A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce – Cruelty – Marriage broken down irretrievably -- Parties have been residing separately since 2012 which is more than thirteen years now, and no substantial or meaningful effort has been made in restoring their matrimonial relationship -- High Court also interacted with the parties in person and found the marriage to have broken down irretrievably -- Relationship has become deeply embittered and acrimonious over the years -- They have a seventeen-year old daughter whose wellbeing, care, and future stability must remain paramount -- No purpose in perpetuating a legal bond that has long ceased to have any substance -- Continuing the marital tie would serve neither the spouses nor their child -- Divorce granted by High Court, affirmed.

(Para 4-7)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia), 25 -- Divorce – Permanent alimony -- Respondent-husband is a serving judicial officer holding a responsible public position and is, therefore, under a heightened obligation to ensure fair, adequate, and dignified financial security for his wife and daughter -- Appellant-wife, who is presently not engaged in legal practice, is entitled to maintain a standard of living broadly commensurate with what she enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage -- Child, now seventeen years of age and soon to pursue higher education, will also require continued financial support and stability -- Rs.50,00,000/- awarded -- LIC policy purchased by the respondent-husband, the amount of Rs.41,00,000/- shall be deposited in the account of the daughter and a sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be deposited by the respondent-husband in his daughter’s account until she is able to maintain herself; bearing all expenses towards her marriage; and that the prohibition against disinheriting the daughter are upheld and shall continue to operate -- All pending proceedings, whether civil or criminal, instituted by either party against the other and arising from the marriage shall stand closed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While invoking power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. trial court should consider the statements of the witnesses adduced before it and it should not place reliance upon the material available in the charge-sheet or the case diary.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- While passing the summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. court must consider whether more than prima-facie case is made out, or not -- Mere prima-facie case is not sufficient -- It is to analyze, whether before the trial court material was sufficient to summon the revisionists u/s 319 Cr.P.C. or not.

(Para 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to wife/ child – Education of wife will not come in way to claim maintenance – No evidence to establish that the revisionist No.1/ wife is presently employed or earning -- Mere fact that she is a post graduate and has done ITI Diploma in tailoring by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that revisionist No.1/wife is working for gain -- Revisionist No.1/ wife staying at her parental home and taking care of her child without any financial or emotional support from the opposite party No.2/husband -- Complete responsibility of meeting the daily need, education and medical expenses of a minor child lies upon both the parents -- Held that both the revisionist No.1/ wife as well as the minor son are equally entitled to maintenance from the opposite party No.2 and he is legally liable to maintain both his wife and minor son – Matter remanded back to the learned Family Court for fresh determination of maintenance.

(Para 15-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial Evidence – Last seen together theory – Failure to establish proximity and reliable identification – Effect – No clear-cut time specified on which the death occurred, when it is trite that the last seen together theory projected by the prosecution should be proximate to the death of the victim – It is the roommates of the deceased who informed PW1 that they were told by a friend of the deceased that he was going to meet A1 in the evening -- The roommates of the deceased were not examined -- Identification of the accused by a witness for the first time in the police station, without holding a Test Identification Parade -- Nothing on record to indicate ownership of auto rickshaw, who was alleged to be driver of auto rickshaw, who had picked up three persons and dropped them near scene of occurrence --   Ransom calls hence remained an unsolved puzzle – Last scene theory not proved -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 13-16, 31)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Confession statement -- Confession can form a legal basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made -- Confession allegedly made by the appellants is of no use in bringing home a conviction, especially when there was no corroboration available, of the statements made, from other valid evidence -- Admissions were only that made in the confessional statements, of the death having occurred in the presence of the accused, on the day the deceased was found missing, which is not worthy of acceptance – Conviction set aside.

(Para 29-31)

A. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Occupancy tenant recorded as owner in revenue record/ Jamabandi – No question of getting a declaration from the Court to the effect that he had become the owner by virtue of the 1952 Act.

(Para 15)

B. Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 (8 of 1953), Section 3 – Death of occupancy tenant -- After getting ownership, he died without leaving behind legal heirs -- Effect of -- Occupancy tenant was already recorded as an owner well before his death -- As such, the defendants-appellants, the erstwhile landlords were left with no right, title or interest whatsoever in the suit land so as to seek redemption of the same – Trial Court rightly set aside mutation re-entered in the name of erstwhile owner.

(Para 16, 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 41(h) – Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 408C -- Rejection of plaint -- Suit for restraining the defendant-respondent from demolishing or taking any coercive action against the property of the plaintiff-appellant – Remedy available with the plaintiff-appellant is to prefer an appeal before the Commissioner -- Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred u/s 408C of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 -- Once the challenge is to the demolition order qua which efficacious remedy is available to the plaintiff-appellant, he ought to have resorted to the same rather than filing the present suit – Rejection of plaint by Trial Court, upheld in appeal – No question of law much less substantial question of law arises – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1-5)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22 – Suit for specific performance -- Respondent-defendant duly placed reliance on Ex.D2, suit which was filed by brother of appellant-plaintiff for recovery of Rs.6,100/-, which goes to show that respondent-defendant had borrowed Rs.4,000/- from brother and executed a pronote and receipt -- It is highly improbable that respondent-defendant would have agreed to sell his property and receive just Rs.5000/- as earnest money and by different transaction on same day, he would go for loan from the brother of appellant-plaintiff -- Evidence points out that agreement to sell was got executed from respondent-defendant by way of misrepresentation by representing it as pronote taking benefit of illiteracy of respondent-defendant – Suit and first appeal dismissed – Second appeal also dismissed.

(Para 6-10)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 22, 24 – Suit for specific performance -- Agreement to sell – Not proved – Alternative relief of damages – Alternative relief of damages liable to be rejected for a simple reason that once appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove agreement to sell to be a genuine document, he is not entitled to any damages for non-execution of sale deed.

(Para 10)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(b)(e) – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 15 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 16 -- Assignment of Decree for Specific Performance -- Does not require Registration -- When the decree itself which is for specific performance does not create or purport to create any right, title or interest in any immovable property, the question of registering an instrument assigning such a decree cannot arise -- Section 17(1)(b) would also not be applicable -- Assignment deed assigning the decree of specific performance did not require registration.

(Para 26-34)

A. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4-24, 29(2) -- Appeal u/s 74 of  Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion -- Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law -- The 2013 Act does not take away from its purview the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act – The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview – Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act.

(Para 62, 76, 77)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 11, 54 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 24(1)(a), 74 -- Acquisition of land under 1894 Act – Award after commencement of 2013 Act – Appeal u/s 74 of 2013 Act will lie -- Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applicable to all those cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act -- For passing the award under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the 2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements -- The first appeals before the High Courts should be treated as ones under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

(Para 97 (i)-(iii))

C. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74, 103 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5, 29(2) – Appeal u/s 74 of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Limitation – Condonation of delay -- Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act -- Consequently, all the applications seeking condonation of delay in preferring the first appeals before the High Courts u/s 74 of the 2013 Act stand allowed -- High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.

(Para 97 (iv)-(viii))

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Financial capacity of Complainant --   Burden of proof -- Loan of Rs.22,00,000/- to accused – Cheque is dated 17.03.2010 -- Complainant is not required, at threshold, to prove his financial capacity unless accused specifically disputes it -- Complainant clearly stated that he had withdrawn amount from bank, accused did not seriously contest said claim – Presumption of High Court that it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal of the said amount and also the date and time of the payment made to the accused, including the date and time of receiving of the cheque is erroneous -- High Court erred in overturning the concurrent findings of guilt and consequential conviction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court – Conviction restored -- Considering age, the accused may be only subjected to fine and not imprisonment – Sentence modified to only payment of a fine restricted to Rs.32,00,000/-

(Para 22, 23, 24)

A. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Custody of child -- Paramount consideration is the welfare of the children but nonetheless there are a host of other factors which weigh before the court while passing the final order of custody -- Host of factors may include the conduct of the parties, their financial capacity, their standard of living, as well as the comfort and education of the children.

(Para 22)

B. Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Custody of child -- Respondent-wife travelled and moved the minors to India without the consent of the appellant-father, who was guardian and without obtaining the original passports from him but rather by procuring fake or duplicate or fresh passports while original already existed for travel purposes -- Qatar Court revoked the custody of respondent wife for the reason that she misconducted herself by removing the children from the jurisdiction of the Court, without the permission of the Court -- Revocation of the order of custody was a crucial material for the purpose of determining the custody of the children -- Regarding abuse and assault filed against the appellant-husband the Qatar Court had given a clean chit to him -- As per the mediation report, both children expressed an inclination towards joining their father – High Court has completely ignored the aforesaid material -- While these aspects may not, by themselves, be the sole reason for determining custody, they are nevertheless necessary and relevant factors --  Order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on its own merits in accordance with the law.

(Para 23-33)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 -- Freezing of bank accounts – Permissibility of -- Section 106 of the BNSS empowers the police only to seize property for evidentiary purposes and does not confer any authority to attach or debit-freeze bank accounts -- Attachment or freezing of bank accounts, being measures directed at securing alleged proceeds of crime, can be undertaken only u/s 107 of the BNSS and strictly upon orders of a competent Magistrate, after following the prescribed procedural safeguards.

(Para 18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(g), 21 -- Blanket or disproportionate freezing of bank accounts – Violates fundamental rights u/s 19, 21 of the Constitution, particularly where the account holder is neither an accused nor even a suspect in the offence under investigation, is manifestly arbitrary, and in the teeth of the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and 21 and of the Constitution of India.

(Para 19)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 106, 107 – Freezing of bank accounts of non-accused – Permissibility of --  In the absence of any complicity of the petitioners, the continued freezing and withholding of various amounts have caused prejudice to the petitioners and have disabled  the petitioner No. 1 from using its funds for paying requisite salaries of employees and meeting their other day-to-day expenses to ensure the smooth running of their business. Directions issued :

(i) Respondent No. 4 shall forthwith issue appropriate directions to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to defreeze the petitioners’ bank accounts.

(ii) If any enforcement or investigating agency proposes to initiate or is conducting an investigation against the petitioners, it shall be at liberty to do so in accordance with the provisions of the BNSS, and the petitioners undertake to fully cooperate with such investigation.

(iii) In the event of finding a positive and specific material indicating the  petitioners’ complicity, Respondent No. 4 shall be at liberty to issue fresh directions, in accordance with law.

(Para 23-27)

Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51(1)(b), 51(3)(e) -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Threat of self-immolation by Sarpanch -- Resorting to self-harm as a means of protest is neither a recognised form of legal redress nor can it be countenanced in a constitutional democracy -- Prima facie, this amounts to mis-conduct in the discharge of her duties and her continuance in the office is un-desirable in the public interest in terms of Section 51(3)(e) of the 1994 Act -- In terms of Section 51(1)(b) of the 1994 Act, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in ordering suspension of petitioner from the post of Sarpanch – Suspension order upheld.

(Para 8, 9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 (2) Cancellation of Bail – Murder -- Accused not named in the FIR and was arrested subsequently on the basis of the oral dying declaration of the deceased and disclosure statement of the co-accused – Suffered incarceration for about six and a half years when the impugned order was passed by the High Court a year ago -- No allegation that, during this period, accused misused the liberty granted to him -- Considering long pre-trial incarceration of respondent No.2 and the evidence against him, not a case where the discretion of grant of bail exercised by the High Court in favour of respondent No.2 should be interfered. Appeal dismissed.

(Para 10, 12)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 243-O -- Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 (11 of 2016), Section 131H -- Nomination for election to the post of Zila Panchayat Member -- Rejection of nomination -- Judicial interference -- Whether permissible :

I. By virtue of the express constitutional embargo contained in Article 243-O of the Constitution of India, the High Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where a law enacted by the State Legislature provides for the remedy of an election petition to redress grievances arising during the course of an election.

II. The election process cannot be lightly interdicted or stalled at the behest of an individual grievance. The right to contest or question an election being statutory in nature, must be strictly construed and exercised in accordance with the statute governing the field. The High Court must, therefore, eschew the grant of liberal interim reliefs in favour of individuals and instead remain mindful of the overarching public interest in ensuring the smooth and uninterrupted conduct of elections across the State.

III. In respect of individual grievances, the ultimate and exclusive remedy lies by way of an election petition. Given the non-obstante nature of Article 243-O of the Constitution, its mandate is required to be adhered to in both letter and spirit. Where the statute provides a complete and efficacious mechanism for redressal, the extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would defeat the very object for which Article 243-O was enacted as a non-obstante provision.

(Para 10, 12)

A. Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) – Consumer -- Purchase of multiple flats – Leasing out the flat -- Whether commercial activity -- Mere factum of leasing out the flat does not, by itself, demonstrate that the appellants purchased the property with the dominant purpose of engaging in commercial activity.

(Para 17)

B. Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) – Consumer -- Purchase of multiple flats – Whether commercial activity -- Mere act of purchasing immovable property, even multiple units, cannot ipso facto attract the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act unless and until it is proved that the dominant purpose behind such purchase was commercial in nature -- In absence of such proof, the appellants cannot be excluded from the definition of ‘consumer’ under the 1986 Act.

(Para 17)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 -- Divorce -- Permanent alimony of Rs. 15,000/- per month -- Obligation of the husband to ensure that the wife is able to live with dignity does not come to an end merely on the ground that she is educated or has parental support – Post-divorce, the wife is entitled to live a life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage – Husband has sufficient earning capacity and financial means to pay more than Rs. 15,000/- per month -- On mutual consent amount enhanced to Rs. 30,000/- per month

(Para 10-14)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 7A, 17A – Corruption case u/s 7, 7A of PC Act -- Demand of illegal gratification – Enquiry / Investigation -- Approval from Government – Requirement of -- Section 17-A talks about enquiry or inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties -- Section 17-A by any stretch of imagination cannot be applied to cases of demand of illegal gratification – Benefit of Section 17-A of the PC Act, 1988 rejected.

(Para 4-8)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 2(1)(c)(vii) – Transfer of case to commercial court -- Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Commercial dispute would mean a dispute arising out of agreements relating to immoveable property used exclusively in trade or commerce -- No such pleading to the effect that the immovable property is being used exclusively in trade or commerce – Plaintiff and defendant No.1 had led their respective evidence in support of their case and thus, apparently the suit has also made much progress -- Trial Court rejected the application filed by the petitioner for transfer -- Impugned order does not call for any interference.

 (Para 6, 7)

B. Constitution of India, Article 227 – Revision Power of High Court -- High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it -- Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of court or tribunal subordinate to it -- A statutory amendment with respect to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227 but at the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 -- Power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court -- Power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. Observations made in Shalini Shyam Shetty’s case (2010) 8 SCC 329 relied.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 25 – Transfer of maintenance case -- Rajpura to Kolkata – On husband’s behest -- Wife abandoned two sons of the parties when they were minors and the petitioner has been taking care of both the sons since 2021 -- Being a single father, it is difficult for the petitioner to travel to Rajpura, Punjab for contesting the proceedings of maintenance application -- Transfer Petition allowed, Maintenance Case transferred  to Family Court at Kolkata, West Bengal.

(Para 2, 3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961) -- Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (XVIII of 2000), Section 16(1)(g), (n) -- No instruction from client – Not a withdrawal of Vakaltnama – Ex-parte decree -- Counsel who represented the defendant had not withdrawn the Vakalatnama but had only claimed no instructions and along with the pursis had annexed letter sent to his client -- As per the appellate court finding there was no claim of the defendants that the letter sent by their counsel was not served upon them -- In such circumstances, if no instructions are provided by a litigant to his advocate, it is the fault of the litigant not of the advocate -- Further, there is nothing on record that any proceedings were initiated against the advocate for his misconduct -- Neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal -- Defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a plausible view based on materials available on record.

(Para 5, 15, 23)

Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994), Section 15, 210 – Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 (19 of 1994), Section 76, 80, 81 – Punjab Panchayat Election Rules, 1994, Rule 50 – Election petition challenging election of Sarpanch -- Procedure before Tribunal – Framing of issues -- Neither the response has been called for nor issues have been framed – No evidence was recorded -- Tribunal proceeded to decide the election petition as if he was resolving a trivial dispute without realizing that he was dealing with democratic rights of the parties -- Order is bereft of application of mind -- Election petition has been adjudicated by passing a callous order – Impugned order not sustainable, quashed – Matter remanded back to Tribunal to decide in accordance  with law.

(Para 10-12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32(5) -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 37 -- Execution -- Decree for permanent injunction – Subsequent dispossession – Restoration of possession – Permissibility of -- Finding of fact was recorded that decree holder was in possession of the suit property, the same carried presumption of her possession as on the date of filing of suit till the date of its adjudication -- In any subsequent execution based on dispossession at the hands of judgment debtor, the non-mentioning of specific particulars in the shape of date or month of forcible dispossession was not of much relevance – Order for warrant of possession, upheld.

(Para 6, 10-16)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96, 100 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Interim protection in Appeal – Permissibility of -- Just because the original suit came to be dismissed, that does not mean that in the pending appeal, the appellate court cannot grant appropriate relief -- Application seeking to maintain the status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed -- Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5, while declining to grant status quo, is grossly misplaced.

-- appeal is considered a continuation of the original suit, and the appellate court has co-extensive power to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending the final disposal of the appeal.

-- interim relief is designed to aid the main relief and ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous. It aims to prevent irreparable harm that might be caused while the case is pending final determination.

-- grant of appropriate relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court, and the same must be exercised judicially based on the well-settled principles of a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience.

(Para 14-20)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96 -- First Appeal – Interim protection -- First appellate court can re-examine both questions of fact and law and may re-appreciate the evidence on record -- Its powers are as extensive as the original court’s, meaning it can reconsider the need for interim protection.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Issue of limitation/ resjudicata/  Order II Rule 2 of the CPC -- High Court restored the suit dismissing the application for rejection of plaint -- Contention that High Court observed that Trial Court should proceed with the case on merits, thereby implying that the issues concerning limitation, res judicata and those arising under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC ought not to be considered at all – Held, this is not an implication of the judgment of the High Court, nor can such a construction be given to its observations -- All that the High Court meant was that the suit is restored on the file of the Trial Court and that it has to be decided in accordance with law, which would include all the above issues apart from the issues on the merits of the case.

(Para 4, 12, 13)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 17 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Age – Educational qualification – Non-consideration of – Effect of -- Factors like age, educational qualification etc. are required to be seen in terms of Rule 15 read with Rule 17 of Punjab Land Revenue Rules, which have not been taken into consideration by the Ld. Collector -- Learned Divisional Commissioner as well as learned Financial Commissioner have rightly appreciated the matter and set aside learned Collector's order and remanded the matter back to learned Collector for deciding the matter afresh after taking into consideration the relevant factors for appointment of Lambardar – No compelling reasons to interfere -- Civil writ petition dismissed.

(Para 5.1, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Whether Moral turpitude -- Not justifiable to categorize a matter involving dishonor of a cheque, issued in a personal capacity, as an offence involving moral turpitude.

(Para 12(i))

B. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4(6) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Not an moral turpitude – Withholding of gratuity – Permissibility of -- Deceased employee was denied gratuity and leave encashment owing to his conviction u/s 138, NI Act -- Cheques qua which criminal complaints had been filed against the deceased were not issued by him in an official capacity to make unlawful gains for himself or cause unlawful loss to respondent-Corporation -- No moral turpitude can be attributed to the deceased – Deceased would be deemed to be in service till his death on 15.06.2022 -- Respondent-Corporation directed to release all the admissible service benefits, including gratuity and leave encashment, accrued to the deceased till the date of his death with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. -- Respondent-Corporation further directed to consider the case of petitioner No.2 for compassionate appointment.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 175(v), 176 – Removal of Women Sarpanch – Qualification-Minimum Middle pass -- Educational qualification neither verified nor proved by the concerned school from which petitioner claims to have passed the 8th class examination -- Petitioner also not made any effort to establish the authenticity or genuineness of the School Leaving Certificate relied upon by her -- Mark-sheet of the 8th class examination, which the petitioner claims to have passed, has not been placed on record of with writ petition – Held, petitioner does not possess the minimum educational qualification (middle class pass for woman candidate) prescribed for contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch and, therefore, she has been rightly removed from the said post.

(Para 10)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 175(v), 176 – Election of Sarpanch – Election petition – Removal of Sarpanch on complaint – Permissibility of -- Contention that since respondent No.6 has also filed an election petition, the complaint filed by her before the District Authorities could not be entertained under Section 51 of the 1994 Act – Held, if the petitioner had any objection as regards the maintainability of the complaint u/s 51 of the 1994 Act, then she should have availed her appropriate remedies before the competent Court at the relevant stage by challenging such proceedings -- However, no such recourse appears to have been taken by the petitioner – Held, once the petitioner had duly participated in the proceedings initiated against her under Section 51 of the 1994 Act and also suffered an adverse order, she cannot now be permitted to turn around and raise an objection to the maintainability of such proceedings merely on the ground that an election petition had also been filed against her – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 11-13)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 20 -- Agreement to sell of year 1990 – Suit for specific performance decreed – 35 year delayed payment of balance sale consideration – Equitable/ Discretionary relief :

-- Equitable answer does not lie either in denying specific performance altogether, or in enforcing the contract mechanically at the 1990 price – Where there is a long passage of time and substantial rise in prices, the Court, while upholding the decree for specific performance, may mould the relief by directing the purchaser to pay an enhanced amount so that the enforcement of the contract does not operate harshly against the vendor nor confer an unfair bonanza upon the purchaser.

 -- Discretion u/s 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (pre-amendment) is meant precisely to address such situations and to secure what is substantive justice between the parties.

-- An amount equal to seventy times (double the time gap between date of agreement and order) balance sale consideration under the agreement is payable by plaintiff/ buyer within three months -- In case the plaintiff fails to deposit the aforesaid amount within the time stipulated, the decree for specific performance shall stand vacated.

(Para 57-59)

Constitution of India, Article 23 -- Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari -- Samagra Shiksha Scheme -- Shiksha Pariyojna Parishad -- Continuously for over ten years in a row are deemed to be employed permanently -- A fixed honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month amounts to ‘Begar’ and unfair practice which is violative of Article 23 of the Constitution – Amount enhanced to Rs.17,000/- per month payable : Held,

i) The appointment of the part time or contractual instructors/teachers in fact no longer remains contractual in nature once the contract period of eleven months for which they were initially appointed or the extended contract period stood expired;

ii) They were not even part time instructors/teachers as they were specifically prohibited for taking any job or part time employment elsewhere during their spare time;

iii) In fact, these instructors/teachers having continued continuously for over ten years in a row are deemed to be employed permanently against deemed substantive posts, as with the passage of time and keeping in mind the continuity of the work, such posts stand automatically created;

iv) The Project Approval Board is the sole central authority to manage budget and finances under the Act and the scheme and to fix honorarium for the instructors/teachers appointed thereunder. No other authority has any say in the matter concerning finance and budget consequently in the fixation of honorarium;

v) The Project Approval Board having once approved the proposal for fixing Rs.17,000/- per month as honorarium to these instructors/teachers, no authority can sit over such a decision and pass orders contrary to it;

vi) The initial burden to pay honorarium to the instructors/teachers is upon the State Government who is free to recover the contribution of the Central Government from the Union of India on the principle of “pay & recover”;

vii) The honorarium payable to these instructors/teachers cannot be permitted to remain stagnant and the same is revisable periodically at least once in three years by the Project Approval Board or any other authority as may be determined by the Central Government/State Government under the scheme or the modified scheme;

viii) Any action of the State/Union Government to employ instructors/teachers on a fixed honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month as was initially fixed in 2013-14 amounts to ‘Begar’ and unfair practice which is violative of Article 23 of the Constitution;

ix) The Project Approval Board having fixed honorarium to these instructors/teachers at the rate of Rs.17,000/- per month with effect from the year 2017-18, the State Government/Central Government is not justified in paying them at a lesser rate of either Rs.8,470/- or Rs.9,800/- or at the basic rate of Rs.7,000/- per month.

Part time contractual instructors/ teachers appointed in the Upper Primary School in the State of U.P. are entitled to revision of their honorarium of Rs.7,000/- per month which was initially fixed for the contract period of eleven months in the year 2013 -- All these instructors/teachers held entitled to receive honorarium at the rate of Rs.17,000/- per month with effect from 2017-18 -- The State Government shall start paying honorarium to them at the rate of Rs. 17,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.04.2026 and the arrears of which shall be paid to them by the State Government within a period of six months from today -- State Government may recover the contribution of the Central Government from the Union of India.

(Para 70-72)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty -- Prosecution u/s 498-A should not be initiated in a routine manner and is warranted only where the complaint discloses a coercive dowry demand or life-endangering cruelty, not where the parties are locked in an acrimonious but civilly resolvable conflict over assets or marital breakdown.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty -- ‘cruelty’ alone is not enough to constitute the offence -- It must be done with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 482 -- Cruelty -- Summoning of accused – Sustainability --  Vague allegations of cruelty, demand for dowry and harassment at the hands of the petitioners -- Only specific allegation against the petitioners/ accused (husband & father-in-law) was that they, along with sister-in-law and sister of father-in-law, assaulted the complainant in the kitchen with brick bats while raising objections to her entry, without attribution of any specific or individual role to any of the four accused -- No injury, no medical evidence, no complaint was lodged with any authority at the earliest point of time – On identical allegations, two other persons were not summoned by the trial Court -- Summoning of the petitioners was not justified.

(Para 12-18)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 482 -- Cruelty -- Summoning of accused (husband and father-in-law) – Quashing --  Complaint, after 21 years of marriage and 03 grown up children is merely a result of failure of marriage, intended to secure suitable settlement with respect to civil rights of complainant and her children -- Civil suit against husband regarding his properties pending – Complaint was filed to be used as a weapon in the personal discord -- Vague and generic allegations of cruelty amidst matrimonial conflict, if not nipped at the initial stage, lead to misuse of legal process and encourage unscrupulous persons to use arm-twisting tactics to seek compliance of unreasonable demands –  Prima facie, no case of cruelty or dowry demand made -- Complaint along with all subsequent proceedings including summoning quashed.

(Para 19-21)

A. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preventive detention -- Constitutional and statutory requirements -- Petitioner already on bail in five NDPS cases -- Consideration of bail orders and bail conditions is a mandatory requirement and failure to do so reflects non-application of mind and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority -- No finding as to how the conditions imposed in bail orders by the criminal Courts were inadequate or ineffective to prevent the alleged activities -- Merely describing the petitioner as a “habitual offender” or stating that he is “likely to resume trafficking” is not sufficient in law unless supported by credible and proximate material showing an immediate threat -- Detention order set aside.

(Para 6-12)

B. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preventive detention -- Constitutional and statutory requirements – Petitioner already on bail in five NDPS cases -- Last case against the petitioner was registered on 20.01.2025, whereas the detention order was passed only on 05.08.2025, after a gap of more than six months, without any satisfactory explanation -- Such unexplained delay breaks the live and proximate link between the alleged past activities and the need for immediate preventive action – Impugned detention is based more on past history and assumptions rather than on any real and urgent necessity -- Detention, therefore, assumes a punitive character instead of a preventive one, unreasonable and unjustified curtailment of the petitioner’s fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution – Detention order set aside.

(Para 12)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Interest -- Notional income of the deceased taken at Rs.2100 per month -- Deceased being about 40 years of age after adding 40% as future prospects, the annual income works out to be Rs.35,280/- -- There being three claimants, 1/3rd deduction made for self-expenses -- Annual loss of dependency comes to Rs.23,500/-.  -- Applicable multiplier will be 15, having regard to the age of the deceased and so compensation works to be Rs.3,52,800/- -- Accident in 1996, an amount of Rs.10,000/- each i.e. Rs.30,000/- awarded towards loss of consortium/parental consortium -- Whereas, Rs.5,000/- each is awarded under the heads of loss of estate and funeral expenses -- Total compensation works out to be Rs.3,92,800/- -- Enhanced compensation of Rs.1,48,800/- payable along with interest @ 7.5% per month from the date of filing of the petition till its realisation.

(Para 3-4)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Interest -- Assessment of income – Deceased is salaried employee/ agriculturist also -- Salary of one skilled labourer added for agricultural income loss in his salary to assess dependency -- Deceased 31 years old was working as a Cluster officer in a Pvt Ltd company -- PW 1 (wife of the deceased) deposed that the deceased was drawing a gross salary of Rs.29447/- per month -- Attested photocopies of jamabandi for year 2016-17 Ex.C-10 were produced on record and income tax return for assessment year 2019-20 (Ex.C-6) was also placed on record which showed the agricultural income to be Rs1,25,000/- -- CW-4 from Income Tax Department proved the attested copy of ITR (Ex.C-6) -- Skilled person is required for the supervising and cultivation of the Agriculture land of the deceased -- Minimum wages applicable to skilled workers in Punjab during the relevant period is Rs 11219.18/- which reasonably rounded off as Rs.11,220/- -- Monthly income of the Deceased should be assessed as Rs. 40667/- (by adding Rs.11,220/- into his gross salary) – After adding 50% for future prospects and multiplier of 16, loss of Estate, funeral expenses and consortium total compensation assessed at Rs.78,92,764/- -- Enhanced amount payable with interest @ 9% (excluding the period of delay of 57 days in filing the appeal) to be deposited with the Tribunal within a period of two months.

(Para 9-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 200, 482 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Dishonour of cheque – Proclaimed person -- Original complaint withdrawn -- Quashing of FIR u/s 17A IPC – -- Since the original complaint related to the dishonoured cheque has been withdrawn, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings u/s 174-A IPC against the petitioner – FIR quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 341(1), 342(1) -- Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe -- Power to specify a caste or tribe as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is conferred upon the President of India, in relation to each State or Union Territory -- Once such specification is made, only Parliament, by law, may include or exclude any caste or tribe from the notified list -- Neither the executive nor the judiciary has any authority to modify or extend the scope of the Presidential Order.

(Para 9.4)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 9, 161 -- Constitution of India, Article 341(1), 342(1) -- Election of Sarpanch – Reserved seat for Scheduled Caste -- Scheduled Caste Certificate of father from other State -- The words “in relation to that State or Union Territory” occurring in Articles 341(1) and 342(1) are of decisive significance; they indicate that the recognition of a caste or tribe is confined to the particular State or Union Territory for which it is so notified -- Since the petitioner does not belong to any caste notified as Scheduled Caste in the State of Haryana, she had no legal right to hold the office of Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes -- Petitioner’s reliance on a certificate obtained from the authorities in Haryana on the basis of Scheduled Caste Certificate of her father issued by the State of Bihar, would not entitle the petitioner to contest election as a Scheduled Caste candidate in Gram Panchayat elections in the State of Haryana.

(Para 9.4, 12, 13)

C. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 51, 161, 176 – Election of Sarpanch/ Panch – Challenge to -- Election of a candidate to the post of Sarpanch or Panch (as the case may be), could be questioned either by filing an election petition under Section 176 of the 1994 Act or by submitting a complaint to the concerned authority under Section 51 of the 1994 Act.

(Para 14, 14.1)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 14 -- Unilateral termination of the agreement to sell – Scope of –

(i) Unilateral termination of the agreement to sell by one party is impermissible in law except in cases where the agreement itself is determinable in nature in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 1963;

(ii) If such unilateral termination of a non-determinable agreement to sell is permitted as a defence, then virtually every suit for specific performance can be frustrated by the defendant by placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff, who despite performing his part of the obligations and having showcased readiness and willingness, would require to also seek a separate declaration that the termination was bad in law. In such cases, the burden cannot be casted upon the plaintiff to challenge the alleged termination of agreement;

iii) Where a party claims to have valid reasons to terminate or rescind a non-determinable agreement to sell, with a view to err on the side of caution, it should be such terminating party, if at all, who ideally should approach the court and obtain a declaration as to the validity of such termination or rescission, and not the non-terminating party. However, this must not mean that the defendant (the terminating party) in such cases would mandatorily be required to seek a declaration because Sections 27 and 31 of the Act of 1963 respectively, while using the phrase “may sue” merely give an option to any person to have the contract rescinded or adjudged as void or voidable;

(iv) Once the alleged termination of a non-determinable agreement in question is found to be not for bona fide reasons and being done in a unilateral manner on part of the defendant, it cannot be said that any declaration challenging the alleged termination was required on part of plaintiff;

(v) If a contract itself gives no right to unilaterally terminate the contract, or such right has been waived, and a party still terminates the contract unilaterally then that termination would amount to a breach by repudiation, and the nonterminating party can directly seek specific performance without first seeking a declaration; and

(vi) In the event it is found that the termination of agreement to sell by the defendant was not valid, then such an agreement to sell will remain subsisting and executable.

(Para 43)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 19(b) -- Bonafide purchaser – Failure to make enquiry – Effect of -- Subsequent purchasers had sufficient notice of the facts that an ATS dated 28.04.2000 existed; the names and addresses of the original vendees; that an earnest money amounting to Rs. 2,00,000/- had been paid by the original vendees to the original vendors; that the original vendors had sought to terminate the ATS due to their inability to execute the sale deed in favour of the original vendees on account of a status quo order; that the date of actual termination could not have coincided with the date of notice; and that deemed termination would have arose only if the original vendees had failed to claim the earnest money within one month; and that despite the issuance of the notice of termination in 2003, the original vendees continued to contest the impleadment application in the Original Suit No. 30 of 2001 until 2005 -- These circumstances should have reasonably aroused suspicion or at the very least prompted further inquiry by any prudent bona fide purchaser -- Yet the subsequent purchasers despite having ample opportunity to become aware of these facts abstained from making any such inquiries -- It is therefore beyond cavil that the subsequent purchasers cannot take shelter under Section 19(b) of the Act of 1963.

(Para 81)

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3(A to G) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Acquisition of land by NHAI -- Alteration of award in Execution petition – Permissibility of -- Award passed by the Arbitrator clearly reveals that a specific finding was given by the Arbitrator stating that one marla was equivalent to 207 sq. ft. -- Said finding has been given in bold in the award hence it is not a case where the same could have been missed by either of the parties -- It does not now lie in the mouth of judgment debtors i.e. petitioners herein to say that one marla is equivalent to 272 sq. ft.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 13, Order 21 Rule 26 -- Execution of ex-parte decree – Application for stay of execution declined -- Application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC pending consideration -- Application for setting aside ex parte as well as the execution application is to be heard by the same Court and same Presiding Judge – Revision petition disposed of with the direction to learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) to decide the application moved by the petitioner under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC within a period of two months and then proceed further with execution proceedings.

(Para 1-6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Permanent disability of 10% – Functional disability -- Future loss of income – A malunited fracture of the foot -- Permanent physical disability is not synonymous with loss of earning capacity -- Appellant unable to demonstrate that the 10% permanent disability of the foot has translated into any functional disability so as to impair the claimant’s earning capacity as a Manager – Rs.1,71,000/- has been awarded towards permanent disability by the Ld. Tribunal -- Assessment does not suffer from any perversity or misapplication of law warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 4-9)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  No fault in DDR – Effect of -- Contention raised by the appellant–Insurance Company regarding the effect of the Daily Diary Report (DDR), wherein it was mentioned that no one was at fault, is concerned, the same does not hold any merit in the eyes of law -- The learned Tribunal has rightly and correctly observed that the contents of the DDR are not conclusive so as to dislodge the otherwise cogent oral and documentary evidence adduced before it.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Standard of proof -- It is well-settled law that the standard of proof applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal trials.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Father of the deceased – Dependency -- Ld. Tribunal rightly concluded that the father of the deceased was financially dependent upon him -- In view of the number of dependents, the deduction of one-fifth (1/5) of the income of the deceased towards personal expenses has been correctly applied while computing the loss of dependency -- Said approach is in consonance with the settled principles governing assessment of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

(Para 14)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Father as dependent -- In a case of aged father, it cannot be held that he was not dependent upon deceased accordingly, father is to be taken as dependent of deceased.

(Para 9)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased was 23 years old at the time of his death and working as driver on the truck thereby earning Rs.6,000/-+100/- per day as diet money, however no evidence led – In absence of any cogent evidence, monthly salary of deceased taken as Rs.2,400/- taking him to be driver on the basis of minimum wages payable to driver -- Since deceased was 28 years old, multiplier of 17 would be applicable -- 40% of monthly income added to the income of the deceased as future prospects -- Since, there are 4 claimants including 60 years old father, claimants-appellants are entitled to compensation after applying 1/4^th deduction – Compensation made as Rs.5,89,080 (Assessed by Tribunal Rs.2,30,400/-) – Enhanced compensation of Rs.3,58,680/- payable with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing of claim petition till realization.

(Para 6-12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 209 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174A IPC/ 209 BNS – Quashing -- When the petitioner came to know about the fact he surrendered before the learned trial Court and got the benefit of bail in the case -- Complaint has already been disposed of -- Once the main case stands decided, the FIR u/s 209 BNS (Section 174-A) amounts to abuse of process of law and deserves to be quashed – FIR quashed.

(Para 9-11)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Non-bailable warrants – Anticipatory bail – Maintainability of -- Since the petitioner has been summoned in a bailable offence, therefore, the provisions of Section 482 of BNSS are not attracted  -- Petition disposed of -- Petitioner on his surrender before the learned trial Court will be admitted to bail subject to the conditions being imposed upon him by the learned trial Court.

(Para 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing – Cheque from Joint account -- In the complaint there is no specific allegation that the petitioner was signatory to the cheque or that she had been instrumental or responsible for the day to day business of the firm on whose behalf the cheques were issued by the husband of the petitioner -- Taking into consideration the fact that the respondent has failed to aver and lead preliminary evidence qua the fact that the petitioner was in any way responsible for the day to day affairs of the company, on whose behalf the cheques were issued or that she had signed the same, order for her summoning to face trial for the commission of offence punishable u/s 138 of NI Act is perverse and deserves to be quashed -- Impugned order quashed, qua petitioner.

(Para 13-20)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence – Jump of bail -- Due to non-appearance of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court, his bail order was cancelled -- Warrant of arrest issued -- Reason for his absence is that his father was seriously ill and got hospitalized on the same day -- Petition disposed of, impugned order set aside subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Divorce petition through attorney – Transfer of petition -- Tarantaran to Gurdaspur -- Balancing of convenience/ inconvenience of the parties is required to be done -- Amicable settlement, earlier reached forms the basis of the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, which is still pending in the Courts at Gurdaspur -- 7 years old child is in the care and custody of the applicant, who herself is not having any source of earning -- Respondent is residing at Malaysia -- Convenience of his attorney-holder cannot be placed, above the convenience of the applicant – Petition transferred from Tarn Taran to Gurdaspur.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Cybercrime complaint – Freezing of Bank Account – Permissibility of -- Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Bank to keep the disputed amount (the amount which was transferred illegally in the bank account of the petitioner) frozen and allow the petitioner to make transactions from his bank account from the remaining balance – The bank directed to send a communication to the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police, to indicate the amount to be earmarked for lien -- In case, the respondent-Bank does not receive any reply from the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police within the stipulated period, then Bank directed to de-freeze the bank account of petitioner.

(Para 1-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 37, 50, 52A – NDPS – Appeal against conviction – Suspension of sentence -- Judicial Magistrate who issued the certificate u/s 52-A was not made a witness -- Gazetted Officer was not produced during trial -- As the prosecution is unable to show that the said 80 packets seized by them during raid were properly classified weighed and sampled and as the said drugs appear to have been mixed up without the order of the competent authority -- Rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act cannot stand in the way in view of such materials on record in favour of the appellants – Sentence suspended.

(Para 18-20)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 31, 32 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Fee waiver to disabled student  -- 5% quota earmarked for persons with disabilities has already been filled, and the fee waiver has been pre-approved, only in respect of those candidates – Held, when the intention of the State is to provide fee waiver to persons with disabilities, its implementation cannot be clubbed with reservation -- Persons with disabilities require both reservation and welfare measures so as to provide them with equal opportunities to complete their education along with other candidates -- Petitioner held eligible for the waiver of fees.

(Para 7-9)