Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3, Article 58, 59, 109, 110 -- Suit for declaration and mandatory injunction – Limitation as preliminary issue – Permissibility -- Findings with respect to the nature of the suit property being ancestral or not, would have a direct bearing upon the adjudication of the issue of limitation -- It would be debatable whether the limitation for filing the suit would be three years as submitted by the petitioner/ defendant as per Articles 58/59 of the Schedule or it would be governed by Articles 109/110 thereof in case the plaintiffs are able to prove themselves to be coparceners besides the suit property in the hands of their father to be of ancestral nature – Trial Court rightly declined the application seeking to treat the issues of limitation and court fee as preliminary issues.

(Para 1, 4, 7-9)

A. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – State continuing to extract regular work while denying regularization on grounds of lack of sanctioned posts or inability of employee to meet educational qualifications for regular post -- Such an approach would be violative of fundamental rights of the temporary employees enshrined in Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Temporary employees cannot be forced to bear the brunt of lack of financial resources with the State – Respondents directed to regularize services of petitioners within six weeks, failing which petitioners shall be deemed to be regularized – Petitioners entitled to consequential benefits including counting of past service.

(Para 5-8)

B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – Punjab and Haryana tend to formulate policies in order to circumvent implementation of judgments rendered by the Constitutional Courts -- More often than not, the claim for regularization is neither accepted nor denied and the applicant is kept in limbo unnecessarily -- Extended ad-hocism of keeping daily wage workers or contractual employees on temporary rolls for decades while extracting regular work is not only unconstitutional but undermines equality and dignity -- State and its instrumentalities being model employer can’t perpetuate such exploitation and use excuses like financial constraints, non-availability of sanctioned post, and lack of qualification or decision in Umadevi’s case (2006) 4 SCC 1 as talisman to deny well deserved regularisation on account of their perennial nature of long periods of work at par with their counterparts working on regular posts.

(Para 7, 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20B(ii)(C), 37 --  Regular bail -- NDPS -- Commercial quantity -- Delay in Trial -- Prolonged Custody :

-- Recovery of 45.414 kilograms of ganja from a vehicle owned by the petitioner, concealed inside a gas cylinder lying in the trunk of vehicle – Petitioner apprehended at the spot – Recovery falls within the category of commercial quantity.

-- Petitioner in custody for a period of one year and six months – Charges framed on 18.11.2024 – Out of 18 prosecution witnesses, only 3 have been examined till date, resulting in undue delay in the trial.

Held, in the absence of substantive evidence directly linking the petitioner to the offence, and considering the inordinate delay in trial, continued custodial detention of the petitioner is not warranted -- Bail allowed.

(Para 3-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21(c), 29, 37 -- Regular bail -- NDPS – Commercial quantity :

-- Recovery of 285 grams of heroin – Petitioner arrested on 14.12.2025 – Challan presented on 23.02.2026 – Total 18 prosecution witnesses cited; none examined till date – Petitioner implicated solely on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused – No independent or corroborative material available on record to connect the petitioner with the alleged contraband -- Petitioner not present at the spot.

-- Held, disclosure statement of a co-accused, in the absence of corroborative evidence, carries limited evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis for implicating an accused – Evidentiary value of such disclosure statement is a matter for trial.

-- Rigour of Section 37 NDPS Act stands diluted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner is likely to abscond or tamper with prosecution evidence – Petitioner in custody for 3 months and 7 days – Not involved in any other case – Bail allowed.

(Para 2, 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 397 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 499, 500, 120-B – Defamation Complaint – Summoning Order – Revisional Jurisdiction -- High Court and Court of Sessions have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain revision petitions – Petitioner directly approached High Court bypassing Sessions Court – No reasons assigned for not availing alternative statutory remedy – No peculiar circumstances pleaded – Petition not maintainable in view of efficacious alternative remedy – Petitioner relegated to approach the Sessions Court.

(Para 5, 6)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Death of Minor Child – Assessment of Income – Multiplier Method :

-- Deceased, a 9-year-old female child – Income assessed on the basis of minimum wages for a skilled worker in the State of Punjab (Rs.8,530/- per month) as on date of accident (31.07.2015) – Multiplier of 18 applied – Addition of 40% towards future prospects – Deduction of 50% towards personal expenses.

-- Claimants entitled to conventional heads, i.e., Rs.18,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs.18,000/- towards funeral expenses, and Rs.48,000/- towards loss of consortium (including 20% enhancement).

Total compensation enhanced to Rs.13,73,736/- from Rs.3,50,000/- – Interest @ 7.5% per annum on enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition till realization.

(Para 7-10)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 442 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise thereafter at revisional stage -- Object and purpose of proceeding initiated under the Act is to provide a compensatory mechanism for expeditious recovery of money and not just punishing the offender, which is a secondary concern – Appellant acquitted, compounding of offence will be subjected to cost of 7.5 % of the cheque amount in question to be deposited with DLSA – Petition allowed, order of conviction and sentence passed by Ld. Trial Court and affirmed by Ld. Appellate Court set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Absence in trial -- Cancellation of bail – Non-bailable warrants issued -- Prime object of cancellation of bail and forfeiture of bail bonds is securing the presence of the accused, the petitioner-accused come forward himself to face trial -- No tangible material brought forward to indicate likelihood of the petitioner to interfere with the prosecution evidence -- Petition allowed -- Impugned order as well as all consequential proceedings set-aside – Cost of Rs.5,000/- and conditions imposed.

(Para 6-8)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 28(3), 31(7)(a) -- Interest pendente lite -- Clause 64(5) of the General Conditions of Contract bars interest “till the date on which the award is made” -- The provisions of the Act of 1996, including provisions contained in Section 31(7)(a) give paramount importance to the contract entered into between the parties and categorically restrict the power of an arbitrator to award pre-award/ pendente lite interest when the parties have themselves agreed to the contrary -- Thus, the AT cannot award pre-award/pendente lite interest, even in the form of compensation.

(Para 45)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31(7)(b) – Post award interest – Permissibility of -- Clause 64(5) does not prohibit interest for the period subsequent to award -- With regard to the post-award interest, Section 31(7)(b) of the Act provides that unless the award otherwise directs, the sum awarded shall carry interest from the date of the award till payment -- There is no provision in the General Conditions of Contract which expressly bars the grant of post-award interest -- In the absence of such an express exclusion, the statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act must prevail.

(Para 47-50)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 28A -- Acquisition of land – Compensation to land-owners -- Execution by land-owner as per compensation given to co-sharer – Execution dismissed merely on the ground that they did not choose to prefer any objection u/s 18 or 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, yet filed an execution application based on an award/determination made in favour of their co-sharers in the acquired land -- Impugned order set aside, matter remitted back to the learned Executing Court for fresh adjudication and in case the petitioner(s) is/are found to be cosharers in the acquired land parcels alongwith those who preferred reference u/s 18 or 28-A of the Act, the necessary amount as determined finally alongwith statutory benefits and interest thereupon be released in their favour. Ramphal’s case (2026) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20854 relied.

(Para 5-7)

Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 133, 139 -- Variance in terms of contract -- Overdrawal of cash credit facility -- Liability of surety – For the applicability of Section 139, the creditor must (1) either act in a manner that is inconsistent with the surety’s rights or omit to act in a manner that the creditor is duty bound to and (2) such act or omission must impair the eventual remedy of the surety as against the principal debtor – Applicable provision is Section 133 of the Act -- Respondent Nos.1 and 2/sureties are liable to the extent of Rs.4,00,000/- with applicable interest that was initially sanctioned to respondent No.6/principal debtor and for which respondent Nos.1 and 2 consented to stand as sureties -- However, they are not liable for the excess amounts permitted to be withdrawn from the cash-credit facility of the appellant-Bank by respondent No.6/principal debtor.

(Para 7.1-7.3)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63, 64, 65, 85 -- Notarised photocopy of POA – Presumption – Secondary evidence -- The 1st Defendant is obligated to follow the procedure for adducing secondary evidence, and thereafter, claim presumption, if any, available to a document so adduced in evidence -- In the absence of an original or at least a secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act to conclude the execution and extent of authority given by the plaintiff to the 1^st defendant -- Exh. B-2/photocopy is no evidence.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Construction of contract / deed -- If the words in a contract/deed are clear, there is very little the courts must do in the construction of the contract in determining the intention of the parties -- In furtherance of determining the intention, the deed must be read as a whole to ascertain the true meaning of its clauses, and the words of each clause should be interpreted harmoniously -- This intention must be derived directly from the plain and ordinary meaning of the text itself -- Furthermore, these words should be understood exactly as the intended parties would commonly use them -- The covenants must be applied precisely as written, neither diluted into irrelevance nor stretched beyond their original scope -- If the construction of the contract/deed, through its words and context, does not provide the court with the parties’ intention, the court may have regard to the circumstances surrounding its creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended to apply.

(Para 19)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52, 106, 111 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 62 -- Unilateral Termination of lease – Permissibility of – Subsequent purchaser’ right -- Construction of contract / deed -- Nomenclature alone of the document is not the decisive factor of the nature of a document; it is the text and the context that point to the obligations undertaken by the parties to a written document – Document’s nomenclature, text and context lead to only one conclusion: that Defendant No. 1 entered into a 99-year lease deed -- Thus, the unilateral cancellation is illegal, and it should be understood as having interfered with the right of the Plaintiff to remain in possession of the Plaint Schedule Property for 99 years – Rights which are preserved and protected in favour of the lessor are allowed to be enjoyed by subsequent purchasers. 

(Para 21, 22)

Constitution of India, Article 141, 309 -- Service Jurisprudence -- Conflict between State Rules and AICTE Regulations -- Finality of Supreme Court Judgment – Effect of High Court Judgment on Non-Parties -- Rule 6A of Kerala Technical Education Service Rules granting exemption from Ph.D. qualification challenged – Earlier provision upheld by Supreme Court – Promotions granted accordingly -- High Court later held that AICTE Regulations override State Rules and made Ph.D. mandatory – Appellants, not parties before High Court, adversely affected despite earlier Supreme Court relief – Held, nothing said in the impugned order of the High Court will affect their career prospects -- Non-parties affected by judgments are not remediless and may seek review or initiate independent proceedings before appropriate forum.

(Para 5, 6, 13-20)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Power of State -- While it is settled law that mere participation in a selection process does not vest an indefeasible right to appointment, the State’s power to cancel such a process is not absolute and must be grounded in justifiable reasons -- Constitutional Courts, in the exercise of judicial review, are empowered to scrutinize an employer's decision to abandon a recruitment process, particularly when it has reached an advanced stage of conclusion -- If such a decision is found to be arbitrary or lacks a rational nexus with the intended objective, the Court may issue appropriate directions to provide relief.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Selection process cancelled at an advanced stage -- Communication indicates that the selection process was scrapped solely to facilitate a transition to online recruitment -- Abandoning a nearly-concluded selection for a mere procedural change, without any allegation of irregularity, constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power -- Decision is legally flawed and lacks a rational nexus to the objective of fair recruitment -- Cancellation is both unreasonable and unsustainable in the eyes of law – Four posts are presently lying vacant, the appellants can conveniently be accommodated against those vacancies, which would effectively resolve the controversy without causing prejudice to the respondents – Writ petition disposed of.

(Para 13-24)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Income tax return – Proof of source of income – Requirements of -- Plea of Insurance Company that the respondent-claimant has proved the income of the deceased by placing on record and proving the Income Tax Return for the relevant year, yet he failed to demonstrate the source of income earned by the deceased – Held, plea taken is without substance and cannot be accepted – Held, neither High Court hearing appeal nor the tribunal could have gone into the source of income of the deceased, which was duly recorded in the ITR filed by her with the Income Tax authorities.

(Para 11, 12)

Uttarakhand Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 2003, Rule 3 (b) (ii), 7 -- Reversion after promotion – Legality of – Petitioners were granted promotion on 29.01.2021 to the post of Sahayak Nideshak/Lekha Parikshak Adhikari on the recommendation made by duly constituted Departmental Promotion Committee – Rendered satisfactory service for a period of more than four years on the promotional post – Reduction to a lower post, grade, or time scale is a major penalty – Held, procedure for imposing major penalties can be imposed only after following procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules, 2003 – No such procedure followed -- Impugned order set aside.

(Para 6-8)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 75 -- GST -- Show cause notice – Opportunity for hearing – On the date given for personal hearing, the petitioner intimated the respondent that he was travelling out of the country -- Respondent authority failed to grant any adjournment – Adverse order passed – Matter remitted back to the authority to recommence from the stage of personal hearing.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 17 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – POCSO – Kidnapping – Regular bail -- Age of victim as 17 years -- Applicants being relatives of the main accused not directly involved, and are stated to have abetted sexual offences, committed by the main accused who is their relative – Considering the nature of the charges framed against the applicants in the case and their continued incarceration since their arrest, without reference to the prosecution evidence, regular bail allowed.

(Para 11-15)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 309 – Airman in Airforce -- Appointment in State Administrative Service – Petitioner participated in the selection process for selection to the J&K Administrative Services and at the time of applying for the same, he had sought permission from the relevant authorities of the Air Force, however, the said permission was rejected on the ground that the post for which he had applied did not fall in Group-A :

-- Petitioner belongs to a far flung village, that was militancy infested at the time when he was undergoing schooling – Pleaded that both his parents were uneducated hailing from an economically weaker background as such he has undergone studies after facing acute hardships and difficulties -- It is because of these adverse conditions that the petitioner could not continue the studies in a college in a regular mode and instead he had to join employment with Indian Air Force so as to feed himself and his family -- Due to his brilliance, the petitioner without any formal coaching and without any regular studies, obtained the requisite merit in the Combined Competitive Examination and made it to J&K Administrative Service -- This attitude of the petitioner and his urge to attain higher goals and excellence in his career is required to be appreciated and encouraged.

-- Even while performing his duties with Air Force, the petitioner had shown great dedication -- Petitioner had no disciplinary violations in his service meaning thereby that while performing the job as an Airman, he has not given scope for any complaints.

-- Petitioner has potential to attain great heights in his career, denying him permission to continue his service as an Officer of the J&K Administrative Service would work very harshly against him and in fact would discourage and dishearten him immensely, that would lead to wastage of a great talent.

Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondents to issue NOC and discharge certificate in favour of the petitioner subject to deposition of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) with the Air Force authorities within two months.

(Para 11-24)

Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016), Section 5, 15 -- Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Rules, 2016 -- Contractual engagement of Deputy Advocate Generals (DAGs) and Assistant Advocate Generals (AAGs) -- Entitlement of medical reimbursement, LTC facility and other pensionary benefits including the earned leave -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation :

Whether the petitioners, in light of the nature of their duties and conditions of service, can be denied core service benefits solely on the nomenclature of “contractual engagement” ?

To restrict their entitlements on the basis of nomenclature alone would be arbitrary, undermine the dignity of the profession, and contravene the principles of equality, consistency, and legitimate expectation inherent in constitutional governance -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation comes into play -- Petitioners as AAG/DAG are performing duties with higher responsibility and quantum of work than the other Law Officers working in various departments of the State Government -- Being deprived of their private practice, the denial of such benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other emoluments tantamount to putting them at discrimination with the Law Officers such as ADAs, DDAs and DAs deputed in Government Departments -- Respondents directed to release benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other benefits/emoluments to the officers appointed as AAG/DAG including the petitioners.

(Para 18-34)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 121 -- Sanad takseem issued – Jurisdiction of Collector thereafter -- Naksha 'Bey' challenged by the petitioners by filing an appeal before learned Collector, however; during the pendency of appeal, partition proceedings concluded with the drawing of sanad takseem – Thereafter, learned Collector had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

(Para 5)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 – Eviction petition – Application for amendment of written statement – Expedite disposal of same advisable -- Application for amendment on 10.01.2025, to which, reply was filed on 30.05.2025 -- Grievance of the petitioner/ landlord is that hearing in the application is being deliberately delayed by the respondent – Held, though the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller on the application show it was adjourned on a joint request, it is always advisable that such applications are decided at the earliest -- Revision petition disposed of with a direction to the Court concerned to make efforts to hear arguments on the application, preferably on the date and thereafter to decide the said application expeditiously.

(Para 4, 5)

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title dispute -- Long pendency – Direction for expeditious disposal -- Petition u/s 11 of the 1961 Act pending before Additional Deputy Commissioner/ respondent No.3 for the last about eight years -- Decision thereupon has been unnecessarily delayed -- Respondent No.3 directed to dispose of the petition within four months in accordance with law.

(Para 3)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 28A, 54 -- Acquisition of land – Award – Some co-owner challenged the same – Rights of other co-sharer, who did not challenge – Held, being ignorant of prosecuting the cause, appellant/ land-loosers did not challenge the award passed either by filing an application u/s 18 of the Act or no application was filed u/s 28A of the Act after the appeal came to be disposed of in favour of one of the co-owners enhancing the compensation they cannot be denied compensation for the lands lost by them to which they are legitimately entitled to and same cannot be denied on hyper technical grounds -- Appellants held entitled for the interest for a period of five years to be reckoned from today backwards and they would be entitled to all other consequential benefits which flow from award of compensation and the respondent(s) authorities shall compute the compensation as has been determined by the award passed u/s 18 of the Act and/or modified by the High Court or Supreme Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

(Para 8, 12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 9 -- Necessary parties -- Partition proceedings involved more than 177 kanals of land distributed among all village proprietors -- Certain proprietors were allotted portions of the suit land now claimed by the plaintiffs as part of the bachat land -- All proprietors who were parties to the original partition proceedings constitute necessary parties to the present suit -- If the partition is flawed qua any of the proprietors, it is flawed in its entirety and must be re-conducted, thereby directly impacting the rights of those not impleaded herein -- Consequently, the finding of the learned Civil Judge that all proprietors were not necessary parties is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.

(Para 12-12.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 -- Suit against dead person – Maintainability of -- A suit cannot be instituted against a dead person, for such a proceeding is a nullity, being void ab initio -- A dead person is a juridical non-entity, and the law does not recognize the institution of a suit either by or against a party who ceased to exist prior to its filing -- The only legally permissible course in such a situation is to implead, the legal heirs or successors-in-interest in their own independent capacity, failing which the suit suffers from a foundational defect -- Order XXII is wholly inapplicable -- Principle actus curiae neminem gravabit has no application, because the defect is inherent and incurable -- Suit having been instituted against a deceased defendant, was inherently defective and non-maintainable, and any decree founded thereon is inexorably rendered coram non judice and unenforceable.

(Para 13-14.5)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158(1)(xvii) – Partition proceedings -- If the plaintiffs were genuinely aggrieved, the statutory route under the Act was the ‘sine qua non’ for redress, and their failure to adopt it is fatal to the suit -- Their attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in conscious disregard of the statutory framework, amounts to a clear circumvention of the legislative scheme -- A suit instituted in violation of such a statutory bar is not merely irregular but fundamentally unsustainable.

(Para 15.1)

D. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158 – Partition proceedings – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Maintainability of suit -- When a statute expressly creates rights, prescribes obligations, and provides a special forum for adjudication, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts stands ousted by necessary implication -- In such a scenario, the principle of ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ operates only within the contours of the statutory framework, and parties must exhaust the remedies provided therein -- Any decree passed by a Civil Court in derogation of such statutory bar is ‘void ab initio’, attracting the maxim ‘coram non judice’ an act done by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law -- Plaintiffs’ conscious awareness of the statutory mechanism, coupled with their deliberate omission to invoke it, renders the suit inherently non-maintainable under Section 158 of the Act -- A party aggrieved by an order passed by a Revenue Officer must avail the statutory remedy of appeal or revision under the Act, and a civil suit challenging such proceedings is not maintainable.

(Para 15.2, 15.3)

E. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz – Presumption -- Wazib-ul-Arz constitutes an integral component of the record-of-rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 -- Consequently, a statutory presumption of truth attaches to it under Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz produced on the record stands duly proved, and the contention that it required further formal proof, or that any interpolation had occurred, is devoid of substance. Gram Panchayat of Village Tulewal’ case 2014(11) RCR (Civil) 2674 relied.

(Para 16.4)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6, 10, 51 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Proposal of Acting Sarpanch passed in favour of petitioner -- No-confidence motion – Requirements of – BDPO directed the petitioner to handover the charge to some other Panch -- Petitioner cannot be held to be a duly elected Sarpanch as envisaged u/s 6 of the 1994 Act read with Rule 4 of 1995 Rules; therefore the provisions contained under Section 10 of the 1994 Act which provides for ‘No Confidence Motion’ against a duly elected Sarpanch, is not attracted -- Contention of the petitioner that he cannot be removed from post of Acting Sarpanch without following process/procedure as envisaged under Section 10 of 1994 Act rejected – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 2, 8-11)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Casual filling of vacancy – Sarpanch/ Panch -- If a casual vacancy has arisen, then in that eventuality, the authorities are required to elect a Sarpanch, panch, etc., in the manner as may be prescribed and any person elected to fill up a vacancy under Section 6 of 1994 Act, is to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term for which the person in whose place he is elected would have otherwise continued in office -- Manner prescribed for filling of a casual vacancy is envisaged under Rule 4 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995.

(Para 12)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 376(2) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO – Rape – Conviction for 20 years – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence -- Debatable issues would arise, in particular, absence of injuries in the alleged victim’s MLR -- Absence of semen on any of the exhibits of the alleged victim, especially when such exhibits were collected on the day of the alleged occurrence and that prior to their collection, as per the alleged victim’s MLR, she had neither bathed nor washed -- Applicant is a first-time offender who has already undergone actual custody of 07 years, 06 months and 01 day, which includes nearly 04 years after his conviction -- Appeal not likely to be heard in the near future -- Sentence suspended.

(Para 1, 6)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules Rule 15 – Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Power of appellate authority – Collector is appointing authority -- Divisional Commissioner set aside appointment -- Divisional Commissioner should not have appointed the appellant instead the matter ought to have been remanded back to the Collector – Held, in case, the initially selected candidate is found to be ineligible or not suitable, then the claim of all the who have applied is to be considered afresh.

(Para 5)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent disqualification – Effect of -- Eligibility and disqualification is to be seen upto the date of appointment as Lambardar -- In case any such disqualification is adapt prior to the appointment, the same will invalidate the appointment itself but in case any disqualification is suffered after the appointment that can only lead to taking action against the Lambardar, in accordance with law.

(Para 5)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent conviction – Effect of -- Appointment in February, 2014 – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act was field in June, 2014, which resulted into his conviction on 09.02.2015 -- Thereafter, on an appeal preferred, on 18.01.2019, the appellant acquitted – Held, on the date when the appointment was made, there was no conviction rather there was no proceeding even pending on such date – Remanding the case for fresh consideration is not correct appreciation of the facts on record – Order set aside.

(Para 7)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Eviction proceedings u/s 7 of PVCL Act, 1961 pending against appointed candidate/ petitioner -- Held, comparative merits/demerits of candidates indeed require re-look at the hands of learned Collector, therefore, order passed by learned Divisional Commissioner and further affirmed by learned Financial Commissioner, remanding the matter regarding appointment of Lambardar to learned Collector for afresh decision, does not call for any interference.

(Para 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need -- Premises alleged to be available to the landlord is situated on the first floor, whereas evidence on record demonstrates that the demised shop is commercially more advantageous and suitable for running a boutique business -- Landlord is the best judge of his or her bona fide requirement -- Tenant or the Rent Controller cannot compel the landlord to adjust in an alternative premises or to reorganize his/ her affairs in a manner suggested by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 8, 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of lambardar by authorities -- Interference in -- Once the revenue authorities, on the basis of the record, preferred respondent No.4 to the post of a Lambardar of the village concerned, the same need not to be interfered merely on the basis that the appellant thinks that he is a better suited candidate than respondent No.4.

(Para 4)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – FIR against candidate – Effect of -- At the time of the consideration, there was an FIR registered against the appellant, though he was acquitted later on – Held, once at the time of consideration, respondent No.4 had clean record as compared to the appellant, appointing respondent No.4 as Lambardar, cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.

(Para 4)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Re-consideration on remand -- Once the case has been remanded back, the Collector will decide as to who is the best candidate for the appointment to the post of Lambardar on the basis of the facts before him without being influenced by any observation made either by the revenue authorities or by High Court.

(Para 3)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent ex-parte enquiry – Effect of -- Ld. Single Judge set aside the order only on the ground that there was a false document qua his passing of 7th class submitted by the appellant -- Said opinion is based upon an ex parte inquiry report submitted before the learned Single Judge -- Said ex parte report was obtained, firstly, without associating the appellant and secondly, after the appointment of the appellant as Lambardar -- Reliance upon subsequent fact to change the candidate is not correct.

(Para 7)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Appointment of Lambardar – Nature of -- Once the appointment is made by the Collector, the filing of an appeal does not mean that the appointment is not final.

(Para 9)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 – Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15, 16 – Appointment of Lambardar – Subsequent enquiry – Effect of -- Document subsequent to the appointment can only be taken into consideration for the purpose of setting aside of the appointment, whereas the Commissioner treated the same for substitution of the candidate, which was impermissible.

(Para 9)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Literate candidate – Requirement of -- Appellant is not literate as he has passed only 6th standard -- Once, under the notification dated 02.06.2008 of the Government of Haryana, the Lambardar should be literate and preferably middle pass; the same has to be followed and candidates are to be adjudged accordingly – Respondent No.4 is 9th pass – Appointment of respondent no. 4 cannot be treated as arbitrary, illegal or perverse to the facts or the law.

(Para 5)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Preference of Revenue authorities – Choice of Collector -- Choice of Lambardar should be left to the discretion of the authorities -- Tehsildar and the SDM had recommended the case of respondent No.4 for appointment as Lambardar -- Once, the initial preference was given to the respondent No.4 and he was appointed by the Collector same position has been restored by the learned Single Judge, coupled with the fact that no disqualification has been attached with the candidate so appointed as Lambardar -- No interference is called for.

(Para 6)

C. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Hereditary claim -- Merely that the father and the grandfather of the appellant was Lambardar, the same cannot be a ground to appoint the appellant as Lambardar in case any better candidate suited for the job was available, as no hereditary right exists with the appellant.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence -- Suit for dissolution of partnership firm -- Accounts and records were in the hands of respondent/ defendant No.1 and his chartered accountant – However, while appearing as DW, respondent/ defendant No.1 failed to produce any record – All the records pertaining to the firm are with respondent/ defendant No.2-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., as the firm is licencee of respondent/ defendant No.2 – Held, production of records was necessitated on account of denial by respondents/ defendants, therefore, the application for additional evidence cannot be held to be delayed and having not filed after due diligence – Two effective opportunities given subject to cost of Rs.10,000/-.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 227 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Long pendency of suit – Expeditious adjudication -- Revisional jurisdiction -- Revision petition seeking a direction to the learned Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), to expeditiously adjudicate Civil Suit as almost 11 years have elapsed since the institution of the suit and the matter is still pending – Ld. ACJ (JD) directed to decide the suit at the earliest, preferably within a period of six months.

(Para 1-6)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Bonafide need – Non-residential building -- Ejectment of tenant on bonafide ground can be made both in case of residential and non-residential building.

(Para 17)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Ejectment of tenant -- Shop-cum-flat – Misuse of premises by tenant -- No permission from Rent controller for carrying on commercial activity in the residential portion taken by both the parties -- Residential portion given to the petitioner for store purposes, in which he is carrying on the tailoring business and by doing so, he has violated the condition laid down in Section 11 of the Act -- Landlord has shown number of show cause notices received by him for misuse of premises – Landlord should not suffer because of the misuse of the premises by the tenant – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 1, 18-25)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 122 – Non-implementation of Sanad Takseem/ Instrument of partition for 3 years – Second application of partition – Maintainability – Earlier sanad takseem is dated 08.04.1992 -- Partition is to be executed within a period of three years – Second partition application filled on the basis of jamabandi for the year 2015-16, wherein the entire land under partition has been shown under joint ownership -- Held, once the sanad takseem dated 08.04.1992 was never implemented/ executed at the spot nor the said sanad takseem was reflected/ implemented in the revenue records and the status of the partition continued to be recorded joint in the revenue records, it has to be taken that the parties by their conduct chose not to implement the partition in terms of sanad takseem and chose to keep their holdings joint – Fresh partition proceedings concluded with the drawing of sanad takseem dated 19.03.2023 -- No fault – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 4-9)

National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3G -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23, 28 -- Solatium and interest -- District Revenue Officer-cum-Competent Authority vide its supplementary award, awarded the benefit of solatium as well as statutory interest payable under Sections 23 & 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in favour of similarly situated land-owners – Representation of the petitioner for similar relief denied – Held, respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to act in a discriminatory manner – Order set aside, respondent No.1 to pass a supplementary award in favour of petitioner with respect to solatium as well as statutory interest.

(Para 4-9)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 16(2), 122 – Sanad Takseem – Instrument of partition – Challenge to -- Whether the learned Collector can entertain, hear and decide the revision petition against Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition)? -- Sanad Taksim (instrument of partition) is to be given effect as if it were a decree of immovable property -- Held, learned Collector is not entitled to exercise revisional jurisdiction and at best he can only formulate an opinion and report the case along with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Commissioner, whose decision shall be final – Revision petition and order passed by learned Collector in revision quashed.

(Para 8-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In the criminal proceedings, it is the accused, which has the privilege to hide his defence or to open it, if so chosen, even at the last stage of the trial – Respondent/ accused had opened its defence during the cross-examination -- Complainant moved application to fill the lacuna, to deprive the accused from drawing any benefit out of the cross-examination of the complainant -- Held, after disclosing of the defence by the accused, complainant/ prosecution could not be permitted to fill the lacuna – Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. rightly dismissed.

(Para 1, 5-7)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 (15 of 2022), Section 3 – Death of wife -- Emergency parole to hardcore prisoner -- A hardcore prisoner can be released on temporary basis or on furlough after completion of 5 years of imprisonment but he cannot be released on emergency parole in case he has not completed requisite 5 years period of his imprisonment after the date of his latest offence -- Fresh FIR under NDPS Act was registered against the petitioner on 04.06.2025 -- He cannot be released on emergency parole -- To enable him to perform the last rites/ rituals of his deceased wife, he is allowed to be taken to his place of residence at his own expenses, while under police escort guard.

(Para 5, 6)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 22 -- Faulty haircut – Deficiency in service -- Compensation – Prosperous career derailed in Corporate job/ Modelling/ Role in movies – Claim for crores of rupees because of deficiency in service was required to be established -- This could not be established by merely producing photocopies of the documents with discrepancies -- Documents produced along with affidavit of complainant were in the form of photocopies, none of the authors of those documents examined -- Rs.2 Crores compensation cannot be justified – Compensation modified to the extent of Rs. 25 lacs.

(Para 4, 19-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(i) -- Special Marriage Act-1954 (43 of 1954), Section 4(i) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Rape -- Promise to marry – Prosecutrix already married – Effect of – Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet/ Trial – Complainant is a married lady with a ten years old child -- Divorce proceedings currently pending adjudication between her and her husband -- Such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR -- Said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 and sub-clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 -- Law prohibits bigamous unions -- Complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman incapable of taking decisions for herself -- Offence alleged against the accused-appellant not made out at all – FIR, the Chargesheet and the consequent proceedings in Session case quashed.

(Para 19-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) – Rape repeatedly on the same woman -- Interpretation of -- The object of this provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the same victim -- Under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376(2)(n) – Promise to marry – Rape -- Mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case - An offence u/s 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.

(Para 18)

A. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b) -- Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (13 of 1955), Section 3 -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3), 26 -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – An order declaring surplus area is, generally not amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court, however, there are exceptions to this general rule -- To find out whether a civil court is barred under provisions of Section 26 of 1972 Act, the test would be whether there was a violation of 1972 Act/1953 Act/PEPSU Act committed by authorities or there was breach of natural justice -- Land was declared surplus vide orders dated 21.08.1956 and 09.06.1961 -- Possession of the land so declared surplus was never taken by the State -- In the absence of utilization, the orders declaring the land surplus in the hands of the landowner did not become operative against his rights prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- Rights of major sons of the landowner had come into force prior to the utilization of the land so declared surplus -- Plaintiffs are challenging the operation and effect of those orders on account of non-utilization of the surplus land till the appointed date and effect of section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Nature of the dispute raised by the plaintiff-appellants is, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court.

(Para 13, 14, 18)

B. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) -- Declaration/ Vesting of Surplus land – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – Where land declared surplus in the hand of land-owner was not utilised by State prior to enforcement of 1972 Act, such land would not automatically vest in State – Surplus area is required to be re-determined under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- Such re-determination shall be governed by the provisions of the 1953 Act only if any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act -- However, if the land stood utilized prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act by way of allotment and taking of possession, the same shall vest exclusively in the State -- Where the land has not been utilized and none of the conditions laid down under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen prior to the enforcement of the 1972 Act, such land shall also vest in the State from the appointed date, i.e., 24.01.1971.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (10 of 1953), Section 10A(b), 33(2)(ii) -- Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (26 of 1972), Section 12(3) – Declaration of Surplus land – Non-utilisation of – 1972 Act came into force -- Re-determination of surplus area – State was duty-bound to determine whether the surplus area was liable to be re-determined on account of the existence of any of the conditions enumerated under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act -- No such exercise undertaken by the State -- Appeal allowed, competent authority directed to determine whether any of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) of 1953 Act had arisen in favour of the landowner prior to the appointed date under the 1972 Act -- If such conditions are found to exist, the surplus area shall be re-determined accordingly under the 1953 Act -- In case none of the conditions specified under Section 10-A(b) are made out, the surplus land shall vest in the State.

(Para 19)

Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1991, Rule 20 -- Disciplinary proceedings – Unauthorised absence – Dismissal – Forged Medical certificate -- Doctor appeared and gave a statement/ Ex.P-9 to the effect that the medical certificate in question was not issued by him; that he was not authorized to issue such certificate and Medical Certificate might have been fabricated by using his old letter pad -- Two undisputed signatures of Doctor, one in exhibit P-9 and the other while acknowledging receipt of notice are themselves not identical, though broadly similar -- Signature on the Ex. P-7 Medical Certificate is also not identical though broadly similar to what is in the acknowledgement and what is on Ex. P-9 – Inquiry officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert, before recording a finding of fabrication and forgery -- Failure to do so,  charge of forgery has not been proved – Dismissal order set aside -- Appellant ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including all arrears of salary and emoluments since the non-employment was not due to the appellant’s fault.

(Para 10, 16, 40-45)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) -- Criminal jurisprudence – Police complaint against public servant by Gram Pradhan – Maintainability of -- No provision in the Cr.P.C., which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence -- No specific provision in the 1984 Act which limits the eligibility of the person making the complaint – Held, High Court manifestly erred in law in holding that since the Gram Pradhan was not the competent authority to lodge an FIR, the action of the Special Judge in taking cognizance and summoning the accused is bad in law -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 7-11)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Assessment of income -- Deduction of family pension -- Since, the deceased was a pensioner and there was no evidence of any independent source of income, the High Court has rightly held that the amount being received by the widow as family pension had to be deducted.

(Para 9)