Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in prayer of suit – Petitioner/ Plaintiff dispossessed during the pendency of suit -- Petitioner earlier sought relief of injunction, but now, by way of the proposed amendment, he is seeking restoration of possession in his favour, on the basis of tenancy -- Such a relief sought by the petitioner would require detailed pleadings and independent evidence – Held, proposed amendment would fundamentally change the character and nature of the case -- Civil Judge has rightly declined the application for amendment of the civil suit.

(Para 10)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- It is well settled that a landlord is the best judge of his own requirements and a tenant is no one to dictate terms and conditions to the landlord.

(Para 20)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Bonafide need -- Eviction of Shops on three sides of the premises of the Gurudwara Sahib -- Landlord instituted the eviction petition on the ground that the shops were to be got vacated and then the building was to be renovated in a manner that the Shri Guru Granth Sahib (holy book) could be shifted to the ground floor which would make it convenient for the devotees, especially those in advanced age, to pay obeisance – Held, said need, under no circumstances, can be said to be not bona fide.

(Para 4, 22)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(3)(a)(i) – Bonafide need – Pleading of ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i)  of 1949 Act -- It is well settled that in case such ingredients are not pleaded and no objection is raised in the written statement, the petition cannot be said to be not maintainable.

(Para 10, 23)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (4 of 1998), Section 12 – Eviction petition under Rent Act -- Religious Institution – Bar of jurisdiction -- Eviction petition instituted under the Rent Act would not be barred in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1998 Act.

(Para 26, 27)

E. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (31 of 1973), Section 2(e) -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib – Applicability of Rent Act -- Whether Public premises ? – Argument that in case of public premises, the Rent Act would not be applicable -- Building of the Gurudwara Sahib, cannot, in any manner, be stated to be a public premises, as a result of which, the said argument would be devoid of merit.

(Para 30)

A. Karewa marriage – Void marriage -- At the time of alleged Karewa Mariage between S and SR, wife of SR namely L was still alive -- It is settled law that second marriage, during subsistence of first marriage, is null and void.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Application for additional evidence by way of DNA test to establish paternity of the defendants No.3 to 6 -- Plaintiff had moved the said application three-and-a-half years after initiation of appeal -- Plaintiff had failed to explain as to why the said application for producing evidence in question was not moved during trial; and why the said evidence was not produced before the learned trial Court -- Needless to say, the said facts were in the knowledge of the plaintiff during trial -- However, he failed to exercise due diligence -- No error in the dismissal of the said application of the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence -- Dismissal of application to lead and conclude evidence – Challenge to -- No cogent reason given by the petitioner to explain as to why in a period of 3½ years, petitioner has been unable to conclude his evidence – Very valuable public time of the Court has been expended in affording 26-27 opportunities to the petitioner -- However, the same cannot be misused to endlessly drag the matter to the unfair advantage or disadvantage of either party -- No ground to interfere in the impugned order – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 12-16)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 69, 84 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Sexual intercourse through deceitful means with promise to marry -- Regular  bail -- De facto complainant is a married lady -- Prima facie, it is doubtful whether the offence u/s can be attracted -- If both of the parties are aware about a subsistent marriage it cannot be alleged that the sexual intercourse between them was with a promise to marry – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation -- Already sold property – Appropriate remedy -- Revenue authorities refused to record name of the appellants after noticing the fact that the original person, through whom appellants-vendor claim right, had already sold his share and was not left with any land which could be transferred – Issues sought to be raised by the appellants cannot be examined in summary proceedings of mutation -- Remedy of the appellants would be to seek appropriate declaration from the competent Civil Court.

(Para 2-4)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation Proceeding – Nature of -- Any order passed in summary proceedings of mutation remain subservient to a declaration granted by the competent Civil Court.

(Para 4)

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37, 38 – National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 3D, 3E, 4 -- Acquisition of land by NHAI – Suit for demarcation and permanent injunction -- Demarcation of land – It was averred that in the garb of the said acquisition, a portion of the house of the petitioner was being sought to be included whereas actually, it had not been acquired -- Direction to Naib Tehsildar to demarcate the suit property but no such demarcation was carried out in compliance thereof -- Reliance was placed upon the signs put on the land by the NHAI, as also on the revenue record – Fresh demarcation of the property ordered to be carried out in accordance with law.

(Para 2, 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (DB) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 5(j)(iii)(m), Section 5(r) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Gang rape of woman under twelve years of age – Fair opportunity of hearing to accused – DNA profiling – Deposition of scientific experts – Requirement of -- Case involves capital punishment and thus, providing a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself is absolutely imperative and non-negotiable – Trial concluded within a period of less than two months from the date of registration of the case, which is reflective of undue haste -- Failure of the trial Court to ensure the deposition of the scientific experts while relying upon the DNA report, has definitely led to the failure of justice thereby, vitiating the trial -- Case remanded to the trial Court, who shall summon the scientific experts associated with the preparation and issuance of the DNA report with the entire supporting material and shall be examined as Court witnesses with a proper opportunity of examination to the prosecution and the defence in that order -- In case the accused are not represented by a counsel of their choice, a defence counsel having substantial experience in terms of the guidelines laid down by this Court in Anokhilal’s case (2019) 20 SCC 196 shall be appointed to defend the accused.

(Para 29, 30)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 148, 149, 302, 201-- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Murder – Regular bail -- Custody of appellant is 03 years, 07 months and 15 days and co-accused has already been admitted on regular bail -- Investigation completed, challan presented to Court on 09.03.2023, charges have been framed on 03.05.2023 -- Out of total 40 prosecution  witnesses only 05 witnesses have been examined -- Suffice to infer that the conclusion of trial shall take considerable time -- Detaining the appellant behind the bars for an indefinite period would serve no purpose – Right to speedy trial is a part of  reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 -- Constitutional right cannot be denied -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4, 5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 11, 166 – Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rule 9 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Accident by Oil Tanker -- Driver did not have a licence to drive a vehicle carrying dangerous and hazardous goods – Training certificate under MV Rules – Requirement of – Additional evidence in appeal -- No explanation for non-production of the certificate before the Tribunal; which was produced at the appellate stage for the first time -- Driver did not have a claim that he had undergone a training as prescribed under the Rules; despite being cross-examined on the point of absence of a valid license -- This raises genuine suspicion on the veracity of the certificate produced at the appellate stage – Direction issued to the insurance company to pay the amounts to the claimants and recover it from the owner of the oil-tanker, upheld.

(Para 17-19)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18, 25, 29 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail -- Commercial quantity – Speedy trial -- One petitioner has completed incarceration of 02 years, 02 months and 26 days and other completed incarceration of 11 months and 22 days -- Petitioners are not involved in any other case -- Out of 18 prosecution witnesses, 12 remain to be examined -- Contraband recovered falls under the category of commercial quantity – Case is covered by Mohd Muslim @ Hussain’s case 2023 Live Law (SC)260 – Veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after the conclusion of the trial – Bail allowed.

(Para 8-11)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Quashing of proceedings u/s 12 (1) of the D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC is not available to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV Act, 2005 are primarily based on the premise that proceedings u/s 12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature -- Said view is not correct -- High Courts can exercise power u/s 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings, however, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application u/s 12(1) -- Normally, interference u/s 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

(Para 35-39)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 23(1) – Interim/ Ex-parte order in DV Act case -- Power has been conferred on the learned Magistrate to pass interim and ex-parte orders.

(Para 20)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13, 23, 28 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223 -- Application/ complaint under DV Act – Procedure of -- An application u/s 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS) -- As provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section 13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on the application -- Sub-section (2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to lay down its own procedure for the disposal of an application u/s 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.

(Para 21, 22)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26 – Jurisdiction -- In a given case, in any legal proceedings pending before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved person, the reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought -- Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate, reliefs u/s 18 to 22 can be sought.

(Para 24, 24.1)

D. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 31, 33 -- Nature of proceedings u/s 12 of the D.V Act -- Notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.

(Para 28)

E. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12(1), 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of proceedings under D.V Act, 2005 – Jurisdiction/ Power of the High Court – Abuse of process -- High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- High Court can quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

(Para 29-31)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 – Acknowledgment of debt – Extension of limitation -- There must be an ‘acknowledgment of liability in respect of the property or right in question’ and even if such an acknowledgment is accompanied by refusal to pay, it would mean that the period of limitation would have to be computed from the time when such acknowledgment is signed.

(Para 7)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 – Acknowledgment of partial amount -- Extension of limitation – Interpretation of -- Stated that Rs. 27,874.10 was due and payable -- There was never an acknowledgment of the total suit claim of Rs.3,07,115.85 – Held, there was no acknowledgment of the full amount claimed by the appellant, in terms of the requirement prescribed in Section 18 of the Act of 1963, the question of extending the period of limitation for the entire suit claim of the appellant did not arise.

(Para 7-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Amendment in complaint -- According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned -- It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion – No prejudice would be caused to the accused/ respondents -- Actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial -- It was a curable irregularity -- It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint -- Trial Court directed to proceed expeditiously and the parties will be at liberty to apply for recall of witnesses already examined.

(Para 16-20)

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 13, 14 – Major penalties – Charge-sheet by officer empowered for minor penalty – Held, an authority empowered to inflict minor penalties (General Manager) can issue a charge-sheet even for imposition of major penalties – Held, issuance of charge-sheet by General Manager could not have been faulted -- Proceedings initiated are held to be validly initiated.

(Para 12-19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142(2)(a) – Cheque bounce complaint – Territorial jurisdiction -- Appellant maintains his bank account in Mangalore – He merely deposited the respondent’s cheques at its Mumbai Branch for the purpose of crediting his account in Mangalore -- Offence u/s 138 of NI Act should be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction, branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated -- Appellant was fully justified in filing his complaint cases before the jurisdictional Court at Mangalore.

(Para 6-8)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Contractual liability of a personal accident insurance cover -- Limited liability – Plea of – Death of driver due to tyre burst of car – Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.25,82,000/- -- High Court reduced the liability to Rs.2,00,000/- -- Contention of limited liability was neither taken before the Tribunal nor even in the memorandum of appeal filed, there was no reason for the High Court to look into the policy document to find limited liability – Guidelines issued by the Tariff Advisory Committee regulates the issuance of the policies by the insurers but unless it is specified in the insurance policy, it cannot bind the insured -- Trite is the principle that there can be no proof offered without specific pleadings -- High Court order, set aside -- Order of the Tribunal restored.

(Para 2, 10-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of – Failure of the accused to raise a pertinent ground/ plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material -- No sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case -- Onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition.

(Para 11-13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362, 482 – Second quashing petition – Maintainability of -- No change in circumstances and no new grounds/ pleas became available to the accused after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition -- Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error -- High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4 -- However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant -- Plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality -- Entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature -- No civil suit has been filed for recovery of money -- By filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police amounts to abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR quashed.

(Para 9-14, 17)

B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Cheating -- To constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception.

(Para 10)

C. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 316(2), 318(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Quashing of FIR – Duty of High Court -- Instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent for settlement – What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any -- High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out.

(Para 10, 11, 17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case -- Accident of 2002 – Injured was Mason -- Appellant suffered two fractures, one of which was a compound fracture, treatment of which required surgical intervention -- Income taken as Rs. 6,000/- per month -- 40% for future prospects given -- As far as disability is concerned, the doctor has assessed it at 35% and the Tribunal reduced it to 25% on mere conjectures – Disability assessed at 35% -- Total compensation assessed at Rs.7,19,480/-.

(Para 3-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape – Sole statement of prosecutrix -- Statement of the prosecutrix, if worthy of credence, requires no corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 --  Rape – Conviction -- Juvenile declaration later -- Appellant’s age at the time of commission of the offence has been returned as 16 years 2 months and 3 days – Appellant held to be juvenile on the date of commission of the crime -- Sentence imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court will have to be set aside, as the same cannot sustain -- Case referred to the Board for passing appropriate orders in light of Sections 15 and 16 of the 2000 Act.

(Para 12-17)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15, 16 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 -- Rape on 17.11.1988 -- Juvenile – Plea of – At  any stage – Plea of juvenility can be raised before any court and has to be recognized at any stage, even after disposal of the case --  Such a claim is required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, i.e., the 2007 Rules, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the 2000 Act -- Relevant factor, therefore, is that the accused, to be a juvenile, should have not completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offense, which entitles him to the benefit of the 2000 Act.

(Para 15)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Licence for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) – Driving Commercial Vehicle/ Tata 407 – Validity of -- No endorsement was required to drive a commercial vehicle of the type in question, by the driver who possesses a license to drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) -- Offending vehicle was TATA 407 Truck, having a gross total weight of around 4995 Kg., which does not exceed 7500 Kg – Held, although the offending vehicle is a commercial one and the driver of the said vehicle at the time of accident possessed a license to only drive a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) and, considering the gross weight of the vehicle in question is not in excess of 7500 Kg., the driver can be said to be holding a valid license to drive the same.

(Para 10)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” -- Deceased was travelling in offending vehicle – Liability only policy -- Vehicle in question was insured with “Liability Only Policy” and no premium was paid to cover the driver, owner, or a gratuitous passenger travelling therein -- Even then, the Courts below erred in holding that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation to the claimant-appellants -- Principle of “Pay and Recover” ought to have been invoked –Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal and recover the same only from the owner of the offending vehicle -- Driver of the offending vehicle is not liable as he was holding a valid driving license to drive the offending vehicle i.e., TATA 407 Truck.

(Para 13-19)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Right of tribal woman (or her legal heirs) for an equal share in her ancestral property – Customary law -- Right to equality – Unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out -- Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved -- That being the case, denying share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin -- Keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property.

(Para 29)

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Negligence of offending vehicle – Requirement of proof -- While entertaining a claim petition u/s 163A of the Act, the question of negligence cannot be looked into.

(Para 11)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, 166 -- Claim petition u/s 163A of the M.V. Act – Assessment u/s 166 of M.V. Act – Permissibility of -- Held, compensation cannot be determined as prescribed u/s 166 of the MV Act as sought for by the claimants -- It requires to be determined u/s 163A read with Second Schedule of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Deceased was working as a driver and his monthly income was Rs.3,000/- or Rs.36,000/- p.a. -- Having regard to the number of dependents being 6 the income of the deceased as prescribed in Second Schedule has to be held as Rs.40,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3 towards personal expense i.e. 13,333/- the annual loss of income to the claimant would be Rs.26,667/- -- Deceased was aged 35 years, hence the appropriate multiplier to be adopted as per Second Schedule is 17 -- General damages as prescribed under Second Schedule is Rs.2,000/-, Rs.5,000/- and Rs.2,500/- towards loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate -- Claimants have contended the amount spent towards medical expenses was around Rs.1,00,000/-, however, Second Schedule restricts the same to Rs.15,000/- and Rs.15,000/- awarded towards the same -- In all Claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,77,839/- which shall carry interest @ 8% p.a. from the date of petition till date of payment or deposit whichever is earlier.

(Para 14, 15)

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 163A, Second Schedule -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case –  Liability of Insurer/ Insured – Third party’s right -- In the absence of any positive evidence being placed by the insurer of the offending vehicle to prove the manner in which accident occurred, the deceased would be a ‘third party’ in so far as offending vehicle is concerned and thus the insurer and the insured of the offending vehicle would be liable to pay compensation jointly and severally -- Insurer of the offending vehicle would be liable to indemnify the award.

(Para 17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Death of injured during pendency of appeal – Legal heir’s right -- If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of death, there is no reason to prohibit the legal representatives to pursue claims for loss of a property, akin to estate of the injured, if the injured dies subsequently – Enhancement sought by the original applicant, which if granted before her death would have accrued to her estate or rather compensated the loss of her estate; caused by reason of the accident, which the legal heirs are entitled to succeed to – Compensation enhanced to Rs. 12,53,770/- from Rs.8,56,970/- awarded by Tribunal.

(Para 5-8)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 106 – General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 27 – Notice of termination of lease – Registered post – Presumption of service -- Notice was sent to the respondent by Registered Post in compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act -- High Court held that since the endorsement on the notice read “ND”, the notice was not delivered and, therefore, any and all proceedings arising therefrom would be bad in law and, hence, the decree of ejectment was set aside – Held, High Court was plainly in error in coming to this conclusion -- Impugned order was passed without consideration of Section 27 of GC Act, which provides that if services are made through Registered Post, it is deemed to have been made in accordance with law -- Appeal allowed, ejectment decree passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 15-17)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Permanent functional disability – Functional disability -- 48% permanent disability to the right lower limb -- Assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earning would depend upon the affected impact of such disability on the earning capacity of the claimant – It is not forthcoming from the award of the tribunal or the impugned judgment as to the corresponding functional disability – As per almanco manual, the whole body disability when compared to the particular limb disability would be 1/4th in respect of that of the lower limb -- Lower limb disability 48% and 1/4th of the same would be 12% -- Considering the income of the claimant at Rs.18,972/-, compensation that becomes payable to the claimant for loss of future earnings would be 18,972 x 12 x 17 x 12% = Rs.4,64,434.56/- -- Total compensation assessed at Rs. 9,06,100/- with interest of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings -- After investigation, a chargesheet was laid and cognizance was taken by the Court -- In such circumstances, before taking a decision to quash the proceedings arising from FIR, incumbent upon the High Court, exercising powers u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., to advert to the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation so as to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not to proceed against the accused.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR/ criminal proceedings – Arbitration clause – Ground of -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the singular ground that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties where they can resolve their differences amicably -- It is well-settled that mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties is not a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings if the necessary ingredients of a criminal offence are made out from the allegations and the materials collected during the course of investigation or inquiry – Held, order of the High Court cannot be sustained – Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 342, 363, 376 -- Rape – Kidnapping – Wrongful confinement – Acquittal -- Positive statement about the occurrence of sexual intercourse and does not even in the slightest imply the same to be against her will -- Absence of consent is the sine qua non to sustain a charge under Section 376 -- Civil Assistant Surgeon opined upon examination of the victim that there was regular sexual intercourse but gave no definite statement regarding the recent occurrence -- For two months, they resided peacefully together without even a hint of discomfort or desire on the part of the victim to leave or escape from the house in Hyderabad -- Prosecution, has not successfully proved that the victim was less than sixteen/ eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged commission of crime, and thus, the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant -- Kidnapping, wrongful confinement and rape not made out -- Conviction set aside, appellant acquitted of all charges.

(Para 19-22)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 11 – Return of plaint – Rejection of plaint -- If the Civil Court is of the view that the dispute being commercial in nature has to go before the Commercial Court then the plaint has to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC -- Entire plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 29, 61, 85 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- NDPS – Regular bail – Recovery of 254 grams heroin from main accused -- Petitioner was arrested on the basis of the disclosure statement of co-accused -- When police arrested him, another alleged recovery of 50 grams of heroin was also effected -- Petitioner is behind bars since 13.10.2023, however, out of total 11 prosecution witnesses -- Petitioner has suffered incarceration of 01 year, 09 months & 09 days -- Petitioner is involved in one another case although he is on bail in that case – Bail allowed.

(Para 5-7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(viii), (ix) & (3)(2)(vii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 --  Offence under SC/ ST Act -- Quashing of criminal proceedings by High Court – Challenge to -- Dispute occurred between two Scheduled Caste groups, and the same was not driven by caste-based malice -- There was no substantive evidence on record to reflect involvement in the matter beyond the complainant’s time-barred assertions -- Delay itself casts doubt on the credibility of the allegations made against them – No evidence on record which would indicate mala fide intention on the part of Respondent No. 2 or any connivance -- Bald allegations against the Appellant would not in itself be sustainable -- High Court’s order does not call for any interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 16-26)

A. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech – Contempt proceedings -- Postponement of publication – Reasonable restriction -- If a member of the public or a litigant or for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the court by making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or Judges who had passed a judicial order or had conducted the court proceedings, certainly the courts would be justified to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against such contemnors -- This would also be a ground to direct postponement of publication as contempt of court is a reasonable restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

(Para 28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a), 19(2) – Freedom of speech –  Judiciary and Media -- For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key -- That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court -- Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution -- For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other -- The above position has become more nuanced in the digital age.

-- By impugned order Division Bench of the High Court found prima facie that the comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, directed the Wikimedia Foundation Inc. to take down/delete the said pages within thirty six (36) hours.

Held, Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions – Impugned directions contained of the impugned order set aside.

(Para 2, 31-33)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 105 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39, 102 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – DNA evidence – Acquittal -- Despite the presence of DNA evidence, it has to be discarded for the reason that proper methods and procedures were not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment of the evidence in the course of the Appellant-convict's conviction -- DNA evidence is only of probative value, subject to the condition that it is properly dealt with – DNA evidence collected has been rendered unusable, it suffers from various shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay; the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out etc. -- None of the circumstances posited by the prosecution are found to be conclusively proved against the Appellant-convict -- Chain of circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular hypothesis, that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence or involvement of none else in the crime -- Conviction of the Appellant-convict vacated, he is directed to be released forthwith -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 35, 43, 45)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 -- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 39 -- DNA Evidence – Procedure to be followed – Directions issued, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved:

1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record.

2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken.

3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial.

4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to  maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible for explaining such lapse.

The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary instruction as may be required -- States requested to examine the necessity of conducting training of the Investigating Officers to ensure full compliance.

(Para 44, 45)

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Legal Principles -- A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Act, 1872, that is examination of at least of one of the attesting witnesses -- However, unlike other documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of living -- This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain whether the Will propounded had been duly proved -- Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator -- Only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as genuine.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Parameters to ascertain ‘suspicious circumstances’ vitiating a Will –

-- Deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession

-- Prudence requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the disposition was a voluntary act.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will in favour of nephew – Wife/ natural heir – Will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the 1^st respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance – Nothing has come on record to show the relation between the couple was bitter – Trial Court erroneously observed that non-performance of last rites of testator by 1^st respondent hinted at sour relations between the couple – Ordinarily, in a Hindu/ Sikh family, last rites are performed by Male Sapinda relations – A cumulative assessment of the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to mention the very existence of his wife in the Will, gives rise to serious doubt that the Will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant and is not the ‘free will’ of the testator – Held, non-mention of 1st respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will, is an eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated by the undue influence of the appellant.

(Para 19, 20)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Cruelty – Acquittal in criminal case -- Long separation -- Parties separated just one year after their marriage and have remained apart ever since for more than 16 years -- Additionally, in the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent under Sections 498A/406/34 of the IPC, the appellant and his family members have been acquitted, which demonstrates that the allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment against the appellant were false -- Welfare and dignity of both the spouses must be prioritized -- Court finds it a fit case to exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution and granted the relief of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Appellant is working as a clerk in a private firm and the respondent is a homemaker who is independently taking care of their minor son aged 16 years -- Appellant ordered to pay composite monthly maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent and their child.

(Para 13-27)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused: Statutory requisites for summoning any person not being the accused:

(a) such person has committed an offence;

(b) his complicity is revealed from the evidence collected during inquiry or trial; and 

(c) for such offence, he can be tried together with the accused already facing trial.

Principles that the Trial Court ought to follow while exercising power under this Section are :

(a) This provision is a facet of that area of law which gives protection to victims and society at large, ensuring that the perpetrators of crime should not escape the force of law;

(b) It is the duty cast upon the Court not to let the guilty get away unpunished;

(c) The Trial Court has broad but not unbridled power as this power can be exercised only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not any other material collected during investigation;

(d) The Trial Court is not powerless to summon a person who is not named in the FIR or Chargesheet; they can be impleaded if the evidence adduced inculpates him;

(e) This power is not to be exercised in a regular or cavalier manner, but only when strong or cogent evidence is available than the mere probability of complicity;

(f) The degree of satisfaction required is much stricter than the prima facie case, which is needed at the time of framing of charge(s);

(g) The Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage as the expression used is ‘such person could be tried’ and not ‘should be tried’.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- It ought to have considered that the standard of satisfaction required is short of the standard necessary for passing a final judgment after trial.

(Para 22)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 -- Summoning of additional accused -- “R”, although not charge sheeted, was named in the FIR, and the evidence thus far, leads, prima facie, to reveal his role -- Therefore, at this stage, there is sufficient material to put him on trial.

(Para 23)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 -- Summoning of additional accused -- High Court proceeded to conduct a mini trial -- It erred in giving a categorical finding on the merits -- High Court erred in observing that witnesses have stated nothing about the motive of the crime; that the depositions are silent on the aspect of common intention; absence of the manner or sequence of occurrence of the incident; or that it cannot be inferred who is the aggressor -- All these questions, amongst others, are relevant or not is a matter to be considered at the stage of final adjudication -- It is a settled law that the power under Section 319 CrPC must be exercised sparingly -- However, where the evidence reveals the complicity of the prospective accused, it becomes obligatory for the authority to exercise the power provided under the said Section -- Summoning order passed by the Trial Court restored.

(Para 24-26)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Customary marriage -- Levirate marriage – Legality of – Prohibited relationship – Effect of -- Petitioner and the Opposite Party No. 1 belong to a community where levirate marriage (marriage of a widow with the younger brother of the deceased husband) is a long-established and socially accepted custom -- Customary marriage was solemnized as per the local and caste-based traditions, practiced since generations, following the death of her husband – Held, if a recognized, longstanding, and reasonable custom exists in a particular community that allows levirate marriage, such a marriage may be legally valid despite otherwise being within a prohibited relationship.

(Para 15)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Levirate marriage – Status of wife -- Petitioner and O. P. No.1 have resided together for a significant period, long enough to give birth to two children-both of whom are acknowledged by the family -- Disowning the Petitioner on the sole ground of the marriage being a levirate marriage, while accepting her children as part of the family, reflects not just a legal contradiction but a moral and social injustice -- Denial of the wife’s status is an unjust act and if accepted, would set a dangerous precedent where a woman who has fulfilled the role of a wife and mother is discarded without remedy, solely due to patriarchal convenience.

(Para 18, 19)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 3(a), 5(iv) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Levirate marriage -- Maintenance to wife -- Marriage, being validated by custom, cohabitation, social acceptance, and the birth of children, must be treated as valid in law for the purposes of Section 125 Cr.P.C -- Disregarding such a union would not only be legally unsound but would also send a regressive message to society, undermining the dignity of women and the security of children born from such relationships -- Petitioner, having lived as wife, borne children, and been deserted without support, falls within the protective umbrella of Section 125 CrPC -- Existence of children born out of the union further strengthens the presumption of valid marriage, or at minimum, a relationship akin to marriage, entitling the petitioner to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C -- Technical plea of invalidity of marriage, in this case, cannot be a valid ground to deny her maintenance.

(Para 21-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Death sentence converted to life sentence till last breath -- Appellant-convict had barbarically murdered his family members – Probation report concludes that:  Appellant-convict has the ability to adapt, engage in constructive activities, pursue an education despite past difficulty, continued worry about his daughter’s future, shows a notable capacity for reform and personal growth – Appellant-convict’s continued incarceration has had a negative impact on daughter, who is really struggling to cope with life – Interactions with her, threw light on a gentle, loving side of the Appellant-convict – Possibility of reformation; as a criteria, apply to the instant case – It can be said that there is mixed opinion on whether he shall or shall not be able to reform his way, the Court will err on the side of caution just as when there are two possible interpretations of a given set of facts or circumstances, the one that favours the accused is to be adopted – Death penalty may not be appropriate – Appellant should spend his days in jail attempting to repent for the crimes committed by him – Appeals are partly allowed to the extent that he is released from death row – Instead, he shall await his last breath in prison, without remission.

(Para 4, 12, 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Permissibility of -- Offence u/s 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature --  Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly -- However, the power of the Court u/s 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – FIR invoking Section 376 IPC, was filed immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the opposing side -- This sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations and suggests that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step -- More importantly, the complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case -- She has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability -- Her stand is neither tentative nor ambiguous -- Parties have amicably resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding -- Continuation of the trial would not serve any meaningful purpose -- It would only prolong distress for all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts without the likelihood of a productive outcome -- Continuation of the criminal proceedings would only amount to abuse of process -- FIR along with all proceedings arising therefrom, including Sessions Case, quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR -- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC.

-- It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.

-- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

(Para 42(i)(ii))

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196, 197, 299, 302 – Promoting enmity – Prejudicial to national integration – Intent to insult religion feelings -- Registration of FIR – Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- Police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out -- Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence -- Same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of BNS -- To ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words -- This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

(Para 42 (iii))

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 – Life and liberty – Freedom of speech – Reasonable restrictions – Preliminary enquiry for FIR -- Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression -- Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution -- Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution -- They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens -- Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 -- If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) -- When an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused -- This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected -- Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

(Para 42(iv)(v))

D. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity – When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds -- The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

(Para 42(vi)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is at a nascent stage -- There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS --   When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage -- It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence -- There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage.

(Para 42(vii)

F. Constitution of India, Article 19(1(a) -- Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society -- Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution -- In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view -- Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected -- Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India -- If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights -- There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

(Para 42(viii)

G. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity/ hatred – It cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities -- Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.

(Para 42(ix)

Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999), Section 25(3) -- Trade Mark Rules, 2017, Rule 58 – Expiry of trade-mark -- Removal of trademark from register – Notice for – Mandate of – Authorities were supposed to issue a notice in the Form O-3/ RG-3 informing the registered proprietor of the date of expiry -- Aforesaid exercise has not been undertaken by the respondents – Since the respondents have failed to comply with the aforesaid mandatory provision, their action of removal of registered trademark of the petitioner from the record is not sustainable in the eyes of law and such action quashed and set aside.

(Para 7)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 39 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 58, 113 – Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA – Allotment of plot to oustees -- Limitation – Suits instituted almost after a period of fifteen years from the date of the Policy of 1992 – Whether Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would be 3 years -- Case is not of recurring cause of action so as to bring the suit within the period of limitation though instituted almost after a period of 14-20 years – Court could take the view that suits NOT maintainable on the ground of limitation – However, Court granted the benefit of the scheme of 2016 instead of non-suiting the respondents (original plaintiffs) completely – Respondents/ plaintiffs are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right relying on the decision of Brij Mohan and Others vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. (2011) 2 SCC 29 that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in the 1992 policy -- The respondents are entitled at the most to seek the benefit of the 2016 policy.

(Pata 92-95 (i)(ii))

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA -- Allotment of plot to oustees – Transfer of plot -- Since the allotment of plot is with a laudable object and not for any monetary gain, a condition should be imposed at the time of allotment that the allotee shall not be entitled to transfer the plot to any third party without the permission of the competent authority and in any case not within five years from the date of the allotment.

(Pata 95 (viii))

C. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 -- Settlement of oustees claims, 1992/ 2016 -- Acquisition of land by HUDA -- Allotment of plot to oustees – Requirement of -- When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation -- It is only in the rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons over and above paying them compensation in terms of money -- It is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must -- Any beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners -- Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition -- In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable.

(Para 95 (ix))

A. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18(2) – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 65 to 81 – Time barred claim -- Conciliation proceedings – Applicability of Limitation Act -- The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act – A time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation as the expiry of limitation period does not extinguish the right to recover the amount, including through a settlement agreement that can be arrived at through the conciliatory process.

(Para 51(i))

B. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18(3), 22 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 2(4), 7(1) – Arbitration proceedings – Applicability of Limitation Act -- The Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act -- The applicability of the provisions of ACA to such arbitrations is determined as per Section 18(3) and other provisions of the MSMED Act, as these are special laws, rather than by Section 2(4) of the ACA, which is under a general law -- This is in addition to the reasoning provided in Silpi Industries (supra) -- Further, the extension of the limitation period on the basis of disclosure under Section 22 of the MSMED Act must be examined on a case-to-case basis.

(Para 51(ii))

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), Schedule – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985, Rule 53, 64, Schedule-I -- NDPS – Buprenorphine Hydrochloride -- It cannot be said that the dealing in of “Buprenorphine Hydrochloride” would not amount to an offence u/s 8 of the NDPS Act owing to the fact that the said psychotropic substance only finds mention under the Schedule to the NDPS Act and is not listed under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules.

(Para 156)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 80, Schedule – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 12 -- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 Schedules -- Psychotropic substances -- Some psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act are also mentioned under the D&C Act and the rules framed thereunder -- This is only because those substances while capable of being abused for their inherent properties could also be used in the field of medicine -- However, the mere mention of certain psychotropic substances under the D&C regime would not take them away from the purview of the NDPS Act, if they are also mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act.

(Para 157)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section  8, Schedule – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) -- NDPS – Retrospective effect of judgment – Whether violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution -- Court in case of Sanjeev V. Deshpande 2014 13 SCC 1 = (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 20209 did not think fit to confine or restrict its interpretation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act to future cases only -- Pending cases, if any, which were instituted before the decision of the Court in Sanjeev V. Deshpande’s case would also be governed by the law as clarified by it -- Retrospective application of the dictum would not give rise to any implications as regards the rights of the accused persons under Article 20(1) of the Constitution – It has only clarified the law as it stood from its inception and given true effect to the meaning assigned to the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act and the Rules thereunder, by the lawmakers – The same cannot be construed as creating a new offence -- Overruling of a decision cannot be equated to the enactment of an ex-post facto law -- Acquittals which have already been recorded as a consequence of the decision in Rajesh Kumar Gupta’ case 2007 (1) SCC 355 and have attained finality, would not be unsettled in light of the overruling decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case or the observations made in this case.

(Para 158-161)

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 23 -- Acquisition of land – Market price – Reliance upon sale transaction proximate to acquisition -- Bona fide transaction of sale, if proximate to the land acquired and the date, in absence of any evidence that acquisition has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of resultant improvement in development prospects, can be relied upon while determining the compensation.

(Para 9)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18, 23 -- Acquisition of land – Market price – Collector of the District himself allotted the land of Survey No. 864 at the rate of Rs. 65/- per square metre prior to acquisition, meaning thereby, the government wanted to fetch higher amount by allotting land to an individual -- In such scenario, computation of compensation by Reference Court and High Court at a lower rate for the land acquired cannot be accepted -- As such, said exemplar is also relevant to determine the fair and reasonable amount -- Sale deed, relied is a piece of plot, after leaving the land for development, in the said contingency, on deduction of 30% as the development cost, the compensation would come at the rate of Rs. 107/- per square metre -- Compensation ordered to be determined at the rate of Rs. 107/- per square metre.

(Para 11-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Suspension of sentence in appeal – Condition to deposit 20% of cheque amount – Setting aside of -- Appellate Court suspended the sentence and ordered to deposit 20% of the cheque amount without affording any opportunity to the petitioner/ accused to explain his position – Petitioner relegated to approach the learned Appellate Court -- Order of the learned Appellate Court to the extent of depositing 20% of the cheque amount set aside.

(Para 4, 5)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 29 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 482 -- Anticipatory bail – Recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride -- Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not a psychotropic substance, included in the Schedule of the NDPS Act -- Appellant held entitled to be admitted to an order for grant of pre-arrest bail.

(Para 3, 9)