A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail – Discretion of court -- Under Section 482 of Sanhita 2023, the Hon'ble Courts have been conferred wider powers and discretion for granting anticipatory bail.

(Para 19)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 531 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Constitution of India, Article 254, List-III of the 7th Schedule – Repeal of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Effect on State amendments -- Cr.P.C. 1973 has been repealed and there is no existence of the Cr.P.C. 1973 and the State amendments made in the erstwhile Cr.P.C. 1973 does not find place in the saving clause of newly enacted Sanhita 2023 – Held, subsequent law made by the Parliament though, does not expressly repeal the State law, nevertheless, the State Law will be impliedly repealed and that shall give way to any subsequent parliament law in respect with “same matter” which adds to, amends, varies or repeals the law made by the legislature of the State, by virtue of operation of proviso of Article 254 of the Constitution of India -- Code of Criminal Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act 2018 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 2019) passed by the State legislature would stand impliedly repealed.

(Para 20, 21, 47-49)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 438(2) -- Execution of maintenance order – Summoning – Interlocutory order -- Challenge to – Maintainability of revision -- An order issuing notice on an application does not decide the rights of the parties, therefore, such an order is interlocutory in nature --  An interlocutory order is used to address procedural matters and it does not decide the rights of the parties conclusively -- Therefore, such an order is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the superior court -- Section 438(2) of BNSS creates a statutory bar for exercising revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order -- Thus the revisional court has rightly refused to entertain the revision petition filed by the petitioners.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 90, 376(2)(n), 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Criminal intimidation – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Complainant/ respondent no2 and appellant interacted frequently and fell in love – She engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions – The narrative of the Complainant/ Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct -- Consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact -- No material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise.

-- Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant.

-- No evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the Complainant/ Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence under section 506 IPC.

A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State -- It a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC -- Ingredients of the offence under Sections 376 (2)(n) or 506 IPC are not established -- Appellant is just 25 years of age, and has a lifetime ahead of him, it would be in the interest of justice that he does not suffer an impending trial and, therefore, the proceedings quashed at this stage itself.

(Para 8-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483(3) -- Bail by Supreme court – Violation of condition of bail – Cancellation of bail – Power of Trial court -- Supreme Court directed the Respondent to be enlarged on regular bail on such conditions as the Learned Trial Court deemed appropriate, albeit illustratively listing down certain condition -- Learned Trial Court i.e., being a Court of Sessions was entitled to entertain an application under Section 439(2) of the CrPC (now 483(3) of the BNSS) seeking cancellation of bail on the grounds of violation of bail conditions imposed by it; notwithstanding the fact that bail was granted by a Constitutional Court.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 430, 34 – Quashing of FIR – Auction of gold by bank inspite of full re-payment -- Revaluation report of gold is of February, 2023, i.e., much after the payment had been made and the loan stood settled – Letters addressed by the appellant to the officials of the bank seeking return of the pledged gold were subsequent to the full and final payment, i.e., on 3rd April, 2023 and 25th April, 2023 -- High Court had improperly quashed the proceedings in FIR -- Proceedings restored.

(Para 12-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 307 – Murder – Attempt to murder -- Anticipatory bail – Setting aside of -- Order of the High Court does not disclose any reasoning for granting anticipatory bail in a matter involving serious offences u/s 302 and 307 IPC -- Impugned order is cryptic and lacking in judicial analysis -- Anticipatory bail in such a mechanical manner cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside -- Specific roles attributed to the accused, as stated in the FIR, indicate that they participated in the assault even after the deceased had collapsed -- High Court has clearly failed to appreciate the gravity and nature of the allegations -- Appeal allowed, impugned order of the High Court set aside -- Respondents are directed to surrender.

(Para 10-13)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Duty of Court – Object of provision -- Order VII Rule 11 CPC serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication -- There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is surreal -- Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are standalone grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit -- However, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses (a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive -- When clever drafting veils the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the threshold -- Power to reject a plaint under this provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit or barred by law.

(Para 14.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (a) – Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- Merely including a paragraph on cause of action is not sufficient but rather, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must disclose a cause of action -- Plaint should contain such cause of action that discloses all the necessary facts required in law to sustain the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s) -- Even if a right is found, unless there is a violation or breach of that right by the defendant, the cause of action should be deemed to be unreal -- A pure question of law that can be decided at the early stage of litigation, ought to be decided at the earliest stage.

(Para 15)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A, 54 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 41(j) – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269ST – Rejection of plaint -- Suit for declaration – Based upon agreement to sell -- Unless and until the sale deed is executed, the purchaser is not vested with any right, title or interest in the property except to the limited extent of seeking specific performance from his vendor -- Any right, until the sale deed is executed, will vest only with the owner -- Since the respondents are not divested any right by virtue of the agreement, they cannot sustain the suit as they would not have any locus -- Consequently, they also cannot seek any declaration in respect of the title of the vendors -- Respondents/ plaintiffs claim to have paid the entire consideration of Rs.75,00,000/- in cash, despite the introduction of Section 269ST to the Income Tax Act in 2017 and the corresponding amendment to Section 271 DA – Yet another defect in the plaint is regarding the identity of the property – Plaint ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC – Application U/O 7 R 11 (a) & (d) allowed.

(Para 15-20)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Defence of defendant – Consideration of -- Principle that only averments in the plaint are to be considered under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- While it is true that the defendant's defense is not to be considered at this stage, this does not mean that the court must accept patently untenable claims or shut its eyes to settled principles of law and put the parties to trial, even in cases which are barred and the cause of action is fictitious -- Where the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless, courts should exercise their power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and not waste judicial time on matters that are legally barred and frivolous.

(Para 17)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53A, 54 – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269ST – Permissible limit of two lacs in cash -- Suit filed claiming Rs.75,00,000/- paid by cash – Not only it create a suspicion on the transaction, but also displays, a violation of law -- When there is a law in place, the same has to be enforced -- Most times, such transactions go unnoticed or not brought to the knowledge of the income tax authorities -- Ignorance in fact is excusable but not the ignorance in law – Directions issued:

(A) Whenever, a suit is filed with a claim that Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is paid by cash towards any transaction, the courts must intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department to verify the transaction and the violation of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, if any,

(B) Whenever, any such information is received either from the court or otherwise, the Jurisdictional Income Tax authority shall take appropriate steps by following the due process in law,

(C) Whenever, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is claimed to be paid by cash towards consideration for conveyance of any immovable property in a document presented for registration, the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar shall intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authority who shall follow the due process in law before taking any action,

(D) Whenever, it comes to the knowledge of any Income Tax Authority that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- or above has been paid by way of consideration in any transaction relating to any immovable property from any other source or during the course of search or assessment proceedings, the failure of the registering authority shall be brought to the knowledge of the Chief Secretary of the State/UT for initiating appropriate disciplinary action against such officer who failed to intimate the transactions.

(Para 18.1)

A. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Guidelines, Para 172 -- UNESCO -- World Heritage Status – Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) -- Construction of verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 in Punjab and Haryana High Court -- Court Room Nos. 2 to 9, which have the preexisting verandahs, provide shelter to the lawyers and litigants and at the same time the area in front of the Court Room No. 1 is unprotected and exposes the lawyers and the litigants to sun, winds and rain -- Neither such verandah can be said to be a major restoration nor a new construction within the main structure of the High Court building -- Such an addition would unquestionably not violate the mandate of paragraph 172 of the Operational Guidelines thereby posing a risk to the OUV of the High Court building -- Decision of the High Court in directing construction of the verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 in alignment with the design of the pre-existing verandahs in front of Court Room Nos. 2 to 9 is absolutely justified and would not violate the UNESCO guidelines.

(Para 34-39)

B. Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031 – Parking area in Punjab and Haryana High Court – Land part of Green belt -- Laying of green paver blocks in open parking area -- Said area is already being used by the lawyers and litigants to park their vehicles during Court hours -- Almost 3000 to 4000 four-wheeler vehicles are parked in the area on any given working day -- This practice has been prevalent since last many years because the pre-existing parking facility has fallen woefully short with the efflux of time and increase of footfall into the High Court campus -- Land in question is a part of the green belt, however, Supreme Court has time and again addressed this issue and has provided that for sustainable development, a balanced view is necessary -- Requirement of a proper parking space for the lawyers and the litigants is imperative -- Orders passed by the High Court for placing green paver blocks in the open area being used for parking, upheld -- High Court administration may consult with the landscaping experts and ensure plantation of a suitable number of trees at appropriate intervals so as to facilitate parking of maximum number of vehicles and creating shade as well as shelter for the said vehicles and in addition thereto, increasing the green cover in the area -- This exercise shall be monitored by the concerned Committee of the High Court.

(Para 40-45)

A. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 55 -- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (24 of 1961), Section 48 -- Charge on immovable property -- Alienation of such property – Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller -- Whether Void or voidable -- It would not be within the domain of the member-loanee who himself commits a breach to take a stand that the act done by him should be declared void, without the society coming forward before an appropriate forum to set aside such alienation -- Law cannot, and does not, reward a person for his/her own wrongs.

(Para 24)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 55 -- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (24 of 1961), Section 48 -- Charge on immovable property -- Alienation of such property – Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller -- Whether Void abinitio or voidable -- Society, in whose favour the charge was created on the land in question, never moved before any forum for enforcing its charge over the suit land or raised any grievance with regard to either of the Sale Deeds -- Section 48(e) of the Act says that any alienation made in contravention of the provisions of clause (d) shall be void has to be read as directory to the extent that the same can be acted upon only at the instance of the party aggrieved (viz. the society concerned) upon whom the right has been created under the statute -- With regard to a transaction, unless the society comes forward to seek its nullification/ setting aside, the same would at best be a voidable action and not void ab initio.

(Para 25)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 -- Doctrine of proportionality – Service matter – Disciplinary proceedings -- As a general principle, not only in service jurisprudence but also in other branches of law, the doctrine of proportionality is deeply embedded as a part of constitutionalism -- Traces of this doctrine are visible through Articles 14, 16, and 21 of Constitution -- Doctrine of proportionality forbids the competent Authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully, or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the Court -- When the punishment of dismissal is awarded on a trivial issue, the Court will be well within its jurisdiction to question the quantum of punishment and annul it -- However, the enforcement of the maxim varies from case to case as the facts and circumstances of each case are necessary parameters to decide how to invoke this principle.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Dismissal from service -- Respondent was posted in a sensitive border area performing the duties of Sentry -- Respondent, was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment, and discipline -- However, contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box -- He has, therefore, committed robbery of the cash amount, which he was designated to protect -- In Para Military Forces  discipline, ethics, loyalty, dedication to service, and reliability are essential to the job -- All members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter -- He was found guilty of minor misconducts on eight separate occasions, where punishments were awarded -- Misconduct proved against the respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient – Dismissal order upheld.

(Para 2, 11-13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 200, 372, 378 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act – Appeal against acquittal – Right of -- Complainant is indeed the victim owing to the alleged dishonour of a cheque -- Proviso to Section 372 does not make a distinction between an accused who is charged of an offence under the penal law or a person who is deemed to have committed an offence u/s 138 of the Act – A victim of a deemed offence u/s 138 of the Act also has the right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing an inadequate compensation -- Merely because the proceeding u/s 138 of the Act commences with the filing of a complaint u/s 200 of the CrPC by a complainant, he does not cease to be a victim inasmuch as it is only a victim of a dishonour of cheque who can file a complaint -- Thus, u/s 138 of the Act both the complainant as well as the victim are one and the same person.

(Para 7.8, 7.9, 7.12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 372, 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Right of – Victim/ complainant -- Victim of an offence has the right to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, irrespective of whether he is a complainant or not -- Even if the victim of an offence is a complainant, he can still proceed under the proviso to Section 372 and need not advert to sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the CrPC.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(b) – Charge -- CrPC does not define what a charge is -- However, judicial pronouncements tell us that a charge is actually a precise formulation of the specific accusation made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the earliest stage -- The charge is against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it -- A charge is an accusation made against a person in respect of offence alleged to have been committed by him.

(Para 6.7.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2 -- Accused -- Expression ‘accused’ is not defined under the CrPC but it denotes different meanings according to the context in which it is deployed -- It, inter alia, means, a person against whom there is an accusation, or a person on trial, and so on -- The expression ‘accused of any offence’ would include within its ambit only a person against whom formal accusation relating to commission of offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his prosecution.

(Para 7.2)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 372, 374, 378 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Complainant’s right to appeal – Convict’s right to appeal -- Right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC -- A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal u/s 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions -- Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal -- Right to prefer an appeal by an accused against a conviction is not merely a statutory right but can also be construed to be a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution -- If that is so, then the right of a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal -- Hence, the statutory rigours for filing of an appeal by the State or by a complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC so as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein, when none exists.

(Para 7.12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Status quo in respect of possession of the suit property – Whether construction permissible -- There is no restraint on the parties to the suit on raising construction on the portion of property which is in their respective possession -- Had it been a case of blanket order of status quo passed by the learned trial court, perhaps the things would have been different but it is a case where the learned trial court has qualified its order of status quo by mentioning the word “possession”, meaning thereby that the status quo has to be maintained by the parties to the suit with regard to possession of the suit property.

-- by raising construction on the suit property, the status quo as has been directed by the learned trial court does not get infringed in any manner whatsoever.

-- there was no need for respondent No.2 or for any other party to seek permission of the court for raising construction over the portion of the suit property which was in their possession.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 153, 153-A, 505, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Promoting enmity on facebook -- Undermining sovereignty and integrity of the Country -- In one of the posts, the Village/ Mohalla/ town committees of Kashmir have been instigated to come together to make sure that not a single non-local lives in their areas -- They have been asked to ensure that all non-Kashmiris leave Kashmir -- The post contains threats to the officers who issue domicile certificates to non-Kashmiris and call for social boycott of such individuals has also been given in the said post -- The post goes on to instigate Kashmiris to collectively fight against settler colonialism -- Another post contains a call for boycotting India, Indian companies and to initiate movement against India. In the said post, it has been stated that by doing so, India will give up Kashmir.

-- these posts have the tendency of promoting enmity between Kashmiris and other people living in the Country and undermining sovereignty and integrity of the Country -- The posts are bluntly prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between various communities and these are likely to disturb public tranquillity -- Thus, it cannot be stated by any stretch of reasoning that these posts do not constitute any cognizable offence, as has been contended in the petition – Petition dismissed.

(Para 5-7, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Petition filed in Covid-19 situation – Non-filing of affidavit in support of petition -- Petitioner at the time of swearing the said affidavit was stationed in Malaysia and not in Jammu and Kashmir -- Affidavit is not attested by the competent authority -- Even after resumption of normal functioning of the Courts, the petitioner has not submitted a duly attested affidavit in support of the petition and the application -- On this ground, the instant petition cannot be entertained.

(Para 10)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Toll fee on National Highway – Non-maintainability of roads as per standard prescribed – Right of Road-user/ citizen -- Writ jurisdiction – Pendency of arbitration proceedings respondent-parties – Effect of -- Petitioner is a road user and he is paying toll fee whenever he travels from Madurai to Tuticorin or from Tuticorin to Madurai despite the fact that the said highway road is not being maintained as per the standards prescribed under the NHAI Act, 1988 -- Pendency of arbitration proceedings is not a ground to reject the writ petition, since the National Highways Authority of India is under obligation to maintain the highways properly and thereafter, collect toll fee from the road users -- Instead, they are maintaining the highway road in a bad condition – Held, collection of toll fee is impermissible and the road users are entitled for a good conditioned National Highways and then alone they are liable to pay toll fee -- Respondents 1 to 4 directed not to collect toll fee from the citizens / road users, who are travelling from Madurai to Tuticorin or from Tuticorin to Madurai till such time, the highways road is re-laid or maintained as per the standards prescribed under the NHAI Act, 1988.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 233, 309 -- Promotion from Civil Judge (Senior Division) to the Higher Judicial Service -- Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) – Quota – Eligibility -- All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country directed to amend the relevant service Rules to the effect that the quota of reservation for LDCE for promotion from the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) to the Higher Judicial Service is increased to 25%;

-- All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that the minimum qualifying service required to appear in the LDCE for promotion from the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) to the Higher Judicial Service be reduced to 3 years’ service as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the total service required to be undertaken, including service rendered as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Civil Judge (Senior Division), be set at a minimum of 7 years’ service;

If any post reserved for LDCE remains vacant, the same shall be filled through regular promotion on the basis of ‘merit-cum-seniority’ in that particular year -- Filling up of the vacant posts in the ratio considered for LDCE will have to be carried out from the simultaneous selection process carried out for regular promotions of the same year -- High Courts and the Governments of the States where the vacancies for the LDCE are not being calculated based on the cadre strength shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that the vacancies for LDCE be calculated on the basis of cadre strength.

(Para 89 (i), (ii), (iv), (v))

B. Constitution of India, Article 234, 309 -- Promotion from the cadre of Civil Judge (Junior Division) to Civil Judge (Senior Division) -- Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) – Quota – Eligibility -- All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that 10% of the posts in the Cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) be reserved for accelerated promotion of Civil Judge (Junior Division) candidates through LDCE mechanism -- The minimum qualifying service required for appearing in the said LDCE shall be three years’ service as Civil Judge (Junior Division) -- If any post reserved for LDCE remains vacant, the same shall be filled through regular promotion on the basis of ‘merit-cum-seniority’ in that particular year -- Filling up of the vacant posts in the ratio considered for LDCE will have to be carried out from the simultaneous selection process carried out for regular promotions of the same year.

High Courts and the Governments of the States where the vacancies for the LDCE are not being calculated based on the cadre strength shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that the vacancies for LDCE be calculated on the basis of cadre strength.

(Para 89 (iii), (iv), (v))

C. Constitution of India, Article 234, 309 -- Promotion from Civil Judge (Senior Division) to the Higher Judicial Service -- All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country where the Rules are not framed or if they are framed but are not adequate to judge the suitability of a candidate for being promoted to the Cadre of Higher Judicial Service from the Cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) shall frame fresh Rules or amend the existing Rules keeping in mind various factors like:

(i) whether the candidate possesses updated knowledge of law;

(ii) the quality of judgments rendered by the Judicial Officer;

(iii) ACRs of the Judicial Officer of the preceding five years;

(iv) disposal rate in the preceding five years;

(v) performance of the Judicial Officer in the viva voce; and

(vi) general perceptions and awareness as also communication skills.

(Para 89 (vi))

D. Constitution of India, Article 234, 309 – Appointment/ Recruitment  as Civil Judge (Junior Division) – Minimum 3 year practice as an Advocate – Requirement of -- All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that candidates desirous of appearing in the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practiced for a minimum period of 3 years to be eligible for the said examination -- Rules shall mandate that the candidate produces a certificate to that effect duly certified either by the Principal Judicial Officer of that Court or by an advocate of that Court having a minimum standing of 10 years duly endorsed by the Principal Judicial Officer of such a District or a Principal Judicial Officer at such a station -- Insofar as the candidates who are practicing before the High Courts or this Court, they shall be certified by an advocate who has a minimum standing of 10 years duly endorsed by an officer designated by that High Court or this Court -- Experience of the candidates which they have gained while working as Law Clerks with any of the Judges or Judicial Officers in the country should also be considered while calculating their total number of years of practice -- The Rules shall also mandate that the candidates who are appointed to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) pursuant to their selection through the examination must compulsorily undergo at least 1 year of training before presiding in a Court;

-- number of years of practice completed by a candidate desirous of appearing in the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) be calculated from the date of their provisional enrolment/registration with the concerned State Bar Council;

-- said requirement of minimum years of practice shall not be applicable in cases where the concerned High Court has already initiated the selection process for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) prior to the date of judgment and shall be applicable only from the next recruitment process.

(Para 89 (vii)-(ix))

Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (54 of 1987), Section 23 -- Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 2(29), 123, 124A – Compensation in railway accident – Deceased purchased ticket before midnight traveling after midnight – Validity of railway ticket -- Bonfide passenger -- RCT dismissed the claim petition – Deceased did not board the train that arrived prior to midnight as it might be overcrowded and he did not feel safe to travel on that train along with his sister and her child – Deceased fell from a moving train and sustained fatal injuries – Ticket remained valid for 24 hours from the time of issuance -- In the absence of any explicit stipulation on the face of the ticket or any statutory prescription to the contrary, it cannot be presumed that the validity of the journey ticket expired at midnight -- Respondent/ railway cannot absolve themselves of their liability in terms of Section 124A of the Act -- Appeal allowed, the appellant made entitled to a statutory compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/- payable with interest of 12% per annum from the date of accident i.e. 04.10.2017 till its realization.

(Para 20-26)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 21 -- Unilateral appointment of Arbitrator – Permissibility of -- Appointment of the 2nd Respondent as an Arbitrator is unilateral in nature, which is not permissible -- If the other party were not to respond to the request favourably, it was for party to approach this Court u/s 11 of the Act, seeking the appointment of any Arbitrator by High Court and not to appoint an Arbitrator by itself and proceed with the matter -- Orders passed by an arbitrator not properly appointed are nonest.

(Para 9)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 21 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Notice suggesting name of Arbitrator – Non-consent to – Effect of -- A person who is the named Arbitrator in a notice issued u/s 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot enter reference and pass orders without the other person consenting thereto, or without an order of appointment of Arbitrator by institution or a Court u/s 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(Para 10.10)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11,  21 – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Appointment of Arbitrator without consent – Possession of hypothecated vehicle -- Misusing the arbitration mechanism – Writ jurisdiction -- Respondent appointed a private person as an Arbitrator without the consent of the other party – Respondent indulged itself in misuse of the Act, obtained so-called order from a unilaterally appointed Arbitrator for repossession of a vehicle using police help -- Actions on part of respondent by involving the jurisdictional police, abusing the process of law, misusing the arbitral mechanism would entitle High Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to render effective justice to the Petitioners who have been deprived of their rights, by the above misuse on part of respondents -- If a Constitutional Court does not come to the rescue of the Petitioners, that would amount to denial of justice to the Petitioners, which cannot be countenanced under any law – Held, Writ Petition is maintainable.

Director General of Police directed to appoint a suitable officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police to conduct an enquiry into the manner in which the above proceedings were held and submit a report within a period of six weeks -- If there are any other similar complaints received necessary enquiry in regard thereto would also have to be held.

(Para 10.9, 12.2, 12.3)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187, 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest of accused – Non-production before Magistrate – Regular bail – Right of -- Petitioner admitted in hospital for last 45 day after the date of his arrest – His status is not of a free person but of an arrestee -- No order u/s 187 BNSS was passed by the Magistrate -- In absence of any order of remand beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in custody -- Since such non-production of the petitioner, even through video conferencing mode, beyond 24 hours in custody amounts to violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, his fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also violated and, on that count, the petitioner is entitled to go on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 14-18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest – Production before Magistrate -- Arrestee shall have to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours -- Where the arrestee is injured and requires urgent medical care have to be rushed to the hospital for providing urgent medical treatment -- However, in such cases also the Magistrate may ascertain the condition of the arrestee through video conferencing or personally visiting such arrestee -- After the arrest of a person if he is not released on bail, an order for remand to judicial custody has to be made -- Magistrate may authorize his detention either in judicial or in police custody -- Unless, such an order is passed, the initial arrest of the petitioner beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, would become illegal.

(Para 15, 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A -- Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal -- PW.1/ complainant deposed the driver of the car was speeding, however, nowhere stated that the accused’s driving involved traces of rash and negligent disposition -- Accident occurred on the left side of the road and the car in question was found on the right direction almost left side of the road -- Deceased was inebriated and under the influence of alcohol when he rode the motorbike -- Mere driving of vehicle in high speed neither amounts to negligence nor rashness in itself -- Degree of negligence of the accused cannot be ascertained on applying the ‘Principle of Foreseeability and Proximity’ since the accused was driving his vehicle in right direction – Conviction order set aside.

(Para 15-20)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135 – Theft of electricity – Penalty – Fine – Compensation -- Section 135(1)(a)(b) of ‘the Act’, gives discretion to the learned Trial Court either to impose upto one year imprisonment or fine of Rs.5,000/- -- Trial Court did not sentence the Appellant to any term as imprisonment, it imposed an amount of Rs.2,70,000/- towards fine and default imprisonment -- In an audit an amount of Rs.44,850/- was arrived, as appellant has indulged in power pilferage – Held, section 135(1)(a)(b) of ‘the Act’ does not confer imposition of Rs.2,70,000/- towards fine -- Petitioner has been in jail for the past fifteen days, he is aged about 84 years at present -- If an amount of Rs.20,000/- is directed to be paid towards compensation to the Corporation, it would meet the ends of justice – After the compensation of Rs.20,000/- is paid by the Appellant, Appellant be released forthwith.

(Para 5-7)

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), Section 39, 87 – Contribution by employer -- Exemption from ESI contribution -- Non-availability of medical facility in area –  Though the Appellant factory was said to have paid insurance to its employees under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 with the Oriental Insurance Company on the premise that there was no medical services available under the Act, the same per se cannot be a ground to exempt the Appellant factory from paying the E.S.I dues – Held, appropriate Government alone can consider this aspect as it requires a fact evaluation and an independent cause of action for the Appellant -- As long as the premises is under coverage of E.S.I. Act, there cannot be any exemption for payment by the authorities constituted under the Act.

(Para 13-18)

A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 33, 33A – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Loss of confidence in employee – Pleadings – Requirement of -- Illegal discharge/ dismissal from service – Effect of -- Findings with regard to the loss of confidence in an employee can be returned by the learned Labour Court provided it is pleaded and proved by the employer that :

(a) the workman is holding a position of trust and confidence;

(b) by abusing such position, he commits acts which result in forfeiting the same;

(c) to continue him in service would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer or would be detrimental of the discipline or security of the establishment.

No such pleading that there was a loss of confidence in the employee -- Court is a slave of pleadings and adjudication has to be within the ambit of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence which is led by the parties to substantiate the pleadings --  Conclusions cannot be drawn by the Court in air on its own whims and fancies without taking into consideration the respective contentions and stand of the parties – Findings returned to this effect by learned Labour Court are perverse, bad, beyond the pleadings and not sustainable in law – Writ allowed, petitioner is deemed to have continued in service as from the date of his illegal dismissal, entitling him to all benefits available, monetary and otherwise.

(Para 16-26)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 33, 33A – Loss of confidence in employee – Non-approval by Labour Court -- Discharge/ Dismissal from service – Effect upon -- If the approval sought by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not granted by the learned Labour Court, then nothing more is required to be done by the employee as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal was never passed and consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to be in continuous service, entitling him all the benefits.

(Para 24)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22 – Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- NDPS – PMLA – Discharge in NDPS case – Continuity in Money laundering offence – Permissibility of -- Money laundering itself is a separate crime, distinct from the original (or scheduled) offence like corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. -- Even if the scheduled offence is tried under Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Act, etc., money laundering is prosecuted separately under PMLA -- Offence u/s 3 is dependent on the scheduled offence, but it is a separate and independent offence once the activity of laundering begins -- Mere discharge or quashing  of a FIR by a competent court does not automatically result in the quashing of an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 -- Discharge in the predicate offence may influence the procedures under the PMLA; however, it cannot be regarded as an automatic or definitive basis for nullifying the ECIR.

(Para 30, 40, 41)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- PMLA – Not an accused in scheduled offence – Effect of -- A person can be prosecuted for money laundering even if they are not directly involved in the commission of the scheduled offence, so long as they are involved in the laundering process -- A person accused of an offence u/s 3 PMLA need not necessarily be shown as an accused in the scheduled offence.

(Para 31, 32)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- Discharge in the predicate offence -- Summon u/s 50 of PMLA – Nature of -- Enforcement Directorate's authority to summon individuals u/s 50 is intended for the acquisition of factual evidence pertaining to money laundering offences; obtaining a summons under this section does not inherently indicate that one is an accused in a money laundering investigation -- This indicates that the individual may have information or documents pertinent to the investigation -- Issuance of summons is a fundamental component in the execution of a fair and unbiased investigation -- It affords the relevant parties an opportunity to be heard, to articulate their case, and to address the allegations levied against them -- Issuance of summons under the PMLA should be regarded as an essential element of due process, intended to advance the rule of law and bolster public trust in the legal system -- Discharge in the predicate offence, albeit substantial, does not, as a legal principle, impact the ongoing validity of the summons -- Mere discharge of the petitioner concerning the predicate offence does not, in itself, grant the Court the power to annul the summons.

(Para 34-39)

Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (7 of 2014), Section 3, 4, 17, 36 -- Welfare of Street Vendors – Medical and insurance facility to street vendors -- Duty of Municipal Corporation -- Street vendors and their families, who are depositing fee with the Municipal Corporation for the certificate being given to them for vending, also need to be provided some social protection -- Amount so recovered by the Municipal Corporation should, therefore, be used for their benefits alone and should be kept in a separate budget head, and as a suitable insurance for them, including medical facilities, should be provided by the Municipal Corporation, U.T. Chandigarh, and Rules in this regard should be framed -- Municipal Corporation, U.T. Chandigarh, should set up a particular cell of Inspectors/ Officers to regulate that there is no misuse of the Vendors’ Act so that genuine people may not be harmed.

(Para 17-19)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Relevant fact – Absconding of accused – Effect of -- Mere absconding by itself does not constitute a guilty mind as even an innocent man may feel panicky and may seek to evade the police when wrongly suspected of being involvement as an instinct of self-preservation -- But the act of abscondence is certainly a relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence and is a conduct u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which points to his guilty mind -- Needle of suspicion gets strengthened by the act.

(Para 10.9.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive is something that is very difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the deep recess of the mind of the person concerned and in the absence of any open declaration by the person concerned himself, the motive has to be inferred from the activities and conduct of the person -- While proof of motive certainly strengthens the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, failure to prove the same cannot be fatal.

(Para 10.11.2, 10.11.3)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, Court see no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Onus of proof -- Recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Prosecution cannot depend on the false alibi or unproven defence plea since the onus is always on the prosecution to prove the prosecution case and the onus never shifts to the accused – If weapon of crime was traced to the accused, it was incumbent upon the appellant/ accused  to explain the circumstances of the recovery of the weapon with which a linkage has been established with the injury suffered by the deceased through scientific evidence -- Apart from claiming ignorance and denying the various incriminating evidence presented during the trial, the appellant chose not to adduce any evidence to explain these circumstances -- Silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution.

(Para 10.15)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Non-explanation of evidence by accused -- Adverse inference -- Examination of an accused u/s 313 CrPC is to enable the accused to prepare and strategize his defence – Accused will have all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution witness or question any evidence and lead his defence evidence if any -- Despite the incriminating evidence which has come up against him has been pointed out to him by the Court, he has not explained any of these but merely denied or feigned ignorance to which necessary inference can be drawn against him.

(Para 10.16.1, 10.16.2)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory – Dead body of the deceased was recovered in a decomposed state, three days after the deceased was last seen together with the appellant -- As per postmortem, the death occurred 3/4 days before the postmortem examination -- Dead body was discovered with gunshot wounds on the head -- A double barrel gun with 2 spent and 1 live cartridges were recovered at the instance of the appellant -- As per the opinion of the ballistic expert, the gun showed signs of discharge and was in working condition, pellets and wads were recovered from the brain/ skull of the dead body, and these could have been fired through the gun examined and the double-barrel gun could be dismantled. Following circumstances and acts of the appellant strengthens the linkage.

(i) The appellant remained hidden from 11.07.2006 till 22.07.2006. He was arrested on 22.07.2006 after extensive search on numerous locations after the identification of the identity of the dead body on 14.07.2006.

(ii) The appellant had misled his friends, his family members and that of the deceased.

(iii) Personal effects of the deceased like gold chain was recovered from the appellant.

Appellant’s silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution -- Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court which the High Court upheld does not warrant any interference.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135-140, 145, 150, 154 – Electricity actionable matters -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Purposive interpretation -- All the actionable matters become amenable for exercising of jurisdiction thereover by the statutorily created special authorities/ special bodies -- There is complete ouster of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the Civil Courts.

(Para 30-32, 34)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135, 145, 154 – Theft of electricity – Jurisdiction of Civil court -- Not only in respect of Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act of 2003 but also in respect of the matters falling within the ambit of Section 135 of the Act of 2003, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

(Para 33)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 151A, 153, 154 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Investigation by police – Offences tried by the Special Courts – Summary trial – Cross-examination of witnesses – Permissibility of -- Powers of investigations conferred upon the investigating officers serving in the police stations stems from the mandate enclosed in Section 151-A -- Reports prepared u/s 173 Cr.P.C., are to be filed before the Special Courts – Even a summary trial, does require the assigning of an opportunity to the accused to make effective cross-examination(s) upon the prosecution witnesses, as right to fair trial becomes envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 39-41)

D. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Theft of electricity – Civil liability – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Only pursuant to a binding and conclusive verdict of conviction becoming made by the Special Court, vis-a-vis the errant consumer, the Special Court in terms of sub-Section (5) of Section 154 of the Act of 2003, shall proceed to determine the compensation amount to be paid by the consumer concerned, to the supplier.

(Para 44)

E. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 152, 154(5), 155 – Composition of offence – Civil liability -- Makings of composition(s) of an offence in terms of Section 152 of the Act of 2003, would tantamount to acceptance of the guilt by the errant consumer -- Post the making of an order of composition, if the compounding fee, does not also cover the civil liability, the Court concerned may proceed to determine the civil liability against the errant consumer.

(Para 48)

F. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Prosecution in Special court – Acquittal – Compensation for malicious prosecution – Jurisdiction of civil court -- There is no remedy to the accused, to post the making of a binding and clinching verdict of acquittal by the Special Court -- As such, in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, a suit in the said regard can be laid before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 53)

G. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 145 -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Jurisdiction of High Court – Judicial review -- Jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs of various genres, is a constitutionally invested power, and, the said power is an in-segregable component of judicial review of administrative actions, or of the quasi-judicial actions, besides is the basic structure of the constitution -- As such, the power of judicial review of High Courts cannot be snatched even through the occurrence of Section 145 in the Act of 2003.

(Para 54)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Abatement of suicide – Discharge of accused -- No normal person could have imagined that a scolding, that too based on a complaint by a student, would result in such tragedy due to the student so scolded taking his own life -- No mens rea can be attributed to the appellant much less, with regard to abatement of suicide committed by the deceased -- Appeal allowed, order framing charge against the appellant under Section 306 of the IPC set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Long pendency of FIR – Withholding of retiral benefits – Legality of -- Right of employee -- Challan was presented before the Trial Court on 08.02.2005 -- Petitioner virtually retired in July’ 2018 -- He is unable to get his retiral dues because of aforesaid FIR -- He cannot be held guilty for non-adjudication of aforesaid FIR -- The fault lies either with the Police Authorities or Public Prosecutor or Court Staff -- Respondent-State has no authority to withhold petitioner’s dues on account of pendency of aforesaid FIR -- State directed to release retiral dues of the petitioner -- If within two months, the Department is able to establish that petitioner was held guilty in aforesaid FIR, the status of retiral dues would be considered as per law.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 229 -- Appointment of Court Managers – Uniform Service conditions – Rules for appointment -- All the High Courts in the country shall frame or amend the rules providing for recruitment and conditions of service of Court Managers, by taking the Assam Rules of 2018 as the model Rules, and submit it to the State Government for approval within a period of 3 months from the date of judgment -- High Courts and the State Governments would be at liberty to make suitable modifications/changes so as to suit their peculiar needs -- Upon receipt of the rules framed or amendments thereof by the High Courts, the respective State Governments shall finalise and grant approval to the same within a further period of 3 months:

-- Minimum rank/ class of such Court Managers should be of a Class-II Gazetted Officer for the purpose of basic pay, allowances and other service benefits;

-- Court Managers appointed in the High Courts shall work under the directions and supervision of the Registrar General/ Registrars of the High Courts. Insofar as the Court Managers appointed in the District Courts are concerned, they shall work under the supervision and control of the Registrars/Superintendents (Head of the Ministerial Staff) of the concerned courts;

-- While determining the duties, functions and the responsibilities of the Court Managers, the Rules Committee of the High Courts shall ensure that their duties, functions and responsibilities do not overlap with that of the Registrars of the High Court/District Courts.

(Para 44)

B. Constitution of India, Article 229 -- Regularization of Court Managers – Court Managers, who are already working either on contractual or consolidated pay basis or on ad hoc basis shall be continued and regularized subject to their passing the suitability test as will be provided in the rules to be framed by the respective High Courts and approved by the respective State Governments;

-- entitled to regularization from the date of their initial appointment.

-- benefits of such a regularization though would entitle them for continuity in service for all the purposes including terminal benefits, they would not be entitled for the arrears, if any, on account of difference between salary for the period from the date on which they are working till the date of their actual regularization;

-- process of regularization of the Court Managers shall commence and be completed within a period of 3 months from the date of approval of the rules by the respective State Governments;

-- respective Registrar Generals of the High Courts and the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments shall be personally responsible for adhering to the aforesaid timelines.

(Para 44)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Petitioner claiming to be the owner of the attached property – Magistrate framed an opinion that the objections of the petitioner would be considered only after attachment order is implemented on spot – Held, procedure adopted by learned trial Magistrate is not countenanced by law -- Impugned order set aside -- Learned trial Magistrate directed to proceed ahead and decide the objections filed by the petitioner to the attachment order most expeditiously after hearing the parties, without waiting for the compliance report of the Deputy Commissioner.

(Para 6-8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Section 84 of Cr.P.C. does not bar raising of objection prior to the attachment -- Thus, if a third party raises an objection prior to the attachment of the property, the court has to decide the same and if the court comes to the conclusion that the property does not belong to the accused, the court can pass an order, either declining to attach the property or withdraw the attachment order.

(Para 7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Transfer of divorce petition – Rohtak to Jind -- Generally, the Courts give preference to the convenience of wife in the transfer applications relating to the matrimonial disputes -- Applicant is not having any source of earning and she is taking care of the minor daughter -- Besides the same, three cases arising from this matrimonial dispute, are already pending in the Courts at Jind and the respondent is making appearance -- Transfer application allowed.

(Para 6-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- M.P. Mineral (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2022, Rules 3, 4 – Quashing of FIR -- Theft – Excavation of sand by Panchayat -- Exception under Rule 4 granted to the Gram Panchayat for transportation and storage of minor minerals quarried from the Government lands for public works -- This rule cannot be interpreted to the extent that the Gram Panchayat can commit theft or can illegally excavate the sand -- State Government is the owner of every mineral and therefore the illegal excavation of the same would amount to commission of theft -- It is not the case of applicant that the sand was purchased by the Gram Panchayat and the sand in question was quarried from Govt. land in legal manner -- Court can quash the proceedings only if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence -- Application dismissed.

(Para 5-10)

A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(g)(s) -- Master-servant relationship – Proof of -- Factum of master and servant relationship has to be proved on the basis the documentary evidence – No appointment order issued in favour of the respondent No.1-workman -- No salary slip issued by the petitioner-school in favour of the respondent No.1-workman has also been brought on record -- Merely that the respondent No.1-workman was working under the supervision of the Head Master, who is appointed by Government, is no ground to assert that there existed master and servant relationship between respondent No.1-workman and petitioner-school so as to claim benefit -- Mere supervisory control over the workman and working of the workman under the Principal employer will not create a master and servant relationship between both.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 2(g)(s), 17B, 25F – Termination of employee -- Master-servant relationship – Proof of -- Workman was appointed as Peon-cum-Chowkidar by Parents Teacher Association and was paid his salary out of the funds of the Parents Teacher Association -- Merely that the respondent No.1-workman working in the school is not good enough to hold that there existed master and servant relationship between respondent No.1-workman and petitioner-school -- Respondent No.1-workman never agitated his claim qua termination against the Parents Teacher Association, which was the employer -- Award against School passed by the Industrial Tribunal set aside -- Financial benefit already given to the respondent No.1-workman u/s 17-B of the 1947 Act will not be recovered.

(Para 1, 8-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Acquittal -- Delay of 5 days in FIR – Non providing of ownership of mobile -- Appellants were not named in the FIR – No Test identification parade/ TIP – If no test identification parade is held, then it will be totally unsafe to rely upon the bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court -- Small recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- -- Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police -- Recovery of money is not sufficient to prove the allegations of snatching -- Held, the trial Court had committed a grave error in convicting the appellants-accused – Conviction and sentence u/s 379-A read with Section 34 of IPC set aside.

(Para 11-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case -- Identity of snatchers – Proof of -- PW-2, stated that accused present in the Court were the persons who had snatched his mobile phone, but he had not given details of physical description of the snatchers like their complexion, height or features or about the clothing as worn by them in the complaint -- Occurrence took place at 11 PM and it was dark at the time -- It was not explained by this witness as to what was the basis on which he could identify the accused persons -- Possibility of this witness having seen the miscreants and identifying them in dark seems very remote -- Identification of the accused persons not established beyond doubt and this fact has created a serious dent in the story of the prosecution with regard to the involvement of the accused in the subject crime.

(Para 17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Recovery of small amount – Identity of currency notes -- Recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- at instance of accused --  Not proved to be having any specific identification mark -- Small amount could easily be planted -- Alleged recovery was effected on 28.07.2020 whereas the occurrence had taken place on 09.07.2019 -- It does not appeal to reason that the appellants would keep such small amounts of money for such a long time with them fully knowing that the same being incriminating piece of evidence could be used against them for proving commission of the subject crime -- Such like currency notes could be easily available in market -- Recovery of money at the instance of the accused could not be considered to be a circumstance sufficient to prove that the appellants had snatched any mobile phone.

(Para 18, 19)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, Section 47 -- Decree for possession with respect to a specific shop identified by the properties located in all the four directions -- Objector purchased the suit property, ten years after the decree was passed -- All the objection petitions are not required to be decided after framing the issues -- Prima facie, merit of the objection petition is to be examined by the Executing Court – Executing Court gave direction for registration of FIR against the judgment debtors and the objector -- FIR already registered by the decree holder will continue and shall remain unaffected – Objection petition dismissed, orders upheld.

(Para 2, 8-12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 2(8)(9), 4 – Rejection of plaint -- Benami properties -- Whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception -- It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred -- However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint -- Defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 27-29)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Absolute property of hindu female -- Plea that plaint is hit by Section 14 of the Act -- No such specific plea was taken by the defendants in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- Such a plea was never raised and argued before either of the courts below -- There is no finding by any court on the above aspect -- Defendants cannot be permitted to raise such a plea for the first time in the Special Leave Petition without there being any foundation to that effect.

(Para 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Absolute property of hindu female -- Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner -- It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property -- Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.

(Para 31)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1(d) -- Criminal misconduct by public servant – Corruption case -- No allegation in the chargesheet that the appellant obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage -- No allegation that the appellant agreed to accept or accepted any gratification -- No allegation that he had agreed or accepted any valuable thing or had dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use any property entrusted to him – Held, the ‘criminal misconduct’ as provided in Section 13(1) is not attracted -- Direction to frame charge for the offences u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act set aside.

(Para 14, 15)

Union of India Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, Regulation 19 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Allegation of adopting a very casual approach while sanctioning credit proposals in 16 accounts --  Respondent Bank sought the opinion of the CVC (Central Vigilance Commission) -- Even before getting the first stage advice charge sheet was served upon the appellant – Once, the first stage advice of the CVC was called, it was the duty of the respondent-Bank to consider the advice and then take a decision to serve the chargesheet – Held, actions of the respondent-Bank are mala fide and arbitrary -- Appellant was sought to be victimised at the fag end of his unblemished career of 34 years -- High Court committed a gross error by holding that Regulation 19 of the 1976 Regulations was not mandatory – Almost six years have passed since the superannuation of the Appellant – Now, at this stage, it will be unjust to allow the respondent-Bank to resume disciplinary proceedings -- Disciplinary proceedings, including the charge sheet quashed and set aside -- Appellant shall not be entitled to back wages and allowances -- Respondent Bank directed to release all retirement benefits.

(Para 15-25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 96  -- Rejection of plaint – Appeal against – Temporary injunction – Legality of -- Where an appeal is filed by being aggrieved by the rejection of a plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the High Court ought not to have granted an order of temporary injunction -- When the plaint itself has been rejected, it cannot be said that the appeal filed against such an order is a continuation of a suit -- Until it is revived / restored, an order of temporary injunction cannot operate against the defendant in the suit.

(Para 5)

A. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) --  Disciplinary proceedings -- Vagueness of charge-sheet – Ground of -- Chargesheet contain the charges against the Appellant supported by documents -- Charge against the Appellant was that she managed to get herself transferred from Kendriya Vidyalaya, Bangalore to Kendriya Vidyalaya, Bombay under a fake transfer order -- In this respect, the language of the said chargesheet is very clear and specific -- A common man on going through the same, would understand as to what were the charges which an employee was called upon to face and defend -- She was the sole beneficiary of the said transfer order -- Plea with regard to the vagueness of the chargesheet cannot be sustained.

(Para 18)

B. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Non-supply of the copy of the Preliminary Inquiry Report – Ground of – It was never made the basis for coming to a conclusion in the regular Departmental Inquiry with regard to the guilt of the Appellant -- After the preliminary Inquiry, chargesheet was issued to the Appellant and thereafter a regular Departmental Inquiry was held where both the parties had led their respective evidence and on that basis the Inquiry Officer has returned his findings -- The principles of natural justice are founded on three fundamental rules that ensure fairness in legal and administrative proceedings.

-- Firstly, the Hearing Rule (Audi Alteram Partem) which mandates that no person should be judged without being given a fair opportunity to present his case.

-- Secondly, the Bias Rule (Nemo Judex in Causa Sua) which asserts that no one should act as a judge in its own case, thereby safeguarding impartiality and preventing any form of bias.

-- Lastly, the principle of Reasoned Decision, also known as Speaking Orders, requires every decision to be supported by valid and clearly stated reasons to promote transparency and accountability in the decision-making process.

Nothing on record which would indicate that the Appellant had ever sought for the Preliminary Inquiry Report after the issuance of the chargesheet -- No prejudice having been caused because of the non-supply of the preliminary Inquiry Report to the Appellant, the plea of violation of the principles of natural justice would not be available to the Appellant -- Court is not bound to simply accept an assertion of a delinquent employee and proceed to question the disciplinary proceedings without being satisfied with regard to any prejudice having been caused to the employee.

(Para 19-23)

C. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 15(2) --  Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Delay in conclusion -- Plea of prolongation of the Inquiry for 9 years – Held, mere delay during the inquiry proceedings, when it is explained with regard to the time taken for the inquiry to conclude and that too justifying the same with no prejudice having been caused, cannot be made the basis for vitiating the departmental proceedings -- Inordinate or unexplained delay in the departmental proceedings may be a justifiable ground if tampered with prejudice having been established to have been caused to the delinquent employee in the said process for interference by the Court -- Same is absent and therefore the said plea of delay fails.

(Para 25, 25)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B, 420, 468, 471 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Cheating, forgery and corruption in bank loan – OTS with Bank – Effect of – Dispute culminated in a comprehensive One Time Settlement under which the Bank has received the entire outstanding amount -- Recovery proceedings before the tribunal have been dismissed as settled and no residual claim survives -- Bank has not raised any objection to the closure of the matter and has issued formal acknowledgments of satisfaction -- In identical proceedings the charge sheets quashed – Settlement having taken place after the alleged offence and there being no continuing public interest, the Court saw no justification for allowing the matter to proceed further found appropriate to quash the proceedings -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Cancellation of bail – Parameters -- Law is well-settled that the considerations for grant of bail and cancellation thereof are entirely different -- Bail once granted to the accused should normally not be interfered with/cancelled unless there exist circumstances giving rise to an inference that the bail has been procured by practicing fraud or mis-representation; that the allegations against the accused are so grave that the same have an adverse impact on the society at large and shake the conscience of the Court; that releasing the accused respondents on bail is likely to create a sense of fear and terror amongst the society or that the accused while on bail may abscond or tamper with the prosecution evidence.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 148, 149, 326, 354, 511 read with 376D, 450 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Cancellation of bail -- Concerted attack on the complainant’s house was launched on the day of election results with the sole objective of wreaking vengeance because he had supported the saffron party --  Complainant’s wife was viciously pulled by the hair and was disrobed -- Accused persons were about to assault her sexually when the lady gathered courage to pour kerosene on her body and gave a threat of self-immolation on which the accused persons including the respondents herein fled away from the complainant’s house -- Charge-sheet filed way back in the year 2022 and till date, the trial has not budged an inch -- Prosecution has alleged that this delay is mostly attributable to non-cooperation by the accused persons including the respondents -- On both counts, i.e., (i) the nature and gravity of the offence which is nothing short of an attack on the roots of democracy and (ii) the imminent likelihood of the accused adversely affecting a fair trial, the bail granted to the accused respondents has to be cancelled -- Bail cancelled.

(Para 17-21)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Divorce – Permanent alimony/ Maintenance -- Respondent-husband’s current net monthly income is Rs. 1,64,039/- -- Appellant-wife, who has remained unmarried and is living independently, is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and which reasonably secures her future -- Rs. 50,000/- per month would be just, fair and reasonable to ensure financial stability for the appellant-wife -- Amount shall be subject to an enhancement of 5% every two years.

(Para 6-9)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Divorce – Maintenance to son aged 26 years -- Court not inclined to direct any further mandatory financial support -- However, it is open to the respondent-husband to voluntarily assist him with educational or other reasonable expenses.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- No material on record to substantiate the allegations of cheating or sexual intercourse under a false promise of marriage – de-facto complainant is a highly educated woman aged 30 year, in the chat, she admitted that she was manipulative and was trying to “get a green card holder” -- It would not be difficult for her to trap the next one -- She would not waste time with the accused appellant and needs to “invest on the next victim” -- She would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and she could happily start with the next one -- She also stated that she was using the accused-appellant -- Accused/ appellant was absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the proposed marriage upon coming to know of the aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of the de-facto complainant -- It cannot be said that the offence was committed by appellant/ accused with the de-facto complainant on the ground that she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community – FIRs and all proceedings consequence thereof quashed in entirety.

(Para 22-31)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Registered owner – Liability of -- Sale of vehicle – Effect of -- Contention that the auction had taken place on 23.06.1989 by virtue of which, the Indian Overseas Bank had sold the car in question in open auction to respondent No.4 and the accident had taken place on 18.12.1989 – When the accident (18.12.1989) took place, it was the Indian Overseas Bank who was the registered owner of the car -- Insurance Company had issued the Insurance Policy to the Indian Overseas Bank for the insurance of the car in question – Transfer of the car from the Indian Overseas Bank to respondent No.4 by the Registering Authority was done on 05.02.1991 – Appellant-Insurance Company cannot be absolved of its liability.

(Para 2, 7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Transfer of Divorce petition – Pathankot to Gurdaspur – Generally, the Courts lean towards the convenience of wife, in case of transfer applications, however, it is not a thumb rule -- Various other circumstances coming forth, also ought to be taken into consideration -- Two sons are studying in B.Sc. (Agricultural) at Hoshiarpur, as well as in 10th class are in the custody of the applicant/ wife -- Applicant herself is working as a teacher -- Interim maintenance has been fixed to facilitate the applicant to bear the expenditure of studies of both the children -- Other weighing factor is distance between the two places, which is less than 40 kilometres and there are well connected means of transport on the said route – Transfer application dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 A – Additional evidence in suit -- Order 18 Rule 17 A of the CPC which provided for production of additional evidence not previously known or which could not be produced despite due diligence has already been deleted from the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 -- Thus, there is no right to lead additional evidence.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17A -- Application for comparison through handwriting expert -- Suit for declaration and for possession in 2011 -- Reliance in the suit upon compromise dated 25.10.2010 -- In the written statement it was plea that the compromise dated 25.10.2010 was a result of fabrication -- Once the petitioner has taken the said plea in his written statement, then it was open to him to have led all evidence in support of the said plea till the time his evidence was closed – On 08.08.2023 i.e., after more than 12 years of institution of the suit, an application seeking permission for comparison through handwriting expert filed – After evidence had been closed, application cannot be allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 173, 199 – FIR for defamation – Permissibility of -- Whether there can be a Chargesheet u/s 500 IPC -- Procedure for initiating any Complaint for defamation, has been specifically provided u/s 199 Cr.P.C – FIR could not have been registered u/s 500 IPC, in view of the express bar u/s 199 Cr.P.C. -- Cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC could have been undertaken only on a Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C filed by the “Person Aggrieved”; no cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC can be taken on an FIR -- Furthermore, even the contents of the Complaint do not prima facie establish any case of defamation -- Summoning Orders set aside.

(Para 38-43, 57, 58)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 199 – FIR for defamation – Offences under other Sections also – Permissibility of -- Irrespective of there being other Sections involved in the FIR or not, the cognizance u/s 500 could have been only on the Complaint and not on the FIR.

(Para 45)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Defamation -- In order to constitute “defamation? u/s 499, there must be an “imputation” with the “intention” to harm the reputation of the person about whom such imputation is made -- It would have to be shown that the accused intended or knew or had the reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant or that he would be directly or indirectly suffered by it.

(Para 52)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 – Defamation – Essential proof – To attract the offence of defamation there must be publication of imputation intending to harm reputation of the person who felt defamed -- The person, involving whom such publication is made, must prove that in estimation of others his moral or intellectual character is lowered down as a result of such false imputation -- Further, to prove the said aspect it is the duty cast on the complainant to lead all necessary evidence before whom his image is ill-effected and lowered -- Albeit the complainant-PW.1 in his private complaint and the evidence stated that, the imputations as per Exs.P1(a) to P1(d) sullied his reputation, however, that in itself would not suffice to attract the offence under Section 499 of IPC -- The damage of the reputation can be ascertained and determined by other persons’ estimation.

(Para 13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Vicarious liability of Director of company --  Role of Director – Pleadings in complaint – Requirement of -- Administrative role of each director would be within the special knowledge of the company or the director of the firm and it is for them to establish that they were not in charge of the affairs of the company -- There is no obligation on the complainant to plead in the complaint as to matters within the special knowledge of the company or the directors or firm about the specific role attributed to them in the company.

(Para 38)