Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 114, Order 47 Rule 7(1) – Review – Appeal -- No appeal lies from an order rejecting a petition for review – On the contrary, if the petition for review is allowed and the suit or proceedings is placed for rehearing, Rule 7(1) permits the party aggrieved to immediately object to the order allowing the review or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit, i.e., after rehearing of the matter in dispute.

(Para 23, 24)

A. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 – Senior citizen case – Misuse -- The Act of 2007 was enacted to uphold the traditional norms of Indian Society emphasizing the duty of children and relatives to provide for senior citizens -- Accordingly, its provisions must be interpreted to achieve the legislative intent, while ensuring that the Act is not misused for the resolution of ordinary civil or property disputes within families.

(Para 6)

B. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 – Senior citizen case -- Maintenance Tribunal declined the petitioner’s prayer for cancellation of the transfer deed and directed respondent No.3 to pay a monthly maintenance allowance of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner – No recital or stipulation in Transfer deed making the transfer conditional for maintaining the petitioner – In pleadings and evidence, mere assertions have been made that the property was transferred by the petitioner on an express/implied condition of maintenance, but no efforts were made to establish such assertion by leading cogent evidence – No justification for invocation of Section 23 of the Act -- Respondent No. 3 is providing care and maintenance to the petitioner, including engaging a domestic helper at his own expense – Held, no infirmity in the orders passed by the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 73 -- Suit for declaration and injunction -- Comparison of signatures/ handwriting -- Scope -- In a suit for declaration and injunction, it is for the plaintiff to prove his case -- Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Act, can only be invoked for an admitted document.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Limitation -- Registered sale deed constitutes constructive notice to the world -- Partition took place way back in the year 1968 -- Suit is filed in the year 2023, i.e. after a period of 55 years -- Further, many of the family members had executed registered sale deeds in the year 1978 – It can be assumed that the predecessors of the plaintiffs had notice of the registered sale deeds -- Plaintiffs cannot reignite their rights after sleeping on them for 45 years -- Trial Court rightly allowed the application of the defendants/appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was a meaningless litigation, that it did not disclose a proper cause of action and was barred by limitation.

(Para 9-17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment -- Necessary and proper party – Dominus litis -- Suit for recovery of service charges – Respondent Nos.1 and 2/ Plaintiffs are not claiming any relief against the appellant :

-- No material to indicate that the relief, as claimed in the suit against respondent No.3, if granted, would be implemented against the appellant – Held, appellant is not a necessary party to the suit.

-- Appellant cannot also be construed as a proper party once it has failed to establish that it is a successor to the respondent No.3.

-- Respondent Nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit against their wishes.

Decree, if any, passed in the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the appellant that is not a party to the suit.

(para 37-39)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 18 -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Anticipatory bail -- Prima facie case – Cancellation -- Not found any political or private vendetta for raising the allegations -- Even the police admit that there was tension prevailing in the locality which led to criminal acts being perpetrated -- Mere attempt at reconciliation cannot prevent the police from taking cognizance of criminal acts -- A prima facie case has been made out against the second respondents under the Act of 1989 -- Appeals allowed, anticipatory bail granted to the party respondents cancelled.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS), Section 482 (528 BNSS) – Complaint in cheque bounce case -- Suppression of facts -- Effect: Statutory notice u/s 138 NI Act was issued by the complainant’s advocate – Appellant/ accused’s advocate write twice within few days seeking supply of documents relied upon in the notice – Documents were not supplied – Complainant suppressed the reply letters sent by the accused in the complaint as well as in the statement on oath under Section 200 CrPC – As the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint – It is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – Held, High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside -- Complaint and the order of cognizance quashed and set aside.

(Para 13-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- After a complaint is filed u/s 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate is duty-bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing -- What is reduced into writing is required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses, if any.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- Recording the complainant's statement on oath u/s 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality, object is to ascertain the truth -- Learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth -- Learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused -- If he is satisfied, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC (227 BNSS) -- Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter.

(Para 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, Order 21 Rule 6, Order 22 Rule 2, 3, 6 -- Execution -- Decree passed in favour of dead persons -- Nullity -- Where appellants in a appeal died prior to the hearing of the appeal and their legal representatives were not brought on record, the judgment and decree passed in their favour is a nullity and has no force of law -- Consequently, the trial Court decree revives and is executable, and its invalidity can be raised even at the stage of execution.

(Para 13, 14)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Service law – Disciplinary proceedings – Delay in pensionary benefits – Interest -- Show cause notice on 09.02.2015 -- Petitioner retired on 31.01.2016 – Disciplinary proceedings concluded on 25.07.2017 and the pensionary benefits of the petitioner were released on 29.11.2017 -- Respondents as ‘model employer’ required to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within a reasonable dispatch -- Six months is a reasonable time – Petitioner held entitled to interest for the delayed period, six months to be excluded.

(Para 5, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- False complaint – Kalandra u/s 182 of IPC – Quashing -- Complaint submitted to Director General, State Vigilance Bureau and marked to Deputy Superintendent of Police -- Proceedings u/s 182 IPC initiated by Superintendent of Police -- Held, complaint u/s 182 IPC could be filed only by the concerned public servant or the authority to whom he is administratively subordinate – Even such power cannot be delegated -- Initiation of proceedings by Superintendent of Police void ab initio being without jurisdiction -- Cognizance taken by Magistrate illegal -- Kalandra and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22, 36, 37 -- Agreement to sell – Suit for permanent injunction -- Subsequent suit for specific performance -- Maintainability -- Earlier suit withdrawn without seeking any liberty to pursue subsequent suit for specific performance -- Plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance when he filed earlier suit for injunction -- Subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff seeking decree of specific performance was not maintainable being barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC.

(Para 12-15)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Negligence – Tribunal’s finding based primarily on the registration of FIR – Held, independent reassessment required on the basis of the material available on record -- Registration of FIR against the claimant cannot be treated as conclusive proof of negligence.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 -- Negligence --  Acquittal order -- Additional evidence in appeal allowed – Said judgment has direct bearing on the finding of negligence recorded by the learned Tribunal -- Though acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto establish negligence of the opposite party in civil proceedings, it certainly demolishes the foundation of the learned Tribunal’s reasoning which rested entirely upon the registration of FIR and pendency of trial.

(Para 8)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) -- Negligence – Non-examination of driver – Adverse inference -- Respondent No.1/ driver despite contesting negligence, did not step into the witness box to depose on oath -- In such circumstances, adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is liable to be drawn.

(Para 9)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Contributory negligence -- Accident occurred on hilly road and claimant was driving downhill, greater caution was expected from him – Failure to regulate speed and maintain adequate control contributed to accident – Principle of contributory negligence attracted – Respondent driver held primarily negligent but claimant held contributorily negligent to extent of 50%.

(Para 12)

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Contributory negligence – Injury case -- Claimant aged 23 years suffered 45% permanent disability in right leg – Functional disability assessed at 40% – Notional income assessed at Rs.2,000 per month – Applying multiplier of 18 with 40% future prospects, loss of future earning capacity assessed at Rs.2,41,920 – Additional compensation awarded towards pain and suffering, medical expenses, transportation, attendant and special diet totalling Rs.40,000 – Total compensation assessed at Rs.2,81,920 – After deduction of 50% on account of contributory negligence, claimant held entitled to Rs.1,40,960 with interest @ 7% per annum from date of claim petition – Insurance company liable to satisfy award.

(Para 14-19)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Gair Marusi – Absence of rent entry – Whether tenancy proved -- Respondent-plaintiff is merely recorded as “Gair Marusi” in possession, without any accompanying recital of rent, thereby negating the essential attributes of tenancy -- Column pertaining to rent in Jamabandi is entirely blank -- Absence of any such entry decisively militates against the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Gair Marusi / Bila Lagan Bawajeh Purani Kast – Scope -- Mere entry of possession as Gair Marusi in cultivation column does not establish tenancy.

(Para 21, 22)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Suit for possession – Plea of tenancy -- Revenue entries showing possession as ‘Gair Marusi’ – Effect – Plaintiff proved ownership of suit property on the basis of registered sale deed and sanctioned mutation – Revenue entries (jamabandi and khasra girdawari) only showed defendant in possession as “Gair Marusi / Bila Lagan Bawajeh Purani Kast” and did not record payment of rent or existence of tenancy – No lease deed, rent receipt produced to establish relationship of landlord and tenant – Mere entry of possession as Gair Marusi in cultivation column does not establish tenancy – Earlier suit filed by defendant resulted only in protection of possession and did not determine title or tenancy rights – Claim of occupancy tenancy also declined by revenue authorities – Courts below rightly concluded that defendant failed to prove tenancy and plaintiff, being owner, was entitled to possession – Concurrent findings of fact do not call for interference in second appeal – Regular Second Appeal dismissed, judgments and decrees of Courts below affirmed.

(Para 14-25)

Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation – Migration of reserved category candidate to unreserved category – Relaxation at screening stage – Effect – Reserved category candidate qualified by availing relaxed cut-off applicable to BC-B category – Thereafter migration to General category on the basis of performance in subsequent stages -- Permissibility :

(i) A reserved category candidate who avails relaxation at any stage of the examination process, including the preliminary/screening stage, cannot thereafter claim allocation against an unreserved vacancy.

(ii) The expression "any relaxation at any stage of the examination" includes relaxation in qualifying marks at the screening stage, even though such stage is qualifying in nature and marks obtained therein are not counted for final merit.

(iii) When a relaxed standard is applied in selecting a reserved category candidate, such candidate shall be counted against reserved vacancies and shall be deemed unavailable for consideration against unreserved vacancies.

(iv) The distinction sought to be drawn between preliminary and final examination for the purpose of migration is totally misconceived. A person who avails relaxation at the initial stage will necessarily avail the same relaxation even at the final stage.

(v) An advertisement has the force of law and binds the parties.

(vi) A candidate who participates in the selection process without protest and is unsuccessful cannot subsequently challenge the process.

(vii) A candidate has no vested right to appointment. Selection confers only a right of consideration, not appointment.

Candidate availed relaxation at the Screening Test stage by securing “56.86” marks against the General category cut-off of “61.8132” -- Having availed such relaxation, he was rightly treated as a BC-B candidate throughout the selection process and could not have been migrated to the General category.

(Para 20, 21)

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5, 11 -- Family pension – Claim by second wife – Validity of marriage – Scope – Widow who is entitled to a family pension is the ‘wife’ who was lawfully married to the officer -- Petitioner’s marriage with the officer was solemnised during the lifetime of the first wife and during subsistence of the first marriage – Authorities rejected claim on ground that petitioner was not lawfully married to the officer – Held, under the applicable Pension Regulations, family pension is payable only to the legally wedded widow of the deceased officer – Marriage contracted during subsistence of earlier valid marriage is void in view of Sections 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Death of the first wife after the officer’s demise does not validate the second marriage nor confer entitlement to family pension – Petitioner not being the legally wedded wife of the deceased officer, not entitled to family pension – Rejection of claim by authorities and Tribunal upheld – Petition dismissed.

(Para 21-27)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Recovery of dead body at the instance of the accused – Ransom calls made from the deceased’s mobile phone – Sale of the deceased’s mobile phone by the accused – Recovery of the deceased’s scooty at the disclosure of the accused – Identification of the deceased by relatives and known persons though the body was partially decomposed – Medical evidence establishing homicidal death due to throttling by ligature – Recovery of the dead body and other articles from places known only to the accused constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance – Identification of the deceased cannot be discarded merely on the ground that DNA test was not conducted – Circumstances proved form a complete chain pointing unerringly to the guilt of the accused – Conviction recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court held justified – Appeal dismissed – However, considering that the accused has undergone more than 15 years of imprisonment, liberty granted to apply for remission in accordance with the applicable policy.

(Paras 12–30)

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4A(3)(b) – Compensation, interest and penalty – Liability of employer/insurer – Scope – Commissioner awarded compensation with interest and also imposed penalty u/s 4A(3)(b) for delay in payment – High Court fastened liability to pay penalty also on the Insurance Company – Appeal by insurer – Held, fastening liability of penalty on the Insurance Company was erroneous – Insurance Company is liable only for payment of compensation and interest – Penalty u/s 4A(3)(b) is payable exclusively by the employer – Impugned judgment set aside to the extent it imposed liability of penalty on the insurer – Employer directed to pay the penalty amount.

(Para 17-25)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 480(5), 528 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Jump of bail – Cancellation of bail -- Non-bailable warrants -- Learned trial Court, while cancelling bail, straight away proceeded to issue non-bailable warrants – Held, cancellation of bail orders amounts to an unjustifiable restriction on the procedural rights of the petitioner in the absence of any misconduct, lack of bona fides, or a deliberate attempt to evade the proceedings on his behalf -- Issuance of non-bailable warrants must not be exercised in a mechanical manner and the same must be adopted sparingly and only upon the recording of cogent reasons reflecting the necessity of adopting such a stringent course -- Petitioner-accused himself come forward to face trial -- Petition allowed, impugned order set aside.

(Para 7-9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Report of fake license – Admissibility of -- Legal Manager, in his cross examination, stated that he had never visited the office of RTO to verify the driving licence and the person who had visited was working in their office -- He further stated that he had not brought any application sent to verify the record -- Said report (Ex.RW3/B) is based on some verbal information having been received -- Nothing in writing which was produced from the RTO to even remotely suggest that the driving licence was fake – Contentions to exonerate Insurance Company rejected.

(Para 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Future prospects – Deceased aged 46 years -- Appointment letter of the deceased (Ex.P4) clearly states that he was being appointed in the establishment in Officer’s Cadre on permanent basis -- In the absence of any contrary evidence having been led, no fault can be found with the addition of 30% made by the Tribunal towards future prospects.

(Para 9)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Age of the deceased – Reliance upon Post Mortem report -- In the absence of any evidence regarding the age of the deceased, the same has rightly been taken to be 46 years as per the post-mortem report.

(Para 10)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Loss of consortium -- Widow, three children and father of the deceased – Entitlement -- Parental [Rs.48,000/- x 3], Filial [Rs.48,000/- x 1], Spousal Rs.48,000/- (Total Rs.2,40,000/-) awarded.

(Para 14)

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Widow, three children and father -- Deceased 46 years old – Permanent employee – Annual income Rs.3,39,280/- [Rs.28,273 x 12] -- Tribunal awarded total compensation of Rs.30,26,600/- -- High Court enhanced it to Rs.45,76,374/- -- Enhanced amount shall also attract interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount.

(Para 3, 14, 15)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 34 -- Cancellation of bail -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail by learned Sessions Judge – Allegations are primarily based upon the suicide note and the version of the complainant, which are matters to be examined during the course of investigation and trial -- At this stage, it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge has ignored any material fact or considered irrelevant material while granting anticipatory bail to the private respondents -- Mere fact that the respondents are also involved in another FIR, by itself, cannot be treated as a sufficient ground for cancellation of the concession of bail already granted.

(Para 8)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482, 483(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 34 -- Cancellation of bail -- Abetment of suicide – Anticipatory bail by learned Sessions Judge – Parameters for cancellation of bail are different and much stricter than those applicable for grant of bail -- Once bail has been granted, the same can be cancelled only if the order granting bail suffers from patent illegality or if the accused has misused the concession by interfering with the investigation, influencing witnesses, or otherwise obstructing the course of justice – Except for a bald allegation that the respondents are extending threats, no specific material has been placed on record to substantiate such assertion – No material to show that the impugned order suffers from serious infirmity or that the private respondents have misused the concession of anticipatory bail – No justification to exercise powers u/s 483(3) of the BNSS for cancellation of bail --  Petition dismissed.

(Para 8)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Live in Relationship with married woman – Divorce not taken -- Police protection – Even if the petitioners are living in a “Live in Relationship”, they are entitled to the protection of their life and liberty – Directions given to respondent No.2 (Superintendent of Police) to consider the representation and to assess the threat perception to the petitioners and after considering the same, to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

(Para 11-15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Live in Relationship – Police protection -- Protection of life and liberty is a basic feature of the Constitution of India as emanating out of Article 21 -- Every person, more so, a major, has right to live his/her life with a person of his/ her choice subject to the laws as applicable -- Whenever High Court, prima-facie, is satisfied that on account of some relatives/ persons being unhappy with the relationship between the petitioners could cause harm to the life and liberty of the petitioners, then in such circumstances, the Courts are required to pass necessary directions for their protection.

(Para 14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 323, 307, 289, 509, 34 -- Murder -- Regular Bail -- As per prosecution, the occurrence took place on the spur of the moment on a trivial issue -- It would be a moot point during the course of the Trial as to whether the offence made out is one under Section 302 IPC (Section 103 BNS, 2023) or Section 304 IPC (Section 105 BNS, 2023) -- Petitioner is a lady, a first-time offender, in custody since 21.03.2025 but none of the 23 prosecution witnesses has been examined so far -- Trial not likely to be concluded anytime soon – Bail allowed.

(Para 6, 7)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 238(a), 241, 308(2), 318(2), 318(4), 336(2), 336(3), 351(4), 61 – Cyber fraud – Regular bail -- Petitioner in custody for the last about one year and one month -- Out of 24 prosecution witnesses, only two witnesses have been examined so far -- Keeping in view the period of custody already undergone, the fact that the petitioner has already been granted bail in the connected FIR arising out of the same incident, the nature of allegations which would ultimately be a matter of evidence during trial, the medical condition of the petitioner and the slow pace of trial, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind bars for an indefinite period – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-9)

Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (VI of 1978), Section 8 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preventive detention – Absurd order -- Previous detention order of the petitioner was dated 15.11.2022 – District Magistrate noted it as 15.11.2024 -- If the District Magistrate is not in a position to re-read the draft of his grounds of detention to come across with a patent error of mention of date of previous detention order of the petitioner then the application of mind of the District Magistrate is not worth trusting that in passing second time detention order of the petitioner due application of mind -- Inherent contradiction obtaining in the grounds of the detention formulated by the District Magistrate on the basis of which the preventive detention order came to be passed against the petitioner -- Preventive detention of the petitioner is held to be illegal -- Petitioner ordered to be restored to his personal liberty by his release from the concerned jail.

(Para 19-23)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 497, 503 – Superdari in mining case – Seizure of truck load with sand -- Superdari subject to condition of deposit of 30% of the total amount of fine/penalty -- Condition of 30% of the total amount of fine/penalty is modified to the extent that the petitioner would furnish a personal bond together with an undertaking that he will not transfer the vehicle till conclusion of the trial and produce the same as and when required, in connection with the aforesaid FIR.

(Para 2-7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 12 – Panchayat Samiti -- Instrumentality of State -- Panchayat Samiti, constituted under statutory enactments governing Panchayati Raj institutions and functioning under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, performs governmental and public functions at the grass-root level, operates under deep and pervasive control of the State Government and is substantially funded through State and Central grants – In view of the overwhelming financial dependence and dominant State funding, the financial control test unequivocally stands fulfilled – Held, Panchayat Samiti is an instrumentality of the State and falls within the meaning of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 20-33)

B. Constitution of India, Article 12 – Employee of Panchayat Samiti – Whether Government employee -- Once it has been held that the Panchayat Samiti is an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the principal foundation of the respondents’ defence that the petitioner was not a Government employee stands substantially eroded.

(Para 3)

C. Constitution of India, Article 12, 14, 16 – Service Law – Daily wager in Panchayat Samiti – Regularisation under Government policy – De-regularisation after three years -- Petitioner appointed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar through Employment Exchange in 1991 under Panchayat Samiti – State Government framed regularisation policy dated 18.03.1996 for daily wage employees completing three years continuous service with 240 days each year – Petitioner’s services regularised w.e.f. 01.02.1996 and regular pay scale, increments and GPF benefits granted – After more than three years, State passed order de-regularising petitioner on ground that he was not a Government employee but employee of Panchayat Samiti -- Held: Reasoning is legally untenable :

-- it is impermissible for the respondents to subsequently withdraw the regularisation on the plea of lack of authority in the initial appointment. Any alleged defect in the appointment of 12.03.1991 cannot be used to unsettle a valid regularisation effected on 01.02.1996, particularly when no fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment is attributed to the petitioner.

-- de-regularisation order suffers from the vice of arbitrariness on account of inordinate delay. For over three years after regularisation, the petitioner was treated as a regular employee in all respects. Such prolonged acquiescence by the State creates a legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioner that his service status would not be disturbed. Administrative fairness does not permit the State to undo a settled position after such a lapse of time.

-- the action of the respondents is ex facie discriminatory. Other similarly situated employees were regularised under the same or similar policies. Though notices for de-regularisation were issued to some of them, their cases either remained protected by interim orders of this Court or became infructuous upon retirement. Singling out the petitioner for de-regularisation in 1999, while extending protection or continued service to others similarly placed, amounts to hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

-- in view of the finding that the Panchayat Samiti is “State” under Article 12, the distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents between a Government employee and an employee of the Panchayat Samiti is artificial and unsustainable.

Impugned order quashed, and the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in regular service w.e.f. 01.02.1996 with full continuity of service -- Petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing therefrom, including pay fixation, grant of increments, and retiral benefits, if any -- Arrears arising on account of such refixation shall be paid to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, calculated from the date the amounts became due till the date of actual payment.

(Para 34-46)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 210, 413 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1)(a), 372 – Complaint/ Protest petition – Offence u/ss 306, 506, 34 IPC -- Dismissal of complaint without summoning – Remedy of Appeal/ Revision – High Court sent the matter to Ld. Sessions Judge to treat the revision petition as an appeal filed u/s 372 of Cr.P.C -- He/she shall either decide the appeal himself/herself or entrust the same to appropriate Court for its disposal.

(Para 2, 7-9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 187(3), 193 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- Default bail -- Challan report without FSL report – Held, mere non-filing of the FSL report along with the police report does not render the challan incomplete so as to confer an indefeasible right of default bail upon the accused -- The FSL report, being a piece of corroborative evidence, can be filed subsequently by way of supplementary challan and its absence at the initial stage does not vitiate the prosecution or revive the right to default bail.

(Para 6)

A. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Challenge – Maintainability of writ petition -- Every award of a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court -- It shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and that no appeal shall lie against it – Award cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding -- Writ petition challenging the award was maintainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Objection in Execution – Writ -- Maintainability -- Treating the filing of objections in such execution as an “efficacious alternative remedy” for challenging the award is inconsistent with the statutory scheme -- Decree in such a case owes its force not merely to the CPC but to the special statute which deems the award to be a decree only for the limited purpose of execution -- Statutory structure is the same whether the aggrieved person is a party to the award or is a third party who claims to be affected by it -- In either case, if the validity of the award is to be examined at all, it is to be tested in writ proceedings before the High Court and not by expanding the scope of execution or by encouraging independent civil suits.

(Para 11-13)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B -- Divorce by mutual consent – Marriage between Hindu boy and Muslim girl -- No necessity for a person professing a particular religion to claim conversion to another religion by any formal ceremony or even declaration, mere conduct would suffice to establish conversion -- Marriage solemnization in accordance with Hindu rights and customs, parties approaching the Family Court invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has sufficiently shown that the second petitioner has converted herself to Hindu faith – They will also not be in a position to seek divorce under the Special Marriage Act -- The only remedy for the petitioners is to seek dissolution of the marriage invoking the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – No necessity for the Court to conduct any roving enquiry, merely because the second petitioner’s name continues to be her original Muslim name -- Matter remitted back to Ld. Subordinate Judge to decide on merits and in accordance with law.

(Para 7-10)

Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purpose Act, 1997 (10 of 1999), Section 7(2), 7(4), 12 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 3 -- Compensation for acquired land – Rent – Interest – Act 1997 facilitate land owners or interested persons to negotiate and arrive at an agreement on the amount of compensation to be paid -- Once such an agreement is arrived at, it becomes a concluded contract under Section 3 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

-- Rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract. Hence,  a contract voluntarily entered into between the parties, shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions, which are sought to be excluded by such contract. A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes, especially after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest. It is not open to either of the parties to resile from the terms of the agreement arrived at

-- Once there is a final agreement, all disputes with respect to determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself. Any interpretation to the contrary, would be violative of Section 7(2) and Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act.

(Para 21, 22)

A. Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), Section 3 – Trust/ Trustee – Nature -- Only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust -- Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued.

(Para 23)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Complaint against trustee -- Trust not party in complaint – Effect of : Whether in the absence of a Trust being made an accused in a complaint under the NI Act, when a cheque has been issued on behalf of the Trust, the said complaint would be maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of the said Trust?

-- Question posed is answered in the affirmative. When a cause of action arises due to an alleged dishonour of cheque and a complaint is initiated under the NI Act, the same is maintainable against the Trustee who has signed the cheque, without the requirement to array the Trust also as an accused.

(Para 29)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 45 -- Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba land – Suit for declaratory decree against change in mutation/ jamabandi entry – Jurisdiction of civil court – Rejection of plaint -- Held, only prayer in the plaint is that mutation entry is illegal, null and void -- Defendant No.4/ Gram Panchayat not able to show as to how the said relief which has been claimed in the plaint is covered u/s 13 Act, 1961 -- Dispute is squarely covered by the provisions of Section 45 Act, 1887 hence the suit cannot be held to be barred by law – Application or rejection of plaint dismissed by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 1, 6-9)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B, 18A -- NRI landlord -- Leave to defend -- Object -- A special and expeditious remedy has been conferred upon Non-Resident Indians intending to return to India, enabling them to recover possession of one residential building for their genuine and bona fide need u/s 13-B of the Act -- Legislative intent underlying the said provision is to provide a swift mechanism, subject to limited grounds of contest.

-- Under Section 18-A of the Act, the tenant’s right to contest is circumscribed. Leave to defend may be granted only where the tenant, by way of a duly sworn affidavit, discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. The scope of defence is confined to the parameters of Section 13-B, namely: (i) that the landlord is not an NRI; (ii) that he is not the owner of the premises; or (iii) that his requirement is not genuine or bona fide.

(Para 7, 7.1)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B -- NRI Landlord -- Contention that rent was collected by power of attorney holder of the respondent, does not dilute the respondent’s status as landlord, particularly when he resides abroad and the rent is received on his behalf.

(Para 7.3)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B, 18A -- NRI landlord – Leave to defend -- Bona fide necessity – Ailing mother in India -- If the respondent-landlord, being her son, intends to return to India to personally attend to and care for his ailing mother, such requirement cannot be characterized as mala fide or a mere pretext – Leave to defend rightly declined.

(Para 7.4, 7.5)

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Scope of second appeal – Question of law -- In Punjab and Haryana, second appeals are to be treated as appeals u/s 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not under Section 100 CPC -- No question of law is required to be framed.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) -- Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Jurisdiction civil court – Re-classification of the electricity connection from industrial to commercial – Demand of higher bill for commercial --  Electricity demand is found to be illegal, arbitrary, issued without notice and in violation of natural justice and the existing agreement – Held, civil court has jurisdiction when the Board's action is without jurisdiction and violative of natural justice.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Easements Act, 1882 (V of 1882), Section 60 – Tenant/ Licensee – Plea beyond pleadings – Not permissible -- As per the legal notice, plaintiff claimed that the defendant was in possession of the suit property as tenant -- No plea raised in the written statement regarding defendant being licensee under the plaintiff -- Parties are bound by their pleadings -- In view thereof, reliance placed upon Section 60 the Indian Easements Act, 1882 is without any foundational pleading and cannot be accepted.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 2(17), 3, Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 -- Stamp duty – Nomenclature/ substance of document – Mortgage deed -- In matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies -- Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument.

-- Appellant executed a “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” in favour of the MDA -- Instrument fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed -- In substance and effect, the deed confers a right over specified properties in favour of the Meerut Development Authority to secure performance of an obligation, while preserving the appellant’s interest until full discharge of obligation -- Nomenclature “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” is, therefore, inconsequential.

(Para 14-17)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 2(17), 3, Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 126 -- Stamp duty – Nomenclature -- Surety bond/ Mortgage deed -- Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act operates in two distinct limbs -- The first limb covers security bond or mortgage deed executed by way of security for the due execution of office, or to account for money or other properties received by virtue thereof -- The second limb, demarcated by the words “or executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract”, is restricted in its application to the execution of security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations -- The term “surety” must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

(Para 20-22)

C. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 -- Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed -- Deed was not executed by a surety but by the principal debtor/appellant, the company, through its director -- Company itself mortgaged the properties and not the director in his individual capacity -- This firmly establishes that the properties were not mortgaged by a third party, but by the principal debtor itself, which, does not attract Article 57 -- Deed executed by the appellant cannot be termed as a security bond -- It, however, fulfils all the requirements of a mortgage deed, falling under the ambit of Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act.

(Para 25, 26)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2(2), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Decree -- An order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC decides the lis finally and would tantamount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC.

(Para 14)

B. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 12A, 13(1A) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Commercial suit -- Rejection of plaint – Application seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the appellant-company had not undertaken the mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement (PIMS) as contemplated u/s 12A of the CCA, 2015 – Trial court accepted the application and rejected the plaint -- High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable u/s 13(1A) of CCA, 2015 – Held, appeal preferred by the appellant-company in the High Court is maintainable and hence, restored to its file and original number.

-- Section 13(1A) of the CCA, 2015, is in two distinct parts -- Main provision contemplates appeals against ‘judgments’ and ‘orders’ of the Commercial Court to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court -- The proviso, operating as an exception, must be construed harmoniously with the main provision and not in derogation thereof -- The proviso merely restricts appeals against interlocutory orders to those specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(Para 6, 14-21)

C. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 13(1A) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 11(d), Order 43 --  Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Commercial suit – Return of plaint – Maintainability of revision -- An order rejecting application(s) under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, are not enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC -- Such an order would not be amenable to an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the CCA, 2015, and rather, can be challenged by filing a revision or a petition/application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 19)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 -- Statement -- Confession statement -- Object of --  Primary purpose of Section 183 of B.N.S.S. is to provide a safe voluntary and judicially supervised mechanism for recording confessions (by the accused) and statements (witnesses or the victims) during a criminal investigation or even afterwards before inquiry or trial begins and this ensures that these statements or confession are made freely and without coercion and it carries higher reliability and evidentiary values as compared to ordinary police statements recorded under Section 180 B.N.S.S.

(Para 10)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 -- Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Police officer cannot record confessions even though may be adorned with magisterial powers -- Only a Judicial Magistrate can record a statement u/s 183 B.N.S.S. -- Magistrate must ensure voluntariness on part of the person making the statement -- Magistrate must explain to the person making a confession or a statement that the person is not bound to confess or give the statement and he must warn him prior to the recording of the statement that it may be used as evidence against them -- Section 183 BNSS acts as a judicial filter between police investigation and trial evidence, thereby capturing important statements/confessions in a protected, verifiable manner to aid truth-finding while safeguarding against abuse of power -- It balances effective prosecution with protection of individual rights, with BNSS adding digital and victim-focused enhancements over the old CrPC framework.

(Para 11)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 180, 183 -- Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Multiple Statements – Permissibility of -- Provision does not contemplate or authorize "second" or repeated statements under this section as a standard procedure -- Purpose is to record a reliable, voluntary statement/confession once, with evidentiary value -- Police statements under Section 180 BNSS (old Section 161 CrPC) can be recorded multiple times if needed during investigation, but magisterial statements under Section 183 BNSS are exceptional and meant to preserve evidence with higher reliability.

(Para 12)

D. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 – Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Discretion of Investigation officer – Power of High court -- Power to record a statement u/s 183 B.N.S.S. is discretionary and is typically initiated by- (i) the investigating officer to producing the person (witness/victim or accused) and (ii) the person voluntarily approaching the Magistrate -- High Court can in appropriate cases exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to direct a fresh recording of statement before the Magistrate and the power is not a routine or an automatic power but is exercised by High Court or Supreme Court to prevent abuse of process, to secure ends of justice or rectify grave procedural irregularities that could lead to miscarriage of justice.

(Para 14-16)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ib) -- Desertion – Divorce – Desertion is not withdrawal from a particular place, but it is withdrawal from a particular state of things i.e., cohabitation – Desertion is a continuing course of conducts and not a single act – Desertion is deemed complete when the period prescribed in law expires, and a petition for remedy is filed on its ground – However, if the deserter returns before the expiry of the prescribed period, the desertion stands terminated.

(Para 12)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ib) -- Desertion – Permanent breakdown of marriage -- Divorce – Marriage was solemnized in the year 1997 and conjugal relationship between the parties has been snapped since 2002 – Respondent-husband filed divorce case in the year 2007 – Parties never resumed the cohabitation after the year 2002 and during last more than two decades efforts to restore their conjugal relationship failed -- A case of complete breakdown of marriage -- Judgment and decree of divorce passed by the learned Family Court requires no interference.

(Para 13)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 25 -- Permanent alimony – Object -- Primary objective of granting permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not left without any support and means after the dissolution of the marriage. It aims at protecting the interests of the dependent spouse and does not provide for penalizing the other spouse in the process.

(Para 15)

D. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 25 – Permanent alimony – Parties living separately from 23 years -- Appellant-wife is unemployed having no independent income and is solely dependent upon the alimony -- She is residing in her parental house and her female child has completed B.Tech on student loan of Rs.4,00,000/- -- Male child has also completed B.Tech and M.Tech -- Educational expenses were borne by the appellant-wife with help of loan and other acquaintances -- Respondent-husband is earning Rs.3,20,000/- per annum having a small plot of land residing in a house constructed by his father -- Respondent-husband solemnized his second marriage and have been blessed with two children – Permanent alimony to the tune of Rs.18 Lakhs awarded to be paid by the respondent-husband as one time settlement to the appellant-wife.

(Para 21)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, 4, Order 43 Rule 1 – Ex-parte injunction – Appeal/ Revision -- Order passed under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC -- Besides this, an application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC too can be moved, as the ex parte injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff without issuing notice to defendants/petitioner – Revision cannot be entertained.

(Para 9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Nature -- Proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. are summary in nature, as such, the minute details of the matrimonial dispute between the husband and wife need not be examined -- It is not necessary to ascertain as to who was in the wrong -- Salutary purpose behind Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to prevent the wife from being subjected to adversities of vagrancies and to ensure that she is not left to lead a life of indignity.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Earning wife -- It is not the law that income of both the sides should be clubbed together to be divided by two or that a fixed proportion of income of the husband be awarded to the wife -- It is also not the law that the wife should get half or even a substantial portion of the husband’s salary, who is earning more -- As per affidavit of income and assets filed by the wife, her monthly expenses are Rs.60,000/- -- Expenses of husband are Rs.95,000/- per month -- Wife earning Rs.79,000/- per month – Husband earning Rs.1,80,000/- -- Maintenance allowance reduced from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.25,000/- per month.

(Para 16-22)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 37 -- Suit for permanent injunction – Possession -- Determinative factor is possession of the parties on the date of institution of the suit, which was instituted on 12.10.1989 -- Revenue entries up to Rabi 1990 continued to record possession of the plaintiff -- Subsequent entries reflecting possession of the defendants from Kharif 1990 cannot displace the position of possession as it existed on the date of institution of the suit.

(Para 8)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Khasra girdawari -- Khasra girdawari entries, though not conclusive proof of title, carry significant evidentiary value regarding possession, particularly when they exhibit continuity over a long period -- A sudden change in such entries, unsupported by cogent material or lawful process, cannot by itself be treated as proof of actual change of possession.

(Para 9)

Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (42 of 1976), Section 116 – Penalty for attempting evading of Octroi -- Jurisdiction of civil court – Alternative remedy available – Assessment and recovery of Octroi fall within the domain of municipal authorities – Imposition of penalty contemplated under Section 116, being penal in nature and capable of extending to multiple times the duty allegedly evaded, can be ordered only by a Criminal Court in accordance with law – Municipal authorities are not vested with the power to impose such penalty – Both Courts below have concurrently held that the Commissioner or officers of the Municipal Corporation lacked competence to impose the penalty in question – Once such a finding regarding inherent lack of jurisdiction stands recorded, the demand raised becomes void and unenforceable in the eyes of law – Rule of alternative remedy is a rule of prudence and not a bar where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction – A party cannot be compelled to pursue a statutory remedy against an order which is a nullity.

(Para 9-12)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Disability pension – Military service -- Primary Hypertension -- Rounding off the disability from 30% to 50% --  Once at the time of enrolment, respondent No.1/ employee was medically examined and was found to be fit in all respects and it was only during his service period, he was found to be suffering from ‘Primary Hypertension’ -- That being so, the said disability has to be attributed to the military service and the unsubstantiated report of Medical Board cannot take away the right to claim the benefit of disability pension.

(Para 10)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 137(2), 75, 96, 126(2), 351(2), 64 -- POCSO -- Regular bail – Minor victim – Love affair – Consensual relationship – Victim aged about 15 years:  

-- Victim girl in her statement before the I.O. stated that she was in love affair with the petitioner and on coming to know the same the family members of the victim girl have scolded her and she intimated the same to the petitioner and at that time petitioner told her that he will marry her – On 18.12.2024, he took her on bike and roamed with her till evening and took her to a room in a hotel and had sexual intercourse against her will.

-- Victim girl has been examined by the doctor and at the time of examination the victim girl has stated before the doctor that she had affair with the petitioner and both had consensual sex.

Held, victim is having love affair with the petitioner and she is of the age of understanding the consequences of her acts – As the charge sheet is filed, the petitioner is not required for further custodial interrogation and the petitioner is in judicial custody since 21.12.2024 and no criminal antecedents, bail allowed.

(Para 6-8)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus -- Custody of minor child -- Dispute between husband and wife – Maintainability –
Where the dispute regarding custody of a minor child is between husband and wife and the whereabouts of the child are specifically known, the remedy of writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable -- In such circumstances, the issue of custody is required to be adjudicated by the competent Guardian Court on the basis of evidence, and not by the Writ Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction -- Writ petition dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the concerned Court for appropriate relief.

(Para 10-14)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 341, 302, 120-B, 427, 149 – Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2) – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Run-away/Absconding Accused – Quashing of Proceedings after Acquittal of Co-accused – All other accused acquitted on the score that none of the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and prosecution has miserably failed in driving home the guilt beyond all reasonable doubt – Though the accused who escaped trial should not be shown indulgence and a direction should be issued to participate in trial and to come out clean – To save the precious judicial time, Court deemed it appropriate to allow the petition -- Proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 8-10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, Order 7 Rule 7 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Relief -- Grant of lesser relief -- When a suitor claims a larger or wider relief than what he is entitled to, his claim (be it a writ petition or a suit) cannot be dismissed by the court on that ground -- Should the court find the suitor entitled to a lesser relief than the larger or wider relief claimed, there is no bar in granting such lesser relief – However, a court cannot grant a larger or wider relief to the suitor than that claimed by him.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction – Multiple reliefs – Maintainability of writ -- Even if multiple relief in a single prayer has been claimed and if at all the High Court was of the view that relief should have been claimed separately, liberty to that extent by way of a correction of the prayer clause could have been granted.

(Para 10)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Writ jurisdiction – Defective prayer – Amendment – If the prayer clause be found defective in any manner or not in the form required by the writ rules of the High Court, amendment of the prayers could have been permitted by the High Court to ensure that they conform to the writ rules -- This would have been in consonance with the norms for amendment of pleadings, envisaged in Order VI Rule 17, CPC -- Even, moulding of relief without insisting on amendment of the prayer clause, should a case be set up therefor, is not unknown to writ jurisprudence.

(Para 10)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties – Role of Registry of Court – Appellant/ writ-petitioner is dominus litis -- It is for him to decide who is to be joined as a party and who is not to be joined -- Registry cannot make inroads into areas within the exclusive domain of the judiciary and seek clarification as to why a particular party has been joined as a respondent.

(Para 1, 11)