Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Death of injured during pendency of appeal – Legal heir’s right -- If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of death, there is no reason to prohibit the legal representatives to pursue claims for loss of a property, akin to estate of the injured, if the injured dies subsequently – Enhancement sought by the original applicant, which if granted before her death would have accrued to her estate or rather compensated the loss of her estate; caused by reason of the accident, which the legal heirs are entitled to succeed to – Compensation enhanced to Rs. 12,53,770/- from Rs.8,56,970/- awarded by Tribunal.

(Para 5-8)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 106 – General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 27 – Notice of termination of lease – Registered post – Presumption of service -- Notice was sent to the respondent by Registered Post in compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act -- High Court held that since the endorsement on the notice read “ND”, the notice was not delivered and, therefore, any and all proceedings arising therefrom would be bad in law and, hence, the decree of ejectment was set aside – Held, High Court was plainly in error in coming to this conclusion -- Impugned order was passed without consideration of Section 27 of GC Act, which provides that if services are made through Registered Post, it is deemed to have been made in accordance with law -- Appeal allowed, ejectment decree passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 15-17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Permanent functional disability – Functional disability -- 48% permanent disability to the right lower limb -- Assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earning would depend upon the affected impact of such disability on the earning capacity of the claimant – It is not forthcoming from the award of the tribunal or the impugned judgment as to the corresponding functional disability – As per almanco manual, the whole body disability when compared to the particular limb disability would be 1/4th in respect of that of the lower limb -- Lower limb disability 48% and 1/4th of the same would be 12% -- Considering the income of the claimant at Rs.18,972/-, compensation that becomes payable to the claimant for loss of future earnings would be 18,972 x 12 x 17 x 12% = Rs.4,64,434.56/- -- Total compensation assessed at Rs. 9,06,100/- with interest of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings -- After investigation, a chargesheet was laid and cognizance was taken by the Court -- In such circumstances, before taking a decision to quash the proceedings arising from FIR, incumbent upon the High Court, exercising powers u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., to advert to the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation so as to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not to proceed against the accused.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings – Arbitration clause – Ground of -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the singular ground that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties where they can resolve their differences amicably -- It is well-settled that mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties is not a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings if the necessary ingredients of a criminal offence are made out from the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation or inquiry – Held, order of the High Court cannot be sustained – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 342, 363, 376 -- Rape – Kidnapping – Wrongful confinement – Acquittal -- Positive statement about the occurrence of sexual intercourse and does not even in the slightest imply the same to be against her will -- Absence of consent is the sine qua non to sustain a charge under Section 376 -- Civil Assistant Surgeon opined upon examination of the victim that there was regular sexual intercourse but gave no definite statement regarding the recent occurrence -- For two months, they resided peacefully together without even a hint of discomfort or desire on the part of the victim to leave or escape from the house in Hyderabad -- Prosecution, has not successfully proved that the victim was less than sixteen/ eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged commission of crime, and thus, the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant -- Kidnapping, wrongful confinement and rape not made out -- Conviction set aside, appellant acquitted of all charges.

(Para 19-22)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 11 – Return of plaint – Rejection of plaint -- If the Civil Court is of the view that the dispute being commercial in nature has to go before the Commercial Court then the plaint has to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC -- Entire plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 29, 61, 85 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 4823 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Recovery of 254 grams heroin from main accused -- Petitioner was arrested on the basis of the disclosure statement of co-accused -- When police arrested him, another alleged recovery of 50 grams of heroin was also effected -- Petitioner is behind bars since 13.10.2023, however, out of total 11 prosecution witnesses -- Petitioner has suffered incarceration of 01 year, 09 months & 09 days -- Petitioner is involved in one another case although he is on bail in that case – Bail allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(viii), (ix) & (3)(2)(vii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 --  Offence under SC/ ST Act -- Quashing of criminal proceedings by High Court – Challenge to -- Dispute occurred between two Scheduled Caste groups, and the same was not driven by caste-based malice -- There was no substantive evidence on record to reflect involvement in the matter beyond the complainant’s time-barred assertions -- Delay itself casts doubt on the credibility of the allegations made against them – No evidence on record which would indicate mala fide intention on the part of Respondent No. 2 or any connivance -- Bald allegations against the Appellant would not in itself be sustainable -- High Court’s order does not call for any interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 16-26)

A. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech – Contempt proceedings -- Postponement of publication – Reasonable restriction -- If a member of the public or a litigant or for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the court by making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or Judges who had passed a judicial order or had conducted the court proceedings, certainly the courts would be justified to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against such contemnors -- This would also be a ground to direct postponement of publication as contempt of court is a reasonable restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

(Para 28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech –  Judiciary and Media -- For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key -- That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court -- Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution -- For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other -- The above position has become more nuanced in the digital age.

-- By impugned order Division Bench of the High Court found prima facie that the comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, directed the Wikimedia Foundation Inc. to take down/delete the said pages within thirty six (36) hours.

Held, Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions – Impugned directions contained of the impugned order set aside.

(Para 2, 31-33)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 105 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39, 102 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA evidence – Acquittal -- Despite the presence of DNA evidence, it has to be discarded for the reason that proper methods and procedures were not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment of the evidence in the course of the Appellant-convict's conviction -- DNA evidence is only of probative value, subject to the condition that it is properly dealt with – DNA evidence collected has been rendered unusable, it suffers from various shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay; the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out etc. -- None of the circumstances posited by the prosecution are found to be conclusively proved against the Appellant-convict -- Chain of circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular hypothesis, that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence or involvement of none else in the crime -- Conviction of the Appellant-convict vacated, he is directed to be released forthwith -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 35, 43, 45)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39 -- DNA Evidence – Procedure to be followed – Directions issued, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved:

1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record.

2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken.

3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial.

4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to  maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible for explaining such lapse.

The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary instruction as may be required -- States requested to examine the necessity of conducting training of the Investigating Officers to ensure full compliance.

(Para 44, 45)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Legal Principles -- A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Act, 1872, that is examination of at least of one of the attesting witnesses -- However, unlike other documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of living -- This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain whether the Will propounded had been duly proved -- Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator -- Only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as genuine.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Parameters to ascertain ‘suspicious circumstances’ vitiating a Will –

-- Deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession

-- Prudence requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the disposition was a voluntary act.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will in favour of nephew – Wife/ natural heir – Will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the 1^st respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance – Nothing has come on record to show the relation between the couple was bitter – Trial Court erroneously observed that non-performance of last rites of testator by 1^st respondent hinted at sour relations between the couple – Ordinarily, in a Hindu/ Sikh family, last rites are performed by Male Sapinda relations – A cumulative assessment of the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to mention the very existence of his wife in the Will, gives rise to serious doubt that the Will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant and is not the ‘free will’ of the testator – Held, non-mention of 1st respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will, is an eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated by the undue influence of the appellant.

(Para 19, 20)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Cruelty – Acquittal in criminal case -- Long separation -- Parties separated just one year after their marriage and have remained apart ever since for more than 16 years -- Additionally, in the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent under Sections 498A/406/34 of the IPC, the appellant and his family members have been acquitted, which demonstrates that the allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment against the appellant were false -- Welfare and dignity of both the spouses must be prioritized -- Court finds it a fit case to exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution and granted the relief of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Appellant is working as a clerk in a private firm and the respondent is a homemaker who is independently taking care of their minor son aged 16 years -- Appellant ordered to pay composite monthly maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent and their child.

(Para 13-27)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused: Statutory requisites for summoning any person not being the accused:

(a) such person has committed an offence;

(b) his complicity is revealed from the evidence collected during inquiry or trial; and 

(c) for such offence, he can be tried together with the accused already facing trial.

Principles that the Trial Court ought to follow while exercising power under this Section are :

(a) This provision is a facet of that area of law which gives protection to victims and society at large, ensuring that the perpetrators of crime should not escape the force of law;

(b) It is the duty cast upon the Court not to let the guilty get away unpunished;

(c) The Trial Court has broad but not unbridled power as this power can be exercised only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not any other material collected during investigation;

(d) The Trial Court is not powerless to summon a person who is not named in the FIR or Chargesheet; they can be impleaded if the evidence adduced inculpates him;

(e) This power is not to be exercised in a regular or cavalier manner, but only when strong or cogent evidence is available than the mere probability of complicity;

(f) The degree of satisfaction required is much stricter than the prima facie case, which is needed at the time of framing of charge(s);

(g) The Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage as the expression used is ‘such person could be tried’ and not ‘should be tried’.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- It ought to have considered that the standard of satisfaction required is short of the standard necessary for passing a final judgment after trial.

(Para 22)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- “R”, although not charge sheeted, was named in the FIR, and the evidence thus far, leads, prima facie, to reveal his role -- Therefore, at this stage, there is sufficient material to put him on trial.

(Para 23)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 -- Summoning of additional accused -- High Court proceeded to conduct a mini trial -- It erred in giving a categorical finding on the merits -- High Court erred in observing that witnesses have stated nothing about the motive of the crime; that the depositions are silent on the aspect of common intention; absence of the manner or sequence of occurrence of the incident; or that it cannot be inferred who is the aggressor -- All these questions, amongst others, are relevant or not is a matter to be considered at the stage of final adjudication -- It is a settled law that the power under Section 319 CrPC must be exercised sparingly -- However, where the evidence reveals the complicity of the prospective accused, it becomes obligatory for the authority to exercise the power provided under the said Section -- Summoning order passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 24-26)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Customary marriage -- Levirate marriage – Legality of – Prohibited relationship – Effect of -- Petitioner and the Opposite Party No. 1 belong to a community where levirate marriage (marriage of a widow with the younger brother of the deceased husband) is a long-established and socially accepted custom -- Customary marriage was solemnized as per the local and caste-based traditions, practiced since generations, following the death of her husband – Held, if a recognized, longstanding, and reasonable custom exists in a particular community that allows levirate marriage, such a marriage may be legally valid despite otherwise being within a prohibited relationship.

(Para 15)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Levirate marriage – Status of wife -- Petitioner and O. P. No.1 have resided together for a significant period, long enough to give birth to two children-both of whom are acknowledged by the family -- Disowning the Petitioner on the sole ground of the marriage being a levirate marriage, while accepting her children as part of the family, reflects not just a legal contradiction but a moral and social injustice -- Denial of the wife’s status is an unjust act and if accepted, would set a dangerous precedent where a woman who has fulfilled the role of a wife and mother is discarded without remedy, solely due to patriarchal convenience.

(Para 18, 19)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Levirate marriage -- Maintenance to wife -- Marriage, being validated by custom, cohabitation, social acceptance, and the birth of children, must be treated as valid in law for the purposes of Section 125 Cr.P.C -- Disregarding such a union would not only be legally unsound but would also send a regressive message to society, undermining the dignity of women and the security of children born from such relationships -- Petitioner, having lived as wife, borne children, and been deserted without support, falls within the protective umbrella of Section 125 CrPC -- Existence of children born out of the union further strengthens the presumption of valid marriage, or at minimum, a relationship akin to marriage, entitling the petitioner to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C -- Technical plea of invalidity of marriage, in this case, cannot be a valid ground to deny her maintenance.

(Para 21-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Death sentence converted to life sentence till last breath -- Appellant-convict had barbarically murdered his family members – Probation report concludes that:  Appellant-convict has the ability to adapt, engage in constructive activities, pursue an education despite past difficulty, continued worry about his daughter’s future, shows a notable capacity for reform and personal growth – Appellant-convict’s continued incarceration has had a negative impact on daughter, who is really struggling to cope with life – Interactions with her, threw light on a gentle, loving side of the Appellant-convict – Possibility of reformation; as a criteria, apply to the instant case – It can be said that there is mixed opinion on whether he shall or shall not be able to reform his way, the Court will err on the side of caution just as when there are two possible interpretations of a given set of facts or circumstances, the one that favours the accused is to be adopted – Death penalty may not be appropriate – Appellant should spend his days in jail attempting to repent for the crimes committed by him – Appeals are partly allowed to the extent that he is released from death row – Instead, he shall await his last breath in prison, without remission.

(Para 4, 12, 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Permissibility of -- Offence u/s 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature --  Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly -- However, the power of the Court u/s 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – FIR invoking Section 376 IPC, was filed immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the opposing side -- This sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations and suggests that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step -- More importantly, the complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case -- She has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability -- Her stand is neither tentative nor ambiguous -- Parties have amicably resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding -- Continuation of the trial would not serve any meaningful purpose -- It would only prolong distress for all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts without the likelihood of a productive outcome -- Continuation of the criminal proceedings would only amount to abuse of process -- FIR along with all proceedings arising therefrom, including Sessions Case, quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR -- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC.

-- It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.

-- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

(Para 42(i)(ii))

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196, 197, 299, 302 – Promoting enmity – Prejudicial to national integration – Intent to insult religion feelings -- Registration of FIR – Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- Police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out -- Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence -- Same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of BNS -- To ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words -- This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

(Para 42 (iii))

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 – Life and liberty – Freedom of speech – Reasonable restrictions – Preliminary enquiry for FIR -- Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression -- Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution -- Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution -- They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens -- Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 -- If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) -- When an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused -- This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected -- Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

(Para 42(iv)(v))

D. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity – When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds -- The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

(Para 42(vi)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS --   When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage -- It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence -- There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage.

(Para 42(vii)

F. Constitution of India, Article 19(1(a) -- Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society -- Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution -- In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view -- Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected -- Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India -- If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights -- There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

(Para 42(viii)

G. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity/ hatred – It cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities -- Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.

(Para 42(ix)

Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999), Section 25(3) -- Trade Mark Rules, 2017, Rule 58 – Expiry of trade-mark -- Removal of trademark from register – Notice for – Mandate of – Authorities were supposed to issue a notice in the Form O-3/ RG-3 informing the registered proprietor of the date of expiry -- Aforesaid exercise has not been undertaken by the respondents – Since the respondents have failed to comply with the aforesaid mandatory provision, their action of removal of registered trademark of the petitioner from the record is not sustainable in the eyes of law and such action quashed and set aside.

(Para 7)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 39 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 58, 113 – Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA – Allotment of plot to oustees -- Limitation – Suits instituted almost after a period of fifteen years from the date of the Policy of 1992 – Whether Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would be 3 years -- Case is not of recurring cause of action so as to bring the suit within the period of limitation though instituted almost after a period of 14-20 years – Court could take the view that suits NOT maintainable on the ground of limitation – However, Court granted the benefit of the scheme of 2016 instead of non-suiting the respondents (original plaintiffs) completely – Respondents/ plaintiffs are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right relying on the decision of Brij Mohan and Others vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. (2011) 2 SCC 29 that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in the 1992 policy -- The respondents are entitled at the most to seek the benefit of the 2016 policy.

(Pata 92-95 (i)(ii))

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA -- Allotment of plot to oustees – Transfer of plot -- Since the allotment of plot is with a laudable object and not for any monetary gain, a condition should be imposed at the time of allotment that the allotee shall not be entitled to transfer the plot to any third party without the permission of the competent authority and in any case not within five years from the date of the allotment.

(Pata 95 (viii))

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA -- Allotment of plot to oustees – Requirement of -- When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation -- It is only in the rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons over and above paying them compensation in terms of money -- It is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must -- Any beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners -- Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition -- In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable.

(Para 95 (ix))

A. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18(2) – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 65 to 81 – Time barred claim -- Conciliation proceedings – Applicability of Limitation Act -- The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act – A time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation as the expiry of limitation period does not extinguish the right to recover the amount, including through a settlement agreement that can be arrived at through the conciliatory process.

(Para 51(i))

B. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18(3), 22 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 2(4), 7(1) – Arbitration proceedings – Applicability of Limitation Act -- The Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act -- The applicability of the provisions of ACA to such arbitrations is determined as per Section 18(3) and other provisions of the MSMED Act, as these are special laws, rather than by Section 2(4) of the ACA, which is under a general law -- This is in addition to the reasoning provided in Silpi Industries (supra) -- Further, the extension of the limitation period on the basis of disclosure under Section 22 of the MSMED Act must be examined on a case-to-case basis.

(Para 51(ii))

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), Schedule – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985, Rule 53, 64, Schedule-I -- NDPS – Buprenorphine Hydrochloride -- It cannot be said that the dealing in of “Buprenorphine Hydrochloride” would not amount to an offence u/s 8 of the NDPS Act owing to the fact that the said psychotropic substance only finds mention under the Schedule to the NDPS Act and is not listed under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules.

(Para 156)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 80, Schedule – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 12 -- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 Schedules -- Psychotropic substances -- Some psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act are also mentioned under the D&C Act and the rules framed thereunder -- This is only because those substances while capable of being abused for their inherent properties could also be used in the field of medicine -- However, the mere mention of certain psychotropic substances under the D&C regime would not take them away from the purview of the NDPS Act, if they are also mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act.

(Para 157)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section  8, Schedule – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) -- NDPS – Retrospective effect of judgment – Whether violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution -- Court in case of Sanjeev V. Deshpande 2014 13 SCC 1 = (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20209 did not think fit to confine or restrict its interpretation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act to future cases only -- Pending cases, if any, which were instituted before the decision of the Court in Sanjeev V. Deshpande’s case would also be governed by the law as clarified by it -- Retrospective application of the dictum would not give rise to any implications as regards the rights of the accused persons under Article 20(1) of the Constitution – It has only clarified the law as it stood from its inception and given true effect to the meaning assigned to the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act and the Rules thereunder, by the lawmakers – The same cannot be construed as creating a new offence -- Overruling of a decision cannot be equated to the enactment of an ex-post facto law -- Acquittals which have already been recorded as a consequence of the decision in Rajesh Kumar Gupta’ case 2007 (1) SCC 355 and have attained finality, would not be unsettled in light of the overruling decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case or the observations made in this case.

(Para 158-161)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23 -- Acquisition of land – Market price – Reliance upon sale transaction proximate to acquisition -- Bona fide transaction of sale, if proximate to the land acquired and the date, in absence of any evidence that acquisition has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of resultant improvement in development prospects, can be relied upon while determining the compensation.

(Para 9)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 23 -- Acquisition of land – Market price – Collector of the District himself allotted the land of Survey No. 864 at the rate of Rs. 65/- per square metre prior to acquisition, meaning thereby, the government wanted to fetch higher amount by allotting land to an individual -- In such scenario, computation of compensation by Reference Court and High Court at a lower rate for the land acquired cannot be accepted -- As such, said exemplar is also relevant to determine the fair and reasonable amount -- Sale deed, relied is a piece of plot, after leaving the land for development, in the said contingency, on deduction of 30% as the development cost, the compensation would come at the rate of Rs. 107/- per square metre -- Compensation ordered to be determined at the rate of Rs. 107/- per square metre.

(Para 11-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Suspension of sentence in appeal – Condition to deposit 20% of cheque amount – Setting aside of -- Appellate Court suspended the sentence and ordered to deposit 20% of the cheque amount without affording any opportunity to the petitioner/ accused to explain his position – Petitioner relegated to approach the learned Appellate Court -- Order of the learned Appellate Court to the extent of depositing 20% of the cheque amount set aside.

(Para 4, 5)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Anticipatory bail – Recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride -- Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not a psychotropic substance, included in the Schedule of the NDPS Act -- Appellant held entitled to be admitted to an order for grant of pre-arrest bail.

(Para 3, 9)

A. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(h), 10, 16, 23 -- Standard form of employment Contract -- Interpretation of -- Unequal bargaining power – Onus of prove -- Legal principles relating to interpretation of standard form employment contracts summarized:-

(i) Standard form employment contracts prima facie evidence unequal bargaining power.

(ii) Whenever the weaker party to such a contract pleads undue influence/ coercion or alleges that the contract or any term thereof is opposed to public policy, the Court shall examine such plea keeping in mind the unequal status of the parties and the context in which the contractual obligations were created.

(iii) The onus to prove that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is not in restraint of lawful employment or is not opposed to public policy, is on the covenantee i.e. the employer and not on the employee.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(h), 10, 16, 23 -- Standard form of employment Contract -- Unequal bargaining power – From the prism of employer-employee relationship, technological advancements impacting nature and character of work, re-skilling and preservation of scarce specialized workforce in a free market are emerging heads in the public policy domain which need to be factored when terms of an employment contract is tested on the anvil of public policy.

-- Ensuring retention of an efficient and experienced staff contributing to managerial skills was one of the tools inalienable to the interest of such undertakings including the appellant-bank.

-- This prompted the appellant-bank to incorporate a minimum service tenure for employees, to reduce attrition and improve efficiency.

Viewed from this perspective, the restrictive covenant prescribing a minimum term cannot be said to be unconscionable, unfair or unreasonable and thereby in contravention of public policy -- Imposition of liquidated damages to the tune of Rs.2 Lakhs in the event of pre-mature resignation, upheld.

(Para 25-35)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13 -- Ex-parte decree – Setting aside of --  Appellant trusted his previous counsel to manage the suit proceedings, however he was not made aware of the ex-parte decree -- It is only after the appointment of the new counsel, the appellant got to know about the exparte decree -- Trial Court had rightly allowed the restoration application filed by the Appellant under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC -- Courts should not shut out cases on mere technicalities but rather afford opportunity to both sides and thrash out the matter on merits -- Further, Court cannot let the party suffer due to negligent or fault committed by their counsel.

(Para 9, 10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Driver holding HTV license/ Heavy Motor Vehicle License – Accident by LTV (Light Motor Vehicle) – Finding of the Tribunal exonerating respondent No.3-Insurance Company of its liability cannot be sustained in law, set aside -- Respondent No.3-Insurance Company held jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimants.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 1 -- Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 1 – Parole/ Temporary release – Object of – The very object of the Act is humanitarian in nature -- Providing opportunities for temporary release ensures that the ties between the prisoner and the society are not severed -- Ensuring that the incarcerated have healthy roots in the society greatly assists in their rehabilitation and reintegration -- It also incentivizes the inmates to maintain good conduct while in custody, that aids the jail authorities in administration as well.

(Para 7)

B. Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners’ (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 (11 of 1962), Section 3(1)(d) -- Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 3 – Constitution of India, Article 215 -- Parole/ Temporary release – Delay in disposal – Contempt against competent authority -- The incarcerated cannot be expected to live at the whims and fancies of the State and neither does their incarceration entitle the administration to jeopardize their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Since the statute itself bestows the convict with the right to be considered for temporary release and enlists circumstances therefor, it is all the more vital to decide such applications expeditiously. Directions issued :

All applications pertaining to temporary release on parole shall be decided by the concerned authority within a period of 04 months from receipt of such application -- In case, these directions are not adhered to without any justifiable cause, the convicts would be at liberty to move an appropriate application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India seeking initiation of contempt of Court proceedings against the officials concerned – Copy of judgment ordered to be supplied to States of Punjab and Haryana as well as U.T. Chandigarh for compliance thereof.

(Para 8-13)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 -- Execution of decree -- Principle of lis pendens -- Limited rights of the transferee pendent lite -- Such limited rights cannot be stretched to obstruct and resist the full claim of the decree holders to execute the decree in their favour.

(Para 9)

A. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 65, 68C – Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Jurisdiction of -- State Police Complaint Authority has power to inquire into complaints against officers holding rank of DSP or above whereas District Police Complaint Authority has power to inquire complaints against personnel upto the rank of Inspector – As per notification dated 24.09.2021 SPCA was competent authority to inquire into complaints -- In view notification, contention of petitioners that State Authority was incompetent to conduct inquiry is mis-conceived.

(Para 8-10)

B. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 68(c)(2)(i) -- Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. -- Effect of -- There is substance in the argument of petitioners while they assert that police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been filed with respect to incident occurred -- Trial Court is seized of the matter -- As per Section 68C(2)(i), Authority could not enquire into any matter because report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been filed.

(Para 10)

C. Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 65, 68C – Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (As applicable to Haryana) -- Enquiry by State Police Complaint Authority/ SPCA  against Inspector/ Asst. Sub-Inspector – Finding of SPCA – Disciplinary proceedings on recommendation -- Disciplinary Authority is not bound by recommendations of State or District Police Complaint Authority -- Disciplinary Authority may act upon any complaint received from any source -- Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as made applicable to the State of Haryana) specifically permit Disciplinary Authority to initiate proceedings either suo moto or on the basis of complaint lodged by anyone -- Thus, proceedings initiated by Disciplinary Authority cannot be set at naught on the ground that proceedings were initiated on the basis of recommendations of State Authority --  Held, the Disciplinary Authority would be at liberty to proceed against petitioners without being influenced by observations/ recommendations of State Police Complaint Authority.

(Para 11, 12)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 27 – Hindu law – Stredhan -- Disposal of property – Separate petition – Maintainability of -- Independent proceeding u/s 27 could not be initiated to result in a decree -- Section 27 is not separate and independent matrimonial proceeding so as to entitle the Court to entertain such independent application -- Section 27 provides alternative remedy to the wife so that she can recover the property, which is covered by the section – Held, return of ‘stree dhan’ has to be an issue, to be determined at trial in a proceeding under the Act and not independently on application made under section 27.

(Para 7, 8)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6(2)(f) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), 13(2) – Corruption case -- Renewal of Passport – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Even though FIR was registered, the investigation so far not completed -- It could not be held that any criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner within the meaning of section 6(2)(f) of the Passport Act -- Therefore, for renewal of the passport of the petitioner, permission of the court is not necessary.

(Para 9)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Suit for declaration – Further relief – Nature of -- Section 34 entitles a person to approach the appropriate court for a declaration, if that person is entitled to (i) any legal character or (ii) any right as to any property -- “Legal character” and “right to property” are used disjunctively so that either of them, exclusively, may be the basis of a suit -- The disjunctive ‘or’ cannot be read as a conjunctive ‘and’.

-- Object of the proviso to Section 34 is to obviate the necessity for multiple suits by preventing a person from getting a mere declaration of right in one suit and then subsequently seeking another remedy without which the declaration granted in the former suit would be rendered otiose.

-- However, the answer to the question whether it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to ask for further relief must depend on the facts of each case and such relief must be appropriate to and consequent upon the right or title asserted.

“Further relief” must be a relief flowing directly or necessarily from the declaration sought, i.e., the relief should not only be capable of being granted but of being enforced by the court and such relief should be necessary to make the declaration fruitful -- The relief must also be such that it is not automatically granted to the plaintiff by virtue of the declaration already sought for.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Simplicitor suit for declaration – Maintainability of -- The words used in proviso to Section 34 are “further relief” and “no other relief” -- Since, a further relief must flow necessarily from the relief of declaration, if such further relief is remote and is not connected in any way with the cause of action which has accrued in favour of the plaintiffs, then there is no need to claim a further relief and the proviso to Section 34 will not be a bar -- All that the proviso forbids is a suit for pure declaration without necessary relief where the plaintiff being able to seek such a relief, has omitted to do so -- The proviso must not be construed in a manner which compels the plaintiff to sue for any and all the reliefs which could possibly be granted to him -- The plaintiff must not be debarred from obtaining a relief that he wants for the reason that he has failed to seek a relief which is not directly flowing from the relief of declaration already sought for.

(Para 28)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 31, 34 – Declaratory relief -- Cancellation of deed – Nature of -- Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed u/s 31 of the Act, 1963 -- But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or nonest, or illegal or that it is not binding on him -- Plaintiff who is not a party to a decree or a document, is not obligated to sue for its cancellation -- This is because such an instrument would neither be likely to affect the title of the plaintiff nor be binding on him – Declaration of title is as good as a relief of cancellation of the sale deed or at least, a declaration that the sale deed is not binding on the plaintiff being void and thus non est.

(Para 29-36)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 1, Section 151 – Frame of suit -- Grant of relief -- Inherent power of Court -- Plaint must be read as a whole and the actual relief sought can also be culled out from the averments of the plaint -- Those reliefs can be granted, if there is evidence and circumstances justifying the grant of such relief, though not directly or specifically claimed, or asked as a relief -- Plaintiff had averred in his plaint that the original defendant nos. 1 to 6 had no title or saleable rights over the suit property -- This reflects the intention of the plaintiff to not be bound by any instrument which they may have executed in favour of another party -- Courts have ample inherent powers and indeed it is their duty to shape their declaration in such a way that they may operate to afford the relief which the justice of the case requires.

(Para 37, 38)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 -- Declaratory decree/ relief – Power of -- Section 34 of the Act, 1963 is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section -- Section 34 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 34 -- Circumstances in which a declaratory decree under Section 34 should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case.

(Para 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive -- Recovery of weapon -- A blood-stained weapon even bearing the same blood group as that of the victim would not be sufficient to prove the charge of murder – Regarding motive, the evidence are very vague and vacillating -- Law is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, interference can only be made if the only possible view based on the evidence points to the guilt of the accused and rules out his innocence -- Prosecution failed to lead clinching evidence to bring home the charges -- Impugned judgment of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6-10)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (3 of 2021), Section 3, 5 – Bail order – Delay of 28 full days in release of prisoner – Effect of -- Reasons given by the State is the non-mentioning of sub-section (1) of Section 5 – Correction made in the release order by the First Additional Sessions Judge, yesterday – Held, on this trivial non-issue, the applicant/ petitioner has lost his liberty for at least 28 full days -- Liberty is a very valuable and precious right guaranteed to the persons by the Constitution -- It cannot be bartered away on the altar of technicalities -- Ad hoc monetary compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) awarded to the applicant to be paid by State – Enquiry marked.

(Para 11-16)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 132(1)(a), 132(1)(i), 132(5) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Offence under GST law – Regular bail – Onerous condition – Condition to deposit Rs.2.5 crores after release on bail -- When attempts are made to foreclose consideration of bail application on merits by voluntarily offering deposits of amounts and thereafter reneging on it by stating that a counsel had no authority and/or that the condition is onerous – Court strongly deprecated this practice -- Today the petitioner is approbating and reprobating, Court cannot allow parties to play ducks and drakes with the Court -- Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits -- Ordinarily the consequence would have been to put the petitioner back in jail -- However, considering the averments made in the modification application, Court granted a limited interim protection to the petitioner from surrendering.

(Para 4-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(u), 24 – Constitution of India, Article 136, 226 -- Additional Public Prosecutor -- Contractual appointment -- Regularisation of -- Petitioner has not been able to establish any right either statutory or constitutional so as to deserve the relief of regularisation -- Appointment of Additional Public Prosecutors is a structured procedure as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the relevant Rules prevalent in the particular State -- Thus, a claim for regularisation of a person working on the said post on contractual basis cannot be entertained as such relief would be contrary to law -- High Court committed no error in rejecting the Writ Petition -- Special leave petition dismissed.

(Para 3, 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 413, 419(4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Leave to appeal – Right of appeal -- Scope and ambit of proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C./413 BNSS are inherently broader and more accommodating when juxtaposed with the comparatively narrower confines of Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C., 1973/ 419(4) of BNSS, 2023 – Matter relegated to Session Judge :

-- The appeal, along with accompanying application(s) remitted to the learned Sessions Judge with a direction to treat the same as having been filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C., 1973/ Section 413 of BNSS, 2023. The said learned Sessions Judge may entrust the appeal to himself or assign it to another Court of competent jurisdiction for its disposal, as per law.

-- The Registry directed to send, expeditiously, the complete records of the present appeal (including the paper-book) to the said learned Sessions Judge.

(Para 3, 4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Murder – Regular bail – Speedy trial – Right of -- Petitioner is behind the bars from the last 03 years, 11 months and 02 days -- Investigation is complete -- Charges were framed and trial of the case has not made much progress – Right to speedy trial is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Speedy trial would cover investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial etc. i.e. everything starting with the accusation against the accused and expiring with the final verdict of the last Court -- If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 61 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular  bail – Conviction in one NDPS case already there – Effect of – Speedy trial – Right of -- Recovery of 87 kgs 800 grams of ganja -- Although the petitioner have been convicted in one case under the NDPS Act, however, that conviction would not come in the way of extending the concession of bail to the petitioner in the instant FIR since it is clearly discernible that the petitioner's right to a fair and speedy trial has been compromised on account of the repeated non-appearance of the prosecution witnesses -- No possibility of the trial concluding in the near future with 16 prosecution witnesses remaining to the examined – Bail allowed.

(Para 3, 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 307, 323, 506, 341, 148, 149 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Murder – Regular bail -- FIR was lodged on 04.01.2023 – Deceased was alive till 22.02.2023 – No effort was made to get the other assailants identified – NS/ Eyewitness in his statement made on 16.01.2023 nominated two others to be the conspirators, he did not name the petitioner to be amongst assailants -- It is only on 25.03.2023 i.e. after the death of injured, the petitioner was arrested on the identification of NS/ eye witness -- Charges framed by the trial Court on 11.10.2024 -- Matter adjourned several times for recording prosecution evidence -- However, the most material witness are not appearing despite repeated summons and bailable warrants -- Petitioner is in custody for the last 2 years 3 months and 3 days and he is not involved in any other criminal case -- Prosecution may take long time to conclude its evidence – Bail allowed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 306, 34 – Abetment to suicide -- Frequent quarrels – Ground of -- Frequent quarrels between the petitioner and the deceased arising out of misunderstandings and discord these alone are not sufficient to constitute an offence u/s 306 of the IPC -- Such disputes between a husband and wife may be considered part of the ordinary wear and tear of marital life and, without credible and substantial evidence, cannot be treated as instigation or abetment to suicide.

(Para 4)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 306, 34 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Abetment to suicide – Regular bail -- Petitioner has already suffered incarceration of 1 year, 1 day and is a person of clean antecedents; co-accused has already been granted the concession of regular bail -- Investigation is complete, challan stands presented and charges framed, out of 14 prosecution witnesses, none has been examined so far -- Conclusion of trial is likely to take considerable time and therefore, detaining the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period would solve no purpose – Right to speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- This constitutional right cannot be denied to the accused -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4, 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 446 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 461, 528 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Jump of bail – Surety for Rs. 1 lakh – Liability of -- Delay of 511 days in appeal condoned -- Appellant/ surety had no knowledge that the convict would not surrender on time and there are no allegations of collusion between the appellant and the accused with regard to the accused not surrendering before learned trial Court -- Penalty reduced to Rs.20,000/- from Rs.1,00,000/-.

(Para 3, 7-13)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38 -- Permanent injunction – Trespasser’ right – Claim as lessee -- For leasing out a Government land, the officials are required to adhere to the relevant statutory provisions -- Appellant failed to plead and prove as to when the lease was created in his favour and what were the terms -- It is not appropriate for the courts to protect possession of the trespassers while granting injunction against a true owner -- Property belongs to the Government -- Mere production of certain receipts evidencing the payment of certain amount without referring to the particular land would not come to the rescue of the appellant – Permanent  injunction declined by Ld. Appellate Court, upheld.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 413, 419(4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce complaint – Leave to appeal – Delay/ Limitation -- Appeal before Session’s Court -- Application u/s 378(4) Cr.P.C. disposed of by directing the learned Sessions Judge to treat the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed u/s 372 of the Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to any appropriate Court to try the same -- The concerned Court shall decide the appeal on merits as per law, as expeditiously as possible -- Concerned Appellate Court need not to adhere to the delay aspect, if any, involved in the case, for the purpose of considering the issue raised in the appeal and its disposal on merit.

(Para 5, 6)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 2(o), 2(k), 18, 19, 21, 22, 31 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Breach of Residence / Monetary/ Custody order – FIR for non-compliance – Quashing of FIR -- Penalty for breach of protection order – Mandate of -- The words in Section 31 are plain and ambiguous -- They only mention the protection and interim protection order -- Applying the literal rules of interpretation, Section 31 applies only to the breach of protection orders mentioned in Section 18 and not to residence orders mentioned in Section 19, monetary reliefs mentioned in section 20, custody orders mentioned in Section 21, and compensation orders mentioned in Section 22 -- Had the legislature intended to apply Section 31 to these orders, it would have mentioned them specifically.

– Section 31 of the DV Act creates an offence. It is the rule of interpretation of the statute that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed because they deprive a citizen of his life and liberty, and no act, which does not fall within the purview of the criminal statute, can be added to it by way of interpretation.

Monetary relief which is separately provided in Section 2 (k) of the DV Act cannot be added to the protection order separately provided in Sections 2 (o) and 18 of the DV Act -- Learned Magistrate erred in referring the application to the police under Section 156(3) of Cr.PC -- Police could not have registered the FIR for the breach of the monetary order -- Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR quashed.

(Para 14, 15, 17, 23)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Contributory negligence -- Learner’s License – Effect of -- B.D.O./ injured/ claimant had exercised his authority to travel pillion, despite being aware of the driver holding only a learners licence – Negligence is only a question of fact, when a person drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence, which by itself cannot lead to a finding of negligence, leading to or as regards, the accident -- Mere fact that the driver of the scooter had only a learners licence would necessarily lead to a conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the scooter driver -- There can be no negligence found on the scooter driver also by the mere fact that the accident occurred on a collision at the tail-end of a long trailer, when the scooter driver had better visibility; which is a question of fact liable to be proved and not merely presumed -- Appellant is entitled to compensation from the insurer of the offending vehicle.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Amputation of both legs -- Accident occurred on 03.11.1999 -- Rs.16,00,000/- awarded as compensation – Simple interest @ 7% per annum from the date of the award given.

(Para 1, 8)

A. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 4, 5, 23 – Maintenance to Senior citizen – Eviction of son – Property already transferred to daughter/ son-in-law – Effect of -- Exfacie Senior citizen ceases to be the owner of the property and it is up to the purchasers to initiate eviction proceedings, if any, against the occupants of any part of it -- Senior citizens are simply entitled to maintenance rather than eviction of their son/ relatives -- It was only in the contingency of son not behaving properly or continuing to humiliate or torture the parents that the eviction proceedings would be necessary against him -- Tribunal was justified in permitting him to continue living therein with the rider of drawing eviction proceedings if he indulges in any untoward behavior or interferes with the life of others.

(Para 26-29)

B. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 4, 5, 23 – Eviction of son -- If son has been living in a small portion of the house, may be of his father, in which he has no share and is continuing with the family business from the shop on the ground floor without interfering with the life of others, it does not appear to be prudent to order for his eviction as after all being a son he also has an implied license to live therein – No necessity for the extreme step for ordering the eviction -- Purpose could have been served by ordering maintenance as provided under Section 4/5 of the Senior Citizens Act and by restraining him from harassing the parents and interfering in their day-to-day life.

(Para 29, 34)

C. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23 -- Senior citizen case -- Eviction of person – Power of -- Provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior person -- It is only on account of the observations made by this Court in S. Vanitha vs. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors, (2021) 15 SCC 730 that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens -- The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act which otherwise provide for treating the sale of the property to be void if it is against the interest of the senior citizen.

(Para 31)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 142, 148, 323, 506 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 9 -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Plea of alibi – Held, plea of alibi put forward by the petitioners cannot form a ground for quashing the impugned challan -- Veracity of the defence put up by the petitioners can be gone into by the trial court – High Court in exercise of its powers u/s 528 of BNSS cannot hold a mini trial -- In case, the petitioners feel that their defence of alibi has not been investigated by the Investigating Agency, it is open to them to approach the learned trial Magistrate before whom charge sheet has been filed and seek further investigation of the case -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11, 96, 100 – Res-judicata – Two suits – Comon judgment -- One appeal – Effect of -- Trial Court dismissed Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 and decreed Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 based on common evidence lead by parties after clubbing of the suits -- There is not even a whisper about findings rendered by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 in the grounds of First Appeal preferred against Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 – Held, Ld. Additional District Judge was justified in dismissing the appeal preferred only against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 without assailing the same in Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 -- Appeal preferred before District Judge as well as present appeal is barred by principle of resjudicata.

(Para 5, 6)