(1) -- Constitution of Inida, Article 243E -- Election of Panchayat -- Term of Panchayat to expire on 31.01.2026 – Deemed dissolution after 5 years -- On expiry of duration Panchayati Raj Institutions shall be deemed to have been dissolved -- Reconstitution of Panchayat shall be completed before expiry of period of 6 months from the date of dissolution -- Rule is to conduct election/ reconstitution of Panchayati Raj Institutions before expiry of tenure of 5 years and the reconstitution of Gram Panchayat after expiry of duration, but within six months thereafter, is an exception -- It cannot be claimed as a matter of right, by the Government to decide to reconstitute the Panchayat after the expiry of duration, but within six months thereafter -- Claim of the respondent-State that it has a right and authority to defer reconstitution of election for one or other reason within six months after expiry of duration, is not legal, justified, and sustainable – Election of Panchayati Raj Institutions cannot be deferred on account of pendency of creation or re-organization of Panchayats as well as Urban Local Bodies in small pockets, in two or three Districts -- Connectivity problem can also not be a reason to defer the election in entire State --  Election directed to be conducted on or before 30.04.2026.

(Para 57, 61, 71)

Multi-State Co-Operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002), Section 5, 10, 22, 103 -- Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (29 of 2000) – Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (XI of 1966) -- Co-operative Societies -- State Reorganisation (Uttar Pradesh - Uttarakhand) -- Deemed conversion into Multi-State Co-operative Society -- Scope and limits -- No automatic or blanket conversion of every co-operative society registered under a State Act into a multi-State co-operative society -- Deeming fiction u/s 103 applies only where, consequent upon reorganisation, the objects of the society extend to more than one State – Where objects remain confined to one State, the society continues to be governed by the State Co-operative Societies Act.

A. Section 103 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 does not, by itself, confer an automatic or deemed status of a multi-State cooperative society upon every society registered under a State Cooperative Societies Act merely because the parent State has undergone reorganisation.

B. The applicability of Section 103 requires a factual enquiry in each case as to whether the objects of the society extend to more than one State. If the objects are found to span more than one State, the deeming fiction under Section 103 will operate and the society would be treated as a multi-State cooperative society. If the objects remain confined to only one State, the status of the society will remain unchanged.

C. It would be erroneous to undertake an enquiry into the area of operation of a society for the purposes of Section 103, when the provision itself mandates an examination only of the objects of the society. Read with Section 5, it becomes evident that Section 103 is attracted only where the objects of the society extend to more than one State. It is only in such situation that the society would, by operation of law, be treated as a multi-State cooperative society.

D. The residence or domicile of the members of the cooperative society has no bearing on determining whether the society is a multi-State cooperative society.

E. Section 5 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 mandates that a society may be registered as a multi-State cooperative society only when its principal objects, as reflected in its bye-laws, serve the interests of members in more than one State. It is, therefore, a pre-condition that the objects span more than one State.

(Para 15)