A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 37 -- Modification in award – Power of -- Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award -- This limited power may be exercised under the following circumstances:

I. when the award is severable, by severing the “invalid” portion from the “valid” portion of the award.

II. by correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record.

III. post award interest may be modified in some circumstances.

IV. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power must be exercised with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power.

(Para 85)

(Reference answered with majority opinion 4:1)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 -- Arbitration award -- Post award settlement -- Parties are entitled to enter into an agreement or settlement even after an award is pronounced -- Such a settlement should be in accordance with the provisions of Order XXIII of the Code -- The law of the land does not bar the parties from entering into a post award or post decree settlement -- Only legal requirement is that such settlement must be verifiable and in accordance with law i.e., the settlement is not a result of undue influence, force, fraud, coercion, etc.

(Para 80)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31, 34, 37 – Arbitration award – Scope of interference -- If two views are possible, there is no scope for the court to re-appraise the evidence and to take the view other than the one taken by the arbitrator -- View taken by the arbitral tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and allowed to prevail – Scope of interference in arbitral matters is only confined to the extent envisaged u/s 34 of the Act – Court exercising powers u/s 34 has perforce to limit its jurisdiction within the four corners of Section 34 -- It cannot travel beyond Section 34 -- Proceedings u/s 34 are summary in nature and not like a full-fledged civil suit or a civil appeal -- Award as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provisions of law or Section 34 of the 1996 Act or the terms of the agreement -- Arbitral autonomy must be respected and judicial interference should remain minimal otherwise it will defeat the very object of the 1996 Act.

(Para 23, 24)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law -- When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one.

(Para 12.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 – First Appeal -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit -- Authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103.

(Para 12.2)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Family property – Burdon of proof -- It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family -- The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property -- If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available -- That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.

(Para 13)

D. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Ancestral property -- For a property to be considered as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the paternal ancestors up to three generations.

(Para 14)

E. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Partiton of ancestral property – Self-acquired property -- As per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish -- After the death of the father, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them -- Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property -- Properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers -- The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as joint family property.

(Para 17-19)

F. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Income and Sale consideration -- Expenses incurred for maintenance, marriage and education of children -- When the income derived from the joint family property or when a joint family property is sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and education within the joint family, the same are to be treated as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so -- Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the children -- That apart, under the customary practices and tradition, it is the father who performs the marriage of his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.

(Para 19.1)

G. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Separate/ self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family – Abandonment of status – From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation.

(Para 20)

Waqf Act, 1995 (43 of 1995), Section 14(1)(b)(iii) -- Muslim Member of Bar Council – Appointment as member of Waqf Board – Challenge to – Appellant been elected as a member of Bar Council – As such elected as a Member of the Board, in accordance with Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act -- Respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the Board -- Appellant is the only Muslim Member in the Bar Council, a fact that has been rightly taken note of by the State of Manipur, while appointing him as a Member of the Board -- No dispute with respect to the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board – Appointment upheld.

(Para 1, 18-21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 3.4 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Civil dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the FIR, the goods were to be exported out of India -- Respondent no. 2, since did not possess an import/export license, the appellant had asked respondent no. 2 to export the goods through M/s. Oswal Overseas -- Respondent no. 2 has in all exported sarees worth Rs. 34,71,344/- -- U/s 482 of the Code, Court will examine the crux of the complaint -- Question is whether such non-payment of the sale price can be an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating at the hands of the second respondent -- Answer is clearly no -- Continuation of the FIR against the appellant is an abuse of the process of law, and at best, the non-payment of the sale price could be a civil dispute – Appeal allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 12-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- In a case of gang rape u/s 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention -- Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- Abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant along with J.K. acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’ -- Sentence u/s 376(2)(g) of IPC reduced from life imprisonment to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default sentence.

(Para 24, 45)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Acquittal -- No evidence to establish the fact that the victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence -- Appellant acquitted from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.

(Para 44)

Unauthorised construction – Regularisation of -- A person who has no regards for the law cannot be permitted to pray for regularisation after putting up unauthorised construction of two floors -- Unauthorised construction has to be demolished -- Courts are not free from statutory fetters -- Justice is to be rendered in accordance with law -- Courts must adopt a strict approach while dealing with cases of illegal construction and should not readily engage themselves in judicial regularisation of buildings erected without requisite permissions of the competent authority -- Law ought not to come to rescue of those who flout its rigours as allowing the same might result in flourishing the culture of impunity.

(Para 7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Bar to appeal -- Proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before the Appellate Court, to attack the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded -- When the fact of compromise is not disputed, the bar in Section 96(3) is absolute.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Bar to appeal -- Compromise terms signed by Counsels -- Challenge to -- Both decrees rest on written compromise terms signed by counsel who held unquestioned vakalatnamas -- Signature of duly authorised counsel is the signature of the party -- Decrees are therefore consent decrees within the meaning of Section 96(3) -- Appellant never invoked the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; instead, she lodged Appeals from Orders on the footing of the deleted Order XLIII Rule 1(m) -- Appellant’s submission that allegations of fraud transform a consent decree into an ordinary decree cannot be accepted -- Fraud, want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs the Trial Court to examine -- Unless and until that route is pursued, the statutory bar in Section 96(3) of the CPC remains operative.

(Para 12, 13)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 1A, 3, 43,  Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Maintainability of Appeal – The CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways -- If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful compromise ever took place, the CPC requires that person to go back to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid -- On the other hand, someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent decree, may approach the Appellate Court in a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, but only after obtaining leave -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create an independent appeal at all.

(Para 15)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Suit for partition – Hindu Undivided Family property -- Suit property already stood partitioned -- Partition effected between the members of the Hindu Undivided Family by their own volition and with their consent cannot be reopened unless it is shown that it was obtained by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence, for which strict proof is required -- Plaintiff failed to prove that execution of the family settlement was the result of any fraud – Trial Court dismissed the suit and Appellate Court affirmed the same – Regular Second Appeal dismissed.

(Para 2, 10, 11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Observation therein – Effect of -- It is settled law that the observations made in the order while rejecting the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC or the appeal therefrom are only for the purpose of deciding the said application -- Suit is to be decided by the trial Court independent of the said observations in accordance with the evidence on record.

(Para 3)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006 (13 of 2006), Section 5(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 (17 of 1976), Section 28A – Land acquisition – Corruption – Conspiracy – Quashing of FIR by High Court – Challenge to – Respondent/ Managing Director of the Cooperative Society obtained the lands after verification of the rights on the land from the Collector of the District – Acquisition was for a purpose of developing the land; which has already been completed and allottees of such lands have raised a residential colony in the location – No action u/s 28-A has been taken by the State to repossess the lands – No allegation against the respondent but for a bland allegation of connivance with the officers of the State – No personal benefit even alleged to have accrued to the party respondent – No reason to interfere with the well-reasoned order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court – Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 1, 2, 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence – Rebuttal evidence -- Plaintiff-petitioner is setting up entirely a new case by way of leading additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings -- Jamabandi, which is now sought to be produced to show the possession of the plaintiff-petitioner, was to be produced in the affirmative as the onus was upon plaintiff -- Having not led the evidence in the affirmative, the plaintiff-petitioner cannot now be permitted to fill in the lacuna in the case by leading the said evidence as additional evidence --  Question of permitting the judgment to be produced as additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings would not arise.

-- Application itself is totally bereft as to why the said evidence was not led earlier.

-- There is not even a whisper that the plaintiff-petitioner was not aware of this evidence at the time of leading his evidence in the affirmative.

Application for additional evidence dismissed by Trial court – No fault, revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 4, 7-9)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Proof of -- Self acquired property – Alienation of -- Plaintiff not in possession of any document to show that he was the owner of the suit property or that the suit property had been purchased out of joint Hindu family funds -- Except for the oral evidence, no documentary evidence was produced in this regard – Once the plaintiff was not able to prove that the suit property had been purchased out of joint Hindu family funds, it can be safely concluded that defendant No.1 was the absolute owner of the suit property and the same was his self-acquired property, he was, therefore, duly competent to alienate the same.

(Para 12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 23A, 25, 27 – Additional evidence – Additional Issue – Remitting back of appeal – Permissibility of -- First Appellate Court is a Court of fact and law both and the application for additional evidence can be allowed -- First Appellate Court erred in remitting the matter back to the trial Court after framing additional issue and permitting the plaintiff to lead additional evidence -- First Appellate Court has neither set aside the judgment of the trial Court on merits nor it has formed an opinion that re-trial of the case is necessary -- Hence, the impugned order passed by the First Appellate Court to the limited extent of remitting the matter back to the lower Court set aside and the first appeal is restored to its original number -- Court will proceed in accordance with Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 -- Maintenance payable from the date of application or the date of the Order? – Delay in decision – Daughter attained majority – Effect of -- Section 125 of the Code is a beneficial piece of legislation which has been enacted to protect the wife and children from destitution and vagrancy and, in the usual course, it would not be appropriate to disadvantage the applicant for the delay in the disposal of the application by the judicial system -- Respondent no.2/ husband ordered to pay Rs.4,000/- per month as maintenance to the appellant, from the date of filing of the maintenance petition before the Family Court -- Daughter attained majority -- Having due regard to the scheme of Section 125 of the Code, maintenance awarded in her favour will only be payable up to the date of her attaining majority. Rajnesh’s case (2021) 2 SCC 324 = 2021(1) L.A.R. 311 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15586 relied.

(Para 16-18)

B. Kazi – Darul Kaja – Kajiyat – Sharia Court – Recognition in law ? -- Court of Kazi’, ‘Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat’, ‘Sharia Court’ etcetera by whatever name styled have no recognition in law -- Any declaration/ decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure -- The only way such declaration/ decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/ decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law -- Even then, such declaration/ decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party.

(Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Jurisprudence regarding the offence of abetment to suicide u/s 306 of the IPC is settled that the offence requires an active act or omission which led the deceased to commit suicide, and this act or omission must have been intended to push the deceased into committing suicide -- Deceased was repeatedly tortured and abused by the accused on account of dowry demand to the extent that the deceased had to return to her parental home seeking refuge -- Went back to her matrimonial home hoping that the events would take an upturn -- However, the abuses hurled at the deceased by the appellant on the day of the incident, acted as a straw that broke the camel’s back and led her to committing suicide -- Guilt of the appellant u/s 306 of the IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment upheld.

(Para 11, 12)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Allotment in favour of two brothers -- Transfer of ownership to facilitate loan – Effect of -- UT Administration transferred the plot to facilitate the plaintiff to obtain loan --  Both the courts decreed the suit of mandatory injunction directing the defendant/ brother to leave and vacate two rooms – Property worth more than Rs.100/- cannot be transferred from one to another without registered instrument -- Once, there is documentary evidence to prove that the allotment was made in favour of two brothers and it was the plaintiff who applied for transferring the plot exclusively in his name because he wanted to borrow the loan, the courts erred in relying upon the oral evidence – Judgments passed by both the courts below, set aside -- Suit filed by the plaintiff dismissed.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 193 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 227, 229 – Maintenance proceedings -- Perjury – False affidavit in court – Burden of proof – Affidavit by wife that she is not gainfully employed -- Petitioner/ husband to prove that she was gainful employee refers to Annexures, however, they relates to the period commencing from 05.04.2013 to 17.05.2024, however, duly sworn affidavit was filed on 27.05.2024 -- No averment that as on the date of filing of the affidavit, respondent No.1/ wife was gainfully employed -- Her past employment would not come in the way of said affidavit -- Burden was on the petitioner to prove the said fact that on the date of giving of the affidavit, respondent No.1/ wife was a gainful employee which is not proved -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 22 -- Property owned by senior citizen -- Eviction order passed by the authorities – Writ jurisdiction -- Once, the property belongs to the senior citizen and the senior citizen is residing in a rented accommodation with another son, the claim of the petitioner that he has right to occupy the property in preference to the senior citizen is contrary to the objective of 2007 Act -- Nothing on record to show that the  senior citizen is not going to occupy the property in question after vacating by the petitioner -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 6-11)

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 18, 40, 41 -- Registered Will -- Office of the Sub-Registrar is a compact office -- In one room, the registration clerk and other officials have their office, whereas in the adjoining room, the Registrar has his office -- Hence, even if the testator signed in the room of the Registration Clerk, it would not result in discarding the Will.

(Para 14)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 18, 40, 41 -- Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 -- Execution of Will – Registration of Will -- Will/ testament is not mandatorily required to be registered -- Execution of the Will is separate from its registration -- The Will is stated to have been scribed and attested by witnesses at the office of the scribe -- Subsequently, the scribe along with the testator and the attesting witnesses went to the office of Sub-Registrar to get it registered -- Signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses were taken by the registration clerk in the office of the Sub-Registrar -- Testator signed the Will, whereas both the attesting witnesses thumb marked the Will in the presence of the scribe -- Testator's signatures were also taken in the register where entry was made by the scribe -- Hence, the execution of the Will was complete.

(Para 14, 15)

C. Deposition of witness – Reading of -- It is fundamental that the entire deposition of a witness is required to be considered after comprehensively reading his statement -- One or two lines in isolation cannot be read divorced from entire statement.

(Para 17)

A. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty – Conviction u/s 498A of IPC – Probation – Non-consideration of – Requirement of law – Sessions Judge and the High Court by omitting to consider whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of probation, occasioned a failure of justice -- Consequently, there was no worthy consideration as to whether the appellants could be extended the benefit of probation -- Matter remitted back to the High Court for limited consideration of the question of grant of probation to the appellants upon obtaining a report of the relevant probation officer.

(Para 6, 29, 31)

B. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361 – Probation – Consideration of -- Duty of Court -- Unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation -- On the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances -- The question of grant of probation could be decided either way -- In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper -- However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.

(Para 28)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 11, 13 -- Ex-parte decree – Setting aside of -- While hearing the application under Order IX Rule 13, CPC as well as the miscellaneous appeal, the trial court and the appellate court, respectively assigned cogent reasons for not accepting the cause shown by the respondents/ defendants -- High Court did not refer to the orders passed by the said courts at all -- Not only vigilance and diligence on the part of the respondents/ defendants are woefully lacking but such lack is glaringly apparent -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside.

(Para 2, 15-22)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6, Order 9 Rule 11 -- Order 14 Rule 1, Section 9 -- Pleadings complete – Defendant proceeded ex-parte – Right to lead evidence – Framing of issue on law – Right of -- Pleadings, either in a plaint or a written statement, constitute the plinth on which the respective claims and defence of the parties to a civil suit rest -- Once the pleadings are complete but the defendant is set ex parte, and such order has attained finality, the defendant’s rights suffer a curtailment -- He cannot produce evidence in defence and hence statements, which are in the nature of factual assertions, cannot be proved by leading evidence -- Limited right that the defendant, set ex parte, would have is confined to cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses -- The effort has to be directed towards demonstrating that they are not speaking the truth and, thereby, demolish the case of the plaintiff -- However, if the defendant raises an issue on law which is traceable in the written statement, for instance, the suit is barred by limitation or Section 9, CPC is attracted, or if the relief claimed in the suit cannot be granted for reasons disclosed, the requirement of the defendant proving such defence as raised in the written statement by leading evidence may not arise and the court may frame an issue of law and decide the same.

(Para 19)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce -- Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Visiting right to meet daughter -- Multiple attempts at reconciliation through mediation failed -- Neither party has shown any willingness or inclination to restore the marital bond -- Parties have lived separate lives for over a decade, and there is a complete absence of marital ties -- Continuing such a marriage would only perpetuate hardship and serve no useful purpose -- Fit case for exercise of Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 – Marriage dissolved.

-- Respondent-wife neither filed nor pursued any formal petition for custody or visitation of the elder daughter -- Depriving the mother of all contact would not only cause emotional harm to her but may also adversely impact the child -- In the interest of justice, equity, and the welfare of the child, Court deemed appropriate to grant visitation rights to the respondent-wife with her daughter on two days each month.

(Para 9-12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Suit based on inheritance -- Limitation -- There is no limitation for filing the suit regarding claim of inheritance -- Appellants per se having no right in the suit property cannot claim so on the basis of wrongly entered mutation – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part II -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC – Review to 304 Part II of IPC – Permissibility of -- Court not to alter judgment -- In the First Judgment, the High Court clearly rejected the contention as raised on behalf of the appellants therein and confirmed the conviction u/s 302 of IPC -- High Court, in the impugned judgment, came to a finding that the incident appeared to be a result of a sudden provocation and occurred in the heat of a moment and therefore converted the conviction from Section 302 of IPC to Part-II of Section 304 of IPC -- Even upon a plain reading of the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C., the procedure adopted by the High Court was totally untenable – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside.

(Para 9-21)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311(1) – Disciplinary control over a deputationist -- Appointing Authority -- Role of -- Such control generally vests with the appropriate authority in the parent department in which the substantive appointment is held -- However, it cannot be gainsaid that by statutory rules or by conditions contained in the order of deputation, it can be provided that the deputationist, for the period he is serving on deputation, will be subject to the disciplinary control of the department to which he is deputed -- Nonetheless, it is the statutory rules which would be the deciding factor -- If the rules indicate that disciplinary control is retained by the parent department, the receiving department would have no jurisdiction to exercise such control.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(y), 197(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 21 -- Public servant -- The words ‘public servant’ appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 197, Cr. PC has not been defined in the Cr. PC; however, what the words ‘public servant’ denote is found in Section 21, IPC and by reason of Section 2(y) of the Cr. PC, the meaning of ‘public servant’ as appearing in Section 197 thereof has to be understood in the light of its definition in Section 21, IPC.

(Para 23)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311(1) – Dismissal of Deputationist -- Appointing Authority -- Role of -- No authority subordinate to the appointing authority can dismiss or remove a member of the civil service of the State or a civil post holder -- While on deputation on committing a misconduct warranting either dismissal or removal, it has not been shown by referring to statutory rules that disciplinary control over him stood transferred -- In the absence thereof, neither the Board of the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh nor its Municipal Commissioner would have the authority or jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the respondent had he misconducted himself while discharging his duty under such corporation.

(Para 25)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Income Tax Return filed after accident -- Just because on the date of the accident i.e., 12.08.2008, the Return for the Assessment Year 2008-2009 had not been filed, cannot disadvantage the appellants -- To reject the Return on the sole ground of its submission after the date of accident alone cannot be legally sustained --  The Income Tax Return is a legally admissible document on which the income assessment of the deceased could be made -- High Court interfered and reduced the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal only on the ground that Return for the Assessment Year 2008-2009 had to be excluded from consideration – High Court has dealt with the matter in a casual and superficial way, which is totally unjustified -- Impugned Order modified to the extent that the original amount [Rs. 31,41,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs Forty-One Thousand)] awarded by the Tribunal restored -- Payment be made with 9% interest per annum.

(Para 12-16)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 176 – Workman/ Employees’ Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 4 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Compensation under the Employees’ Compensation Act 1923 -- Unclaimed amount lying in MACT/ Tribunal – Steps required -- In absence of the exercise of the rule making power u/s 176 of the 1988 Act by the State Governments, the respective High Courts can either frame rules of procedure or issue practice directions for ensuring that material details are disclosed while filing claim applications under Section 166(1) of the 1988 Act --  Till the rules are not framed, the High Courts shall either issue practice directions or formulate rules of procedure by incorporating the following provisions:

a) While filing claim petitions under the 1988 Act, following particulars shall be incorporated:

(i)      Names and addresses (local and permanent) of the injured persons or the owners of the damaged property, as the case may be, their Aadhar and PAN details and email-id, if any; and

(ii)    Names and addresses (local and permanent) of all the legal representatives of the deceased victim of the accident who are claiming compensation, their Aadhar and PAN details and email-id, if any;

(b) If the aforesaid details are not furnished, the registration of the application should not be refused on that ground, but MAC Tribunals at the time of issuing notice may direct the applicant(s) to furnish the information and make the issue of the notice subject to making compliance;

(c) While passing an interim or final order of grant of compensation, the MAC Tribunals shall call upon the person or persons held entitled to receive compensation, to produce their bank account details along with either a certificate of the banker giving all details of the bank account of the person or persons entitled to receive the compensation including IFS Code, or a copy of a cancelled cheque of the bank account. The Tribunal shall call upon the claimants to produce the documents within a specified reasonable time;

(d) A further direction shall be issued to the persons entitled to receive compensation to keep on updating information regarding the bank accounts, email id, in case there is any change;

(e) In the event a consent award or consent order is made, the MAC Tribunals may direct the deposit of the compensation amount ordered to be released to the claimants directly to the bank accounts of the persons held entitled to receive compensation. However, the consent terms must contain all relevant account details of the persons entitled to compensation in accordance with clause (c) above. The account details can also be incorporated in the order passed for the disbursement of the amount on the basis of a compromise between the parties. In case of compromise before the Lok Adalats, the MAC Tribunal, on the basis of the settlement, shall pass a consequential order in the above terms;

(f) It shall be the duty of the learned Judges presiding over the MAC Tribunal to verify from the certificate issued by the banker and ascertain whether the account is of the persons held entitled to receive compensation;

(g) The MAC Tribunals, while passing orders of withdrawal/disbursement, shall, in the ordinary course, pass an order of transfer of the requisite amounts directly to the bank account of the person/s entitled to receive compensation as per the account details furnished. If there is a long gap between the date of furnishing the account details and the date of filing application for withdrawal of the amount, the Tribunal will be well advised to get fresh account details of the claimants;

(h) Whenever the MAC Tribunal passes an order of deposit of compensation amount with the Tribunal, there shall be a direction issued to invest the amounts to be deposited in fixed deposit with any nationalised bank and the fixed deposit shall be with the standing instructions to the bank to renew the same after periodical intervals till further orders are passed by the Tribunal;

(i) Similarly, practice directions/rules be framed in respect of adjudication made under the 1923 Act. The above directions issued while passing awards in claims under the 1988 Act shall be applied in case of the claims for compensation under the 1923 Act;

(j) The Central Project Co-ordinator of e-court project or Registrar (Computer/IT) of the High Courts, as the case may be, with the help of the State Government, shall create a dashboard on which the information regarding the amounts lying deposited in connection with the compensation granted under 1988 or 1923 Acts shall be regularly uploaded with all details. It will help all concerned to implement the directions issued under this order;

(k) All the High Courts shall issue administrative directions to the MAC Tribunals and Commissioners under the 1923 Act to initiate a massive drive to ascertain the whereabouts of the persons who have been held to be entitled to receive compensation, but have not taken the same. This shall be done by taking the assistance of the District and Taluka Legal Services Authorities and para-legal volunteers;

(l) The State Governments shall provide assistance to the Legal Services Authorities of the local police officers/revenue officers of the district and taluka to trace the claimants who are held entitled to receive compensation;

(m) The State Legal Services Authorities shall monitor compliance with the directions issued in terms of clauses (k) and (l) above and report compliance within a period of four months from today.

These directions shall continue to bind the MAC Tribunals and the Commissioners under the 1923 Act till rule-making power is properly exercised by the Government -- High Courts directed to take up implementation of the aforesaid directions at the earliest and submit compliance reports to the Court on or before 30th July 2025.

(Para 9, 10)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 17, 18 -- Securitisation application – Impleadment of Auction purchaser as party and condonation of delay applications – Rejection of -- Condition of pre-deposit in appeal – “Any order” – Interpretation of -- In Appeal, DRAT directed to deposit Rs. 125 crore as debt due was appox. Rs. 259 crores – High Court affirmed the order – If such an application stands rejected and an appeal is preferred before the DRAT against such order which is more a procedural part, should Section 18 so far as the aspect of pre-deposit is concerned, apply ? -- This is the moot question that the High Court should have considered at the time of deciding the writ petition -- Expression “any order” should be given some meaningful interpretation -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside, matter remitted to the High Court to decide it afresh in accordance with law.

(Para 4-18)

Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of judicial officer – Seniority – Late implementation of judgment – Effect of -- Writ petition filed by the appellants was decided on 2nd May 2012, as such, the State ought to have appointed the appellants within a reasonable time -- Though the State had challenged the said order in an SLP, the order of the High Court was never stayed -- Ultimately, the SLP came to be dismissed on 30th November 2012 -- Even thereafter, for a period of around 8 months, no action was taken by the State in issuing an order of appointment to the appellants – The 2012 batch was appointed on 10th July 2012 i.e., after a period of more than 2 months from the date of the order of the High Court -- Right to be appointed accrued to the appellants on the date of the order of the High Court i.e. on 2nd May 2012 -- Held, delay in giving effect to the order of the High Court by the State Government should not be permitted to act to the prejudice of the appellants – Appeal allowed, seniority given.

(Para 12-16)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12, 19 – Guilty  of contempt – Review by other Bench – Permissibility of -- Ld. Single Judge of the High Court, held the Respondent to be guilty of intentionally and malafidely violating the orders dated 11th June 2020 and 1st July 2020 and thus committing contempt of the orders of the Court -- Respondent was granted time either to purge the contempt or failing which to file an affidavit as to why he should not be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act -- When the matter was listed before the another ld. Single Judge of the High Court after the change of roster, it was held that it cannot be said that there is any wilful and deliberate disobedience by the respondents and the respondent No.1 was discharged – Ld. Single Judge of the High Court reviewed the entire order – Held, it was not permissible for the ld. Single Judge to have revisited the issue as to whether the Respondent has in fact committed contempt or not – Impugned judgment and final order set aside, matter remitted back.

(Para 13-20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) -- CBI Case -- Settlement with Bank – Cheating, Forgery, corruption -- Quashing of FIR -- Aggrieved party, if any, would have been the Bank which has no grievance against the Appellants -- No loss caused to the Bank -- Not only the principal amount has been returned but an amount over and above thereto, on the basis of the settlement, has been received by the Bank -- Case is at the very initial stage with the chargesheet having been filed -- Criminal case has an overwhelming and pre-dominant civil character arising out of pure commercial transaction where the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 19-24)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 (3) – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Revisional power of High Court – Acquittal to conviction – Permissibility of -- High Court does not have the authority to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction while exercising its Revisional power -- But that precisely was done by the High Court under the impugned judgment -- Impugned decision of the High Court is unsustainable -- If the High Court was convinced about a wrongful acquittal, the High Court in Revision could not have ordered for conviction -- It ought to have remitted the matter back to the appellate court to re-appreciate the matter -- This course was not adopted -- Matter remitted back to the appellate court.

(Para 5-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 21, 22, 29, 37 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 439 -- NDPS -- Regular bail – Commercial quantity -- Case of the prosecution is that quantity of contraband recovered from all the accused persons falls within the meaning of commercial quantity -- Fact that all the accused persons apprehended by the Investigating Agency were having common intention has to be established during the course of trial -- At this stage, the applicant was only carrying the contraband of intermediate quantity – Contraband found from the possession of the applicant is less than commercial quantity, as such, embargo of Section 37 of NDPS Act, would not be applicable -- With regard to intermediate and small quantity, the consideration for grant of bail is under that principles govern under Section 437 of Cr.P.C -- Applicants detained for the last more than six months – Investigation is complete, charge-sheet presented, the applicant is not required for purposes of investigation – Bail allowed.

(Para 13-15)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023) -- Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage – Certificate by Arya Samaj temple – Validity of – Proof of -- Any marriage solemnized in Arya Samaj Mandir as per the Vedic procedure is valid marriage as it fulfills the requirements of Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act -- Though certificate issued by Arya Samaj may not have a statutory force of prima facie validity of marriage but the certificate issued by Arya Samaj regarding performance of marriage is not a waste paper, it can be proved by the Purohit (who performed the marriage) as per the provisions of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 during the trial of the case.

(Para 17)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 7 -- Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage – Valid marriage -- Where the marriage between two Hindus (Male and Female) is performed in accordance with the applicable rites or ceremonies of Hinduism then such marriage will be valid even if the same is performed in Arya Samaj Mandir, in any temple, house or at any open place, as the place is not relevant for performing marriage as per section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act -- It is Hindu customs and rites which is relevant for the valid marriage.

(Para 18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 294, 506 -- Anticipatory bail – Challenge to -- Accused in jail in another case – Effect of -- Alleged offences are all triable by Judicial Magistrate, First Class -- None of the offences would carry sentence of more than seven years – Order of High Court to release respondent no. 2 on anticipatory bail does not suffer from any fundamental error of law -- Ordinarily habitual offender ought not to be released on bail in a routine manner, however the High Court has elaborately dealt with the cases against respondent no. 2 -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Conspiracy -- Very nature of the offence of conspiracy, being hatched in secrecy, no evidence of the common intention of the conspirators can be normally produced before Court – The offence can be proved largely by inferences from the acts committed or words spoken by the conspirators in pursuance of a common intention.

(Para 18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120B, 323, 324, 427, 450, 304 Part II – Conspiracy – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Role of A-6 – Conviction of A-6 -- Accused 1 to 4 entered the house and unleashed a frontal attack with wooden logs -- Before entering the house they picked up the wooden logs, within the eye-sight of A6 – They entered the house of PW2 on his invitation and unleashed an attack without any provocation from the inmates of the house – In retaliation of the incidents that happened earlier, on the same day A6 had seen the accused picking up the wooden logs and entering the house and also had exhorted them from outside the house – A6 definitely had the knowledge that the attack perpetrated on the accused could lead to death and the attack was carried out under his watch-full eyes – Knowledge that the attack is likely to cause death can definitely be pinned down on A6, at whose instance and connivance as also active instigation, the attack was carried out – No reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence of A6 – Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 18, 19)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Negligence of the offending vehicle -- Deposition of RW3/ I.O. about the negligence of bike driver conflicted with the charge sheet filed by him, against the truck driver -- His explanation was that the Charge sheet was filed against the truck driver since the motor-cycle driver had died in the accident – Court find itself unable to countenance the said statements of the Investigating Officer – Evidence of the eyewitness, PW3, was that he was accompanying the deceased in another bike, he specifically spoke of both the bikes being driven in normal speed when the offending truck came through the wrong side and hit the bike of the deceased -- He has also deposed that the truck was driven in a rash and negligent manner -- High Court fixing the entire liability on its owner and driver is perfectly in order -- Petitioner-insurer, who has insured the vehicle is bound to indemnify the owner of the vehicle who has the vicarious liability as against the negligence of his employee-the driver.

(Para 4-6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8 and 20(b)(ii)(C) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- NDPS – Acquittal -- Prosecution’s evidence, on 4th March 2016, one “S” was found sitting with another accused in a WagonR car -- All the contemporary documents, including the memo of arrest of the same date, do not mention the name of the appellant as the accused -- Accused is described as “S” -- In the examination of the appellant u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C, it is not put to the appellant that she is the same person as “S”, who was arrested on 4th March 2016 -- Therefore, the appellant was deprived of an opportunity to deal with the prosecution case causes prejudice to her -- Prosecution has adduced no evidence to show that the appellant is "S", who was arrested on 4^th March 2016 – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder – Intention/ knowledge -- Nature of injury – Relevancy of -- To attract Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree -- If hurt of any nature is caused and it is proved that there was intention or knowledge to cause death, Section 307 IPC would stand attracted.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt to murder – Accused-respondent fired from his service weapon AK-47 and since he was a constable in the army, he was well aware that gunshot from such a weapon, if hits anyone will certainly result in causing death -- There is no denial of the fact that the injured had sustained four injuries, two each on both the upper thighs and they were of grievous nature -- The injuries may not be life threatening, but it leaves no doubt that there was intention to cause death -- Considering the fact that the accused was in discipline force, the incident is of 2010 and that it had happened in a rage of anger, but with predetermined mind, in the interest of justice, punishment reduced to already undergone about 1 year 5 months.

(Para 13-15)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Circumstantial evidence – Eye witness – Criminal jurisprudence -- Just as a strong motive does not by itself result in a conviction, the absence of motive on that sole ground cannot result in an acquittal -- When the eyewitnesses are not convincing, a strong motive cannot by itself result in conviction, likewise when the circumstances are very convincing and provide an unbroken chain leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the accused and not to any other hypothesis; the total absence of a motive will be of no consequence.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Circumstantial evidence – Motive remains hidden in the inner recesses of the mind of the perpetrator, which cannot, oftener than ever, be ferreted out by the investigation agency -- Though in a case of circumstantial evidence, the complete absence of motive would weigh in favour of the accused, it cannot be declared as a general proposition of universal application that, in the absence of motive, the entire inculpatory circumstances should be ignored and the accused acquitted.

(Para 24)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Accused and the deceased along with the wife of the accused and his two other children were residing in the house which was the scene of occurrence --  Accused, admittedly a right-handed person, had gunshot residue particles in his right hand --  There were also gunshot residue particles around the gunshot wound by reason of which the son succumbed -- Circumstances coupled with the falsity of the claim made by the accused immediately after the detection of the body, to the onlookers and the false explanation given by the accused in his statement u/s 313, regarding both his hands having been forcefully smeared with gunshot residue provides further links in the chain of circumstances which is complete and leads only to the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and not to any hypothesis of innocence.

(Para 26)

Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1982, Rule 2(c) – Reservation for ex-serviceman – Personal from Indian Military Nursing Service as ex-serviceman – Consideration of -- Respondent no. 4 served as a Short Service Commissioned officer in the IMNS -- Rule 2(c) specifically includes Military personnel – No reason to exclude IMNS personnel from the category of “ex-servicemen” -- Respondent no. 4 held to be qualifies as an ex-serviceman and must be considered under the “ex-servicemen” category.

(Para 17-22)

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 6(3) – Return of dowry articles – Acquittal of the accused in criminal trial would not warrant rejection of the application for return of the dowry articles -- If dowry articles are given without a demand, regardless whether an offence under the Act is committed, they still may have to be returned in view of the provisions of the Act considering that in absence of any children of the deceased, the mother would be the natural heir of the deceased.

(Para 5)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(r)(s) – Abuse by caste in public view – Requirement of law -- Acquittal -- Nothing to indicate that there was anybody present in the vicinity of the alleged scene of occurrence, other than family members of the complainant -- It cannot be said to have occurred in public view – Accused absolved of any offence under clause (r) or (s) of Section 3 of the SC & ST Act -- Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 9, 11)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(f) – Forceful dispossession – Acquittal -- As to Section 3(1)(f) (wrongful occupation of land), no allegation in the complaint that the complainant and her family were forcefully evicted from land -- Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 9, 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 447 -- House trespass – Acquittal -- Place of occurrence is at a distance of 1 km from his house -- FIR talked about the house in which she was residing while alleging trespass on the accused persons -- However, no such allegation is even spoken of in the oral evidence; thus, putting to jeopardy the offence of house trespass too – Conviction set aside, acquitting the appellants.

(Para 10, 11)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 25H – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Termination of Chowkidar – Industrial dispute -- Petitioner completed more than 240 days in 12 months preceding his termination -- Later on again Chowkidars were engaged by the Corporation without asking the workman to opt for re-engagement -- Contention that the Corporation is not an industry, as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, was not agitated before the learned Labour Court -- In exercise of its power of judicial review, high Court has to test the award passed by learned Labour Court on the basis of material which was before said Court -- Award suffers from no illegality – Issue that Corporation is not an industry left open.

(Para 15, 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 120B – Acquittal of main accused – Trial of co-accused u/s 120B IPC -- Quashing of -- Main accused persons acquitted of the charges levelled against them u/s 386 and 120B IPC -- Applicant charge-sheeted only for the offence u/s 120B IPC for the same incident -- No fruitful purpose would be served, if the trial is proceeded against the present applicant -- Petition allowed -- Summoning order as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-7)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Liability of Insurance company -- FIR against an unknown vehicle – Effect of – Mere fact that initially the FIR records the vehicle as unknown would not be fatal for the prosecution/ claimants -- Police upon investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the driver of the car -- Inspection report prepared by the Motor Vehicle Inspector discloses a bent on the front right side of the bumper of the car to indicate that it dashed against something, which could have been the scooter of the deceased -- MACT’s Award fastened liability jointly and severally on the owner of the vehicle and the insurance company -- Liability of the respondent no.1/ Insurance company set aside by High Court -- Owner has neither appeared before the MACT nor before the High Court and not even before Supreme Court despite valid service of notice -- Court left with no option but to presume that the owner of the alleged offending vehicle which was the cause of the accident had no defence to offer -- During the police investigation owner of the vehicle admitted to the accident in question having occurred –  Appeal allowed, order of the High Court set aside and the order of the MACT restored.

(Para 17--24)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 29A -- Time limit for arbitral award – Extension of – Delay in completion of proceedings beyond 18 months – Effect of -- Once the Learned Arbitrator permitted the parties to participate in arbitral proceedings beyond the permissible period of 18 months then, the Impugned Order passed by Arbitrator that he cannot proceed because his mandate stood terminated and the arbitral proceedings were kept in abeyance, certainly amounts to prejudicing the petitioner due to an act of Arbitrator herein which defeats the principle of “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit” – Impugned order set aside, arbitration proceedings restored.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder of wife – Plea of alibi -- Circumstantial evidence -- Acquittal of husband by Trial court -- High Court emphasized that the accused and the deceased were living together and hence, the accused should have an explanation regarding the death of his wife u/s 106 of the Act, 1872 reversed the acquittal without anything other than a finding on alibi having not been proved -- The alibi being a possible and probable explanation, the accused cannot also be found to be in the teeth of Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- Not enough material to upset the order of acquittal of the Trial Court, especially when there was also no evidence led regarding the death being a result of homicide -- No circumstance leading to the guilt of the accused -- Order of the High Court set aside -- Order of acquittal of the Trial Court restored.

(Para 5, 6, 9, 10, 12-14)