Constitution of Inida, Article 14 -- Excess payment to pensioners – Recovery of -- Permissibility of -- Petitioner is a pensioner and no material has been brought on record by the respondent/Corporation to show that any fraud or misrepresentation was committed by the petitioner while receiving the pension -- On the contrary, the explanation furnished is that excess pension payment was made to the petitioner, which is an administrative lapse -- In that eventuality, the petitioner cannot be blamed as he has not mislead the respondent/Corporation in order to secure higher amount of pension – Recovery from retired employees or their family pensioners impermissible -- Respondents directed to refund the amount if already recovered from the petitioner from the date of recovery till its actual realization, along with interest at the rate @ 6% per annum, within a period of three months.

(Para 6-9)

Punjab Police Act, 2007 (10 of 2007), Section 66 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 413, 419(4) -- Appeal against acquittal – Leave to appeal before High Court -- Direction given to learned Session Judge to treat the application/appeal as filed u/s 372 of Cr.P.C -- Registry directed to send the complete paper-book and record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, forthwith. Celestium Financial’s case 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208 relied.

(Para 3-8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 346, 302, 34 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Regular bail -- Prima facie, the case is of circumstantial evidence, as there is no direct eye witness -- Further, whether dead body recovered from drain is of the same person for whom missing FIR was registered or not is yet to be established by the prosecution, during the course of trial -- Whether, mere suspicion of the petitioner, based solely on a disclosure statement, is sufficient for conviction, remains a significant legal question for the prosecution itself to resolve -- Petitioner is already in jail for the last more than two years and only 04 prosecution witnesses out of 26 prosecution witnesses have been examined till date -- Petition allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Constitution of  India, Article 21 – Criminal justice system – Curtailment of liberty -- Criminal justice system, though permitting curtailment of personal liberty, mandates that such deprivation must strictly conform to the procedure established by law -- The said procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 84, 528 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person order – Challenge to -- Procedure prescribed u/s 82 Cr.P.C. (section 84 BNSS) was not complied with -- Three conditions, contained in sub-clauses (a) to (c) of Section 82(2)(i), are cumulative in nature -- A valid proclamation can be said to have been made only when all three modes of publication are duly complied with and proved -- Object behind issuance of non-bailable warrants or proclamation is only to secure the presence of the accused -- Petitioner has voluntarily approached this Court and undertaken to appear before the trial Court regularly -- Moreover, the petitioner is ready to settle the matter with the complainant -- Petition allowed, impugned order declaring the petitioner proclaimed person set aside – Petitioner to appear before the trial Court within four weeks and upon doing so ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357, 374, 389, 397, 401 – Cheque bounce complaint – Appeal against conviction -- Suspension of sentence – Condition to deposit of 20% of compensation – Exception to –  Ld. Appellate Court was required to consider whether the present case falls in the exception or not, which was not considered -- Matter remanded back, Ld. lower Appellate Court to re-examine the case after granting an opportunity to the petitioner to make submissions regarding the exceptional circumstances and decide whether it is an appropriate case that warrants waiver of the requirement of deposit of 20% of the compensation awarded by learned trial Court in the light of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jamboo Bhandari's case (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 = 2024(2) L.A.R. 323.

(Para 5, 6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 168 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Age appox. 40 years -- Amputation of the right arm above the elbow -- Functional disability assessed as of 80% -- Significantly impairing earning capacity -- Considering lifelong suffering, loss of amenities, mental stress, future medical needs (prosthetics, physiotherapy), and loss of dignity attached to such a disability, enhancement is justified u/s 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act -- As such, compensation for loss of future earning is assessed as:

* Notional annual income: Rs.36,000/- per annum

* After Addition of 40% future prospects: Rs.50,400/- per annum

* Multiplier: 15

* Functional disability: 80%

Loss of earning capacity = (Rs.50,400 × 80%) × 15 = Rs.6,04,800/-

High Court is empowered to reassess these amounts to ensure just compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Total Compensation assessed as 9,14,800/-, rounded to: Rs. 9,15,000/- -- Claimant shall be entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs.4,65,000/-, over and above the award of the Tribunal, along with interest @ 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization.

(Para 13-18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 – Joint land – Restraining co-sharer from construction – Mandate of -- Suit for partition is pending and the respondents are in exclusive possession of their respective portions -- A co-sharer in physical possession of a specific portion of joint land, whose possession is admitted, cannot be restrained from raising construction thereupon -- Any construction raised by the respondents over their exclusive portion shall, however, remain subject to the final outcome of the partition proceedings – Ld. Additional District Judge rightly declined to grant stay and has dismissed the application filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs – Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 9, 10)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 311 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Bank statements in application u/s 311 of Cr.P.C -- Permissibility of -- Documents allowed to be proved by the learned trial Court are the statement of account being maintained by the Public Bank in usual course of its business -- If the respondent/ complainant is seeking the assistance of some documents, i.e. statement of account of the parties, it cannot be held that the respondent-complainant has created an evidence in his favour during the pendency of the case -- No illegality committed by the learned trial Court while permitting the respondent-complainant to prove the documents.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 439 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Regular bail -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Jump of bail – Proclaimed person -- Petitioner already remained in custody for a period of about 26 days after surrendering before the Court -- Keeping in view the bailable nature of the offence u/s 138 of the NI Act, Court deemed appropriate to grant him the concession of bail subject to the Rs.10,000/- as costs – Bail allowed.

(Para 5)

A. Punjab land Revenue Rules, Rule 16 -- Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 15, 16 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Appointment of Lambardar – Interference in – Once, the authorities after evaluating the claims of all eligible, found respondent No.1 as a better suited for the post of Lambardar, unless and until, the respondent No.1 is ineligible to hold the said post or, the said appointment is causing prejudice to the residents of the area in any manner, no interference can be done.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab land Revenue Rules, Rule 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Non-resident Indian -- 16 years passed and not even a single complaint has been brought to the notice that there is mis-performance of a duty by respondent No.1 due to his absence from the village in question -- That being so, the argument being raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent No.1 is a non-resident Indian and will not be available in village to perform the duty, cannot be accepted – LPA dismissed.

(Para 6, 7)

Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 16 -- Appointment of lambardar -- Theft of the electricity – Financial Commissioner found that allegations of theft of the electricity not proved as he had no concern with the said premises and the electricity meter was in the name of father of respondent No.4 and even the Electricity Department has already exonerated the respondent No.4 of any misdoing as the house in question was being used by his brother -- Learned Single Judge, upheld the said order – Orders have not been proved to be perverse -- No ineligibility attached to respondent No.4 has been brought to the notice -- Respondent No.4 is working as Lambardar for the last so many years -- No ground made out for any interference – LPA dismissed.

(Para 1-6)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Duty of MACT/ Tribunal – Compensation has to be awarded once and for all as victim is not at fault and it is the duty of the Tribunal to award just compensation -- Considering overall facts and circumstances relating to treatment, mental agony, pain, disablement, loss of wages and expenditure in the hospital for nutritious diet and other expenditure incurred by the family members and other charges for attendant is also required to be considered -- Disablement and mental pain, shock and suffering qua loss of amenities -- Adopting a sensitive approach is crucial for the Tribunal -- It plays a key and vital role in ensuring not only justice to the victim of the motor accident but also to determine just and fair compensation -- The Tribunal is expected to have empathy and to prevent subsequent trauma by taking a sensitive approach to feeling the pain of the victim of the road accident because the victim of the road accident and their family often deal with physical and emotional trauma and an empathetic approach can provide them a sense of support and understanding.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Injury case – If no proof of income is produced on the record then Tribunal has to consider prevalent minimum wages in absence of ample evidence of monthly income of the applicant -- Accident occurred on 05.01.2011 and during that time, the appellant-injured was student of PTC course, and as per the Government approved minimum wages was Rs.4,370/- -- Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly assessed the income of the appellant at Rs.7,000/- p.m including future prospect considering disability at 40% and also multiplier of 18 which are just and proper -- Therefore, the Tribunal has not committed any error in awarding Rs.7,56,000/- as future loss of income. So far medical expenses are concerned, the Tribunal has awarded Rs.1,90,441/-, which is also just and proper.

Other heads : Appellant has to replace her artificial leg at every 3 to 5 years continuously -- At the time of accident, the appellant was young lady aged about 19 years, who lost her left leg in the accident – For Pain, shock and sufferings = Rs.2,00,000/-, Special diet, attendant and transportation = Rs.50,000/-, Loss of amenities and loss of enjoyment of life   = Rs.2,00,000/-,  Future medical expenses Rs.2,00,000/- -- Loss of matrimonial prospects = Rs.3,00,000/-.

(Para 7, 15)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 17(3), 18 -- Arms Rule, 2016, Rule 32 – Cancellation of arms license -- Cartridges were expended only during testing and cleaning of the weapon -- Petitioner has specifically denied that the petitioner has ever used the weapon for public firing in any wedding or any other public place – Held, it is necessary that the authority forms an opinion as to whether any licensed fire arm was either not carried in the proper protective gear or was brandished, discharged or whether any blank firing took place in any public place or fire arm free zone -- Such considerations and opinions are sine qua non for invocation of Rule 32 under the Rules, 2016 -- District Magistrate has not given any finding with regard to any of the conditions enumerated under Rule 32, violation of which would allow the authority to pass an order for cancellation and seizure -- Appellate authority also failed to indicate as to how Rule 32 is applicable in the case and also failed to give a clear finding with regard to violations of any of the conditions as enumerated under Rule 32 – Orders quashed, licence of the petitioner restored.

(Para 11-16)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for specific performance -- Fabricated document in Court – Enquiry ordered by Trial Court – Challenge to -- Sale agreement dated 04.04.2000 against the defendants -- Executants of the agreement passed away on 20.01.1995 and 05.07.1990 respectively – Submission that unless and until any concrete evidence is made available on the record in support of such contentions, any order, issuing directions for conducting an enquiry for ascertaining the correctness of the execution of the document, cannot be passed – Held, if any litigant approaches the Court with fabricated documents, a thorough enquiry is required in order to ascertain the truth -- This is because filing of false documents is a serious matter that can be considered a fraud played on the Court, potentially leading to legal consequences for the litigants – No merit in instant petition,  dismissed.

(Para 2, 3, 14-16)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 19, 21 – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6, 7, 8 --- Insurance / renewal of Passport – Criminal trial pending – Effect of -- NOC granted by the trial court and passport validity restricted to one year – Again approached the trial court for grant of NOC for obtaining passport for five years – Application dismissed by trial court primarily, on the ground that the same is premature because the earlier NOC granted by the said court is valid upto 23.02.2026 -- Another ground that he has not produced any documentary proof that would go on to show that he was required to travel abroad in connection with his business – Held, every citizen has a legal right to hold a passport and that the said right can be taken away only in accordance with law – Held, petitioner is entitled to get his passport renewed for further as the expiry of his passport is approaching -- A criminal court while considering an application for grant of NOC has only to advert itself to the question as to whether the accused, if allowed to travel abroad, would be available to face the trial -- No other factor should influence the decision of the criminal court while considering an application for grant of NOC in favour of an accused who intends to obtain a passport/travel document -- Petition allowed, matter remanded to the court to decide the application of the petitioner for grant of NOC afresh.

(Para 6-9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Consortium -- Estranged husband – Right of -- At the time of the death of the deceased, the appellant was her legally wedded husband, although it appears that they were living separately -- Question for consideration, therefore, is whether the appellant, being the legally wedded but estranged husband, is entitled to any compensation under the head of loss of consortium – Held, appellant, being the legally wedded husband of the deceased, is entitled to a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur’s case (2021) 11 SCC 780 relied.

(Para 8-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Minor Driver – No driving licence – Driven without consent – Ground of -- U/s 3 read with Section 4 and 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no person below the prescribed age can drive a motor vehicle, and the owner of such vehicle is under a statutory duty to ensure that the vehicle is not driven by a person who does not hold a valid licence -- Both the owner and the driver are real brother -- Duty to keep the vehicle safe and not accessible to an unlicensed person lies squarely on the owner -- Owner cannot escape liability by merely stating lack of consent -- Breach being fundamental and directly contributing to the cause of the accident, the insurer is entitled to be exonerated from liability to indemnify the claimants -- Insurance Company is directed to pay the compensation to the claimants in the first instance and recover the same from the owner and driver thereafter.

(Para 6-14)

A. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 124A – Compensation in railway accident -- Unauthorised crossing of railways tracks – Contributory negligence -- Effect of -- Even if the deceased persons were crossing the railway tracks unauthorizedly to reach to other platform, the claim for compensation u/s 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, may still be maintainable -- Contributory negligence or unauthorized entry alone does not automatically absolve the railway administration of liability, unless the case falls within the exceptions provided viz. suicide, self-inflicted injury, own criminal act, intoxication, or natural cause.

(Para 8)

B. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 124A – Compensation in railway accident -- Statement of (Loco Pilot) shows that on 17.04.2011, he was running the train and while passing through Railway Station, deceased (only 3 years old) came onto the railway tracks and while saving him, two female also came onto the track and all of three were run over by the train -- Said statement is sufficient to presume that the act of deceased persons was not deliberate, albeit, to save the child who had no knowledge about the consequence of crossing tracks, two female also lost their lives -- Railway Claims Tribunal directed to award the compensation to the claimants in accordance with the Rules and guidelines prevailing at the relevant point of time.

(Para 9-13)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Offending vehicle – Burdon of proof -- Preponderance of probabilities -- Deceased was pillion rider – Driver tendered his affidavit Ex.PW2/A wherein he has deposed that on date of accident, his motorcycle was hit from behind by offending vehicle -- In said accident, he also received injuries and was admitted in the Hospital -- In the meantime, FIR was registered in death case by his brother against unknown vehicle -- During investigation of the case, statement of injured/ PW2 was recorded wherein he has specifically mentioned the registration number of subject vehicle -- Burden of proof, in claim petitions under Motor Vehicles Act, need not be beyond reasonable doubt as the claimants have to prove their case on touchstone of preponderance of probabilities -- Keeping in view the well-reasoned and detailed findings recorded by the Tribunal after relying upon FIR (Ex.PA), copy of challan (Ex.PC) and Postmortem Report of deceased (Ex.PB) as well as observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mangla Ram’s case 2018 AIR (SC)1900 and Kuncham Lavanya’s case 2025(2) RCR (Civil) 420 – No merit in the appeal -- Dismissed in limine.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Prosecution of Public servant – Sanction from Government – Requirement of -- Alleged offence must have been committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their official duties -- Protective mantle of Section 197 of the CrPC is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto -- Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not attract the bar imposed u/s 197 of the CrPC.

(Para 30)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (4 of 1964), Section 170 -- Prosecution of Public servant/ police officers – Sanction from Government not taken – Ground of – Quashing of summoning order:

(1) abuse of official authority by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or vendetta;  

(2) physical assault and ill-treatment of the complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged police excess;  

(3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and  

(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.

Allegations levelled against the accused persons, though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of the CrPC respectively -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 37-42)

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 -- Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016), Section 2(h), 3, 39, 40, 47(1)(a) – Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (10 of 1993), Section 2(d) -- India’s international obligations under the UNCRPD, Article 31 -- Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983, Rules 196, 197, 198(iii) – Right of person with disabilities in prison -- Directions issued in the larger public interest to uphold the dignity, and healthcare rights of prisoners with disabilities in all custodial settings -- The obligations herein are rooted in India’s constitutional guarantees, statutory mandates, and international human rights commitments – Direction issued for immediate and time-bound compliance:

1) All prison authorities shall promptly identify prisoners with disabilities at the time of admission. Each prisoner shall be given an opportunity to declare any disability and provide information about their specific needs.

1.1) All rules, regulations, and essential information about prison life shall be provided to such prisoners in accessible and understandable formats (e.g., Braille, large print, sign language, or simplified language).

2) All prison premises shall be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments to ensure universal accessibility.

3) All prisons shall designate and maintain dedicated spaces for physiotherapy, psychotherapy and other necessary therapeutic services.

4) A State-level access audit of all prisons in Tamil Nadu shall be completed within six months by an expert committee comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, the Department for the Welfare of Differently Abled Persons, and certified access auditors.

4.1) Periodic audits shall thereafter be conducted and updated regularly in accordance with the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021).

5) The prison authorities shall ensure complete compliance with Sections 40 and 45 of the RPwD Act, 2016, Rule 15 of the 2017 Rules and the Harmonized Guidelines, 2021 in all prison infrastructure and services.

6) The State shall provide healthcare for prisoners with disabilities equivalent to that available in the community, including access to physiotherapy, speech therapy, psychiatric services, and assistive devices (such as wheelchairs, hearing aids, and crutches).

7) All prison medical officers shall be adequately trained and sensitized to address disabling conditions, ensuring provision of appropriate accommodations and treatment without discrimination or bias. Furthermore, regular awareness and sensitization programmes shall be conducted in all prisons.

8) Every prisoner with a disability shall be provided a nutritious and medically appropriate diet, tailored to their specific health and dietary needs.

9) Lifesaving treatments, including regular and need-based physiotherapy and psychotherapy must be made available on-site or through linkage with government health facilities. 10) All prison staff shall undergo comprehensive training on the rights of persons with disabilities. This training shall include:

- awareness of equality and non-discrimination principles

- proper handling of disability-related challenges

- use of appropriate language and behaviour, as per the UN Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs.

11) The State Prison Manual shall be reviewed and appropriately amended within six months to ensure conformity with the RPwD Act, 2016 and the UNCRPD.

11.1) A specific section must be incorporated to prohibit discrimination against prisoners with disabilities and promote equal treatment and reasonable accommodation.

11.2) The revised Manual shall be prominently displayed in every prison establishment.

12) The State shall undertake periodic consultations with civil society organisations working in the disability sector to develop inclusive policies and identify accommodations based on real needs.

13) The State shall constitute a monitoring committee to conduct periodic inspections and submit compliance reports every three months.

14)The State shall maintain and update disaggregated data on the disability status of prisoners, including records on accessibility, reasonable accommodations, and medical requirements.

14.1) This is to ensure compliance with Article 31 of the UNCRPD and the RPwD Act, 2016.

14.2) The data shall be made available in the public domain, subject to privacy safeguards.

15) The Director General of Prisons shall file a comprehensive compliance report before the State Human Rights Commission within three months from the date of this judgment, detailing all steps taken in furtherance of these directions.

(Para 35, 35.1)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased aged 28 years -- Monthly income of the deceased was assessed as Rs.22,763/- per month -- Future prospects @ 50% added -- Further, a sum of Rs.48,400/- to each of the claimants required to be awarded on account of filial consortium – Deceased is bachelor, deduction of 1/2 of the assessed income would have to be made on account of personal expenses instead of 1/3rd as assessed by the MACT – Multiplier of 17 applied --  Total compensation assessed at Rs.36,15,839/- -- Rounded off to Rs.4,50,100/- payable -- This amount would be payable in addition to the amount assessed by the learned MACT along with interest @ 7.5% annually.

(Para 8-13)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased was minor/ 16 years of age – Multiplier – Future prospects -- Claimants are deceased’s parents – Income assessed as per the minimum wage for a skilled worker @ Rs. 10,382/- per month and a multiplier of ‘18’ would be applicable -- Future prospects added at 40% -- Keeping in view the age of the child, 50% deduction would also be applicable – Loss of estate Rs.18,000/-, Funeral expenses Rs.18,000/-, Loss of consortium Filial [Rs.48,000/- x 2] = Rs.96,000/- -- Total compensation comes to Rs.17,01,762/- -- Will attract interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the entire amount.

(Para 9-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 61, 85  -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS -- Commercial quantity – Petitioner arrayed as an accused on the basis of disclosure statement of coaccused -- No recovery effected from the petitioner, however the recovery of 200 Kgs of Doda Post effected from co-accused -- Co-accused are on bail and the case of the petitioner is stated to be at par with them -- Custody certificate produced would show that the petitioner has suffered incarceration of 01 year, 08 months & 06 days as on 04.12.2025 -- Petitioner is involved in 02 more cases, however in 01 case, he has been acquitted – Petitioner is covered by the ratio of law in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain’s case, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 260 – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 61, 85  -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS -- Commercial quantity – Delay in trial – Regular bail -- Petitioner was found in possession of 610 capsules of Tramadol Hydrochloride of heroin which falls within commercial quantity -- Custody since 22.06.2024 -- Challan presented but the trial has not been concluded till date and there is also no likelihood of the same being concluded soon -- As such, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo created u/s 37 of the NDPS Act – Bail allowed.

(Para 8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Petitioner nominated as an accused only on the confession of the co-accused to the effect that he had purchased the contraband from the petitioner, which, such confession is not corroborated by any recovery from the petitioner -- Investigation in the case is complete -- Other case registered against the petitioner pertained to intermediate quantity of contraband and are not in relation to any commercial quantity – Bail allowed.

(Para 6)

Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 16.3 – Acquittal in NDPS Case –Departmental punishment – Sustainability of -- Acquittal by trial Court is not absolute bar and Authorities are duty bound to examine whether case of delinquent falls within exceptions carved out in aforesaid Rule or not – There is no finding that Opium was planted by Investigating Officer of Deputy Superintendent of Police -- There is no finding that there was no recovery of 1 Kg Opium -- Findings recorded by trial Court disclose that petitioner was acquitted by trial Court on the ground of benefit of doubt -- It was a case of non-compliance of mandate of Section 50 of NDPS Act as well as discrepancies in the statements -- It cannot be concluded that case of petitioner does not fall within the exceptions carved out under Rule 16.3 of PPR -- He was liable to be punished -- Punishment of forfeiture of 05 years regular service for increments, upheld.

(Para 2, 8-11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 2(47), 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – License to drive transport vehicle -- Accident by Tanker – Recovery rights -- Once there is an endorsement on the licence to include T.V. (Transport Vehicle), it clearly proves that the appellant no.2/ driver was entitled to drive transport vehicles, which included a tanker – Recovery rights given by the Tribunal to the insurance company from the appellants set aside.

(Para 13-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Compromise acquittal/ quashing of FIR in POCSO – Challenge by private party – Locus standi -- A private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution if the judgment of acquittal led to serious miscarriage of justice -- Such right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) – POCSO – Compromise quashing of FIR – Quashing by High Court – Challenge to -- Before exercising the power u/s 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime -- Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society -- Allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the same -- Order passed by High Court quashed -- Consequently, the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law.

(Para 25-33)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Cancellation of allotment -- Forfeiture of amount – Suit for declaration that cancellation was null and void -- HUDCO was in breach of several obligations as contemplated in the Allotment Letter, viz. failure to execute documents for securing approval under the ULCR Act and the IT Act; failure to execute the sub lease agreement in favour of the Appellant and; failure to secure the approval of the revised layout plan for the construction of the hotel -- It is a settled position of law that a commercial document ought not to be interpreted in a manner that arrives at a complete variance with what may originally have been the intention of the parties -- Respondent No. 1/HUDCO, was in breach of its reciprocal contractual obligations, thereby disentitling them from forfeiting the monies already paid by the Appellant towards the first instalment as enshrined in Clause 5 (iii) of the Allotment Letter – Appellant has blatantly engaged in forum shopping, and considering that their overall conduct does not in any manner reflect an approach aligning with the clean hands doctrine, they are not entitled to grant of any discretionary relief of interest in their favour -- Appellant held entitled to a refund of the principal amount, without any interest.

(Para 42-47, 60)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 34 – Interest -- It is trite law that u/s 34 of the CPC, the award of interest is a discretionary exercise steeped in equitable considerations.

(Para 49)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust -- Sale of partnership property by accused -- Cheating – Inducement – Dishonest intention -- There is a clear absence of material on record to attribute any dishonest and fraudulent intention to the appellant-accused at the time of creation of partnership agreement -- No allegation in the complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellant-accused right from the time of formation of the partnership deed -- Mere allegations that the appellant-accused dishonestly induced the complainant to part with the property of the partnership firm and subsequently sold the property to a third party does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 of the IPC – Complainant failed to place any material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted the subject property to the appellant-accused -- Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the appellant-accused, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust – Complainant has an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit to set aside the sale deed and claim damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which he is already pursuing against the appellant-accused which is currently pending adjudication – Held, criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas – Appellant-accused could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant-accused are unsustainable – Criminal complaint quashed.

(Para 20, 22, 24, 29)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 -- Criminal breach of trust  -- Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of a property entrusted to him -- In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of contract, then the question whether such retention is with dishonest intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

(Para 21)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Cheating – Criminal breach of trust – Cannot co-exist together -- In case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same -- Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property -- In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously -- Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct -- Said offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

(Para 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge of accused -- At the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices -- However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341, 354C, 506 -- Discharge of accused -- Allegation by complainant that by clicking her photographs without her consent accused intruded her privacy and obstructed her entry into premises -- FIR and charge sheet silent about the manner in which complainant was threatened or was watched or captured by the accused while she was engaging in a 'private act' to attract Section 354C -- Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and charge-sheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property -- The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR -- Complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations -- Ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted -- Ingredients of wrongful restraint u/s 341 not made out, in absence of material on record to show that complainant was a tenant in the property at any point of time -- On the date of the alleged offence, complainant had no right to enter the property - Accused enforce bonafidely thought was his lawful right over property in terms of injunction order -- Accused discharged.

(Para No. 20-30)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Recovery of weapons – Acquittal in revision -- Grounds :

i) that the weapon of offence was never test fired. Thus, the report of Arms Act Expert (PW-5) could not have been believed with regard to the fact that the weapon was in working condition;

ii) that the sanction order was defective as the weapon was never produced before the sanctioning authority;

iii) that the link evidence was missing as the storekeeper in whose custody the weapon was kept had not been examined;

iv) that the weapon was not produced in sealed condition before the arms expert, which shows that it was not sealed on the spot. Thus, the tampering of case property in this case cannot be ruled out;

v) that despite the fact that recovery had taken place at a crowded place, any independent witness has not been joined;

vi) that the testimony of witnesses of recovery i.e. PW-2 and PW-4 were contrary with regard to material witnesses;

If the cumulative effect of all the above mentioned factors is taken into consideration, it leads to a conclusion that the story set-out by the prosecution, with regard to recovery of country-made pistol from the possession of petitioner, fails to inspire confidence – Held, there is sufficient scope for indulgence and interference in the findings returned by the learned trial Court -- Charge for the commission of offence punishable u/s 25 of Arms Act was not proved against the petitioner – Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Service law -- Change of category – Sports SC (M&B) to SC (M&B) -- Permissibility of -- At the time of filling the application form for the post of Multipurpose Health Worker, the petitioner has applied under Sports SC (M&B) category -- At fag end, when the selection process for the said post(s) is over, the petitioner cannot be allowed to change her category from Sports SC (M&B) to SC (M&B).

(Para 6)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Adjournment request in civil suit -- Adverse remarks against advocate – Legality of -- Serious personal findings recorded against the counsel, attributing to her conduct which the order-sheet itself does not substantiate -- Remarks were not essential for adjudicating the request for adjournment and were made without affording any opportunity to the counsel to clarify the circumstances -- Adverse remarks affecting the professional standing of an advocate must be avoided unless absolutely necessary for the decision of the case and only after due notice and opportunity -- Nevertheless, the language employed in the impugned order was avoidable -- A more measured and temperate approach would have sufficed, particularly when the record itself reflected the earlier presence and bona fide conduct of counsel -- Civil revision allowed, adverse and stigmatic remarks recorded against the counsel, as well as the direction imposing costs of ?30,000 on the judgment-debtor for the alleged conduct of counsel, ordered to be expunged.

(Para 4-8)

Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Expedite disposal of civil suit -- Revision petition seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) to decide Civil Suit within a time-bound manner -- Revision petition disposed of, with a direction to learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) to decide the Civil Suit as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law.

(Para 1-4)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 90(3) -- Auction sale in execution -- Challenge to – Right of -- Given the insertion of Order XXI Rule 90(3) in the statute book with effect from 01.02.1977, it would be incumbent upon a judgment debtor or any other interested person who applies for setting aside an execution sale, held thereafter, to satisfy the executing Court that the ground upon which the application was made could not have been taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up – Held, if such a ground could have been taken by that applicant who seeks setting aside of the sale but he failed to do so at the appropriate stage, he would stand barred, by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, from doing so at a subsequent stage.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 66(2)(a), 90(3) -- Auction sale in execution -- Challenge to – Right of -- Having failed to raise a material irregularity in the context of Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC at the appropriate stage, i.e., with regard to sale of a part of the property being sufficient to satisfy the decree, it is not open to them to now raise such a belated plea and blithely place the burden on the executing Court, so as to seek setting aside of a sale held as long back as in the year 2002.

(Para 18)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Incorporate company -- Definition of “person” in Section 2(1)(m) is inclusive and not exhaustive --  Therefore, there can be no doubt that even an incorporated company could be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) read with Section 2(1)(m) of the 1986 Act.

(Para 14)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Self use/ Commercial purpose -- Generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not – Consideration of – What is to be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction i.e. whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser(s) and/or its/ their beneficiary – If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing goods or services is for personal use and consumption of the purchaser, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, the question whether such purchase is for generating a livelihood by means of self-employment need not be looked into – However, where the transaction is for a commercial purpose then it might have to be considered whether it is for generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not.

(Para 16)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(m) – Consumer – Incorporate company – Purchase of software – Object of purchase – Whether Generating livelihood by means of self-employment or not -- Goods purchased by a self-employed individual for self-use for generating livelihood would fall within the explanation even if activity of that person is to generate profits for the purpose of its livelihood -- But where a company purchases a software for automating its processes, the object is to maximise profits and, therefore, it would not fall within the explanation of Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act -- Object of the purchase was not to generate self-employment but to organize its operations with a view to maximise profits -- Case of the complainant does not fall within the Explanation to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act -- If upon consideration of all relevant factors the picture that emerges is one which reflects that the object of the purchase of goods/ services is to generate or augment profit, the same would be treated as for a commercial purpose -- qua that transaction the appellant cannot be considered a consumer as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act.

(Para 18-27)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Change in the selection criteria – Permissibly of -- Weightage points allotted to a B.Sc. Degree in Forestry was 25 points was altered only after interviews were held, that is, when all the stages of participation by a candidate in the selection process were over -- Evaluation procedure was altered on representation of candidates -- Such alteration, cannot be termed transparent and does not have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved in as much as the academic qualification required for the post was barely 10+2 with science and stress was more on physical attributes of a candidate including viva voce --  Held, a change in the selection criteria, after interviews were held, was rightly not countenanced by the High Court – No merit in appeal, dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), Section 2(e)(ii) -- Temporary Safaikarmi -- Honorarium of Rs.1200/- per month – Legality of – Schedule employment -- Petitioners say that they are working as Safaikarmi with their respective police stations on a temporary basis -- They receive for their services an honorarium of Rs.1200/- per month from the State Government -- SP replied that they work for one every day and for that they are compensated by an honorarium of Rs.1200/- a month – Since, they are men, whose service and labour is hired as outsiders, the protection of the Act of 1948 would be available to them -- Petitioners are part-time wagers and working as such in the Police Stations, they held entitled to be remunerated according to the minimum wages notified from time to time under the Act of 1948 and not in accordance with Government Order.

(Para 1, 2, 6, 24)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Expiry of Driving licence – Effect of -- Licence expired on 05.05.2016 and the accident occurred on 20.08.2016 -- No evidence on the record to show that an application for renewal was filed within thirty days of expiry; on the contrary, statement of PW-3 (Criminal Ahlamd) confirms the absence of such timely renewal -- Driving Licence similarly corroborate that the licence was not valid for driving a transport vehicle on the date of the accident – Held, learned Tribunal, after a proper appreciation of the entire evidence, rightly concluded that there was a violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased, was a minor aged merely 12 years -- A minor, by virtue of tender age, is not engaged in employment, and therefore rigidly categorizing him as a “non-earner” would defeat the object of awarding just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -- Proper method of determining compensation under the head “loss of income” is to adopt, at the very least, the minimum wages notified for a skilled worker in the relevant State at the relevant time -- Notional monthly income of the deceased assessed at Rs.10,300, being the minimum wages of a highly skilled worker notified for the relevant period in the State of Haryana – Future prospects 40%, multiplier of 18 applied – 50 deduction towards personal expenses -- Loss of Estate Rs.18,150/- -- Funeral Expenses Rs.18,150/- -- Loss of Consortium Filial :  Rs. 48,400 x 2 Rs.96,800/- -- Total comes to Rs.16,90,460/- -- Interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition allowed.

(Para 21-29)

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (56 of 2007), Section 23, 25 -- Senior Citizens case -- defect of coram non judice – Issue not raised earlier – Effect of -- Once an order is found to have been passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction or lawful coram, it is a nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be sustained, irrespective of whether such a plea was initially taken -- Matter remanded to the Maintenance Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

(Para 7)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 152 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Raising slogan ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ when the war was going on between India and Pakistan – Regular  bail -- Petitioner was arrested on 10.05.2025 has suffered incarceration of 06 months and 11 days as on 24.11.2025 -- Petitioner is not involved in any other case -- Challan has already been presented and charges are yet to be framed -- Veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after the conclusion of the trial and on the appreciation of evidence to be led by both the parties before the trial Court – Bail allowed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 310(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395 – Dacoity -- To sustain a charge of dacoity under Section 310(2) of the BNS [Section 395 of the IPC], the offence of robbery [Section 309 of the BNS/Section 392 of the IPC] must first be established -- Robbery, in turn, is an aggravated form of theft or extortion -- A foundational element of ‘theft’ as defined under Section 303 of the BNS [Section 378 of the IPC] is ‘dishonest intention’, i.e., the intention to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another.

(Para 10)

B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 310(2), 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), 352  – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 326, 506, 504 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Dacoity – Partial quashing of FIR by High Court – Permissibility of -- Compromise quashing -- FIR itself discloses that the accused persons were primarily seeking access to specific institutional records viz. Engineering and B.A.M.S. files, and had no intention to steal cash or property belonging to the institution -- There is no allegation that the accused persons were armed with weapons or that they caused any serious injury to anyone -- Taking of cash, cheque books, and the computer appears incidental to this main purpose and not the primary object of the intrusion -- All money, files, and other materials were subsequently returned and that there was no harm or injury caused to anyone and that an amicable settlement has been reached -- This complete restitution and amicable settlement completely dilutes the allegation of ‘dishonest intention’ required to constitute theft, and by extension, robbery or dacoity -- High Court erred in sustaining the objection raised by the school and in proceeding on the premise that the offence of dacoity was not personal to complainant, who had already settled the dispute with the accused persons -- Once the High Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR with respect to the offences punishable u/s 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), and 352 of the BNS [Sections 326, 506 and 504 of the IPC], on the basis of the voluntary affidavit of respondent No.2-complainant, there was no justification whatsoever to sustain the same FIR for the offence punishable under Section 310(2) of the BNS [Section 395 of the IPC] -- Impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken in furtherance thereof in entirety, quashed – Powers under Article 142 of the Constitution exercised

(Para 9-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.c. – Mandate of -- Statements given by all three persons are carbon copies of each other -- How such statements can pass muster at the hands of the learned Trial Judge is understandable -- Out of the four questions asked, directly related to the sequence of events, were only two -- The second question was as general as can be, with reference to only the bare allegations, to which an omnibus denial was issued -- The third was also of similar nature, saying that it has been alleged and evidenced, and nothing further -- This cannot be said to be the putting of every material circumstance -- Desire to secure a conviction for the accused persons, the prosecutor also let their duty of assisting the Court in conducting the examination of the accused under this section fall by the wayside -- Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and holds a solemn duty to act in the interest of justice -- Appeals allowed and the matter sent back to the concerned Trial Court to recommence from the state of the recording of the Section 313 CrPC statements.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 506 – Murder -- Regular bail – Parity as a ground -- Bail has often been stated to be the rule, and jail, the exception -- At the same time, this, however, does not mean that the relief of bail is to be granted without due regard to the circumstances involved in the alleged offence for which the accused person has been arrested – High Court erroneously granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only common factor between the accused persons -- Parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted – Bail cancelled.

(Para 10-16)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 506 – Murder -- Regular bail – High Court granted bail, in the impugned order unable to assign reasons, even briefly – Matter remanded to the High Court to be considered afresh, keeping in view the gravity of the offence, the role of the instant accused and all other relevant factors, as delineated time and again in various judgments of Supreme Court.

(Para 17-20)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29,  33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469, 470, 473, 482 – Offence under Insecticides Act – Limitation – Period of limitation begins from the date of the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst – Period of limitation is 03 years from the said date – However, the time spent in obtaining sanction is to be excluded – Sample was taken on 26.08.2011 – Report of the Public Analyst was made available is dated 28.09.2011 – Sanction for prosecution was applied on 06.08.2012 and was granted on 05.10.2012 – Sanction was received by the CAO on 15.10.2012 – Approximately 02 months elapsed between when sanction was sought and when it was granted – Complaint was instituted only on 23.04.2018 after a gap of 06 years, 06 months and 25 days from the date of the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst – Complaint case is hopelessly barred by time – Complaint and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9-14)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C – Belated claim – Limitation -- Claimant discharged from the hospital on 12.07.2016, he repeatedly visited the hospital over the next six months for follow-up -- Claiming compensation of Rs.1 crore, petitioner approached the Lok Adalat by filing an application under Section 22-C of the Act of 1987 on 10.08.2022 -- Cause of action arose to the petitioner in the year 2016, however, he has invoked the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat in the year 2022 -- Limitation for filing a petition under the Act of 1987 is three years and any petition filed thereafter is barred by time.

(Para 4)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Presumption of innocence -- An order of acquittal is not to be interfered with lightly because presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal -- Interference is called for only under compelling circumstances, where impugned findings are perverse, unreasonable and convincing material on record has been ignored unjustifiably by the trial Court.

(Para 12)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 57 -- NDPS – 7 KG Charas – Acquittal -- CFSL Form was not prepared at the spot and sample seal impressions were not preserved and were not deposited with the MHC of the Police Station with case property and not transported to Director CFSL Madhuban, with samples for comparison of the seal -- The seal was not handed over to independent witness/Ex-Sarpanch, who was allegedly present at the time of recovery -- Even documents prepared on the spot were having FIR number with same pen and ink which shows that FIR was lodged first and thereafter, investigation was conducted -- Hence, the investigation appears to be tainted – As per ruqa Ex.PB and recovery memo Ex.PD, three seals of 'WS' and two seals of 'SY' were affixed on the sample parcels, whereas as per FSL report Ex.PJ, there were four seals of 'WS' and one seal of 'SY' on the parcels – Only independent witness joined by the prosecution had not supported the prosecution version – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 15-22)

A. Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4 – Compensation to employee – Injury – Negligence of employee – Effect of -- Commissioner erred in dismissing the application holding that the claimant suffered injuries on account of his own negligence -- Trite it is that the 1923 enactment deals with accidents arising out of and during the course of employment -- The concept is based upon ‘strict liability’ -- There is no room for assessing contributory negligence -- Order passed by the Commissioner, cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside.

(Para 4)

B. Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 3, 4, 4A – Compensation to employee/ Lineman – Injury – Disability of 30% -- Functional disability assessed at 100% -- Injuries assessed to have caused 30% permanent disability -- It is the functional disability that has to be assessed -- Appellant was serving as Lineman -- Claimant having lost grip power of both the hands, the same is assessed as 100% -- He was 45 years of age at time of accident -- Date of accident is 05.02.1995 -- Claimant shall also be entitled for 12% interest on the awarded compensation in terms of Section 4A of 1923 Act, for the period commencing from 30 days after the date of accident i.e., 30 days after 05.02.1995 till the date of actual realization -- He will also be entitled for penalty @ 50% of the awarded compensation along with interest @ 7% per annum from the date i.e. 30 days after the accident till the date of actual realization.

(Para 5-9)