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Posted On: 01-12-2025
152. (H.P. HC) (Decided on: 11.11.2025)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 17, 34 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34, 37 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 rule 11 – SARFAESI proceedings – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Rejection of plaint -- Plaintiff has neither raised any loan from the bank nor the plaintiff is a guarantor in the issue which has led to the action having been initiated by the bank under the 2002 Act -- Plaintiff approached the Civil Court seeking a declaration that gift deed alleged to be executed and registered by the GPA holder and thereafter mortgage deed, in the year 2015 are void abinitio, false and fictitious documents and a result of fraud committed by defendants No.1 to 3 in connivance with each other -- In light of this prayer of declaration, a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant-bank to misuse the process of law to take the possession of the suit premises has also been prayed for -- Invoking jurisdiction under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC and throwing out the plaint at the very initial stage, would be a very-very dangerous step as it would take away the right of the plaintiff to agitate the cause before the appropriate For a -- The issues raised in the suit, cannot be decided under Section 17 of the 2002 Act – Trial Court dismissed application under order VII Rule 11 -- Revision dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

Posted On: 30-11-2025
157. (SC) (Decided on: 28.11.2025)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304B, 328 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Dowry death – Presumption – Regular bail by High Court – Cancellation of -- Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage – Dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC -- Consequently, the presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1/ husband -- High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles -- Courts has to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail – Held, such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society -- Judicial passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice -- A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative, not only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry -- Bail cancelled.

 (Para 17.1, 17.2, 25-26)

Posted On: 30-11-2025
158. (SC) (Decided on: 28.11.2025)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Review/ Appeal -- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, and whether such exercise of power was valid in law – Held, High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act -- Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled --  The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise -- Such an exercise cannot stand -- Issue is answered in the negative.

(Para11, 11.15)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 16, 29A -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Remedy against -- Once the Section 11 order had attained finality, the only remedies available were to approach Supreme Court under Article 136 or to raise objections u/s 16 before the arbitral tribunal -- Having chosen neither route, and having participated in the arbitral proceedings, including joint applications under Section 29A, they were estopped from reopening the matter through review.

(Para 11.13)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Unilateral power with one party -- Remedy -- Where a clause contains an otherwise defective unilateral appointment mechanism, the Court may sever the offending portion and exercise its power u/s 11(6) to appoint an independent arbitrator, thereby giving effect to the parties’ genuine intention to arbitrate -- Refusing to sever such clauses would effectively confer on the dominant party a “nuclear veto”, wholly inconsistent with the pro-arbitration policy of the Act and violative of Article 14 -- Court is empowered under Section 11(6) to cure the defect and appoint an independent arbitrator.

(Para 12.13, 12.16)

D. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 4, 12(5), 29A – Proceed with arbitration without objection – Waiver -- Whether the joint application filed by both parties, seeking extension of the arbitral mandate u/s 29A amounts to an express or implied waiver u/s 4 read with the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act – Held, a joint application u/s 29A amounts to a valid waiver u/s 4, save in cases of statutory ineligibility u/s 12(5) -- Any contrary view would render Section 4 redundant and distort the legislative design -- Where the disqualification u/s 12(5) is attracted, the language being plain and mandatory, a joint application merely seeking extension, without an informed written waiver, cannot cure ineligibility -- Conversely, where no such disqualification exists, the conduct of the parties, especially in jointly invoking Section 29A, constitutes waiver under Section 4.

(Para 13.11, 13.12)

E. Constitution of India, Article 136, 141 -- Binding precedent -- Doctrine of merger -- Dismissal of SLP – Effect of -- A non-speaking dismissal of an SLP signifies only that the Court, in its discretion under Article 136, has declined to interfere -- It does not amount to approval of the reasoning of the subordinate forum -- Doctrine of merger does not apply to such dismissals – A non-speaking dismissal of an SLP neither endorses the reasoning of the judgment challenged nor transforms it into binding precedent -- At best, such a decision has persuasive value; its only legal effect is to bring finality to the dispute between the parties in that particular case.

(Para 14.1-14.3)

Posted On: 28-11-2025
159. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 17.11.2025 Decided on: 21.11.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Execution of money decree – Arrest and detention -- If a person has no means to pay, in absence of any mala fide or dishonest intention, the arrest and detention cannot be resorted to.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Execution of money decree – Arrest and detention – Physical disability -- If a person is incapable on account of physical disability and is able to show his inability to pay in a bona fide manner, then also detention cannot be justified.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37, 41 -- Execution of money decree -- Means to pay – Onus to prove -- Decree holder attached the schedule of properties which were known to be owned by petitioner/judgment debtor along with his execution petition -- Application under Order XXI Rule 41 CPC for seeking directions against petitioner/judgment debtor to file details of his properties duly moved -- From material placed by decree holder it is clearly made out that petitioner/judgment debtor was high worth individual who had got movable and immovable properties -- Further it is proved by decree holder that presently also petitioner/judgment debtor is residing in a leased accommodation in Gurugram and spending considerable amount on himself, therefore, the initial onus cast upon decree holder stands discharged -- It is the duty of petitioner/judgment debtor to rebut the evidence of decree holder and show that he has got no means to discharge the liability.

(Para 12)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 55, 58, Order 21 Rule 37 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Execution of money decree -- Means to pay – Onus to prove -- While appreciating evidence of judgment debtor in this regard, provisions of Section 106 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1972 needs to be kept in mind which mandates that facts which are in special knowledge of a person need to be established by said person -- It is duty of judgment debtor to come clean and disclose specifically all the particulars about his properties to show his bona fide -- Failure to come clean by taking plea of roving enquiry would be against his own case.

(Para 13)

Posted On: 27-11-2025
161. (SC) (Decided on: 21.11.2025)

A. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Re-determination of outstanding rent – Power of Appellate Rent Authority -- Rent Control Appellate Authority is not the Court of first instance, it only tests the exercise of jurisdiction and power by the Rent Control Court -- Appellate Authority is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent -- It has only to examine as to whether the Rent Control Court has erred in law or in facts and/or has exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law.

(Para 30)

B. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Arrears of rent -- Power of Appellate Rent Authority -- While hearing the appeal, the Appellate Authority has full discretion to pass any order in accordance with law, including an order dismissing the Appeal and/or extending the time to deposit/pay the arrears of rent, or if it finds substantial merit in the Appeal, it may issue notice and unconditionally stay the impugned order of eviction, or if it finds that the Appeal raises an argument which is plausible but improbable, it may direct the Appellant to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller pending the hearing of the Appeal -- Though the power of the Appellate Authority cannot be put in a straitjacket, yet normally speaking, a tenant must be directed to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller before an Appeal is heard by the Appellate Authority and that too when a money decree has been passed by a Civil Court which has not been stayed by the Appellate Court.

(Para 31)

C. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12, 18 -- Eviction of tenant – Pendency of appeal -- Application u/s 12 of Act, 1965 – Not mandatory -- Respondent-tenant’s submission that in an Appeal challenging an eviction order under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1965 a fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act, 1965 is mandatory, is contrary to the explicit language of Sections 12 and 18 of the Act, 1965.

(Para 32)

D. Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Section 12 -- Eviction of tenant – Pendency of appeal -- Application u/s 12 of Act, 1965 – Held, Sections 12(1) and 12(3) procedure is to be primarily followed by the Rent Controller -- It is essentially in cases where supervening events have taken place during the pendency of Appeal, that the parties have the liberty to file an application u/s 12 of the Act, 1965 once again before the Appellate Authority like where rent has been paid till the date of filing of the Appeal, but by the time the Appeal has matured for hearing, further rent has accrued, which has not been paid -- In such a case, it would be open to the Appellate Authority to entertain a fresh application u/s 12(1) by the landlord and decide the same in accordance with the procedure stipulated u/s 12 of the Act, 1965.

(Para 32)

Posted On: 26-11-2025
164. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 17.11.2025)

A. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Landlord – Execution of decree – Issue of ownership – Effect of -- A landlord need not be the owner of the property -- Subsequent events would not come in the way of the petitioner from getting the judgment and decree executed against the respondents, who are admittedly tenants of the petitioner.

(Para 11)

B. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11, 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Execution of decree -- Judgment debtor not filed any objections -- Warrant of possession issued – Recalling application and further objections -- Maintainability of -- Application filed for recalling the warrant of possession and the objections raised by the respondents/ judgment debtors required to be summarily rejected -- Principle of res judicata/ constructive res judicata applies to orders passed at different stages in a proceeding -- Once the Executing Court had not given any further opportunity to the respondents/ judgment debtors to file objections and had issued warrants of possession, then, the subsequent entertaining of the objections filed by the respondents was in violation of the said principle.

(Para 12)

C. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Eviction of tenant -- Execution of decree – Purchase of part of property by tenant – Effect of – Purchase from other co-sharers, the respondents-judgment debtors cannot hold on to the possession of the property and cannot stall the execution proceedings -- Further it is a matter of settled law that mere agreement to sell in favour of a party does not give any right to the said party in the property and the only right that the respondents have is to seek specific performance of the said agreement -- Even in case the sale deed, then also, the respondents would have no right to object to the execution proceedings and thus, the question of framing issues and seeking evidence on the same is a completely futile exercise and would result in delaying the execution proceedings endlessly – Impugned order set aside, the Executing Court directed to proceed further in the case to execute the judgment and decree, in accordance with law.

(Para 17-19)

Posted On: 24-11-2025
171. (SC) (Decided on: 14.11.2025)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 26, 27 – Recovery on disclosure – Relevancy -- Section 27 is an exception to the preceding Sections 25 and 26 -- Language further indicates that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person who is in custody of the Police in connection of an offence, it must relate distinctly to the fact so discovered -- For relevancy, the “facts thereby discovered” is preceded with the words “so much of such information, whether it amounts to confession or not as relates distinctly” -- “distinctly” indicates directly, indubitably, strictly and unmistakably, apparently, used in Section 27 to limit and define the scope of probable information -- Only that much information as is clearly connected with the fact discovered can be treated as relevant under the phrase ‘facts discovered’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder -- Last seen – Motive not proved – Conviction based upon recovery and FSL – Sustainability of -- When the eye-witness has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case and no evidence of ‘last seen’ has been adduced, and the alleged motive against the appellant remains unproved, however, mere recovery and the FSL report can, by itself, sustain the conviction of the appellant, more particularly when other co-accused having motive has been acquitted -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 16, 25)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 1959), Section 25 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Recovery of pistol – Reliance upon FSL -- Prosecution has not established that the recovery distinctly relates to the commission of the offence or that the weapon so recovered was the same which was used to commit murder so as to constitute a relevant fact distinctively related to the disclosure -- Recovery was effected from an iron box lying in a room accessible to other family members, wherein various household articles were kept, which were neither seized nor proved examining any independent witness from neighborhood -- After the recovery, the pistol and cartridges were kept in the Malkhana, but the record does not indicate on which date these were handed over to PW-6 for deposit to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and the same article was sent for forensic examination -- Chain of recovery linking the seizure, storage, and deposit of the material exhibits thus remains incomplete and was not duly proved -- Though the FSL report indicates that the pistol and cartridges recovered correlate with the bullets found in the body of the deceased, such evidence by itself is not sufficient to establish the appellant’s guilt in the absence of any proof that the recovered pistol was indeed used in the commission of the offence -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 22-25)

Posted On: 20-11-2025
175. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 29.08.2025)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence --  Last seen evidence -- “Last seen” is likewise weak by itself, unless the time gap is narrow and intervening possibilities are reasonably excluded -- PW-11 admitted knowledge of the death of the deceased by noon on 21.12.2001 yet divulged nothing until 07.01.2002, 16 days later -- He offered no convincing explanation for this unnatural silence -- Name of the appellant was absent from the FIR, which was lodged on 21.12.2001 -- His name emerged only through the post facto statement of PW-11 on 07.01.2002, making that statement the pivot of implication -- A circumstance so central and yet so belatedly disclosed cannot, without strong corroboration, be the bedrock of guilt -- Although PW-8 supported that both the deceased and the accused were consuming liquor on the fateful day around 6:30 to 7:00 pm and a quarrel followed, however, “last seen” alone-especially when the version of PW-11 is tainted by delay, does not exclude other reasonable hypothesis, including the role of ‘RK’, who, as per the earliest version, had taken the deceased from his house – Conviction set aside.

(Para 19-22, 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession -- Extra-judicial confession is a weak form of evidence and ordinarily requires cautious scrutiny and corroboration of trustworthy quality -- PW-7, Sarpanch, before whom the accused made his extra-judicial confession, the record shows that there was no relationship of trust or familiarity between the appellant and this witness that would naturally prompt a confession to him-particularly, 20 days after the occurrence -- When the sole corroboration proffered is the recovery and a belated last seen account of doubtful credibility, the confession cannot safely be acted upon -- Extra-judicial confession is inherently unsafe to rely upon in this factual matrix.

(Para 19, 23-26, 37)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 45, 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA linkage – Requirement of – Recovery of spade – Human blood on spade and shirt of accused -- Alleged recoveries of spade and bloodstained shirt pursuant to the disclosure statement and the report of the FSL: a spade is a common agricultural tool -- Mere recovery from the house of the appellant does not, by itself, establish its use in the crime in question -- Furthermore, FSL report (Exhibit PU) confirms human blood on the spade and shirt -- However, in the absence of any DNA linkage to the deceased and given the otherwise weak corroborative circumstances, the recovery does not conclusively connect the appellant to the murder in question -- Recovery, weeks after the incident, diminishes the probative force in the absence of unmistakable scientific linkage -- Evidence of recovery is inconclusive and cannot complete the chain.

(Para 27-29)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA linkage – Requirement of – A belated and unreliable “last seen account” of PW 11 -- An improbable extra-judicial confession to a person not shown to be a natural confidant, and inconclusive evidence of recovery of the weapon of offence and bloodstained clothes, with no linkage to the deceased, against the backdrop of unproved motive and inconsistency in the medical evidence regarding alleged alcohol consumption -- These circumstances do not form a complete chain that points only to the guilt of the appellant while excluding all reasonable hypothesis of innocence -- Prosecution has not discharged its foundational burden -- Approach of the learned trial Court-treating weak links as mutually reinforcing-was clearly erroneous -- Conviction of the appellant founded on infirm and uncorroborated circumstances -- As the chain is incomplete, the benefit of doubt must follow -- Appeal allowed, conviction and order of sentence set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him.

(Para 34-37)

Posted On: 20-11-2025
176. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 17.09.2025 Decided on: 06.11.2025)

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 34 -- SARFAESI -- Injunction – Fraud alleged – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- Normally the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred and the correct remedy for a party is to knock the doors of the DRT u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act -- In certain cases, where fraud is pleaded and the same cannot be proved in the proceedings before the DRT, the Civil Court does have the jurisdiction to deal with the issue.

(Para 23)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 34 -- SARFAESI -- Injunction – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- Before exercising jurisdiction, the trial Court should have considered the judgments and the law on the subject as regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and in case, after referring to the said judgments, it had come to the conclusion that the Civil Court, prima-facie had the jurisdiction to deal with the issue, it could have proceeded ahead -- However, no such exercise was undertaken and in fact, there is not even a reference to the provisions of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act or the law on the subject -- Trial Court erred -- Parties relegated to the trial Court where they should project their respective cases and then the trial Court should arrive at a specific conclusion.

(Para 24, 25)

C. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 13, 34 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Defendant proceeded ex-parte -- Ex-parte stay – Revision in High Court -- Petitioner should have first approached the trial Court by way of an appropriate application since it had been proceeded against exparte and then it should have agitated about the grant of exparte stay -- However, the petitioner chose to straightaway come to High Court rather than filing an application before the trial Court -- Impugned order set aside, parties relegated to the trial Court -- Petitioner-defendant, may move the requisite application before the trial Court, which if so moved, shall be dealt with by the trial Court, in accordance with law -- Parties may then agitate their claims as regards the grant or non-grant of injunction in view of the averments made in the civil suit; the provisions of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the law.

(Para 26-28)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 6 – Notice received by clerk of Company – No one appeared -- Proceeded ex-parte -- Once the petitioner-defendant had been served and it chose not to appear, the trial Court rightly proceeded ex-parte against it.

(Para 21)

Posted On: 20-11-2025
177. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 27.10.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party -- For impleading a person as a party, two conditions must be satisfied: firstly, that there must be a right to some relief against such person in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; and secondly, that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such person -- Power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly but to advance the cause of complete justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Applicant placed on record Mutations and Jamabandi for the year 1996-97 showing transfer of the suit land from the State Government to ‘J’ and thereafter to himself -- Several rounds of litigation, including writ petitions before the High Court, in which his alleged rights over the same land have been contested -- These materials were sufficient to give the trial court a prima facie basis to conclude that the applicant has at least an arguable interest in the subject matter of the suit and that his presence would facilitate complete adjudication of the dispute.

(Para 2, 16)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Objection as to claim based upon fraudulent documents – It is a matter of evidence which cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of impleadment -- Impleadment order does not confer any legitimacy upon applicant’s title; it merely allows him to be heard so that the court's final decree, if passed, may bind all persons claiming interest in the property and avoid future litigation -- Apprehension that the impleadment will prejudice the plaintiff/ petitioner's rights is thus unfounded.

(Para 2, 17)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction --Dominus litis – Argument as to Plaintiff/ Petitioner, being dominus litis, is free to choose his defendants, cannot prevail when the relief claimed directly affects third-party rights reflected in the public records -- Petitioner's suit seeks declaration of nullity of a rapat entry and correction of revenue records may have an impact upon any person claiming interest through existing entries or documents.

(Para 2, 18)

Posted On: 13-11-2025
192. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 26.09.2025)

A. Rent laws -- Tenancy -- Oral assertions regarding subsistence of tenancy was not rebutted at all -- Defendant has not even appeared in the witness box -- Petitioner has placed on record house tax assessment showing that petitioner/ tenant was recorded as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs.1,750/- therein -- If the ocular account given by landlord is appreciated in the light of other material i.e. sale deed in favour of his parents, electricity connection in tenanted premises in his name and house rent assessment where respondent is shown as tenant, the conclusion would be regarding existence of tenancy.

(Para 7)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 20, 75 – Non-payment of rent -- Rent petition under Old Act – Maintainability of -- Landlord had sought eviction of tenant u/s 13 of Act, 1949 for non-payment of rent -- If the entire petition is read, it is clearly made out that landlord has sought eviction of tenant for non-payment of rent, therefore, merely by mentioning wrong provision of law landlord cannot be non-suited on this ground alone -- Plaint has to be read in totality -- Cause of action under Punjab Rent Act 1995, duly arises on reading of plaint and mere mentioning of wrong provision would not make any effect on the rights of either of the parties.

(Para 8, 9)

C. Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 20 -- Non-payment of rent -- Notice u/s 20(2)(a) – Not mandatory --  Section 20 is directory in nature and it would be sufficient to seek eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent from the date when tenant had notice regarding demand of rent, which is due against him -- No further notice shall be required for further defaults.

(Para 10, 11)

D. Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 20 -- Non-payment of rent -- Notice u/s 20(2)(a) – Denial of tenancy – Effect of -- Two months’ notice not required as petitioner/ tenant is denying tenancy itself.

(Para 11)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
194. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 07.11.2025 Decided on: 08.11.2025)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Summoning u/s 12 of DV Act – Review of order – Permissibility of -- Proceedings u/s 12 of the DV Act cannot be equated with lodging of a criminal complaint or initiation of prosecution -- So, the trial Magistrate, after obtaining the response from the husband and his relatives etc. is well within his jurisdiction to revoke his order of issuing summons to them or he can even drop the proceedings against all or any of the relatives of the husband -- Since the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are not, in strict sense, criminal in nature, as such, bar to alter/revoke an order by a Magistrate is not attracted to these proceedings.

(Para 6)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Summoning u/s 12 of DV Act – Application for dropping of proceedings – Maintainability of -- Magistrate if, after receiving the version of the husband and his relatives in a proceeding u/s 12 of the DV Act, comes to a conclusion that no case for proceeding against either all of them or some of them is made out, he can drop the proceedings and he can even re-call his order of interim monetary compensation granted in favour of the aggrieved person -- In view of this legal position, it would be open to the petitioners to file an application before the learned trial Magistrate seeking an order for dropping of proceedings against them – Direction given to Magistrate shall, after hearing the parties, pass appropriate orders in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of one month from the date such application is made by the petitioners before the learned Magistrate.

(Para 9)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
195. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 04.11.2025 Decided on: 08.11.2025)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 15, 21, 37 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular  bail -- Commercial quantity – Examination of evidence – Nature of -- At the stage of considering bail application of an accused, the evidence led by the prosecution cannot be meticulously examined -- It is only if from a cursory look at the evidence recorded during trial of the case, it is possible to frame an opinion that accused is not guilty of offence involving commercial quantity of drugs that he can be enlarged on bail -- If such an opinion can be framed only after meticulous examination and appreciation of the evidence on record, the same is to be left for determination at the final stage of the case and not while considering a plea for bail of the accused.

(Para 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 15, 21, 37 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular  bail -- Commercial quantity – Representative sample -- Only one bottle, out of seized 12 bottles of Cofmaster-C containing 100 ml solution each, has been sent to FSL for chemical analysis and as per the result, the said bottle was found to contain Codeine – In the seizure memo, the batch number and the nature of solution contained in the recovered bottles is not mentioned -- No material on record to suggest that the recovered bottles were bearing the same batch number – Held, the evidence on record does not, prima facie, show that the recovered bottles pertained to the same batch, which could have led to inference that all the recovered bottles contained the same stuff -- 11 kgs of Poppy Straw were also stated to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner-- There are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of offence of possession commercial quantity of contraband drugs – No previous history of having indulged in the trade of illicit drugs -- Custody of more than two years -- Bail allowed.

(Para 13-17)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
197. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 13.10.2025 Decided on: 06.11.2025)

A. Medical negligence -- Bolam Test -- Determining factor of Negligence” for the purpose of fastening liability under civil law and under criminal law is jurisprudentially different -- Generally it is the amount of damages incurred, which is the determinative factor of the extent of liability in tort, and it is the degree of negligence which is the determinative factor of liability as a crime -- While in a civil proceedings, mere preponderance of probability shall be sufficient for the plaintiff for making out a case, in criminal proceedings, complainant is required to prove guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt because negligence to be established by the prosecution or the complainant, as the case may be, must be culpable or gross – To fasten liability in criminal law, the degree of negligence has to be higher than that of negligence enough to fasten liability for damages in civil law and essential ingredient of mens rea could not be excluded from the consideration when charge in criminal court consists of criminal negligence.

(Para 15, 16)

B. Medical negligence – Criminal liability -- In order to make out a case against a medical professional, the prosecution or the complainant, as the case may be is obliged not only to plead but prove by cogent and trustworthy evidence that the accused medical professional lacked requisite qualification or the skill or that he failed to exercise the requisite skill with reasonable competence.

(Para 17)

C. Medical negligence – A professional cannot be held liable for negligence till he is acting in accordance with acceptable norms of practice -- A professional can be held liable for negligence only when he is not possessed with requisite qualification or skill or he fails to exercise reasonable skill.

(Para 18)

D. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, Section 420, 109, 427, 504, 506, 540 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 -- Medical negligence – Criminal complaint and cognizance – Quashing -- Nothing in the impugned complaint to suggest that petitioner No. 1 was not possessed with the requisite qualification of surgery or that he failed to exercise the reasonable skill -- It was alleged by the complainant that he was referred by petitioner No. 1 to the PGI, Chandigarh due to tracor injury, as a consequence of surgery performed by petitioner No. 1 -- However, there is no prima facie evidence on the record in the form of credible opinion given by a competent doctor of PGI, where complainant was subsequently treated, or any other doctor or institute for that matter to support the allegation of gross negligence on the part of the accused doctor-petitioner No.1 -- Standard of criminal liability, particularly in case of medical negligence requires proof of gross negligence or significant departure from the expected standard of care, rather than a simple error or accident -- Impugned complaint, is an abuse of the process of law -- Complaint as also the impugned order of cognizance and process quashed.

(Para 19-26)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
198. (J&K&L HC) (Decided on: 08.11.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Court its own motion -- If a plaint has missing or deficiency of fact/s on the basis of which a given cause of action intended to be agitated can be said or assumed to be constituted, then a plaint is self-warranting its rejection sooner than later, be it on court’s own indulgence or on asking of a defendant.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Replication can be looked into – Pleadings in the sense where, even after the stage of written statement, if there is a replication filed, in a given situation the same can also be looked into to see whether there is any admission on the part of the plaintiff.

(Para 14)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Cause of action – Averment in plaint – If the facts put up in a factual statement in the plaint are presenting or introducing a cause of action, then a civil court has no discretion reserved to it to reject such a plaint by borrowing outside reference, howsoever persuasive it may be, from the defendant’s end to discredit a plaint and the factual averments made in written statement.

(Para 9)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 enables a person to file a suit of civil nature excepting those whose cognizance by civil court is expressly or by necessary implication barred -- Rejection of a plaint is a matter of very attentive application of mind rather than routine following of motion on the part of a civil court.

(Para 11, 12)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Rejection of a plaint is a sort of digression of that nature of adjudication of a civil suit and as such, such a digression is not to be served to a civil suit unless and until a plaint is self-inviting the same for its rejection -- This is what is essence of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is.

(Para 13)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
199. (H.P. HC) (Reserved on: 30.10.2025 Decided on: 06.11.2025)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 23(1) – Land Acquisition case – Market value of acquired land -- Market value deemed to be the just and fair compensation for the acquired land -- "market value" would be the price of the land prevailing on the date of publication of the preliminary notification u/s 4(1) of the Act -- Acid test for determining the market value of the land is the price, which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser -- In determining the market value, the factors enumerated in Section 23 are to be taken into consideration -- There cannot be any mathematical accuracy in ascertaining the amount of compensation payable -- Existing amenities like, water, electricity, possibility of their further extension, whether near about town is developing or has prospect of development have to be taken into consideration.

(Para 9)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 23(1) – Land Acquisition case – Market value of acquired land – Sale transaction relating to a smaller parcel of land – Reliance upon -- A sale transaction relating to a smaller parcel of land can be considered for the purpose of assessing the market value in respect of a large tract of land, after making appropriate deductions such as for development of land, for providing space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a layout, lumpsum payments, as well as for the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed and other expenses involved therein, but before doing so, the evidentiary value of such a sale deed is required to be carefully scrutinized.

(Para 13)

C. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 23(1) – Land Acquisition case – Market value of acquired land – Nature of use – Consideration of -- Where the entire area is similarly situated, the value of the land under acquisition is to be assessed as a single unit irrespective of its classification and nature ignoring the purpose to which it was being put prior to the acquisition, as well as to the one it is likely to be put thereafter.

(Para 19)

D. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 23(1) – Land Acquisition case – Market value of acquired land – Land has been acquired as the single unit for the public purpose, i.e., for construction of Kaithlighat Basha road, as such the learned Reference Court had rightly awarded the market value of the acquired land at the flat and uniform rate, irrespective of the classification and category of the acquired land.

(Para 21)

Posted On: 11-11-2025
200. (H.P. HC) (Reserved on: 11.7.2025 Decided on: 07.11.2025)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation  in motor vehicle accident case -- Accident by L&T machine -- L&T machine was registered with Registering and Licensing Authority, Nahan -- Plea of appellant that L&T machine involved in accident was not a motor vehicle is not sustainable and, accordingly, rejected.

(Para 23, 24)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 167 – Claimant’ right to file petition under EC Act – Effect of -- Objection with respect to maintainability of petition -- Claimants have option to prefer the claim petition either under EC Act or under MV Act and claimants, in present case, have not preferred any petition under EC Act but had preferred the petition under MV Act and thus the objection on this count raised by State is also not sustainable.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Negligence – Principle of res ipsa loquitur -- It is an admitted fact that at the time of accident, RW-1 was driving the L&T machine and during that course, accident occurred and Om Parkash died -- In his examination-in-chief, he denied the rash or negligent act on his part -- From the evidence on record, it is apparent that employment of deceased with Department, receipt of salary of Rs.18797, assignment of duty to deceased to help RW-1 and to lookafter L&T machine, occurrence of accident, death of deceased in accident, registration of FIR against RW-1, registration of L&T machine have not been disputed -- Dependency of claimants upon deceased as well as his relation with claimants has also not been disputed -- Case has to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probability -- The present case has to be decided by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur -- No cogent, reliable and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of rashness and negligence on the part of RW-1 -- For the material on record, held  that there is sufficient material on record to hold that accident took place on account of rash or negligent act of Ganga RW-1.

(Para 31, 35)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Negligence – Principle of res ipsa loquitur -- Where possibility of any other reason causing the accident is ruled out by evidence on record, the defendant/driver of vehicle owed a duty to drive the vehicle carefully and diligently and explanation offered by defendant is not reliable then applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur it can be construed that accident took place on account of rash or negligent act of driver.

(Para 34)

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Future prospects -- Deceased was of 40 years and he had permanent job -- Adding 30% enhancement in the salary of deceased as future prospects, upheld.

(Para 36)

F. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Consortium to each claimant -- Claimants are entitled for loss of consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each.

(Para 37)