Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 -- Mutation on the basis of sale deed -- Locus standi to challenge --  There is no challenge to the said sale deed at the hands of the appellants -- Once, there is a sale deed and the Revenue Authorities have accepted the said sale deed so as to enter the mutation, the appellant cannot raise any grievance qua the mutation -- Revenue Authorities have raised no objection qua the aspect of entering into the mutation -- Existence of the sale deed dated 24.06.1966 in favour of respondent No.5/ Society not disputed – Held, appellant has no locus to challenge the same.

(Para 5, 9, 10)

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 128 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 122 -- Personal diary of wife – Privileged communications during marriage – Trial Court allowed personal diary to be tendered in evidence – Held, personal diary of the complainant/ wife does not fall within the ambit of Section 122 of the Evidence Act/ Section 128 of BSA Act, 2023 – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 2-8)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 – Interim maintenance – Respondent/ husband admitted his monthly income to be Rs.3,72,543 and claims his monthly expenses to be Rs.3,32,900/- -- Respondent has also placed on record income tax return of complainant/ wife for the year 2021-22 as per which her income is shown to be Rs.17.16 lakhs -- Keeping in view the fact that both the parties are sharing the household and the respondent claims his own monthly expenses to be Rs.3,32,900/-, applying the principle that the wife is entitled to enjoy the status as is being enjoyed by husband, interim maintenance modified to Rs.75,000/- to be paid by respondent No.1-husband.

(Para 8)

A. Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 2(a), 3, 7 – Gas regulator – Whether it is essential commodity -- A gas regulator is merely an accessory or an appliance used in conjunction with liquefied petroleum gas and cannot in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, be elevated to the status of an essential commodity.

(Para 5.1)

B. Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 2(a), 3, 7 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Unauthorized possession of 38 gas regulators without a valid licence – Acquittal -- Alleged seized articles were never subjected to any scientific or technical examination -- No expert evidence has been adduced to establish that the recovered articles were, in fact, gas regulators or that they were in a serviceable and working condition -- Alleged articles cannot be conclusively categorized as regulated commodities -- Independent witness not joined -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 2, 5.2-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 227 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape case -- Discharge – Although the Court ought not to minutely marshal evidence at the stage of framing of charges, however, when the primary material on record is only the statement of the prosecutrix, the Court cannot be precluded from considering whether the same inspires such confidence so as to give rise to grave suspicion against the accused or if the same is riddled with inconsistencies, delays or improbabilities – To hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of sifting evidence and warrant framing of charges in every case where the prosecutrix makes allegations of rape in her statement u/s 164 of the CrPC.

(Para 14)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 227 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape case -- Discharge – In the FIR as well as in her statement u/s 164 of the CrPC, the petitioner asserted that accused had inserted his finger in her private part, however, during her medical examination, the petitioner stated that she had been subjected to oral sex – For another incident, the prosecutrix has alleged on one hand that both the accused persons raped her one by one which implies that she was conscious to some level, however, she has alleged in her statement u/s 164 of the CrPC that she was unconscious and she had felt something wrong had been done to her after she regained consciousness -- Said inconsistencies in regard to the petitioner being conscious or not during the 2nd incident as well as the precise nature of acts cannot be deemed to be minute, especially when coupled with lack of corroboration from CDR -- There is also significant delay in registration of FIR after a lapse of around seven months -- No explanation tendered as to why no complaint was given by the petitioner in the 10 day gap between the two incidents either – Due to delay no medical evidence can be obtained – Discharge order upheld.

(Para 15-24)

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (No.36 of 2003), Section 61(d) – Supply of power/ electricity -- Annual fixed charges -- Mandate under Section 61(d) of the 2003 Act, is that in the determination of tariff recovery of the cost of electricity in a reasonable manner is to be ensured -- Respondent, having supplied continuous power, cannot be denied the annual fixed charges for the relevant period, and if it were done so, they will permanently lose that amount, which will be unjust and contrary to law.

(Para 31)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (No.36 of 2003), Section 61(d) – State Regulations -- Power Purchase Agreement/ PPA – Argument that the State Regulations came only after the amended PPA is not appealing – Central Regulations operate as guiding factors under Regulation 4 of the State Regulations and in any event when the State Regulations came into force on 03.08.2005, the PPA can only be read in a manner as to be aligned with the State regulations – That is the mandate of the law – Power Purchase Agreement/ PPA can only be read in manner as to be aligned with State Regulations.

(Para 33)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Hostile witness – Acquittal -- When the main witness of the prosecution, i.e. the victim herself, has not supported the case of the prosecution, it is not open for the Court to presume that she did not support the case of the prosecution because the appellant-accused has won over the said witness -- Moreso, PW-2, i.e., the husband of the victim, also did not support the case of the prosecution -- Further, medical evidence also does not support the case of the prosecution -- Furthermore, three independent witnesses, though cited as prosecution witnesses in the chargesheet, were not examined by the prosecution – Held, Trial Court as well as the High Court committed an error by recording the order of conviction of the appellant-accused and therefore, the said orders are required to be quashed and set aside – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

A. Insurance law -- Standard Fire and Special Perils Insurance Policy – Cause of fire – Ground of -- Once it is not disputed that the loss is caused by fire, then the cause igniting the fire becomes immaterial -- Insurer cannot refuse to indemnify the damage caused by fire, which is a specified peril, on the ground that the proximate cause of fire was burglary/ theft (which is excluded under the RSMD clause), particularly when no such exclusion is provided in the specified peril “Fire”.

(Para 20)

B. Insurance law -- Standard Fire and Special Perils Insurance Policy – Cause of fire – Ground of -- Loss occurred on account of the transformer being set ablaze and the fire could not be controlled for about 6 hours –  On the intervening night of 01.11.2006, some miscreants entered the factory and committed burglary -- It was reported in the FIR that flames were coming out of the transformer and at no stage any defense was taken that the insured caused the fire -- Loss caused to the Appellant was due to fire only and the incident of theft/ burglary merely preceded the incident of fire -- Burglary/theft is not an exclusion under the specified peril “Fire” -- Even, the general exclusions to the policy do not cover theft which precedes the insured peril as an exclusion and the said exclusion is only provided under the RSMD clause -- It is a trite law that the exclusions in the contract for insurance must be read strictly and, therefore, the exclusion provided under the RSMD clause would not oust the liability of the insurer when the loss or damage is attributable to the peril of fire which has its independent exclusions – Matter remitted back to NCDRC to assess the loss.

(Para 25-30)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Sections 13(1)(i-a) – Divorce -- Cruelty -- Spouses have strongly held views with regard to the approach towards matrimonial life and they have refused to accommodate each other for a long period of time -- Consequently, their conduct amounts to cruelty to each other – Held, in matrimonial matters involving two individuals, it is not for the society or for the Court to sit in judgment over which spouses’ approach is correct or not -- It is their strongly held views and their refusal to accommodate each other that amounts to cruelty to one another.

(Para 24)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 142 – Divorce – Long pendency of litigation – Ground of -- Pendency of matrimonial litigation for a long duration only leads to perpetuity of marriage on paper -- It is in the best interest of parties and the society if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time -- No useful purpose shall be served by keeping the matrimonial litigation pending in Court without granting relief to the parties – Marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down -- In exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Court dissolved the marriage between the parties -- The power to do ‘complete justice’ under article 142(1) is not Fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame.

(Para 27-35)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 376(2)(i), 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Acquittal -- Rape of four-year old girl – Circumstantial evidence -- Omission in FIR – Investigation lapses -- First Information Report, despite the informant’s professed complete knowledge of the incident, is bereft of even the most rudimentary details, neither the name of the accused person (appellant herein) nor those of the purported witnesses of the last seen together circumstance find mention -- Investigation hopelessly botched and a trial conducted with a  pedantic rigidity that obscured, rather than unveiled, the truth -- Highly unnatural conduct of the witnesses, marked by gross insensitivity/ rank apathy, contradictions and apparent concoctions raises serious doubts about the reliability of the prosecution’s case -- Yet, in face of this disturbing matrix, the accused-appellant stands convicted and has remained behind bars for nearly thirteen long years – Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-52, 78)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 393 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 354 -- Criminal trials – Judgment must contain -- More structured and uniform practice must be adopted to enhance the legibility of criminal judgments -- Directions issued to all trial Courts across the country for :  

Preparation of Tabulated Charts in all the judgments:

All trial Courts dealing with criminal matters shall, at the conclusion of the judgment, incorporate tabulated charts summarizing: -

a. Witnesses examined,

b. Documents exhibited, and

c. Material objects (muddamal) produced and exhibited.

These charts shall form an appendix or concluding segment of the judgment and shall be prepared in a clear, structured and easily comprehensible format.

Standardized Chart of Witnesses

Each criminal judgment shall contain a witness chart with at least the following columns:

a. Serial Number

b. Name of the Witness

c. Brief Description/Role of the Witness, such as: Informant, Eye-witness, Medical Jurist/Doctor, Investigating Officer (I.O.), Panch Witness, etc.

The description should be succinct but sufficient to indicate the evidentiary character of the witness. This structured presentation will allow quick reference to the nature of testimony, assist in locating the witness in the record, and minimize ambiguity.

Specimen Chart for Witnesses Examined

Standardized Chart of Exhibited Documents

A separate chart shall be prepared for all documents exhibited during trial. This chart shall include:

a. Exhibit Number;

b. Description of document;

c. The Witness who proved or attested the document.

Illustratively, the description may include: FIR, complaint, panchnamas, medical certificates, FSL reports, seizure memos, site plans, dying declarations, etc.

The requirement of specifying the witness who proved the document ensures traceability of proof and assist the Court in appreciating compliance with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/ Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

Specimen Chart for Exhibited Documents

Standard Chart for Material Objects (Muddamal)

Whenever material objects are produced and marked as exhibits, the trial Court shall prepare a third chart with:

a. Material Object (M.O.) Number;

b. Description of the Object;

c. Witness who proved the Object’s Relevance (e.g., weapon, clothing, tool, article seized under panchnama, etc.)

This enables clarity regarding the physical evidence relied upon.

Specimen Chart for Material Objects/Muddamals

Special Provisions for Cases Involving Voluminous Evidence

In complex cases, such as conspiracies, economic offences or trials involving voluminous oral or documentary evidence, the list of witnesses and exhibits may be substantially long. Where the number of witnesses or documents is unusually large, the trial Court may prepare charts only for the material, relevant, and relied-upon witnesses and documents, clearly indicating that the chart is confined to such items. This ensures that the charts remain functional reference tools rather than unwieldy compilations.

Application to Defence Witnesses and Evidence

The aforesaid directions shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to all witnesses examined and all evidence adduced by the defence.

Adoption of Specimen Format and Permissible Deviations

The specimen charts provided herein shall ordinarily serve as the standard format to be followed by trial Courts across the country.

Observations Regarding Applicability to Civil Proceedings

While these directions are primarily intended to streamline criminal trials, we leave it open to the High Courts to consider, wherever appropriate,  the adoption of similar tabulated formats in civil matters as well, particularly in cases involving voluminous documentary or oral evidence, so as to promote clarity, uniformity, and ease of reference.

High Court may consider incorporating the above directions in their respective rules governing the procedure of trial Courts.

(Para 86-90)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Suit for refund of earnest money -- Agreement to sell -- Concealment of mortgage – Legal notice for refund – Effect of – Conduct of Parties – Adverse Inference from Silence -- Appellant issued a legal notice alleging concealment of the mortgage and seeking a refund -- Respondent’s failure to reply to this notice, combined with his subsequent agreement to reduce the sale price by Rs.35,00,000/- after the mortgage was discovered, was viewed as evidence of "culpable intent" and "deceit" -- Appellant held entitled to realize Rs.65,43,750/- with interest at 13% per annum from the respondent and his assets.

(Para 12, 24, 30, 31, 33)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Agreement to sell – Not seeing of original title deed -- It is a common practice for landowners to keep original title deeds in the bank lockers for security purposes -- Hence, the explanation offered by the plaintiff-appellant for not insisting on the inspection of the original title deeds, at the time of entering into the agreement, was reasonable and justified.

(Para 32)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47, Order 21 Rule 58, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 -- Doctrine of lis pendens – Separate suit – Maintainability of – Third party rights – Adjudication of doctrine of lis pendens along with Rules 58, 89 to 92, 99 to 104 of Order XXI CPC respectively and Section 47 CPC is as follows:

(i) Section 52 of the 1882 Act embodying the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to suits where any right to the property in question is directly and specifically in issue. Whether any right in the property was directly and specifically in question in the suit would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine cannot blindly be made inapplicable to suits in which the plaint contains a specific averment that the mortgaged property be attached and sold in lieu of the decree or a charge be created on the property. If interpreted so, any judgment-debtor can render the decree incapable of execution by transferring his interest in the property during the pendency of such a suit.

(ii) Rule 89 of Order XXI CPC provides an opportunity to any person claiming an interest in the property sold or a person acting for or on behalf of the persons having such interest, another opportunity to save the property from the clutches of the sale. A sine qua non for setting aside the sale under this rule would be the payment of the deposit as prescribed therein within a period of sixty days from the date of the sale. For the purposes of this rule, a pendente lite transferee of the judgment-debtor would also fall under the ambit of the phrase “person claiming an interest in the property sold”.

(iii) Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC provides that the sale shall be set-aside if there exists any material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Furthermore, such material irregularity or fraud must cause a substantial injury to the applicant under Rule 90. In other words, there must be a direct nexus between the material irregularity or fraud and the substantial injury caused to the applicant.

(iv) The words “material irregularity in publishing or conducting it” in Rule 90 would include any material irregularity or fraud occurring at a stage prior to the proclamation of sale as well, provided that the applicant did not have an opportunity to raise or could not have raised such a grievance at the appropriate time. Furthermore, the mere absence of or any defect in the attachment, by itself, cannot be a ground for setting aside the sale under Rule 90, unless substantial injury is proved. The applicant must make specific averments as regards the alleged irregularities or fraud, and convince the executing court that a substantial injury has been caused to him as a consequence.

(v) The absence of a saleable interest on the part of the judgment-debtor to the suit property cannot be brought in as a ground under Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC. Such a ground would squarely fall within the ambit of Rule 58 of Order XXI CPC, if the sale is yet to be confirmed.

(vi) Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC states that no person against whom an order under Rule 92 is made (either confirming the sale under Rule 92(1) or setting it aside under Rule 92(2) can institute a separate suit in that regard. However, there is a very narrow scope for a person to file a separate suit despite the bar under Rule 92(3). The reason for such a separate suit must be that the execution proceedings and the sale was without jurisdiction and therefore, a nullity and not binding on the plaintiff who has instituted a separate suit.

(vii) Having said so, before holding such a separate suit instituted by a plaintiff alleging that the entire execution proceedings was without jurisdiction and therefore, the sale was a nullity, maintainable, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the plaintiff was not a party to the original decree or a representative of a party to the original decree, as stated in Section 47 CPC. If so, instead of filing a separate suit, such persons must prefer an application under Section 47 CPC. Upon any failure to do so, their separate suit would be hit by the bar contained in Section 47 CPC which specifically uses the words “and not by a separate suit”.

(viii) The term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would mean a party other than the judgment-debtor, decree-holder or the auction-purchaser and would refer to a party who has not had his right, title or interest vis-à-vis the property in question adjudicated under Rule 58, Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC respectively. To put it very simply, the term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would refer to a party who is extraneous to the original suit proceedings and the proceedings under Order XXI CPC, and who either has not had his right, title or interest adjudicated or having the opportunity to have his right, title or interest adjudicated, has not availed such a remedy within the required time. Such a “third party” would also be someone who falls outside the scope of Section 47 CPC.

(ix) Rule 92(4) is not a provision which confers any right to the third party to institute a suit for challenging the title of the judgment-debtor to the property which is subject to the execution proceedings. It is merely a procedural provision which states that such a suit must be instituted against the auction-purchaser, where the decree-holder and judgment-debtor would be necessary parties.

(x) When a party other than the judgment-debtor, including a third party, is dispossessed during the course of execution of a decree, the only remedy for such a dispossessed party would lie in filing an application under Rule 99 complaining of its dispossession. In such an application, all questions including that of the right, title and interest of the parties in the proceeding, to the property, would be examined by the executing court.

(xi) The words “may” used in Rule 99 along with the words “and not by a separate suit” used in Rule 101, must not be read to mean that a party who has been dispossessed has two options i.e., to either prefer an application under Rule 99 or to file a separate suit, the moment they are dispossessed.  This would defeat the underlying object of the amendment made to the scheme of Rules 99 to 104 respectively wherein the executing court has been specifically empowered to look into the questions relating to the right, title and interest of the parties, quite akin to that which would have been done by way of a separate suit. Once the period of limitation for preferring an application under Rule 99 lapses, the person who has been dispossessed in the course of the execution of the decree, including a third party, cannot file a separate suit to circumvent or by-pass the said prescribed period of limitation.

(xii) Rule 102 prevents the executing court from passing any order under Rule 100 if it is found that the applicant under Rule 99 is a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. This again, cannot be construed as giving leeway to such a person to institute a separate suit. Court say so for the simple reason that, even in the separate suit, the law would not look favorably upon a pendente lite transferee, and no relief of declaration of title and/or possession would be granted to him. His fate would be the same as under an application under Rule 99.

(xiii) Therefore, - First, the separate suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively would be non-maintainable because they are representatives of the judgment-debtor and the bar envisaged under Section 47 CPC would squarely apply to their case. Secondly, having not availed the remedy under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC within time, the separate suit instituted for the same relief(s) would be barred. Thirdly, even if the aforesaid two reasons assigned could be said to not affect the suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, they would still not be entitled to the reliefs claimed owing to them being pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor whose transaction would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

(Para 256)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C – Death/ Injury by electrocution – Public Utility service – Jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat – PLA does not possess the jurisdiction to determine compensation on account of death or bodily injury caused by electrocution.

(Para 16)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Pay scale parity -- Delay and laches -- Matters involving pay scale parity based on removal of anomalies, the cause of action continues from month to month as long as the anomaly persists -- Every month when the employee receives lesser pay than his similarly situated counterparts constitutes a fresh cause of action.

(Para 24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Pay scale parity -- Discrimination – Employees appointed pursuant to a common competitive examination to identical posts and allocated to different departments purely by administrative allotment – Higher pay scale being given to others -- Principle of equality brooks no discrimination between persons who are similarly situated, and any differential treatment must be based on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved -- Fixation of different pay scales without intelligible differentia is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 – Ld. Single Judge of High Court directed the State to revise the pay scale – Direction upheld.

(Para 2, 30, 33)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 2(1)(zf), 13(2)(4) – SARFAESI proceedings – Security interest -- Mortgage of property – Requirement of – Guarantee deed -- For Invocation of SARFAESI Act presupposes the existence of a validly created security interest in favour of the lender, mortgage is a must – Guarantee deed lacked the authority to invoke the SARFAESI Act against the Company – SARFAESI proceedings quashed.

(Para 25-27, 36, 37)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 2(1)(zf)(zd),  13(2)(4), 17 – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- SARFAESI proceedings – Secured interest/ Secured Creditor is pre-requisite -- Writ jurisdiction – Alternative remedy – Availability of – Effect of -- No security agreement by which security interest has been created in favour of a secured creditor -- High Court held in favour of the Company and allowed the writ petition, despite availability of an alternative remedy u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act as Corporation failed to establish that any security interest was created in its favour either by the Company (borrower) or the Council (guarantor) and/or that the Corporation was a “secured creditor” – Held, once it have been held that the SARFAESI Act was erroneously invoked by the Corporation and that such invocation was without jurisdiction, there is no question of relegating the Company to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act – Judgment of Division Bench, upheld.

(Para 13, 36, 37)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – 14 year Child died -- Monthly notional income can be adopted as per the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – For a Class B city taken as Rs.5400/- per month -- 40% increase has to be adopted for future prospects and the multiplier is 15 and one-half deduction for personal expenses -- Rs.50,000/- as medical expenses -- Claimants are further entitled to loss of estate and funeral expenses at the rate of Rs.15,000/- each and loss of filial consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each -- Parents would be entitled to some compensation for the pain and suffering suffered by the child on his death computed at Rs.25,000/- -- Total compensation, hence, would be Rs.8,65,400/- -- Interest at the rate of 7.5%.awarded.

(Para 2-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Claimants/ Wife and three children -- No Income tax return -- Deceased was a reputed transport contractor and there would be no difficulty in continuing the business after his death -- Deposition of PW 1 that the trucks were parked idly cannot at all be accepted -- Death of the victim would not have put a stop to the income that could be generated from his business; especially from the two trucks he owned -- Legal representatives of the deceased in a motor vehicle accident cannot expect a windfall from a tragedy, nor can the amounts granted be a mere pittance, an apology for compensation -- Keeping the said principle in mind, amount of Rs.50,00,000/- would suffice as compensation for loss of dependency, which works out to half of the total loss of dependency as computed by the Tribunal – Additionally claimants held entitled to compensation for loss of consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses as awarded to a total of Rs.1,60,000/- -- Total award amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of claim petition.

(Para 3, 7-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 14, 166 -- Expiry of licencee – Accident within statutory validity of 30 days – Effect of -- Licence expired on 04.06.2001 -- Thirtieth day fell on 04.07.2001 and remained valid till midnight of that day -- Accident occurred on 04.07.2001 at about 10:45 AM, well within the statutory window of validity -- Therefore, by operation of law, the licence continued to remain effective at the time of the accident – Award of the Tribunal fastened liability upon the appellant-Insurance Company without granting recovery rights affirmed.

(Para 1, 4-7)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 26E – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Secured creditor -- Government dues – Priority – Writ jurisdiction -- Object behind introduction of Section 26E of SARFAESI Act was to give priority of security interest due to any secured creditor under SARFAESI Act over all other debts including revenue taxes, cesses and other rates payable to Central or State Government or local authority, except in cases where the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 became applicable -- Right of a secured creditor to recover its debts, will always be a prior right, even over the right of recovery of a crown debt or any other debt -- Prior charge created in the Revenue records vide rapat No.117 dated 8.11.2018 in favour of District Food and Supply Department, State of Haryana quashed by a Writ of Certiorari.

(Para 6.3-9)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 26E – Secured creditor -- Government dues – Priority -- After the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or local authority in terms of the provisions contained in Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.

(Para 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 397, 401 -- Rejection of application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. – Maintainability of revision -- Interlucatory order -- Revision petition against the order declining application u/s 311 Cr.P.C is not maintainable.

(Para 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Compromise effected between parties – Monitoring of its performance instead disposing the complaint – Permissibility of -- Held, proper course for the learned trial Magistrate should have been to dispose of the complaint in terms of the compromise with liberty to file execution petition on which the learned trial Magistrate could have proceeded u/s 421 of Cr.PC -- Procedure adopted by the learned trial Magistrate, is not in accordance with law -- Direction given to ld. trial Magistrate to proceed in the matter as indicated.

(Para 3, 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Injunction against co-sharer – Exclusive possession reflects in jamabandi -- Co-owner in exclusive possession of a specific portion of joint land is entitled to seek protection against interference by other co-sharers -- No co-sharer has the right to alter or change the nature of the portion under the exclusive possession of another -- Application for interim injunction, restraining the appellants/ defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession over the suit property and from altering the nature of the property by raising further construction allowed by Trial Court, affirmed by Appellate Court – Revision dismissed.

(Para 3.1, 9.3, 9.4)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Loss of income – As per Salary slips gross monthly remuneration came to Rs.78,051/- -- Ld. Tribunal deducted Dearness Allowance (DA), dress allowance, and soap toilet allowance and assessed his salary at Rs.64,298/- -- This approach is no longer tenable in the eyes of law -- For computing “loss of income,” one must reckon the full taxable income, including all money-based benefits and allowances, and not merely basic pay or selected allowances – Only income tax is to be deducted from the gross salary – Taken Gross salary i.e. {(basic + all allowances) – income tax} as the proper basis for calculating loss of income, assessed at Rs.72,592/- (Rounded off to Rs.72,600/-), after deducting income tax.

(Para 9-12)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Interest @ 9% p.a. -- Compensation enhanced in appeal by Rs.29,47,775/- -- Appellants/claimants granted the interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of its realization.

(Para 14, 15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Cheque bounce case -- Time barred complaint – Quashing of summons/ complaint -- Condonation of delay -- Complaint filed beyond the time prescribed under the statute, there cannot be an automatic or presumed condonation -- There cannot be any deviation except when an application accompanying the complaint is filed seeking condonation disclosing reasons for the delay -- It is obligatory on the part of the Court to take note of such filing beyond limitation and to consider the reasons disclosed independently and to come to a judicious conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of that case condonation is justified -- The same not having been done, the order cannot be sustained – Summoning order set aside, complaint quashed.

(Para 6-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 34 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act No. 28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings – Father-in-law and Moher-in-law -- Cruelty and dowry demand -- FIR shows that the allegations made are vague and omnibus inasmuch as there is an absence of any specific instance or occasion detailed with particulars wherein the appellants demanded dowry from complainant and on refusal of the same, subjected her to mental and physical cruelty -- Only allegations levelled against the appellants are that subsequent to the birth of her daughter, the conduct of her husband underwent a change on account of the alleged inducement exercised by the in-laws including the appellants for the purpose of demanding additional dowry and that pursuant to the counselling conducted at the Women Police Station, they nevertheless continued to subject complainant to mental and physical cruelty -- Aforesaid allegations even if taken at their face value, do not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged offences so as to warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 8, 14, 15, 18)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 13 Rule 1 – Exhibition of document -- Merely because a document has been assigned exhibit number, it does not mean that the document stands proved in accordance with law.

(Para 4)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 2 – Pleading of evidence -- Pleadings are required to contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 54, Order 37 Rule 4 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Execution of ex-parte decree – Application for setting aside the ex-parte decree is pending consideration – Effect of --  Warrant of auction/ sale issued against the attached property of the petitioner/ Judgment Debtor – Revisional jurisdiction -- Held, in the event of auction of the property, the very purpose of filing the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC would be frustrated -- Revision petition disposed of, impugned orders set aside -- Learned trial Court directed to decide the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC, which is pending consideration within a period of two months.

(Para 1-6)

Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 24 -- Rent laws -- Leave to contest – Challenge to – Evidence of the petitioner already recorded and the trial has substantially progressed – Once the parties have acted upon an order, and the proceedings have advanced substantially, the clock cannot ordinarily be set back unless grave prejudice or failure of justice is demonstrated -- At this stage, to remand the case back for reconsideration of the application for leave to contest would not only result in duplication of proceedings, but would also defeat the object of expeditious disposal contemplated under the Punjab Rent Act, particularly under Section 24 of Punjab Rent Act, 1995, which provides a summary and time-bound mechanism – Held, question of setting aside the order granting leave to contest and remanding the matter for reconsideration of that very issue becomes largely academic and impermissible in law -- Rent Controller ordered to make an endeavour to dispose of the eviction petition expeditiously, in accordance with law.

(Para 5-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Functus officio -- Application for Release of FDR in new account -- Learned MACT, declined the application on the grounds that the Tribunal has become functus officio after ordering the release of FDR – Held, considering the fact that release of amount is still not made and until and unless award holder get the amount of compensation, Tribunal retains the jurisdiction -- Impugned order set aside -- Learned MACT directed to decide the application of the petitioner.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 16 Rule 2 -- Diet money – Delay in deposit – Summons to witness – Court was duty-bound to issue summons to the witnesses for whom the diet money had been deposited -- Impugned order, by closing the petitioner’s evidence without issuing summons or initiating coercive process, reflects a clear non-observance of mandatory judicial obligations – Impugned order set aside.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 16 Rule 10 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Summons to witness – Coercive steps – Mandate of – Revisional jurisdiction -- Despite proper service, the witnesses failed to appear before the Court -- In such circumstances, the learned Civil Judge was under a statutory and judicial obligation to take all necessary steps, including issuing coercive process, to secure the attendance of the witnesses -- Instead, Ld. Civil Judge closed the evidence of the petitioner -- Impugned order suffers from material illegality, non-observance of mandatory procedural safeguards, and warrants interference under the revisional jurisdiction of High Court – Impugned order set aside – Ld. Civil Judge directed to secure the presence of the duly served witnesses by issuing appropriate coercive process.

(Para 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 60, Order 21 Rule 46A, 46B – Attachment of Bank account -- Executing Court ordered  for attachment of only one Bank Account -- Subsequent attachment of another account of the Judgment Debtor without any specific order is clearly not in consonance with the Court’s directions -- Attachment of the latter account revoked.

(Para 3)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Nature -- Power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection -- While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial -- Degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction -- Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Improved deposition – Effect of -- At this stage, deposition cannot be construed as an embellished or improved one simply because of the absence of certain particulars in the FIR, particularly when his testimony is consistent with the overall narrative -- Conducting a mini-trial at the stage of summoning is impermissible -- At the stage of deciding the application u/s 319 CrPC, the Court is not required to test the credibility or weigh the probative value of the evidence as would be done at the end of the trial for determining the conviction or otherwise of the accused -- What the Court has to consider at this stage is whether the material on record reasonably indicates involvement of the proposed accused so as to exercise the extraordinary power -- Conjointly reading of PW-2’s deposition along with her Section 161 statement, it was found that a specific and overt act has been assigned to the respondents -- Whether she actually witnessed the firing or arrived immediately thereafter, and the extent to which her statement inspires confidence, are matters that are to be determined at the stage of trial, upon full appreciation of the evidence.

(Para 8-12)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162, 319 -- Dying declaration – Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. -- Acceptability of – Summoning of additional accused -- A statement made by a deceased person, as to the cause of his death or to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, to a Police Officer and recorded u/s 161 CrPC, shall be relevant and admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, notwithstanding the express bar provided in Section 162 CrPC -- Such a statement, upon the death of the declarant, assumes the character of a dying declaration -- Dying declaration need not necessarily be recorded in the presence of a Magistrate, and that the lack of a doctor's certification as to the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind would not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable -- Any inconsistencies between them, as well as their evidentiary value, reliability, and the weight to be attached to them are, again, matters which are to be examined at trial and not at the preliminary stage of summoning.

(Para 14, 15)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Delayed death – Effect of -- Death of the deceased occurred after a substantial lapse of time from their recordings -- Law does not require that a declarant, at the time of making the statement, to be under the shadow of death or the expectation that death is imminent -- Here the time gap between the incident and the death is less than 2 months -- In any event, Section 32 of the Evidence Act, contains no such limitation -- What is pertinent is that the statement relates either to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it.

(Para 16)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 25, 430 – Concurrent running of sentence – Presumption of – Suspension of sentence -- When the trial Court does not mention that the sentence would run concurrently or consecutively, the primafacie benefit should be given to the accused, and it should be primafacie presumed that the sentence shall run concurrently, not consecutively -- If the applicant files an application for suspension of sentence, the same shall be decided by primafacie presuming that the sentence is concurrent and not consecutive.

(Para 12-16)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 25, 415 – Conviction by Trial court in different offenses – Appeal in High court -- Listing of Appeal/ Revision before Division bench or Single Bench – Procedure of -- To decide the jurisdiction, highest sentence imposed shall be counted and not the total of all the sentences -- Observations made are only for the purposes of the case shall not be considered as any order or directions to the Registry -- A copy of the order sent to the Registrar (Listing) to bring it to the notice of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for the Lordship to consider taking a decision on the Administrative Side.

(Para 20)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Appeal against acquittal – Scope of – Session court’s conviction order set aside by High Court, acquitting the accused -- Guilt of the accused and the commission of the offence by the accused have to be established beyond reasonable doubt -- Circumstances should suggest “must or should” and not “may be” -- It is a well-settled principle that there must exist “substantial and compelling reasons” to upset the acquittal -- Once the court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is reinforced -- Thereafter, the interference by the appellate court would be minimal and has to be guided by strong and cogent reasons -- Reversal of acquittal should not be a matter of course just because the other view is considered to be possible by the appellate court -- Even when the appellate court re-appreciates the evidence while dealing with the judgment and order of acquittal, the innocence attributed to the accused acquitted from the charges of offences would be a weighty rebuttable factor -- Plausible conclusion by High Court, acquitting accused – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 7, 9-9.2, 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376D -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(w)(i) & 3(2)(v) -- Rape – Murder – SC/ST Act -- Circumstantial evidence -- Medical evidence regarding the homicidal death and the rape committed on the victim, the time of death as stated in the postmortem report, the accused having been found in the same vicinity as the victim and the failure of the accused to establish the alibi as spoken of u/s 313 questioning, would provide a complete chain of circumstances to convict the accused under Sections 302 & 376D read with Section 34 of the IPC -- Though the prosecution has proved the caste of the victim/deceased, there is nothing to indicate that the accused knew the caste of the victim or even that they were in any manner acquainted with the victim, to be aware of her caste status -- No offence under the provisions of the SC/ST Act – Sentenced to 25 years without remission.

(Para 12, 13, 16)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Frozen of Bank Account – Release of amount -- Bank directed to keep the disputed amount (the amount which was transferred illegally in the bank account of the petitioner) frozen and allow the petitioner to make transactions from his bank account from the remaining balance -- Bank shall send a communication to the concerned Investigating Officer/Police, to indicate the amount to be earmarked for lien, while endorsing a copy of the instant order -- Upon receipt of such communication/ letter, the concerned Investigating Officer/ Police shall be under an obligation to apprise the respondent-Bank about the amount to be kept in lien, within a period of seven days of receiving the communication from the respondent-Bank.

(Para 2-4)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) (6A), 16 – Appointment of Arbitrator -- Party's capacity to invoke Arbitration and maintainability issues fall within Arbitration tribunal's domain -- Once the High Court was satisfied that an arbitration agreement prima facie existed, an aspect neither seriously disputed nor refutable at this stage, its decision to constitute the AT cannot be faulted -- A detailed scrutiny on the basis of evidence must be left to AT -- Whether first respondent has validly invoked arbitration individually, whether the Consortium continues to exist, whether consent of other Consortium partners was necessary, and whether claims are maintainable after commencement of liquidation, are all matters which may legitimately be raised, contested and determined before the AT under Section 16 --  Entertaining these questions here would amount to conducting a mini trial at the Section 11 stage, contrary to the settled principles of minimal judicial intervention.  

(Para 19)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63(c) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Will – Suspicious circumstances -- Court cannot put the testator in its shoes, and Court should step into his – Court cannot substitute its opinions in place of that of the testator; his desire prompted by his own justifications -- As is trite, Court would only ensure that, sitting in the arm-chair of the testator the rule of prudence is satisfied for the exclusion.

(Para 28)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63(c) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Will – Deposition on leading question in cross-examination – Evidential value -- Presence of the testator and the attesting witnesses and the signatures affixed on the will by each of them have been stated by DW-2 in his deposition – Attestation by other witness was not deposed to -- High Court found that though in the examination-in chief, the witness did not depose on the attestation by the other witness, in cross-examination to a leading question he answered that all persons signed on the will on the date when the witness signed the same – High court held that that by the leading question, the answer was put in the mouth of the witness and hence, it lacks probative value and fell short of the mandate u/s 63(c) of the ISA, 1925 read with Section 68 of the IEA, 1872 – Held, what was lacking in the examination-in-chief was brought out in the cross examination by way of a positive suggestion -- Leading questions are permitted in cross-examinations and the response elicited cannot be said to have lesser probative value -- Testator was also established to be of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution of the will -- There can be no interference to the Will which stands proved unequivocally.

(Para 6, 29)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 269SS – Cheque bounce complaint -- Cash transaction above Rs.20, 000/- -- Effect of -- High Court acquitted the accused mainly on the ground that the petitioner having extended financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 9,00,000/- by way of cash transaction in violation of provisions of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961 -- Judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in P.C. Hari Vs. Shine Varghese & Anr.: 2025 SCC Online Ker 5535, came up for consideration before Supreme Court, particularly, on the issue as to whether the cash transaction more than Rs 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) is in violation of Section 269SS would render the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of NI Act – It was held that any violation of Section 269SS would not render the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of the NI Act or rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act -- Accordingly, the conclusion of law in P.C. Hari’s case set aside – Held, very foundation of the impugned judgment does not survive as the legal proposition on which the impugned judgment has been rendered, has been set aside -- Matter remitted back to the High Court for consideration afresh on merits as permissible under the revisional jurisdiction.

(Para 3-9)

Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, Chapter I, Volume II, Rule 2.2(b) -- Disciplinary proceedings after retirement – Legality of -- Disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated or continued against retired employees holding non-pensionable posts -- Foundational charge against the petitioner, relating to moisture gain, is unrelated to his duties as a Security Guard and has no statutory or rule-based foundation -- Impugned charge-sheets and subsequent proceedings  deserve to be set-aside -- Withholding of the petitioner’s retiral dues are without any legal or statutory basis -- Charge-sheets set-aside and the impugned order withholding the retiral dues of the petitioner to the tune of Rs.9,03,598/- set-aside -- Respondents directed to release the retiral dues of the petitioner amounting to Rs.9,03,598/- along with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum, to be calculated from the date of retirement till its realization.

(Para 6-9)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6, 22 – Notification dated 25th August, 1993 -- Office Memorandum dated 10.10.2019 issued by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Criminal case pending – Issuance of Passport – Right to go abroad -- High Court can, during the pendency of Criminal Proceedings grant the necessary clearance to the applicant enabling him to apply for a passport – Petitioner granted permission to apply for the issuance of a passport before the passport authority and the said authority without raising objecting relating to pendency of criminal cases against the present petitioner but subject to other conditions being fulfilled considering the case of petitioner for the issuance of passport in accordance with law -- However, petitioner shall have to seek permission from the Trial Court before going abroad and grant of permission to apply for a passport shall not be construed as implied permission to go abroad.

(Para 5, 6, 10, 11)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Eye witness to the accident – Requirement of -- FIR u/s 279 and 304-A of the IPC was also registered on the same day against the driver of the offending vehicle, who also faced trial before the Illaqa Magistrate -- It is not necessary that there would be an eyewitness in such type of motor vehicle accident cases and merely due to non-examination of an eyewitness the impugned award passed by the Tribunal can be faulted.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – ITR field after accident/ death – Reliance upon -- Income Tax Returns filed after the accident/ death can also be taken into consideration for assessing the income of the deceased.

(Para 8)

General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960, Rule 33 – GPF Funds – Nomination in favour of mother – Subsequent marriage – Effect of -- Nomination in favour of the mother/ respondent no.1 would become invalid upon him acquiring a family (marriage or otherwise), as such, by function thereof, it became invalid in 2003 -- He did not alter the nomination to comply therewith – Held, where a subscriber neglects to or fails to make such changes, that Rules have been prescribed, laying down how the money is to be distributed amongst survivors.

(Para 2-7)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31 -- Arbitral award – Interest on Pre-award/ Post award period – Mandate of -- Award is in two parts, the first part i.e., clause (a) deals with passing of an award which would include interest upto the date on which the award is made, while the second part, i.e., clause (b) deals with the grant of interest on the sum awarded by the arbitral tribunal -- Intent behind granting the pre-award interest is to compensate the claimant for the loss suffered from the time the cause of action arose till the passing of the arbitral award -- Similarly, the intent behind grant of post-award interest is to discourage the award-debtor from delaying the payment of the arbitral amount to the award-holder -- Grant of interest during the pre-award period is subject to the agreement as regard the rate of interest or unpaid sum between the parties – Grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) is mandatory -- Only discretion which the arbitral tribunal has is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded -- Where the arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, then the statutory rate, as provided in Section 31(7)(b), shall apply -- Unless there is an express bar contained in the agreement, the arbitrator possesses the discretion and has jurisdiction to award interest including the post-award interest.

(Para 39-42)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31, 34, 37 – Arbitration award -- Re-appreciation of evidence – Permissibility of -- Both the courts below concurrently held after a detailed analysis of the evidence as regards the genuineness of the loan agreement, thereby affirming the rate of interest at 24% p.a. -- To take a view contrary would amount to re-appreciation of evidence, which is prohibited under the scheme of the Act, 1996 -- The proviso to Section 34(2A) of the Act, 1996 explicitly prohibits re-appreciation of evidence.

(Para 45)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- 24% Exorbitant interest in agreement -- Whether interest at the rate of 24% as provided in the agreements between the parties could be said to be against public policy? -- On a plain and grammatical construction of clauses (ii) and (iii) of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b) of the Act, 1996 it cannot be said that the imposition of an exorbitant interest in the background of contemporary commercial practices, would be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law, or against the basic notions of morality or justice -- It is well-settled that fundamental policy of Indian law does not refer to violation of any Statue but fundamental principles on which Indian law is founded -- Any difference or controversy as to rate of interest clearly falls outside the scope of challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India unless it is evident that the rate of interest awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the Court sans which no interference is warranted in the award, whereby interest is awarded by the Arbitrator.

(Para 49-53)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8, Rule 6A -- Counter claim against the co-defendant cannot survive and the same has to be rejected.

(Para 14)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 9 -- Non-joinder of necessary party -- Original sole defendant filed a written statement contending that two others (defendant Nos.2 and 3, subsequently impleaded) were the persons in possession of part of the suit property and hence the suit is bad for nonjoinder of the necessary parties -- Impleadment of the 2nd and 3^rd defendants though voluntarily made by themselves, saves the suit from the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties.

(Para 6, 14)

A. Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), Section 3(2)(b), 5(1)(b) -- Foreigners Order, 1948, Clause 5(1)(b) -- Foreigners Rules, 1992, Ruel 3, 5(1)(b), 11 – Bail – Restrictions on foreigners -- When a foreigner’s presence is required in India to answer a criminal charge, permission to leave India must be refused -- Therefore, once a foreigner is released on bail, he cannot leave India without the permission of the Civil Authority, as provided in clause 5 of the Order -- Under clause 11 and other clauses of the Order, various restrictions can be imposed on a foreigner while he is in India -- Said power is wholly independent of the power to grant bail.

(Para 5)

B. Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), Section 3(2)(g) – Detention/ Regular bail to foreigner – Independent in nature -- Power to arrest or detain a foreigner under the Act is independent of the power of the criminal court to grant bail -- Notwithstanding the bail granted by a criminal court, the power to arrest and detain a foreigner can be exercised, provided the Central Government makes an order in terms of clause (g) of Section 3(2) of the Act.

(Para 5)

C. Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), Section 14 -- Foreigners Order, 1948 – Bail to foreigner -- Civil Authority or the Registration Officer as a party – Necessity of -- No need to make Civil Authority or the Registration Officer as a party to a bail application filed by a foreigner or a notice of the bail application be issued to the said authorities -- No locus to oppose bail application unless bail is sought where the allegation is of the offence punishable u/s 14 of the Act -- Impleadment of the Civil Authority or Registration Officer in all bail applications filed by foreigners may result in unnecessary delay in deciding the bail applications.

(Para 6)

D. Foreigners Rules, 1992, Ruel 3, 5(1)(b), 11 – Bail to foreigner -- Restrictions on foreigners -- Conditions : (i) While granting bail to a foreigner within the meaning of the Act, the concerned court shall issue direction to the State or prosecuting agency, as the case may be, to immediately communicate the order granting bail to the concerned Registration Officer appointed under Rule 3 of the Rules who, in turn, shall communicate the order to all concerned authorities including the Civil Authorities -- If such information is furnished, it will enable the authorities under the Act, the Rules and the Order to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law; and (ii) A copy of this order forwarded to Registrar Generals of all the High Courts, who in turn will forward the copies of the order to all the criminal courts in the respective States.

(Para 8)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Plying vehicle with no-permit – Principle to pay and recover for Insurance company -- Accident took place within the territorial limits of the State of Haryana (Sonepat) -- Offending vehicle was having a permit to ply in the State of Punjab only -- It had no permit to ply in the State of Haryana – In such cases, the liability to pay compensation would be that of the driver/owner -- Nevertheless, the Insurance Company would pay the compensation amount in the first instance and would then be entitled to recover the same from the driver/owner.

(Para 16, 21)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- No permanent disability suffered by the appellant however suffered a head injury as a result of which he initially remained admitted in hospital from 10.09.2013 to 29.09.2013 and then from 15.10.2013 to 30.10.2013 and again from 02.07.2014 to 06.07.2014 -- For about one year, the appellant was having problems -- Must not have been able to work properly for at least for six months for that Rs.48,000/- (Rs.8000/- x 6) -- Medical expenses, for, the bills produced Rs.1,95,863/- -- Attendant charges Rs.8,000/- per month i.e. Rs.48,000/- (Rs.8000/- X 6) -- Pain and suffering Rs.2 lakhs -- Special diet Rs.25,000/- -- Transportation charges Rs.20,000/- – Total compensation comes to Rs.5,16,863/- -- After deducting a sum of Rs.2,54,863/- as assessed by the MACT, the balance compensation comes to Rs.2,62,000/- -- This amount would be payable along with interest @ 7.5% per cent annually.

(Para 15-17)

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 -- Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2(h), 3, 39, 40, 47(1)(a), 89 – Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (10 of 1993), Section 2(d) -- India’s international obligations under the UNCRPD, Article 31 -- Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983, Rules 196, 197, 198(iii) – Right of person with disabilities in prison – In addition to the salutary directions set out in L. Muruganantham, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1444 = (2025) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20637 = 2025 INSC 844, following directions shall also be read in conjunction with the mandate of the said judgment: -

A. The directions issued by this Court in L. Muruganantham (supra) shall be extended to all the States and the Union Territories, to ensure that the principles are adopted mutatis mutandis within their prison systems as well.

B. Every State and Union Territories shall establish a robust, independent and accessible grievance redressal mechanism specifically designed for prisoners with disabilities. The said mechanism shall ensure prompt registration, effective monitoring and timely resolution of complaints, so as to safeguard inmates from systemic neglect, abuse and discriminatory practices.

C. Appropriate facilities shall be created to ensure that prisoners with disabilities have meaningful access to inclusive education within the prison system. No inmate shall be deprived of the opportunity to pursue educational programmes solely on account of disability, and suitable adjustments shall be made to facilitate their effective participation.

D. Section 89 of the RPwd Act shall mutatis mutandis be made applicable to prison establishments across the country. All prison authorities shall take adequate steps to disseminate awareness of the obligations flowing from the said provision to all officers, staff, legal-aid personnel, and other stakeholders.

E. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has sought directions for the provision of appropriate assistive devices, mobility aids, and other support equipment to prisoners with disabilities. However, considering the crucial issue relating to prison security and the practical modalities of implementation, we, for the present, deem it appropriate to call upon all States and Union Territories to indicate in its compliance report the structured institutional mechanism proposed to ensure the regular availability, maintenance, and secure provision of assistive devices, mobility aids, and other disability-support equipment for prisoners with disabilities. The affidavit shall clearly outline the procedures, infrastructure, procurement systems, supervision protocols, and security measures by which such assistive aids will be made accessible to inmates, enabling them to carry out their daily activities with dignity without compromising institutional safety.

F. Prisoners with benchmark disabilities shall be entitled to enhanced visitation provisions, in order to ensure sustained family support, emotional well-being, and continuous monitoring of their special needs. The specific modalities for such visitation shall be framed by the concerned departmental head of each State and Union Territory so as to balance security considerations with the imperative of accessibility and humane treatment.

All States and Union Territories directed to place on record a comprehensive compliance report before this Court within four months, indicating the measures undertaken for effectuating the directions issued in L. Muruganantham (supra) as well as those mandated herein -- The report shall clearly set out the steps adopted, the progress achieved, and the modalities evolved for ensuring faithful implementation of the aforesaid directions in the prisons located within their jurisdictions.

(Para 11)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 38 Rules 5 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53 – Attachment before judgment – Sale prior to filing of suit – Ground of fraudulent transfer -- Effect of -- Scope of Rule 5 is confined to securing the plaintiff’s prospective decree by preventing the defendant from frustrating execution through alienation or concealment of his property during pendency of the suit -- Essential condition, however, is that the property sought to be attached must belong to the defendant on the date of institution of the suit; property already transferred prior to the suit cannot be attached under this provision -- In cases where such prior transfer is alleged to be fraudulent, the remedy lies under Section 53 of the T.P. Act and not under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC.

(Para 11.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 38 Rules 8 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53 – Attachment before judgment – Sale prior to filing of suit – Ground of fraudulent transfer -- Effect of -- Any claim under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 CPC must be adjudicated recognizing the protective and procedural nature of attachment before judgment, without prejudicing the pre-existing rights of bona fide third parties -- Determination of whether the sale deed is fraudulent is exclusively governed by Section 53 of the T.P. Act and the claim petition procedure under Rule 8 cannot substitute or override the statutory safeguards and requirements of such substantive proceedings.

(Para 20)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 38 Rules 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, Order 21 Rule 58 – Attachment before decree -- Combined reading of Rules 5 to 10 makes it clear that Rule 5 operates at the stage of ordering attachment, while Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 governs the stage of adjudication of third-party objections -- Rule 10 emphasises that attachment before judgment does not create any charge or proprietary interest for the plaintiff and that pre-existing rights of strangers remain unaffected -- Thus, attachment before judgment is only an ancillary, protective relief to secure the decree, subject to adjudication of independent claims, and cannot prejudice pre-existing rights or confer any substantive advantage upon the plaintiff beyond securing satisfaction of the decree.

(Para 11)

D. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 53 – Fraudulent transfer – Onus of proof -- Onus to establish that the transfer was made with an intent to defeat or delay creditors lies squarely upon the party alleging fraud -- Mere suspicion, inadequacy of consideration or the existence of a relationship between the parties, cannot, by themselves, constitute proof of such intent.

(Para 16)