***

Amendment of plaint -- Amendment after commencement of trial cannot be permitted in absence of due diligence.

***

Additional evidence -- Inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to overcome negligence or fill up lacunae.

***

Evidence in rebuttal -- Evidence required to establish party's own case cannot subsequently be introduced in rebuttal.

***

Article 227 -- High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over every interlocutory order.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment of plaint -- After commencement of trial -- Amendment can be permitted only when, despite due diligence, party could not have raised matter before commencement of trial -- Amendment sought at fag end of proceedings to introduce challenge to earlier judgments and compromise proceedings and alteration/substitution of plaintiff's name/legal identity -- Facts sought to be incorporated could have been raised before commencement of trial -- No satisfactory explanation for delay -- Relief sought by way of amendment prima facie beyond prescribed period of limitation -- No interference with order declining amendment.

(Para 14 to 17 and 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence -- Production at later stage -- Inherent power survives in appropriate cases where evidence could not, despite due diligence, be produced earlier and its production is necessary for just adjudication -- Such power to be exercised sparingly and cannot be invoked to overcome negligence or fill up lacunae -- Documents were within plaintiff's knowledge and could have been produced during affirmative evidence -- No exceptional circumstance made out -- Application rightly dismissed.

(Para 18 to 20 and 24)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 18 -- Evidence in rebuttal -- Scope -- Confined to issues in respect of which onus lies upon opposite party -- Party cannot reserve evidence required to establish its own case and subsequently introduce it in rebuttal after opposite party has concluded its evidence -- Revenue record sought to establish plaintiff's own case could not be characterised as evidence in rebuttal.

(Para 21 and 22)

D. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Interference with interlocutory order -- High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over every interlocutory order -- Interference warranted only where subordinate Court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or acted in a manner so perverse or contrary to settled principles of law as to occasion manifest injustice -- No such infirmity found -- Petitions dismissed.

(Para 23-25)

***

Impleadment as party -- Mere assertion of an independent right in suit property does not, by itself, confer a right to be impleaded in a simpliciter suit for permanent injunction.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10(2) -- Impleadment of party -- Simpliciter suit for permanent injunction -- No relief claimed against applicant seeking impleadment -- Mere assertion of independent right, co-ownership or possession in suit property does not by itself confer a right to be impleaded -- Applicant's impleadment would introduce an independent controversy concerning title, co-ownership and possession, thereby enlarging scope of simpliciter injunction suit -- Applicant had already instituted independent civil suit for adjudication of his asserted rights -- Application for impleadment rightly dismissed.

(Para 4 to 9)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10(2) -- Impleadment of party -- Necessary and proper party -- Necessary party is one in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed, whereas proper party is one whose presence is necessary for complete, effective and adequate adjudication of matters in dispute -- Plaintiff, being dominus litis, cannot be compelled to litigate against a person against whom no relief is sought unless requirements of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC are otherwise satisfied.

(Para 5)

***

Suit for possession -- Owner of suit property entitled to recover possession from defendant held to be an illegal unauthorized encroacher, despite failure to prove relationship of landlord and tenant.

***

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for possession -- Plaintiff proved ownership of suit property -- Defendant failed to prove alleged sale in his favour -- Relationship of landlord and tenant not proved -- Defendant failed to show in what capacity he was in possession of suit property -- Earlier suit for permanent injunction dismissed with liberty to plaintiff to seek appropriate remedy and claim of defendant regarding ownership also rejected -- Defendant held to be an illegal unauthorized encroacher -- Owner entitled to recover possession.

(Para 8 to 12)

***

NDPS -- Default bail -- Extension of time for presentation of challan granted without notice to accused -- Extension order set aside and accused held entitled to default bail.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) -- Default bail -- Extension of time for presentation of challan -- Mandatory notice to accused -- Extension of time granted without issuing notice to accused -- Order of extension held illegal and set aside -- Challan presented after expiry of stipulated period of 180 days -- Accused acquired indefeasible right to default bail -- Order declining default bail also set aside -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 10 and 11)

***

Civil appeal -- Remand is not to be adopted as a matter of ordinary course -- Where the Trial Court framed comprehensive issues, a finding can be returned by appreciating the pleadings, issues, oral and documentary evidence instead of remitting the matter to the Trial Court.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 41 Rules 23 and 24 -- Civil appeal – Remand -- Framing of issues -- High Court remitted the matter to the Trial Court to frame specific issues on whether the Sale Deed was a sham document, possession and limitation, and to allow parties to adduce further evidence -- Trial Court had not decided the Suit without relevant issues being presented by the pleadings of the parties, as the issues framed were comprehensive -- Remand is not to be adopted as a matter of ordinary course -- There were no circumstances preventing the first appellate court from deciding the points in issue -- The correctness or otherwise of the case of the contesting parties is appreciated from the pleadings, issues, oral and documentary evidence, and a finding can be returned instead of remitting the matter to the Trial Court -- Such discretion for remand is exercised when imminently warranted by the circumstances of a given case -- Order of remand to the Trial Court set aside.

(Para 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 16, 17)

***

Unlawful Assembly -- Mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person member of the unlawful assembly.

***

Unlawful Assembly -- Quashing of FIR -- Where petitioners distanced themselves from the unruly mob and started helping the victims, and the chances of their conviction were very bleak, no fruitful purpose would be served in permitting the FIR to sustain and the same was liable to be quashed.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 -- Unlawful assembly -- Beating by mob -- Common object -- Mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly -- Liability would shift to the bystander only when he shared the common object with the unlawful assembly -- Petitioners, though part of the protest march, after having seen the conduct of persons who allegedly gave beatings to the teachers, separated themselves and attempted to save the teachers from beatings -- They cannot be said to be a part of the unlawful assembly -- The word "knew" used in the second part of the Section implies something more than possibility and positive knowledge is necessary -- There was nothing on record to suggest that petitioners were aware of the intention and object of some members of giving beatings to the staff and teachers.

(Para 18, 19, 21, 22)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Though petitioners were part of the protest march, they immediately after having seen the behaviour of the unruly mob, distanced themselves and started helping the staff and teachers -- Complainant as well as victims had specifically named persons who had allegedly given them beatings -- Chances of conviction of the petitioners were very bleak and, as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in permitting the FIR sought to be quashed to sustain -- Consequently, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 23-25)

***

Oral evidence -- Internal documents held irrelevant and excluded from record -- Their contents cannot be brought on record indirectly by oral evidence.

***

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 60 -- Oral evidence -- Excluded documents -- Where internal documents and discussions were held irrelevant and excluded from the record, their contents could not be introduced indirectly through oral evidence -- However, evidence regarding the mere fact of discussions or the witness's independent perception, not amounting to reproduction of the contents of excluded documents, could be retained.

(Para 13-16)

***

Parking lot – Lease – Stamp duty -- Expression “lease” includes any instrument by which tolls of any description are let -- Contract for collecting parking fees is regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let, falling within the ambit of a lease deed.

***

Functus officio -- Impounding of a document is purely an administrative function under Section 33 of the Stamp Act -- Doctrine of functus officio has no application in the sphere of administrative law.

***

Adjudication as to proper stamp -- Collector is required only to determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable -- Not competent to impose a penalty or direct recovery of the deficient stamp duty, being beyond the scope of his statutory jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Stamp Act.

***

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Sections 2(16)(c) and 3 -- Lease -- Tolls -- Parking fees -- Expression “lease” includes “any instrument by which tolls of any description are let” -- Contract in question was meant for collecting parking fees -- Such contract is regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let -- Parking sites were leased out to the petitioner through execution of the instrument in question -- Instrument falls within the ambit of a lease deed and consequently attracts stamp duty payable under Schedule I-A, read with Section 3 of the Stamp Act -- Instrument in question cannot be regarded as a simpliciter operation and management agreement.

(Para 18-22)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 33 -- Impounding -- Functus officio -- Licence agreement expired on 31.01.2023, whereas the instrument was impounded subsequently on 16.05.2023 -- Audit Stamp Department is duty-bound to examine every document to ascertain whether the requisite stamp duty has been duly paid thereon -- In case of insufficient stamp, matter is required to be brought to the notice of the competent authority, who may proceed to impound the document in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 33 -- Impounding of a document is purely an administrative function under Section 33, whereas assessment of deficiency in stamp duty by the Collector is a quasi-judicial function -- Doctrine of functus officio has no application in the sphere of administrative law -- Neither the Audit Stamp Department nor the Joint Commissioner had become functus officio upon expiry of the licence agreement.

(Para 23-25)

C. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 33 -- Impounding -- Public office -- Section 33(3) provides that, “in cases of doubt”, the State Government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices -- Requirement of a determination by the State Government arises only when there exists a doubt -- Office of the Joint Commissioner cannot, by any reasonable construction, be regarded to be other than a public office -- Mere non-determination or non-declaration by the State Government does not curtail the powers of the Joint Commissioner to impound a document under Section 33 of the Stamp Act.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 31 -- Adjudication as to proper stamp -- Penalty -- Recovery of deficient stamp duty -- Under Section 31, where an instrument is brought before the Collector for adjudication, Collector is required only to determine the duty with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable -- Section 31 does not postulate anything further to be done by the Collector -- After giving his opinion under Section 31, duties and powers of the Collector under Section 31 come to an end -- Collector is not competent to impose a penalty or direct recovery of the deficient stamp duty, same being beyond the scope of his statutory jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Stamp Act.

(Para 38, 40-42)

***

Murder trial – S. 12 UP Gangsters Act, 1986 -- Precedence of trials -- Gangsters Act proceedings to be given preference in event of clash of dates -- No clash of dates -- Section 12 not attracted -- High Court order keeping murder trial in abeyance set aside.

***

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 346 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (7 of 1986), Section 12 -- Precedence of trials -- In a trial for murder under the IPC, accused filed an application seeking that trial be kept in abeyance pending conclusion of trial under Gangsters Act -- Purpose behind Section 12 was not to freeze other proceedings against accused till proceedings under Gangsters Act were concluded -- Purpose was only to indicate that, in event of clash of dates, proceedings under Gangsters Act were to get priority -- Section 346 of BNSS mandates to continue proceedings from day-to-day basis until all witnesses in attendance are examined -- Harmoniously reading Section 12 of Gangsters Act with Section 346 of BNSS, all that Section 12 contemplates is that, in event of a clash of dates, proceedings under Gangsters Act would be given preference -- Right to speedy trial is not only prerogative of accused but is also a valuable right of victim -- Interpretation canvassed by respondent-accused would give a handle to accused to delay all other cases under pretext that proceedings are pending under Gangsters Act and make a mockery of judicial process -- There was no issue of clash of dates warranting application of Section 12 -- High Court clearly erred in directing murder trial to be kept in abeyance -- Impugned order set aside.

(Paras 12, 15, 19, 22-26)

***

Abetment of suicide -- When Section 306 IPC is read with Section 107 IPC, it is clear that there must be direct or indirect instigation in close proximity to the commission of suicide, along with clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide.

***

Abetment of suicide -- Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, adverse remarks regarding official performance, or even stern behaviour on part of superior officer cannot be elevated to status of abetment under Section 306 IPC

***

Criminal intimidation -- Alleged threats of suspension -- Appellant was not the competent authority to suspend the deceased -- Essential ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 IPC not attracted.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 306 and 107 -- Abetment of suicide -- Superior officer -- Proximity and mens rea --  Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC requires direct or indirect instigation in close proximity to commission of suicide, along with clear mens rea to abet commission of suicide -- There must exist a proximate act amounting to instigation or intentional aid -- Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, adverse remarks regarding official performance, or even stern behaviour on part of superior officer cannot be elevated to status of abetment under Section 306 IPC – There is complete absence of any proximate act of instigation immediately preceding suicide -- Prosecution failed to prima facie establish any intention to instigate, aid or abet deceased to commit suicide -- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law -- Appellant discharged.

(Para 14, 22-26, 28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 504 and 506 -- Intentional insult -- Criminal intimidation -- Official acts performed by superior officer and alleged threats of suspension -- Allegations against Appellant pertain primarily to acts performed in his official capacity as superior officer of deceased -- Material on record does not disclose any intentional insult likely to provoke a breach of peace, nor does it reveal any criminal intimidation -- Appellant was not the competent authority to suspend deceased -- Essential ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 IPC not attracted -- Appellant discharged.

(Para 27, 28)

***

Consortium -- In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses spousal, parental and filial consortium.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166(1)(c) – Compensation to major children -- Loss of Consortium -- Appellant No. 1 is the wife whereas appellant Nos. 2 to 4 are the sons and daughter of the deceased -- All the children are aged between 18 and 21 years -- All legal representatives of the deceased become entitled to compensation and can file a claim petition -- Head of “consortium” is part of the conventional sum to be awarded as part of the compensation -- In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium” -- Right to consortium would include company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family -- Each of the claimants who are the wife and the children of the deceased, would be entitled to a fixed amount each under the head of consortium -- Amount enhanced @ 10% at the interval of every three years, Rs. 48,400/- each -- Additional amount of Rs. 1,46,600/- shall be payable with 7.5% interest from the date of filing of the petition till realisation

(Para 5-8)

***

Execution -- DRT -- RC -- Transfer of an execution proceeding to the DRT -- Order XXI Rule 22 of the CPC has no impact on the validity of the auction sale.

***

Execution -- DRT -- RC -- Income Tax Act, 1961, Second Schedule, Rule 2 -- Where the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor were already parties to the execution proceedings and had notice of the auction, the question of substantial injury being caused on account of non-service of notice under Rule 2 does not arise.

***

Execution – One Residential house – LR’s right -- Protection afforded by Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code is personal to the judgment-debtor and this protection does not extend to the legal representatives.

***

Writ jurisdiction -- A mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 22 -- Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Sections 29 and 31 -- Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Second Schedule -- Execution proceedings were transferred from civil court to the DRT under Section 31 of the 1993 Act -- DRT attached and sold a property in execution of the decree – Auction was challenged due to omission of notice under Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code – Held, transfer of execution proceeding to the DRT under Section 31 of the 1993 Act did not merely change the forum of execution, it clothed the Recovery Officer with the power to recover the amount in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 29 of the 1993 Act read with Second Schedule to the 1961 Act, in supersession of the procedure under the Code before the civil court -- Procedure governing the execution before the Recovery Officer only required notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act -- Therefore, Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code has no impact on the validity of the auction sale.

(Para 37)

B. Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Second Schedule, Rules 2 and 61 -- Notice of demand – Requirement of -- No notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule was served on the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor -- However, they were already parties to the execution proceedings, had notice about the auction, and had filed applications regarding the property -- Question of substantial injury being caused on account of non-service of notice under Rule 2 does not arise -- Further, they did not take recourse to the remedy provided under Rule 61 -- Absence of notice under Rule 2 does not render either the execution or the sale void.

(Para 39, 40)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 60(1)(ccc) -- One main residential house -- Exemption from attachment -- Personal to judgment-debtor – Legal representative’s right -- Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code in its application to Delhi exempts attachment and sale of one main residential house belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and occupied by him -- The protection is by its own text personal to the judgment-debtor as it is confined to a house belonging to and occupied by the judgment-debtor -- This protection does not extend to the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor -- A legal representative is a distinct juridical concept from a judgment-debtor and cannot claim personal exemption merely by virtue of residing in a house which belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor.

(Para 42, 43)

D. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 60(1)(ccc) -- Writ jurisdiction -- Mixed question of law and fact -- Plea of exemption under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code was raised for the first time in a writ petition, without any factual foundation having been laid before the Recovery Officer or the DRT -- A question of fact that requires an investigation and inquiry for which no factual foundation has been laid cannot be allowed to be agitated in a writ petition -- A mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition -- High Court erred in entertaining and remitting the matter to the Recovery Officer to decide the exemption plea after giving an opportunity to lead evidence.

(Para 45, 46)

***

Compensation for electrocution -- Writ Petition -- Maintainability -- If questions of fact are disputed, then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy.

***

Strict Liability -- In cases of electrocution of an individual, to impose strict liability would be more appropriate -- Liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part.

***

Electrocution – Compensation -- Multiplier method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution.

***

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Maintainability of Writ Petition -- Electrocution -- Disputed questions of fact -- Petitions were filed claiming compensation for death and injury due to electrocution -- The appellant opposed the petitions on the ground of maintainability, lack of fault on the part of the appellant, and the presence of disputed questions of fact -- If questions of fact are disputed, then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy in cases of electrocution -- As there are disputed questions of facts involved, the Writ Petition seeking compensation filed by the respondent was not maintainable.

(Para 7-9, 16)

B. Electrocution -- Tort Law -- Strict Liability vs. Absolute Liability -- In cases of electrocution of an individual, the standard of liability upon bodies such as the appellant is strict liability, not absolute liability -- To impose strict liability would be more appropriate, for not in all cases can it be said that the electricity boards are liable -- Those who carry out the inherently dangerous activity should bear the burden, and the State is no exception to that rule -- They are liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part, provided that none of the exceptions to the rule of strict liability apply to the case at hand.

(Para 14)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 57 – Compensation for electrocution -- Yardstick for calculation -- The multiplier method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution -- Since the calculation paradigm as provided for in connection with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the multiplier, the scenario thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis to electrocution cases -- The Electricity Act 2003 provides for the liability of the licensee to pay compensation in certain scenarios under Section 57 thereof but does not say anything regarding the method applicable to calculating the same -- The overarching principle of just and reasonable, fair compensation would govern the calculation here as well, based on the income of the person and other related claims.

(Para 15)

**

Interim relief -- Protection from arrest -- While dismissing a petition seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that the same is not maintainable, the high court or the sessions court cannot extend or grant protection which is in the nature of interim relief that could be granted during the pendency of the application.

***

S. 69 CGST Act -- Communication of order -- An order under Section 69 of the CGST Act being a sine qua non to seek anticipatory bail, it would be an anomaly to hold that the order need not be communicated at all -- Without such communication, question of arrest would not arise.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 69 -- Pre-arrest bail -- Grant of interim protection upon dismissal -- The High Court rejected the application for anticipatory bail noting that in the absence of an order under Section 69 of the CGST Act, there could be no apprehension of arrest -- Nonetheless, the High Court granted protection to the respondent from arrest for a period of one week, if the order under Section 69 is passed, from the date of intimation of such order -- An interim relief can only be in the aid of and ancillary to the main relief -- While dismissing a petition seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that the same is not maintainable, whatever be the ground therefor, the high court or the sessions court cannot extend or grant protection which is in the nature of interim relief that could be granted during the pendency of the application.

(Paras 2, 4, 8–11)

B. Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Sections 69 and 132 -- Order of arrest -- Reasons to believe -- Requirement of communication -- Once the Commissioner concludes that there are “reasons to believe” that any offence under Section 69 has been committed warranting an arrest and an order to that effect is passed, the alarm is activated and the person becomes an accused who is open to be arrested and, thus, acquiring the right to seek pre-arrest bail -- The order under Section 69 of the CGST Act being a sine qua non to seek anticipatory bail, it would be an anomaly to hold that the order need not be communicated at all -- Communication of the order reinforces the right of the accused to seek anticipatory bail -- Without such communication, question of arrest would not arise.

(Paras 16–22)

***

Condonation of delay -- Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference.

***

RERA Act -- Interest under Section 18 is compensatory in character and therefore, it cannot operate retrospectively -- Section 2(za) of the Act, 2016, deployed for levy of interest for the delay which occurred prior to the said Act, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary.

***

RERA Act – S. 44(4) -- Communication of orders -- Where the email was sent by the Tribunal to the parties containing the copy of dismissal order, and each and every case is updated on the portal of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the appellant was not aware of the case.

***

Frivolous litigation -- Appellant has continued to initiate repetitive proceedings, thereby delaying the enforcement of the respondent's lawful entitlement -- Exemplary cost could be imposed.

***

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Condonation of delay -- Sufficient cause -- There was a delay of more than 720 days in filing the restoration application -- Burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the applicant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence -- Expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party -- Appellant failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied -- Thus, the delay caused in filing the restoration application by the appellant is miserably barred by limitation and the delay at belated stage cannot be condoned.

(Para 50, 57-62)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 2(za), 18 -- Builder-buyer agreement -- One-sided clauses -- Retroactive application -- Any term of one-sided agreement will not be final binding -- Any agreement or settlement of one-sided cannot be made a condition precedent by the promoter to handover possession of the unit to the allottee and the settlement is void ab initio -- Clause 19 of the builder-buyer agreement clearly stipulates that in case of default by the allottee, he would be charged 24% interest -- Interest as provided under Section 18 of the Act, 2016, is compensatory in character and therefore, it cannot operate retrospectively -- Levy of interest at the rate of 24% for delay in handing over possession from the promised date of possession cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary -- Promoter cannot escape from responsibility/liability, the contractual terms will not have any overriding effect.

(Para 41, 74-78)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 44(4) -- Appellate Tribunal -- Communication of orders -- A plain reading of Section 44(4) of the RERA Act, 2016, clearly shows that it is mandatory for the Appellate Tribunal to send a copy of every order to the parties -- Email was sent by the Tribunal to the parties containing the copy of dismissal order and the receipt of the same has been acknowledged during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the respondents before the Tribunal -- Each and every case is updated on the portal of the Tribunal and the date fixed in every matter and case status is uploaded on the portal of the Tribunal -- It cannot be said that the appellant was not aware of the case -- Thus, it is clear that the Tribunal has complied with the provisions of Section 44(4) of RERA Act, 2016.

(Paras 68, 70, 71)

D. Frivolous litigation -- Exemplary costs -- Despite the matter having attained finality at various stages, the appellant has continued to initiate repetitive proceedings, thereby delaying the enforcement of the respondent's lawful entitlement under the orders passed by the competent authorities and this Court -- Even after more than 13 years from the date of booking, the appellant has neither completed the project nor obtained the requisite Occupancy Certificate -- It is a fit case, where exemplary cost could be imposed as the respondent being a lady had been harassed for the last 13 years and had to run from pillar to post and also face a multiple litigation, for no fault of her own -- Accordingly, a cost of Rs.2,50,000/- is imposed upon the appellant to be paid to the respondent within a period of four weeks for filing various frivolous case.

(Para 83-92)

***

Ex-servicemen -- ESM status -- Proscription against being treated as an ESM would apply only where the application was made more than one year prior to the expiry of the prescribed period -- Persons who had already retired from the Armed Forces were ESMs.

***

Regular Appointment -- Contractual employment -- Right to be considered for regular appointment pursuant to the interview survived, and contractual appointment did not extinguish that right.

***

A. Ex-servicemen Re-employment Rules, 1979, Rule 5 -- Ex-servicemen (ESM) status -- Age relaxation -- The respondent's candidature for regular recruitment as a Professor was cancelled on the sole ground that he did not satisfy the criteria for grant of age relaxation -- The persons who would apply after the expiry of the prescribed period would be as entitled to be treated as ESMs as persons who would apply within one year of the expiry of the prescribed period -- The proscription against being treated as an ESM would apply only where the application was made more than one year prior to the expiry of the prescribed period -- Persons who had already retired from the Armed Forces were obviously ESMs -- Inasmuch as the respondent had applied for regular recruitment as Professor in the ESIC Hospital after he had completed his prescribed period in the IAF, it would not be correct to hold that he was not an ESM -- He qualified as an ex-serviceman and was entitled to the benefit of Rule 5 and age relaxation thereunder.

(Paras 4, 8–12, 15)

B. Service Law -- Regular Appointment -- Effect of contractual employment -- Prior to the cancellation of his candidature, the respondent had also been interviewed for being appointed as Professor on contractual basis, whereafter he was appointed on contract -- This is not a case of regularization of a contract employment -- Even though the respondent was appointed on contract basis, his independent right to have been appointed on regular basis pursuant to the interview which had taken place survived -- The appointment of the respondent on contractual basis did not wipe out that right.

(Paras 16–20)

***

Appointment of Local Commissioner -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner.

***

Supervisory jurisdiction -- The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner -- Collection of evidence -- Burden of proof -- The plaintiff sought appointment of a Local Commissioner for inspecting the spot and submitting a report regarding the existing position of the wall and shed allegedly constructed by the defendant over the land forming part of the pahi -- Power under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is discretionary -- A commission is intended to act as a facilitator to the Court for ascertainment or elucidation of a matter in dispute and not as a substitute for the evidence which the parties are required to produce -- The plaintiff cannot shift the burden of proving those assertions upon a Court-appointed Commissioner -- Whether a pahi exists at the spot, what is its location and whether the construction allegedly raised by the defendant encroaches upon it are matters which have to be established by the plaintiff through legally admissible evidence -- The power under Order 26 Rule 9 cannot be invoked to fill up an evidentiary lacuna or to provide a party with an additional opportunity to establish a fact which she was required to prove herself.

(Paras 2, 3, 5-7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Supervisory jurisdiction -- Scope of interference – Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction -- Interference is warranted only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or its order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or such material irregularity as has resulted in failure of justice -- Where the trial Court has considered the relevant circumstances and exercised its discretion on a legally permissible basis, the High Court would not substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible.

(Para 10)

***

Interest on Solatium -- If the award of the Reference Court or the Appellate Court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium, and the claim for such interest has not been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication, then it would be open to the Executing Court to grant interest on solatium and permit its recovery from 19.09.2001, the date of the judgment in Sunder v. Union of India, 2001(7) SCC 211, and not for any prior period.

***

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23 -- Interest on Solatium -- From which date payable -- Land Acquisition Tribunal determined the amount of compensation and directed the respondent to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of possession i.e. 22.08.1984 for the first year and at the rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent period till payment, but did not clarify whether interest would be payable on solatium -- Petitioner filed execution application claiming interest on solatium from 22.08.1984 -- Executing Court held that petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium for the period from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 and was not entitled to interest for the period from 22.08.1984 to 18.09.2001 -- Held, interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and the Executing Court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder’s case, 2001(7) SCC 211 i.e. 19.09.2001 and not for any prior period -- In the absence of specific direction by the Tribunal or the High Court to pay interest on solatium, petitioner was entitled to interest on solatium from 19.09.2001 -- Executing Court rightly awarded interest from 19.09.2001 to 30.04.2023 -- Petition dismissed.

(Paras 7-10)

***

Senior Citizen case -- Maintainability of Complaint -- Not attained the age of 60 years -- Does not fall within the definition of “senior citizen” -- Complaint itself is not maintainable.

***

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007) -- Maintainability of complaint -- Jurisdiction -- On the date of filing of the complaint, the second respondent had not attained the age of 60 years and, therefore, she did not answer the definition of a "senior citizen" -- She is also not the parent of the petitioners -- In such circumstances, the complaint itself is not maintainable and the authorities lacked jurisdiction to entertain the same.

(Paras 7)

***

Impleadment of Party – Suit for Possession – Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC rightly declined where the petitioner claimed possession of land allegedly handed over by the defendant, but produced no document or revenue record to substantiate his claim and had no concern with the agreement to sell forming the basis of the suit.

***

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 CPC –Impleadment of party -- Suit for possession based on agreement to sell along with permanent injunction and alternate relief for recovery against the defendants -- During pendency of the civil suit, petitioner filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC for impleading him as a party, claiming possession of land handed over to him by defendant where he had planted eucalyptus trees on the basis of half batai/half share -- Petitioner had no concern with the agreement to sell -- There was no document on the file to show that defendant ever handed over any part of the land to petitioner nor any revenue record to confirm his version -- Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was rightly declined.

(Para 2, 4)

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Second marriage during subsistence of earlier marriage – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband despite subsistence of her first marriage, where she was de facto separated from her first husband, was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, and the second husband was aware of the circumstances.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Dismissal in default – Mere dismissal of an earlier petition for non-prosecution, without adjudication of the substantive claim, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. – Earning Capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Subsistence of earlier marriage – Expansive interpretation of “wife” – The alleged marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.1 was contracted during the subsistence of her earlier marriage, without obtaining a decree of divorce from her first husband – The parties lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period and a child was born out of their relationship – A woman could claim maintenance from her second husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even though her first marriage had not been dissolved by a decree of divorce, where she was de facto separated from her first husband and was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage, particularly where the second husband was aware of the circumstances and had nevertheless entered into the relationship with her – The expression “wife” ought to receive a broad and expansive interpretation – Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice and its application cannot be defeated by technicalities where the factual circumstances otherwise justify the grant of maintenance.

(Para 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Dismissal in default – Maintainability of subsequent petition – Where an earlier petition seeking maintenance on the same cause of action was dismissed in default, such dismissal, being without adjudication on merits, cannot operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.

(Para 7, 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Earning capacity – The fact that the wife is an educated lady and had worked as a teacher cannot, in itself, be a ground for completely denying maintenance – Entitlement to maintenance is to be considered on the basis of the actual means and circumstances of the parties and the statutory parameters governing a claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 3, 18)

***

S. 376 IPC – Rape -- Acquittal -- Where the oral testimony of witnesses regarding injuries and bloodstains is contradicted by a negative FSL report and medical examination, the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Medical and Forensic Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence – Since inception, it was the stand of witnesses that there were bloodstains on the clothes of the victim – The victim stated that she had experienced pain as a result of the alleged sexual act of the appellant – The medical examination conducted within twelve hours of the alleged occurrence, however, belies the presence of any injury whatsoever on her body – The FSL report rules out the presence of blood and semen on the clothes of the victim – Absence of any blood on the clothes of the victim as well as on the undergarment of the appellant after the garments were subjected to the ‘Benzidine test’ as per the FSL report is a relevant factor, which cannot be ignored – When the oral statements of witnesses are considered along with the Final Medical Report and the report of the FSL, a grave doubt is created about their version – Entire prosecution evidence has to be taken into consideration before arriving at any conclusion – Material on record not sufficient to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 13-16)

***

Gambling in house -- Common Gaming House – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient for a "common gaming house" and the mere fact that persons were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house.

***

Gambling in house -- Special Search Warrant – Objective Satisfaction – Before authorizing a special warrant, the competent authority must, upon necessary inquiry, be satisfied that there are good grounds to suspect the house is used as a “common gaming house” – Overstepping the statutory limits would become an instrument of persecution.

***

A. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Sections 3, 4 and 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Common gaming house – Essential ingredients – The FIR did not state that the house was used for the profit or gain of the person owning, occupying, using or keeping such house, nor did it use the word “Jugarkhana” – The element of profit or gain is an essential ingredient – The fact that the petitioners were playing cards in a house, perhaps for money, does not necessarily make it a common gaming house – An FIR being silent on the aspect of “common gaming house” cannot constitute an offence – FIR and consequential proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 9, 12-14)

B. Gujarat Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (4 of 1887), Section 6 – Special search warrant – Objective satisfaction and inquiry – The police left the police station after receiving a special warrant merely 23 minutes after receiving the telephonic message – No officer shall be authorized by special warrant unless the competent authority is satisfied, upon making such inquiry as he may think necessary, that there are good grounds to suspect the said house to be used as a common gaming house – Issuance of the warrant within merely 23 minutes reflects that the inquiry was perfunctory in nature – While issuing a warrant under Section 6, the competent authority must be careful and confine himself exactly within the limits which the Act lays down, since overstepping the line would directly become an instrument of persecution – Such discretion must be used with utmost care since the penal consequences under Section 6 entail.

(Para 10, 11, 13)

***

S. 125 Cr.P.C. -- Interim maintenance -- Court granting interim maintenance, cannot be oblivious of the cumulative variables which ought to be considered, especially since a balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim Maintenance – Balance has to be struck between the rights and liabilities of the applicant and non-applicant – Petitioner is responsible for taking care of financial needs of both the children born out of the wedlock, particularly the elder daughter, who is pursuing MBBS, which is admittedly an expensive course – Respondent was residing in the residential accommodation exclusively purchased by/belonging to the petitioner, was a well-qualified lady truly capable of earning for herself, and was having rental income and getting interest from her FDs – The learned Family Court did not give due weightage to these factors and tilted solely towards the income of the petitioner – Interim maintenance of Rs.30,000/- awarded by the learned Family Court reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

(Para 9-14)

***

Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Benefit of doubt -- Where delay in registration of FIR and material contradictions regarding the presence of last seen witnesses create serious doubt, and there is no other evidence to corroborate the last seen evidence or establish motive -- Accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Benefit of doubt -- The case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and the evidence of last seen witnesses -- The distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station is hardly 04 kms, however, the delay occurred in registration of the FIR creates a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- The material contradiction made by both witnesses creates serious doubt regarding their presence at the relevant time of occurrence -- There is no other evidence to corroborate the last seen evidence -- The appellants were living in a separate house from the deceased -- Thus, neither the appellants were present at the place of occurrence nor they had any motive in committing murder -- They had been implicated only being the family members of in-laws of the deceased -- On re-appreciation of the evidence, the case of the prosecution is found to be suffering from serious doubts -- The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts -- Benefit of doubt goes to the accused – Appellants acquitted.

(Paras 5, 7, 9-11)

***

Victim Compensation Scheme -- Acid Attack -- Sections 357A and 482 Cr.P.C. -- Power to recommend compensation under Section 357A is a power coupled with a duty, and every criminal court is expected to consciously examine the question of victim compensation, particularly in cases involving acid attacks -- Mere pendency of the appeal cannot be a ground to decline the relief.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 357, 357A and 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 326A -- Victim Compensation Scheme -- Acid Attack -- Inherent powers -- The trial court convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 326A of the IPC but omitted to make a recommendation to the District Legal Services Authority for determination of the quantum of compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme under Section 357A of the Code -- Compensation envisaged under Section 357A of the Code is independent of, and in addition to, the compensation that may be awarded under Section 357 of the Code -- The entitlement to compensation under the Scheme cannot be curtailed merely because a fine has been imposed upon the accused -- Every criminal court is expected to consciously examine the question of victim compensation while rendering judgment, particularly in cases involving acid attacks -- Where a statutory obligation has been omitted to be discharged, depriving victims of the benefits of the Victim Compensation Scheme, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to remedy the omission -- Mere pendency of the appeal cannot be a ground to decline the relief.

(Para 10-16)

***

S. 135, Electricity Act, 2003 – Quashing of FIR -- Where the consumption of electricity is bonafide and not with dishonest intention, there may be civil liability for unpaid dues, but there is no criminal liability; hence, the FIR is liable to be quashed.

***

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Sections 126 and 135 -- Quashing of FIR -- Absence of dishonest intention -- Unpaid electricity dues -- There was an outstanding due of electricity charge payable by the petitioner to the SBPDCL -- The claim of the SBPDCL that the electricity connection of the petitioner was disconnected on account of non-payment of electricity charge, is not supported by the material on record -- The absence of disconnection further gets proved by running of the meter as usual without any tampering and the reading going up as per the consumption -- The petitioner was not consuming electricity with dishonest intention, in fact, he was using it bonafidely -- The only thing against the petitioner is that he had not paid the electricity charge due against him -- There may be civil liability, but there is no criminal liability as per the whole alleged facts and circumstances -- FIR liable to be quashed.

(Para 9-12)

***

Matrimonial dispute — Abetment of suicide — Absence of proximity — Where deceased and accused had no contact for 5 months and 12 days preceding suicide, and there was no cogent evidence of harassment or instigation, presumption under Section 113-A cannot be invoked to sustain conviction under Section 306 IPC.

***

Demand of dowry -- Burden of proof -- Where alleged dowry demand and payment are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and accused raises a reasonable defence of prior matrimonial disputes on preponderance of probabilities, conviction under Sections 498-A IPC and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is unsustainable.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A -- Abetment of suicide -- Absence of proximity -- Presumption under Section 113-A -- The deceased and her husband were not in contact with each other for 5 months and 12 days since FIR was registered by the deceased against the appellant -- It cannot be said that the appellant abetted the deceased to commit suicide even without there having been any contact or communication between them -- In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the Court cannot straightway invoke Section 113-A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.

(Paras 51, 56, 58)

B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Sections 3 and 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Demand of dowry -- Preponderance of probabilities -- The allegation of harassment for demand of dowry was levelled for the first time in FIR, prior to which the appellant had already filed a criminal complaint and a suit for divorce against the deceased -- The allegation of giving Rs.6,00,000/- in cash as dowry has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt -- There are serious discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses regarding the demand of dowry and harassment therefor -- The appellant was merely required to raise a doubt against the prosecution case on the basis of mere preponderance of probabilities, which he succeeded to do -- Therefore, the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Paras 42, 43, 59)

***

Further investigation -- Leave of Court -- No police officer, of howsoever high a rank, can direct further investigation during trial unless leave of the Court is obtained -- An application conveying orders of further investigation passed by a superior police officer is not an application seeking permission to further investigate made to Court.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8) -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 193(9) -- Further investigation during trial -- Leave of Court -- No police officer, of howsoever high a rank, can direct further investigation in a case governed by the Cr.P.C. unless the Police obtain leave of the Court to investigate further -- An application conveying to the Court orders of further investigation passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police, with a prayer to facilitate the Investigating Officer, is not at all an application seeking permission to further investigate made to Court -- Impugned order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police being absolutely without jurisdiction, quashed -- Any investigation held pursuant to the impugned order would be non est and struck off the record.

(Paras 13, 17-20, 22-25)

***

SC/ST Act – Ss. 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) -- Caste-related abusive words used over the telephone to son of complainant do not satisfy the basic ingredient of the offence.

***

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) -- Insult or intimidation in public view -- Caste-related abuses over telephone -- Allegation that respondent used caste-related abusive words over telephone while speaking with son of complainant -- Complainant neither privy to conversation nor personally heard alleged caste-related abuses -- In order to attract rigours of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), alleged offence must, prima facie, have been committed in a place within public view -- Basic ingredient of offence that words were uttered in any place within public view not made out.

(Para 6-8)

***

MACT -- Impleadment of parties -- Road construction authority -- Award could be passed only against insurer, owner or driver of vehicle -- Authority empowered with laying or maintenance of road cannot be mulcted with liability under Motor Vehicles Act.

***

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 168 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties -- Necessary and proper party -- Tortious claim against road construction authority -- Insurance Company seeking impleadment of National Highway Authority of India and Director, KMC Construction Ltd. on ground that accident occurred due to negligence in constructing proper retaining wall -- Section 168 empowers Tribunal to pass award only against insurer, owner or driver of vehicle -- Authority empowered with laying or maintenance of road cannot be mulcted with liability under Motor Vehicles Act -- Motor Accident Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain tortious claim against any other person not named under Section 168 -- Claimant is dominus litis and Insurance Company cannot be permitted to implead parties against wishes of claimant – NHAI and Director of Construction company neither necessary nor proper parties -- Applications for impleadment rightly rejected.

(Paras 18, 19, 22, 23)

***

S. 34 IPC -- Constructive liability -- One who keeps watch to enable companions to commit an offence is as much a participant in the common intention as the principal offender.

***

Rape -- Intact hymen -- Slight penetration – It is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse necessary for offence of rape -- Rupture of hymen not a sine qua non for proving offence.

***

Sentencing -- Omission to impose fine -- In appeal preferred by accused alone, imposition of fine would amount to enhancement of sentence and Court cannot place accused in more disadvantageous position.

***

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Constructive liability -- Active and passive participation -- Standing guard -- For attracting Section 34 IPC, prosecution must establish existence of common intention and participation of accused in commission of crime -- Such participation may be active or even passive, provided it is intended to facilitate or advance the common design -- One who keeps watch to enable his companions to commit an offence is as much a participant in the common intention as the principal offender.

(Paras 4, 5, 6, 11, 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 375 and 376 -- Medical evidence -- Intact hymen -- Slight penetration – It is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary for the offence of rape -- Rupture of the hymen is not a sine qua non for proving the offence -- Absence of injuries or an intact hymen cannot, by itself, be a ground to discredit an otherwise credible and consistent testimony of a victim of sexual assault.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) – Rape -- Sentencing -- Omission to impose fine -- Enhancement in appeal preferred by accused -- Where IPC provision prescribes punishment in the form of imprisonment and fine, failure to impose fine amounts to an error in sentencing -- Since imposition of fine would amount to enhancement of sentence already awarded, Court, while deciding appeal preferred by accused alone, cannot place him in a more disadvantageous position -- Omission of trial Court, though legally erroneous, cannot be rectified in appellate proceedings.

(Para 22)

***

Dishonour of cheque -- Expression "insufficient funds" is a genus and dishonour for reasons such as "account closed", "payment stopped" and "referred to the drawer" are species of that genus -- Expression cannot be given narrower meaning, rather requires to be given wider meaning.

***

Dishonour of cheque – Merger of Bank -- Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of the situation that cheque issued by bank, which ultimately merged into some other bank, had become old, especially when account remained the same with new bank.

***

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Merger of Banks -- Return memo with remarks "88-Old Cheque" -- Expression "insufficient funds" is a genus and dishonour for reasons such as "account closed", "payment stopped" and "referred to the drawer" are species of that genus -- Expression cannot be given narrower meaning, rather requires to be given wider meaning -- Whether at the time of issuance of cheque accused had sufficient funds in the account is a relevant factor to be decided by Trial Court in totality of evidence -- Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of the situation that cheque issued by bank, which ultimately merged into some other bank, had become old, especially when account remained the same with new bank.

(Para 2, 4, 14, 15, 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Merger of Banks -- Return memo with remarks "88-Old Cheque" -- Quashing of complaint -- Disputed questions of fact and law -- Questions whether bank with which bank of accused came to be merged was under legal obligation to honour cheque and extent of its liability under terms governing merger are matters germane to controversy -- Such questions involve disputed issues of fact and law, which can be effectively adjudicated only after parties have led evidence in a full-fledged trial -- Prima facie case made out and sufficient material available to connect accused with alleged commission of offence -- Complaint cannot be quashed at threshold.

(Para 22, 25)

***

Section 482 Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of FIR -- Abetment of suicide -- Mere demands for repayment of money or harassment in connection with financial transactions, without anything more, do not satisfy ingredients of "abetment" -- No overt act, proximate instigation or intentional aid -- FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 107 and 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Abetment of suicide -- Demand for repayment of loan -- Mere allegations of persistent demands for repayment of money or harassment in connection with financial transactions, without anything more, do not by themselves satisfy the ingredients of "abetment" -- No material indicating any overt act, direct instigation, intentional aid or proximate conduct on part of petitioners immediately preceding the occurrence which could be said to have driven deceased and his family to commit suicide -- Suicide note and FIR cannot be depicted as expressing anything intentional on part of accused that deceased might commit suicide -- Continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 2, 18-20)

***

Matrimonial dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- Larger and substantial part of the alleged cause of action arose in Canada and not in India -- Allegations pertaining to India are omnibus, vague and devoid of necessary particulars -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed qua petitioner.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406 and 498-A -- Matrimonial dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- Territorial jurisdiction -- Marriage solemnized in India -- Matrimonial life primarily spent in Canada -- Principal allegations of physical and mental harassment, demand of money, retention of gold ornaments and istridhan, withholding of passport, educational certificates and immigration documents, compelling the complainant to transfer money and other acts of cruelty predominantly attributed to the period when the parties were residing together in Canada -- Allegations regarding incidents occurring in India are vague, lacking in particulars and not disclosing any specific offence committed within India -- Larger and substantial part of the alleged offences having been committed in Canada, registration of FIR in Punjab could not be sustained -- Continuation of criminal proceedings amounting to abuse of process of law -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed qua petitioner.

(Para 17, 18)

***

Supernumerary post -- Section 20(4) of RPwD Act attracted only when employee acquires disability during service -- Scheme of Act does not provide for creation of supernumerary post for person appointed as a person with disability.

***

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 20(4) -- Supernumerary post -- Person appointed as a person with disability -- Section 20(4) comes into picture only when an employee acquires a disability during service -- Scheme of RPwD Act does not provide for creation of any supernumerary post for adjustment of a person with disability appointed in his or her capacity as such -- No mandamus can be issued to post petitioner at a place where the post being held by him is not available -- Petition dismissed.

(Paras 9, 10, 13 and 14)

***

Regular bail -- NDPS Act -- Commercial quantity -- Prolonged incarceration -- Rigor imposed under Section 37 of NDPS Act stands diluted in light of Article 21 of Constitution -- Where trial is procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon petitioner, further detention as undertrial not warranted.

***

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21(c) and 37 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Regular bail -- Commercial quantity -- Delay in trial -- Petitioner in custody for more than one year -- Recovery of 392 grams of heroin -- 15 prosecution witnesses cited, but none examined -- Trial procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon petitioner -- Rigor imposed under Section 37 of NDPS Act stands diluted in light of Article 21 of Constitution -- Further detention of petitioner as an undertrial not warranted -- Regular bail granted.

(Paras 6, 6.1, 6.3 and 7)

***

Pension and Family Pension -- Monetary crunch of the Corporation cannot come in the way of petitioners receiving the benefits to which they are entitled on account of their father having served the respondent-Corporation.

***

Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 -- Pension and family pension -- Monetary crunch -- Employee having taken voluntary retirement during currency of pension Scheme -- Corporation admitting the case of petitioners -- Monetary crunch cannot come in the way of petitioners to receive benefits to which they are entitled -- Corporation under obligation to pay arrears of pension and family pension.

(Paras 4-9)

***

Parole -- Rejection on ground of non-expiry of six months from last parole -- Prison Manual cannot supersede provisions contained in parent Act -- Petitioner directed to be released on parole for 28 days.

***

Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (12 of 1969), Sections 3, 4 and 6 -- Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1969, Rule 3(3) -- Himachal Pradesh Prison Manual, 2021, Para 19.12 -- Grant of parole -- Rejection on ground that six months from date of return from last parole had not expired -- Act nowhere suggests that prayer for grant of parole can be rejected on such ground -- Provisions contained in Prison Manual cannot supersede provisions contained in parent Act -- Once conduct and behaviour of petitioner while in custody was good and nothing adverse was reported against him, prayer for grant of parole deserves to be considered -- Impugned order quashed and petitioner directed to be released on parole for 28 days.

(Paras 9-16)

***

Condonation of delay -- Appeal against conviction -- Liberal approach should be taken insofar as delay occasioned in filing an appeal from an order of conviction and sentence.

***

Sole eyewitness testimony -- May result in conviction, but only when the testimony is believable, credible, consistent with the other circumstances and inspires the confidence of the Court, and not when there are serious discrepancies raising a reasonable doubt as to the witnessing of the incident.

***

Confession to police -- A confession having been made by the accused after his arrest definitely cannot be relied upon; inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

***

S. 27 Evidence Act -- Recovery of stones and a brick rejected, nothing found in the stones recovered connecting those to the murder; no blood stains were visibly seen, nor were any detected on chemical examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory.

***

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 383 -- Jail Appeal -- Condonation of delay -- Access to justice -- Constitutional Courts should take a liberal approach insofar as delay occasioned in filing an appeal from an order of conviction and sentence, depriving a person of the most valuable and fundamental of all rights; liberty -- Not a mere liberal approach but a pro-active one to condone delay, however large it is, when a convict knocks at the door of a Court in appeal.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Sole eyewitness testimony -- Conviction based on single eyewitness -- Serious discrepancies -- The testimony of the eyewitness was shaky and highly improbable -- Eyewitness testimony alone resulting in conviction is not impermissible, but only when the testimony is believable, credible, consistent with the other circumstances and inspires the confidence of the Court, and not when there are serious discrepancies raising a reasonable doubt as to the witnessing of the incident.

(Paras 11, 14, 15, 17)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 -- Confession to police -- Inadmissibility -- A confession having been made by the accused after his arrest definitely cannot be relied upon; inadmissible under Section 25.

(Paras 12, 18)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Recovery of weapons -- Contradictions in recovery -- Absence of blood stains -- The recovery of stones and a brick from the accused was rightly rejected since there was nothing found in the stones recovered connecting those to the murder -- No blood stains were visibly seen, nor were any detected on chemical examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory -- The First Informant, the eyewitness and the mahazar witnesses consistently said that the stones and brick were lying near the bodies, in plain view and with blood stains.

(Para 13)

***

Subvention Scheme -- TMA Pai Foundation Case -- Payment of Subvention Amount beyond Academic Year 2002-03 -- It was impermissible to direct release of the subvention amount for the entire 5-year course even after academic year 2002-03 once the subvention scheme was declared unconstitutional on 31.10.2002.

***

Precedents -- Retrospective versus Prospective Applicability -- If a decision of the Apex Court does not expressly provide its application to be prospective, the law declared by the Court will have retrospective effect unless otherwise stated -- Prospective application was intended only for such statutory provisions which stipulated something contrary to the ratio laid down in the TMA Pai Foundation case.

***

A. Education Law -- Subvention Scheme -- TMA Pai Foundation Case -- Payment of Subvention Amount beyond Academic Year 2002-03 -- The scheme of subvention obligated the Central Government to pay the subvention amount to each eligible college on an annual basis and not for the entire course in lump sum -- It was not incumbent upon the Central Government to pay the subvention amount for the entire 5-year course in one go -- Directing release of the subvention amount for the entire 5 years even after academic year 2002-03 was impermissible once the subvention scheme was declared unconstitutional on 31.10.2002.

(Para 8, 12.2, 12.3, 13)

B. TMA Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka -- Retrospective versus Prospective Application -- If a decision of the Apex Court does not expressly provide its application to be prospective, then it is settled law that all decisions of this Court are retrospective in application -- A conjoint reading of paragraph 393 of the final decision in TMA Pai Foundation case by 11-Judge Bench and the clarificatory order dated 01.04.2003 of the Division Bench of this Court makes it abundantly clear that the intention of this Court was to give prospective application to only such statutory provisions which stipulated something contrary to the ratio laid down in the final decision in TMA Pai Foundation case by 11-Judge Bench -- The schemes or executive instructions, particularly the subvention scheme, ceased to operate on 31.10.2002.

(Para 11, 12.1, 12.2)

***

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts -- 'Scheduled Areas', although referring to a specific geographical area, cannot be taken to mean, in view of the object and intent of Schedule V to the Constitution, to be applicable to non-tribal parties -- The Civil Court had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the dispute pertaining to non-tribal parties.

***

A. Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (19 of 1972), Section 1(3) -- Precedent -- Binding Precedent -- Nagarjuna Gramin Bank v. Medi Narayana’s case did not lay down any proposition of law, much less to be a binding precedent -- It was rather a case of judicial deference to the executive/legislature without a legal analysis of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972.

(Paras 9.5, 9.7, 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 and Fifth Schedule -- Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (19 of 1972), Section 1(3) -- Civil Courts -- Jurisdiction in Scheduled Areas -- Disputes between exclusively non-tribal parties -- The notification of Scheduled Areas is specifically directed towards the people of the Scheduled Tribes living in that area -- Merely because the word ‘area’ has been used, it cannot be said that any and everything that falls within that geographical area pertains to scheduled tribes -- There is no basis for a blanket exclusion of Civil Courts in so far as it pertains to civil disputes of succession between exclusively non-tribal parties although the property is situated within Scheduled Areas -- The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts shall stand restored in so far as civil transactions involving exclusively non-tribal parties are concerned.

(Paras 12.5, 12.6, 13-15)

***

Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Electricity theft -- Civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred merely because allegations of theft have been made -- Jurisdiction would be barred only where a complaint regarding theft of energy has been filed by the competent officer/authority before the Special Court and cognizance has been taken, or where an FIR has been registered by the police and the matter has proceeded in accordance with law.

***

S.126 Electricity Act, 2003 -- Penalty -- Natural justice -- Penalty cannot be imposed directly without first making and communicating provisional assessment and providing opportunity of hearing to the consumer -- Direct imposition of penalty without following mandatory procedure under Section 126 violates principles of natural justice.

***

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Sections 145, 151 and 154 -- Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Theft of electricity -- Cognizance by Special Court -- Suit challenging demand raised towards loss and compounding charges -- Mere allegation of theft of electricity does not by itself bar jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Jurisdiction would be barred only where a complaint regarding theft of energy has been lodged by the competent officer/authority and the Special Court has taken cognizance thereof, or where the requisite criminal proceedings have been initiated in accordance with law -- In absence of complaint before the Special Court or registration of FIR and cognizance thereof, Civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred.

(Para 9, 14-16)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126 – Penalty -- Assessment -- Natural justice -- Penalty cannot be imposed without first making and communicating provisional assessment and providing opportunity of hearing to the consumer -- Direct imposition of penalty without following mandatory procedure under Section 126 violates principles of natural justice.

(Para 10-12)

C. Electricity Meter installed outside premises -- Tampering/defect -- Liability -- Courts below concurrently found that the electricity meter of the plaintiff was installed outside his premises and, in such circumstances, liability for tampering could not be fastened upon the plaintiff, as under Sales Circular No. D-21 of 2007, responsibility in case of tampering with or defect in a meter installed outside the premises was that of the Feeder Manager -- Findings based upon proper appreciation of facts, pleadings and law -- No substantial question of law arising for adjudication -- Regular second appeal dismissed.

(Para 12, 17)

***

Regular Bail -- Involvement of petitioner in other criminal cases cannot be the sole ground to deny him the concession of bail and the prayer for bail has to be considered in the light of facts and circumstances of each individual case.

***

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 61(2), 111(2)(a), 115, 117(2), 126, 190, 191(3), 232(1), 324(4) and 351(3) -- Regular bail -- Parity -- Petitioner not named in FIR and nominated as accused on disclosure statement of co-accused -- Co-accused similarly placed already granted regular bail -- Investigation completed and challan presented -- State opposing bail on ground that five other criminal cases were registered against petitioner -- Registration of other criminal cases cannot be the sole ground to deny concession of bail -- Prayer for bail has to be considered in light of facts and circumstances of each individual case -- Petitioner granted regular bail on ground of parity.

(Para 5, 6)

***

Road safety -- A right to safe travel is inherent to the right to free movement and the right to life and liberty under Article 21.

***

Road safety -- Third-party insurance for four years for new cars and six years for new two-wheelers is now mandatorily required to be purchased.

***

MACT -- Owner/ occupant -- Insurance companies are liable to compensate for any occupant in the vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy, which covers the owner of the vehicle as well, who was travelling in the car as a passenger.

***

A. Constitution of India, Articles 21 and 19(1)(d) – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 146 – Right to safe travel – Road safety – Third-party motor vehicle insurance – An unfortunate reality of road safety in India is that despite the existence of a statutory framework mandating third-party motor vehicle insurance, compliance thereof is found to be lacking – Consequently, victims or families affected by motor accidents often have to run pillar to post in order to receive compensation – The Right to safe travel is inherent to the right to free movement under Article 19(1)(d) and the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – The object behind mandatory insurance under Section 146 of the MVA is not just that victims of road accidents are compensated, but also that they are not drawn into prolonged litigation – Integration of the enforcement system with technology is the need of the hour to ensure compliance with statutorily mandated insurance.

(Paras 16-17, 20-21)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Sections 146 and 196 – Mandatory third party insurance – Enforcement – Technology integration – Directions – Existing offline technology for issuance of challans and road-safety management is required to be integrated with e-models, specifically when it comes to ensuring compliance with statutorily mandated insurance – ANPR Cameras deployed on highways and roads are to be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau and the VAHAN portal for issuance of automatic e-challans to uninsured vehicles – State Police to be provided with handheld devices or downloadable apps, linked with the data from Insurance Information Bureau and VAHAN portal, to monitor real-time insurance status of vehicles and impose challans for violations – Henceforth, third-party insurance for four years for new cars and six years for new two wheelers be required to be purchased.

(Paras 18, 22, 23.1-23.2 and 23.7)

C. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 (41 of 1999), Section 14 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 146 – Motor-vehicle insurance – Uniform policy structure – Customer option form – A broad four-layer structure is to be implemented for private vehicles to bring clarity to policy options, allowing the vehicle-owner to make an informed choice: (I) Third Party only base policy; (II) Optional cover for the occupant(s)/pillion rider; (III) Personal accident cover for the owner, driver and occupant(s); and (IV) Own damage cover -- Every customer will be issued a ‘customer option form’ at the time of purchase to ‘opt in’ via check box to the add-on options -- The IRDA shall formulate uniform policy wordings for these optional covers.

(Para 23.4-23.5)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Motor accident claim – Comprehensive/package policy – Liability of insurance company – Owner travelling as passenger – In accordance with the circular of the IRDA dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies are liable to compensate for any occupant in the vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy – A comprehensive policy would cover the owner of the vehicle as well, who was travelling in the car as a passenger – Tribunal erroneously absolved the insurance company of its liability on the ground that no extra premium was paid to cover the personal risk of the owner’s vehicle – Courts, in matters concerning motor accident claims, should not adopt a hyper-technical approach.

(Paras 27, 29, 31 and 34)

***

Compulsory Retirement – The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood – The order is not punitive in nature and is passed in public interest and thus, Judicial review is extremely narrow and restricted

***

A. Fundamental Rules, Rule 56(j) – Compulsory Retirement – Object and scope of judicial review – The object underlying compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood so as to maintain a high standard of efficiency and integrity in public service – An order of compulsory retirement is not punitive in nature and implies neither stigma, prejudice nor any suggestion of misbehaviour – The order is passed in public interest on the subjective satisfaction of the Government – Principles of natural justice, audi alteram partem, find no application – Judicial review is extremely narrow and restricted – The Court, while exercising judicial review, cannot sit in judgment as an appellate authority, but can interfere where the order is malafide, based on no evidence, arbitrary or perverse.

(Paras 5, 7)

B. Fundamental Rules, Rule 56(j) – Compulsory Retirement – Assessment of service record – “Washed-off theory” – Disciplined force – Members of the CISF, being a disciplined and uniformed force entrusted with vital security functions, are expected to maintain a consistently high standard of efficiency, vigilance and discipline -- Government or the Review Committee, as the case may be, shall take a decision considering the entire record of service, attaching more importance and weightage to records and performance during the subsequent years, weighing in both favourable and adverse remarks – An order of compulsory retirement cannot be invalidated merely because uncommunicated adverse remarks formed part of the material considered by the authority – The “washed-off theory”, applicable in matters relating to promotion, has no application where the competent authority assesses the suitability of an employee for continued retention in service – Where the performance of an employee suffers a discernible decline in the last two years immediately preceding the order of compulsory retirement, such decline is material for determining whether the employee is fit to be retained in service – The entire service record may be considered, including adverse material preceding the employee’s promotion, while due weight must be accorded to the service record of the immediate past period.

(Paras 6, 8-15)

***

Jurisdiction of Reference Court -- The jurisdiction exercised by the Reference Court under Section 3H(4) is, wide enough to incidentally determine questions of title insofar as such determination is necessary for deciding the person entitled to the compensation arising out of the acquisition.

***

Approbate and reprobate -- A litigant who has taken the benefit of a remand order cannot subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the forum to which the matter was remitted merely because the findings ultimately returned are averse to him.

***

A. National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3H(4) -- Jurisdiction of Reference Court -- Determination of title -- A dispute arose between the appellants and respondent No. 1 asserting a competing claim over the acquired property and over the compensation amount payable therefor -- The determination of the person entitled to receive compensation inevitably requires an adjudication of the underlying claim of title -- Such an inquiry is incidental and integral to the jurisdiction conferred under Section 3H(4) -- A reference to the principal civil court is not intended to be a mere ministerial exercise of dividing the compensation amongst claimants -- Its purpose is to secure a judicial determination of the person lawfully entitled to receive the compensation where such entitlement itself is disputed -- The jurisdiction exercised by the Reference Court under Section 3H(4) is, therefore, wide enough to incidentally determine questions of title -- Any contrary interpretation would frustrate the legislative scheme and compel parties to simultaneously pursue independent civil suits for declaration of title, thereby defeating the very object of referring the dispute to the principal civil court.

(Paras 7, 15, 18, 22.5, 22.6, 22.7)

B. Remand order -- Finality inter partes -- Approbate and reprobate -- Once the remand order was accepted by the parties and was not subjected to any further challenge, the directions contained therein became binding upon both the parties as well as the Reference Court -- A litigant who has taken the benefit of a remand order cannot subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the forum to which the matter was remitted merely because the findings ultimately returned are averse to him.

(Paras 22-24)

***

Ratification -- A ratified act is deemed valid from the date of the original, unauthorised act, and not merely from the date of ratification.

***

Acceptance of resignation without authority -- Principle against approbation and reprobation -- A resignation, though initially accepted by one not clothed with authority, may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both sides have treated it as final and altered their positions upon that footing.

***

Withdrawal of resignation -- Resignation shall take effect only on the date on which the resignation is accepted by the appointing authority, and non-communication of an acceptance does not keep the resignation alive for withdrawal.

***

A. Delhi Technological University Act, 2009 (6 of 2009), Section 23(2)(ix) -- Service Law -- Resignation -- Ratification -- Withdrawal of resignation -- Respondent tendered his resignation, requested waiver of the notice period, and was relieved with effect from 31.05.2016 by an officer holding additional charge of Vice-Chancellor who was not the competent authority under Section 23(2)(ix) -- Nearly four months after being relieved and having accepted all consequential benefits, the respondent sought withdrawal of his resignation before the Board of Management (BOM) ratified the acceptance of the resignation -- A ratified act is deemed valid from the date of the original, unauthorised act, and not merely from the date of ratification -- Once the competent authority ratifies an act, the law treats it as though the authority had existed from the beginning, and ratification operates retrospectively to cure the defect arising from the absence of prior authority -- Once ratified, the acceptance related back to the date on which the resignation was accepted by the In-charge Vice-Chancellor, leaving, in point of law, no resignation in existence which the respondent could have withdrawn -- An employee who has acted upon and accepted the consequences of his own resignation cannot later found a challenge on a technical infirmity in the mode of its acceptance.

(Paras 4, 5, 16-19, 24, 25)

B. Delhi Technological University Act, 2009 (6 of 2009), Section 23(2)(ix) -- Service Law -- Acceptance of resignation without authority -- Principle against approbation and reprobation -- A resignation, even where accepted in the first instance by one not clothed with authority to accept it, may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both sides have, by their conduct, treated it as final and altered their positions upon that footing -- In such a case, an employee is precluded, not by any doctrine of curative ratification but by the ordinary principle against approbation and reprobation, from later impugning the very transaction he brought about and from which he has already taken the entire benefit.

(Para 20)

C. First Statutes of the National Institute of Technology, 2009, Statute 30 -- Service Law -- Resignation -- Effective date of resignation -- Non-communication of acceptance -- Withdrawal of resignation -- Respondent tendered an unconditional letter of resignation which was accepted by the competent authority on 22.11.2018, but before such acceptance was communicated on 04.12.2018 and before he was permitted to be relieved upon completion of the notice period, sought to withdraw his resignation on 28.11.2018 -- The proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, is explicit that resignation shall take effect only on the date on which it is accepted by the appointing authority -- It imposes neither any requirement of communication as a condition of efficacy nor makes acceptance of resignation contingent upon expiry of the notice period -- Non-communication of an acceptance which has, in fact, already been made by the competent authority does not keep the resignation alive for withdrawal.

(Paras 8, 9, 27)

***

Anticipatory bail -- Benefit of anticipatory bail cannot be denied for the reason that some money is yet to be recovered -- Whether or not the money was indeed entrusted to the petitioner would be a matter of trial.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406 and 420 -- Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482(2) -- Anticipatory bail -- Recovery of money -- Complainant alleged that petitioner had cheated him of Rs.5,50,000/- on the pretext of securing job for his son -- The State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail arguing that custodial interrogation of the petitioner was required to effect recovery and that though petitioner joined investigation, he did not cooperate in investigation nor got Rs.5,50,000/- recovered -- Benefit of anticipatory bail cannot be denied for the reason that some money is yet to be recovered -- Whether or not the money was indeed entrusted to the petitioner would be a matter of trial – Bail allowed.

(Para 2, 4, 5)

***

Attempt to culpable homicide -- Grievous injury -- Intention or knowledge to cause death -- Where only lathis were allegedly used and no sharp-edged weapon was recovered, a grievous injury pertaining to a fracture of a metacarpal bone cannot by itself be construed as an injury dangerous to life or indicative of an intention or knowledge to cause death.

***

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 308 and 325 -- Attempt to commit culpable homicide -- Framing of charge -- Grievous injury -- Intention or knowledge to cause death -- Injury No. 3, pertaining to a fracture of the left fourth metacarpal bone, was declared to be grievous in nature -- Only lathis were allegedly used in the occurrence and no sharp-edged weapon was recovered from the petitioners -- Injury No. 3, cannot by itself be construed as an injury dangerous to life or indicative of an intention or knowledge on the part of the petitioners to cause the death of the complainant -- Essential ingredients of Section 308 IPC are not prima facie made out -- Rather, the allegations, at the highest, disclose the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 IPC -- Charge under Section 308 IPC set aside.

(Paras 4, 6, 7)