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Posted On: 09-09-2025
101. (SC) (Decided on: 04.09.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Disability certificate – Proof of -- Medical board’s certificate can be accepted, even without a witness being examined.

(Para 7)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Income tax return – Reliance upon -- Registration of the firm of the claimant took place on 06.03.2006 and the income tax returns produced are also for the assessment years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 relatable to the financial years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 which are prior to the accident which occurred on 09.04.2007 -- It cannot be said that the claimant apprehended an accident and got registration of a firm and filed his income tax returns two years prior to the accident -- Income tax return accepted.

(Para 8)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Functional disability -- Amputation of one leg and a portion of the pelvic bone on the same side -- Disability to be assessed as functional disability which reduces the earning capacity of the claimant and not strictly the medical disability -- Claimant was running a business, and the claimant has already been fitted with a prosthetic limb to ensure his mobility – Functional disability assessed at 50% -- Entire medical expenses claimed for which invoices were produced, totalling Rs.12,54,985/-, Rs.1 lakh for pain, shock and suffering and an amount of Rs.2 lakhs for loss of amenities, Rs.1 lakh for the attendant expenses and Rs.4,70,805/- for the purchase of prosthetic leg based on the vouchers awarded -- Rs.10 lakh would suffice to account for the future expenses for continued use of the prosthetic limb and the medical expenses -- Total compensation awarded as Rs. 48,44,790/- with 6 % interest awarded.

(Para 7-13)

Posted On: 03-09-2025
108. (SC) (Decided on: 29.08.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty – Demand for dowry in any form is itself sufficient for Section 498-A of IPC being attracted – Demand made in any form either by the husband or by the relative of the husband would also attract Section 498-A of IPC – Even if the demand exhibits the conduct that would likely to drive the said woman being unable to bear such conduct would attract Explanation (a) – Likewise, harassing of a married woman with a view to coercing her or her relative to meet any unlawful demand would also fall within the mischief of the expression ‘cruelty’.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty – Complainant/ father of deceased stated that deceased used to tell them during her visit to the paternal home that her mother-in-law used to comment on her sarcastically for dowry -- There is not even a word with regard to any dowry demand having been raised by the appellant – Mother admits that married life of her daughter was happy and cordial and at the time of marriage there was no demand for dowry -- She infact admits at the time of marriage her son-in-law had told that he has no demand of dowry -- Evidence of PW-2 that is the brother of the deceased is in line with the evidence tendered by his mother PW-3 – Conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498-A and the sentence imposed on her cannot be sustained – Appeal allowed.

(Para 9-11)

Posted On: 01-09-2025
117. (SC) (Decided on: 29.08.2025)

A. Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.2 -- Absence from duty – Dismissal of Constable from service -- Absence of the respondent from the duty on various occasions in a short tenure of service of around 7 years, is a gross indiscipline on the part of the respondent – No illegality in the order passed by the disciplinary authority whereby the services of the respondent have been dismissed.

(Para 25)

B. Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.2(1) – Dismissal of constable from service – In the first part of Rule 16.2, punishment of dismissal can be awarded to the delinquent for the gravest act of misconduct -- In the second part, the punishment can be awarded as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service – Respondent/ employee was dealt by the department earlier on three occasions having remained absent from duty and the penalties were inflicted for the same -- It is the fourth time when he remained absent to which, a chargesheet was issued and his guilt was found proved – Disciplinary authority, while imposing the penalty, had merely referred the past conduct and also given weight to the gravest act of misconduct -- Order of dismissal is not based on the charge of “cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service” -- Therefore, mere reference of the past conduct would not amount to constitute dismissal of the respondent based on the second limb of Rule 16.2(1)  -- Held, dismissal of the respondent was based on gravest act of misconduct, for which he was dealt with by the disciplinary authority following the procedure as prescribed and in due observance of principles of natural justice, hence, not find any fault in the same.

(Para 25-33)

Posted On: 31-08-2025
120. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 27.08.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interlocutory injunction -- Call has to be taken by the Courts for issuance of interlocutory injunction, at the time, when the existence of legal right is asserted by the plaintiff and there is alleged contest, qua the violation of this legal right and the same, as such remains uncertain, before the Court, till the evidence adduced, is to be appraised by the Court -- The purpose of interim injunction is to mitigate the risk of injustice to a person, knocking the door of the Court, during the interregnum period of resolvement of uncertainty, vis-a-vis, violation of legal right.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interlocutory injunction -- Court ought to consider three ingredients i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss -- Considering the existence of these three conditions, the need for such protection has to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against the injury, resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights, for which, he could not be adequately compensated -- Thus, the Courts are supposed to weigh one need against another and determine, where the balance of convenience lies.

(Para 10, 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Interim injunction  -- Existing of tubewells/ borings is not disputed by the defendants -- Plaintiff No.2 asserts himself to be the co-owner in the suit land -- On account of tubewell, not being put to use, will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs also, if the defendants are not restrained from destroying the tubewells as well as PVC pipes or from creating hindrance in the running of the tubewells/boring -- Defendants cannot be allowed to take law in their own hands and cause damage to the tubewells/borings or PVC pipes -- Learned trial Court appropriately allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC further correctly affirmed by learned Appellate Court warrant no interference.

(Para 12-16)

Posted On: 30-08-2025
129. (SC) (Decided on: 19.08.2025)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Stolen cash – Presumption -- Cash so recovered had no special or distinct identification characteristics and thus, the same could not be linked to amount allegedly stolen from the deceased even if such allegation was proved by tangible evidence -- To base a conviction u/s 411 IPC solely on the ground that both the accused were unable to account for being in possession of such huge amount of cash is both incorrect and untenable.

(Para 14, 14.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 102 – Criminal Trial – Burdon of proof -- In a criminal prosecution, the initial burden is always on the prosecution to discharge, whereby the allegations raised by it against the accused person are preliminarily satisfied -- If the prosecution is unable to do so, by virtue of Section 102 of Evidence Act, the criminal trial initiated against the accused deserves to be dismissed without asking the accused to lead any evidence from the side of defence.

(Para 14.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Acquittal for offence of theft – Conviction for possession of Stolen goods – Legality of -- Trial Court acquitted both accused u/s 379 IPC -- In order to uphold conviction u/s 411 IPC, it is sine qua non that the property in the possession of accused is a stolen property -- If the property is not a stolen property, the charge u/s 411 IPC cannot be sustained -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-19)

Posted On: 30-08-2025
130. (SC) (Decided on: 19.08.2025)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Temporary labelled employees – Long-term extraction of labour – Equal protection – Financial stringency/  Budget – Excuse of -- Duty of Government -- “Ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque – State (Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer -- It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions -- Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices -- Long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection -- Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 21 --  Temporary labelled employees – Creation of supernumerary posts -- Regularization of -- As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit -- Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers -- Creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 20)

Posted On: 26-08-2025
134. (H.P. HC) (Decided on: 20.08.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- A plaint can be rejected if it does not disclose a cause of action, if the relief claimed is under-valued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped and plaintiff on being required by Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law etc.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Pleadings -- Court is not to step out of the pleadings as are contained in the plaint and the documents appended therewith -- Defence of the other party is not to be taken into consideration at the time of deciding the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- In terms of the averments made in the plaint, the cause of action is stated to have lastly accrued on 11.01.2016 and the suit was filed in the year 2016 itself, prima facie, it cannot be said from the perusal of the plaint that the suit is barred by limitation -- Trial Court dismisses the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC, call for no interference.

(Para 11)

Posted On: 23-08-2025
146. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 18.08.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Rs.9,000/- per month assessed by the Ld. Tribunal – Deceased left behind his widow, three minor children and old aged parents -- Minor children have their entire life ahead of them -- Their education has to be taken care of as well as the living expenses of all the claimants -- Compensation should at least be sufficient to mitigate the financial difficulties the family is likely to face – Keeping in view the rising prices as well as the fact that the education of the minor children is still at the threshold, Court deemed it appropriate not to interfere in the income of the deceased as assessed by the Tribunal -- Argument that the income ought to have been assessed as per the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 33 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Power of Court of Appeal – Appeal of Insurance Company – No cross-appeal by claimants – Just compensation -- Claimants relied upon Surekha & Ors. vs. Santosh & Ors., 2021 (16) SCC 467 to contend that even though no cross appeal was filed, the claimants would be entitled to enhanced compensation by addition towards loss of future prospects, which ought to have been 40% keeping in view the age of the deceased, who was 30 years of age at the time of his death -- Argument of the claimants accepted -- An addition of 40% made towards loss of future prospects -- Claimants held entitled to (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards loss of estate and (Rs.18,000/- (Rs.15,000+20% increase) towards funeral expenses as also to Rs.48,000/- each (Rs.40,000+20% increase) towards loss of consortium – Total compensation assessed at Rs.22,51,800/- -- Interest @ 7.5% per annum awarded on enhanced amount from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount awarded.

(Para 5, 11, 9-13)

Posted On: 23-08-2025
150. (SC) (Decided on: 14.07.2025)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-impleadment of Partnership firm as accused – Maintainability of Complaint against Partner – Vicarious liability/ Joint and several – Since the liability is joint and several, even in the absence of a partnership firm being proceeded against by the complainant by issuance of legal notice as mandated u/s 138 of the Act or being made an accused specifically in a complaint filed under Section 200 of CrPC, (equivalent to Section 223 of the BNSS), such a complaint is maintainable.

(Para 7.21, 9.9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Offence by partnership firm – Partners personally, jointly and severally liable in the case of a partnership firm, when the offence has been proved against a partnership firm -- Partnership firm is only a compendious name for the partners of the firm, any offence committed u/s 138 read with Section 141 of the Act would make the partners of the firm jointly and severally liable with the firm.

(Para 9.10, 9.11)

C. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 4, 5 -- Partnership firm – Whether a Separate Legal Personality -- A partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Companies Act, does not possess a separate legal personality and the firm’s name is only a compendious reference for describing its partners -- This fundamental distinction between a firm and a company rests on the premise that the company is separate from its shareholders -- Even the registration of a firm does not mean that it becomes a distinct legal entity like a company -- Hence, the partners of a firm are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in a company who are not co-owners of the property of the company.

(Para 7.9, 7.10, 8)

D. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 42 (c) -- Partnership firm and partners – Death of partner -- Perpetual Succession -- A partnership firm’s fundamental identity is contingent on the partners and undergoes a change with a change in partners, subject to contract -- Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act provides that subject to contract between the partners, a firm is dissolved by the death of a partner.

(Para 7.17)

E. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners -- Liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm --  Any liability of a firm has the same effect of a liability against the partners -- Debt of the firm is the personal debt of a partner and the debt of the firm has to be incurred by each partner as a financial personal liability -- The liability of the firm for acts done by the partner would arise when such acts are done in the ordinary course of the business of the firm.

(Para 7.18-7.20, 7.22)

F. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 25, 26 -- Liability of Partners – Penalty -- Since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable -- Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.

(Para 7.23)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 145 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 – Cheque bounce complaint – Liability of Directors, manager, Secretary and other officer -- Director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company cannot be proceeded against per se by virtue of the position they hold in the company but can be proceeded against only when there is proof that the offence u/s 138 was committed by the company with their consent or connivance or due to negligence on their part -- Standard of proof is higher under sub-section (2) of Section 141 vis-à-vis the category of persons mentioned therein with regard to their specific role in the commission of the offence u/s 138 of the Act.

(Para 9.4)