A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement – Recovery therefrom – Evidential value -- While recovery u/s 27 of the Act can be a crucial piece of evidence, it cannot be the sole basis for conviction -- It is not substantive evidence -- It needs to be corroborated by other evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 114(a) – Section 379 – Theft - Conviction of the petitioner based on the evidence regarding recovery u/s 27 of the Evidence Act and drawing presumption under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act alone cannot be sustained -- Impugned conviction and sentence set aside – Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 11-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 397, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Parole – To accompany his ailing wife who is suffering from various diseases and maintain social ties with his daughter who is settled in Australia – Held, parole serves a reformative and humanitarian purpose by preserving family ties and supporting rehabilitation -- Despite directions dated 16.09.2025 requiring a decision on his parole within two weeks, the authorities failed to comply -- Such administrative delay cannot be allowed to prejudice the petitioner’s rights -- While parole, no doubt, is a concession, but it is, in essence, a reformative measure grounded in Article 21 of the Constitution, ensuring the right to life with dignity even during incarceration -- Petitioner ordered to be released on parole for four weeks.

(Para 3.1, 9)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Dependency of not legally wedded wife and her daughter – Legal representatives -- Tribunal can award compensation to a cohabitant of deceased who lived like a spouse -- Principle of substantive justice, recognizes the partner's dependency on the deceased -- However, the cohabitant must prove that he/she was in a stable, long-term relationship with the deceased, financially dependent upon him and the relationship had the character of marriage, even if not formalized -- Appellants No.1 and 2 are sister-in-law and niece of deceased -- Appellant No.1 and deceased were living the status of spouse and deceased was also having the responsibility of appellant No.2 -- In such circumstances, appellants/ claimants come under the purview of 'legal representatives' of deceased for filing the claim petition on account of death of deceased under Motor Vehicles Act.

(Para 6-12)

A. Interpretation of law -- Clarifications/ circulars/ instructions issued by Government are not binding upon Courts which are supposed to interpret and rely upon statutory provisions.

(Para 13)

B. Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Rule 13.9 – Haryana Police Act, 2007 (25 of 2008), Section 50(n)(p), 92, 93 -- Promotion -- Head Constable to Assistant Sub-Inspector – WAN message by DIG on behalf of DGP clarifying that official under currency of punishment may not be deputed to Intermediate School Course – Legality of -- Held, Appointment and promotion of police officers is governed by PPR – Clarification issued by DGP is beyond his jurisdiction could not issue clarification relating to matters covered by PPR -- Action of DGP amounted to amendment of Rule 13.9 of PPR which was impermissible in law and beyond his jurisdiction -- Amendment in Rules and clarification to remove difficulties can be made/issued by State Government -- Respondent cannot keep petitioners away from Intermediate School Course on the basis of aforesaid WAN messages issued by DGP -- Respondents directed to depute the petitioners for ongoing Intermediate School Course -- In the event, they are not be deputed for ongoing course, they shall be enlisted in the subsequent Intermediate School Course, however, would be deemed to have passed said course along with candidates who at present are undergoing Intermediate School Course.

(Para 7, 13-18)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 50, 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Sale of vehicle – Further sale -- Registered owner – Insurance company -- Liability of -- Transfer of vehicle -- Transfer of the registration as per Section 50 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 requires the transferee to report the fact of transfer in the prescribed form to the Registering Authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is affected within 14 days of the transfer -- No contention raised by the registered owner that he made such a report u/s 50(1)(a)(i) of the Act -- Hence the ownership was with the registered owner even at the time of the accident and it is his liability to compensate the victims in the accident, which also has to be indemnified by the insurer -- Liability to pay falls squarely on the registered owner, even if there has been successive transfers which has to be indemnified by the insurer.

(Para 10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166(3) -- Claim petition under Motor vehicle Act – Limitation – Interim order / No Claim Petition should be dismissed as time barred -- During the pendency of SLP, the tribunal and the High Courts directed not to dismiss the claim petitions on the ground of such petitions as barred by limitation as prescribed under sub-Section (3) or Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Matters ordered to re-list on 25.11.2025.

(Para 5, 6)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 -- Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (59 of 1960) -- Stray dogs bites : Directions issued having regard to the alarming rise in incidents of dog bites within institutional areas such as educational institutions, hospitals, sports complexes, bus stands/depots (including Inter-State Bus Terminals) and railway stations, in the interest of public safety, health, and management of stray dogs: -

-- The State Governments and Union Territories shall through their respective local/ municipal authorities, within a period of two weeks, identify all Government and private educational institutions, hospitals (including district hospitals, primary health centres, and medical colleges), public sports complexes or stadia, bus stands/depots (including Inter-State Bus Terminals) and railway stations situated within their territorial limits.

-- The administrative heads of the aforesaid institutions shall through their respective local/ municipal authorities, under the overall supervision of the District Magistrate concerned, ensure that the premises are secured by adequate fencing, boundary walls, gates and such other structural or administrative measures as may be necessary to prevent the ingress of stray dogs. The said exercise shall be completed as soon as possible and preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today.

-- The management of every educational institution, hospital, sports complex, bus stand/depot (including Inter-State Bus Terminal) and railway station identified under Direction (A) shall designate a Nodal Officer responsible for the upkeep and cleanliness of the premises and for ensuring that stray dogs do not enter or inhabit the campus. The details of the said officer shall be displayed prominently at the entrance and notified to the jurisdictional municipal body/authority.

-- The local municipal authorities and panchayats shall carry out regular inspections, at least once in every three months, of all such premises to ensure that no stray dog habitats exist within or in the immediate vicinity of these institutions. Any lapse in this regard shall be viewed seriously, and responsibility shall be fixed upon the concerned municipal officials/administrative authorities.

-- It shall be the responsibility of the jurisdictional municipal body/authority to forthwith remove every stray dog found within the premises of an educational institution, hospital (public or private), sports complex, bus stand/depot (including Inter-State Bus Terminal) or railway station and to shift such animal/s to a designated shelter, after due sterilisation and vaccination, in accordance with the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023. The stray dogs so picked up shall not be released back to the same location from which they were picked up. We have consciously directed the non-release of such stray dogs to the same location from which they were picked up, as permitting the same would frustrate the very effect of the directions issued to liberate such institutional areas from the presence of stray dogs.

-- All Government and private hospitals shall maintain a mandatory stock of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin at all times.

-- Every school and educational institution shall be directed by the Ministry of Education, Government of India, to conduct awareness sessions for students and staff on preventive behaviour around animals, first-aid in case of bites, and immediate reporting protocols.

-- The management of stadiums and sports complexes shall ensure the deployment of security or ground-keeping personnel specifically tasked with around the clock vigil against the entry or habitation of stray dogs.

-- The railway authorities having jurisdiction over the railway stations as well as the State transport corporations and municipal authorities having jurisdiction over bus stands, depots and Inter-State Bus Terminals, shall ensure that such public-transport premises/facilities are effectively secured and maintained so as to prevent the habitation or movement of stray dogs within their premises. Proper waste-management systems shall be implemented to eliminate food sources that attract animals, and regular inspections shall be conducted to detect and address the presence of stray dogs.

-- Animal Welfare Board of India shall, within four weeks, issue detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for prevention of dog bites and management of stray dogs in institutional premises (public or private) including but not limited to Government and private educational institutions, hospitals (including district hospitals, primary health centres, and medical colleges), and sports complexes or stadia, to be uniformly adopted across all States and Union Territories.

The aforesaid directions in continuation of and in furtherance of Court’s order dated 22nd August, 2025, to ensure that the menace of stray dog attacks within institutional areas is curbed through effective preventive and administrative mechanisms. The primary objective is to safeguard the fundamental right to life and safety of citizens, particularly children, students, patients, and sportspersons, while ensuring compliance with the principles embodied in the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 framed under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 -- Any reported non-compliance shall be viewed very seriously and may invite penalties/consequences including but not limited to the initiation of suo moto contempt proceedings against the erring officials.

(Para 25, 26, 32)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 -- Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (59 of 1960) -- Stray dogs bites – Suo moto directions issued / Modified/ Clarified/ Supplemented: Direction dated 11.08.2025/ 22.08.2025 --

“2. Pursuant to the taking of suo moto cognizance, the matter came to be listed before the Bench on 11th August 2025, on which, the following directions were issued: -

“12. For the present, the aforesaid directions shall be complied with and implemented scrupulously. We, at the cost of repetition, again make it abundantly clear to the above concerned authorities in clear words that it shall at the earliest: -

(i) Start picking up and rounding the stray dogs from all localities of Delhi, Ghaziabad, NOIDA, Faridabad, Gurugram as well as areas on the outskirts, and relocate these dogs into designated shelters/pounds.

(ii) The appropriate authorities of NCT of Delhi, NOIDA, Ghaziabad, Gurugram & Faridabad are directed to immediately create dog shelters/pounds and report to this Court the creation of such infrastructure all over the National Capital Region (NCR). A report in this regard shall be filed before this Court within a period of eight-weeks.

(iii) In no circumstances, should these stray dogs after their relocation be once again released back onto the streets. In this regard proper records should be maintained by the concerned authorities regularly.

(iv) The stray dogs shall be captured, sterilized, dewormed and immunized as required by Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 and as noted above, shall not be released back. The dog shelters/pounds should have sufficient personnel to sterilize, deworm and immunize stray dogs and also for looking after the stray dogs who would be detained.

(v) We further make it clear that both the exercise of rounding up of stray dogs as well as the creation of necessary infrastructure in the form of shelters/pounds for the relocation, sterilization, deworming and immunization, shall be undertaken simultaneously. We do not want to hear about even a semblance of lethargy from the concerned authorities on the pre-text of awaiting the creation of shelters/pounds, otherwise, we will proceed to take strict action against these authorities. All authorities are directed to immediately begin the picking up stray dogs and in the same breadth creation of appropriate and adequate shelter homes and pounds across the National Capital Region.

13. Any hindrance or obstruction that may be caused by any individual or organization in the smooth and effective implementation of our aforesaid directions will be viewed as contempt of this Court and we shall proceed to take appropriate action in accordance with law.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Directions supplemented, Modified and clarified on 22.08.2025 as under:

“33. We, therefore, feel that a holistic approach requires mollification of the directions issued vide order dated 11th August, 2025. Accordingly, the directions issued by the two-Judge bench of this Court are supplemented, modified, and clarified in the terms indicated below: -

a. Municipal authorities shall continue to comply with the directions contained in paras 12(i) and 12(ii) of the subject order.

b. The directions contained in paras 12(iii) and 12(iv), to the extent that they prohibit the release of the picked up strays, shall be kept in abeyance for the time being. The dogs that are picked up shall be sterilised, dewormed, vaccinated, and released back to the same area from which they were picked up.

It is, however, clarified that this relocation shall not apply to the dogs infected with rabies or suspected to be infected with rabies, and those that display aggressive behaviour. Such dogs shall be sterilised and immunised, but under no circumstances should they be released back onto the streets. Furthermore, as far as possible, such stray dogs shall be kept in a separate pound/shelter after sterilisation and immunisation.

c. The directions contained in para 12(v) shall remain subject to the directions given by us in paras (a) and (b).

d. Municipal authorities shall forthwith commence an exercise for creating dedicated feeding spaces for the stray dogs in each municipal ward. The feeding areas shall be created/identified keeping in view the population and concentration of stray dogs in the particular municipal ward. Gantries/notice boards shall be placed near such designated feeding areas, mentioning that stray dogs shall only be fed in such areas. Under no condition shall the feeding of stray dogs on the streets be permitted. The persons found feeding the dogs on the streets in contravention of the above directions shall be liable to be proceeded against under the relevant legal framework.

The aforesaid directions are being issued in view of the reports regarding untoward incidents caused by unregulated feeding of stray dogs and to ensure that the practice of feeding dogs on roads and in public places is eliminated, as the said practice creates great difficulties for the common man walking on the streets.

e. Each municipal authority shall create a dedicated helpline number for reporting incidents of violation of the above directions. On such a report being received, appropriate measures shall be taken against the individuals/NGOs concerned.

f. The direction given in para 13 of the order dated 11th August 2025, is reiterated with a slight modification that no individual or organisation shall cause any hindrance or obstruction in the effective implementation of the directions given above. In case any public servant acting in compliance with the aforesaid directions is obstructed, then the violator/s shall be liable to face prosecution for obstructing the public servant acting in discharge of official duty.

g. Each individual dog lover and each NGO that has approached this Court shall deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.2,00,000/-, respectively, with the Registry of this Court within a period of 7 days, failing which they shall not be allowed to appear in the matter any further. The amounts so deposited shall be utilised in the creation of the infrastructure and facilities for the stray dogs under the aegis of the respective municipal bodies.

h. The desirous animal lover/s shall be free to move the application to the concerned municipal body for adoption of the street dogs, upon which the  identified/selected street dog/s shall be tagged and given in adoption to the applicant. It shall be the responsibility of the applicant(s) to ensure that the adopted stray dogs do not return to the streets.

i. The municipal authorities shall file an affidavit of compliance with complete statistics of resources, viz., dog pounds, veterinarians, dog catching personnel, specially modified vehicles/cages available as on date for the purpose of compliance of the ABC Rules.

34. Since the application of the ABC Rules is uniform all over the country and the same issues which have been taken up in the Suo Moto Writ Petition have either cropped up or are likely to exist in every State, we propose to expand the scope of this matter beyond the confines of New Delhi and the NCR region.”

(Para 2, 33-36)

A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 126, 130, 170 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 170, 528 -- FIR under u/s 126, 130, 170 of BNS --  Preventive action u/s 170 of BNSS – Permissibly of -- Once a substantive criminal case had already been registered in relation to the alleged offence, any warranted arrest or custodial measure ought to have been taken therein -- To subject the petitioners to parallel preventive proceedings u/s 170 B.N.S.S. amounts to a form of double jeopardy in spirit, if not in letter -- Impugned order passed by the Executive Magistrate (ACP Headquarters) quashed and set aside.

(Para 7, 18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 130, 170 – Preventive action – Sureties with character certificate – Permissibility   of -- Character certificate condition of sureties is not found in any provision of law — Neither u/s 130 B.N.S.S. nor under any other provision -- In fact, the concept of “character certificate” is alien to preventive law jurisprudence -- Such extra-legal impositions amount to legislative overreach by the Executive Magistrate and are wholly unsustainable.

(Para 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 494 – Second marriage – Offence u/s 494 IPC -- To establish the offence u/s 494 IPC, the prosecution must incontrovertibly prove two indispensable ingredients: first, the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between the complainant and the accused at the relevant time; and second, the performance of another marriage by the accused with all essential ceremonies and customary rites recognized under personal law, thereby rendering the said marriage legally valid -- Vague allegations of cohabitation, or assertions of the parties living together as husband and wife, fall far short of the statutory requirement under Section 494 IPC.

(Para 3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part-1 – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Pre-mediation or deliberate plan – Role of -- Sentence reduced -- Neck injury identified as the fatal and the primary cause of death -- No evidence to suggest that the assault was premeditated or carried out with a deliberate plan to kill the deceased – No undue advantage or cruelty on the part of the appellant -- Assault was the result of a sudden altercation between the parties, the act can be characterized as culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Conviction altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I, IPC -- Appellant has already undergone the incarnation for more than nine years including the remission and the appellant is still in judicial custody since his arrest -- Sentence reduced to the period already undergone by him.

(Para 21-25)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7(iv)(c) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Sale deed – Challenge to -- Agriculture land – Plea of -- Ad-valorem court fee -- Petitioner has not, at any stage, pleaded that the court fee is liable to be computed on the basis of the land revenue assessed or payable in respect of the suit property -- Instead, the petitioner has affixed court fee treating the suit as one seeking a mere declaration – Held, petitioner, being the executant of the impugned sale deed, is liable to pay advalorem court fee on the sale consideration mentioned therein.

(para 2-5)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 265 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 82, 420 – Witness through video-conference – Ld. Trial Magistrate allowed the examination of two witnesses, who are residing in New Zealand and Canada respectively through Video conferencing – Specific direction issued to verify the identity of the witnesses and counsel for complainant directed to furnish the passport and one ID proof of the witnesses as per Government of India/ State Government rules and to furnish details regarding nearest office of the Consulate General of India to the witnesses for necessary further action -- All necessary precautions have been taken while passing the impugned order, thus, does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and no interference in the impugned order is called for – Petition dismissed.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Abetment to suicide -- Refusal to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Appellant could not be said to have intended the consequences of his act namely suicide -- It is possible that she might have felt hurt -- Mere refusal to marry even if true by itself would not amount to instigation as explained under Section 107 of the IPC -- First Information Report quashed.

(Para 17-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide -- Ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 306 of the IPC would stand fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/ incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide -- Act of instigation as alleged must be with the intention to push the deceased into such a situation that she is left with no other option but to commit suicide.

(Para 17)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427 -- Concurrent running of sentence -- Conviction in two cheque bounce complaints -- Both the cheques were issued for the discharge of single liability – Substantive sentence imposed ordered to run concurrently -- However, the sentence of payment of compensation shall remain intact in each case.

(Para 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11, Order 21 – Resjudicata in execution proceedings -- Principles of res judicata available in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the execution proceedings.

(Para 3)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 18 -- Reference to District judge -- Full particulars of total land acquired not given – Effect of – Petition for amendment in the description of land preferred was allowed – Challenge to -- Landowner not required to give any details; and it was the job of the Collector to provide the complete details of the land of the aggrieved landowner – LAC cannot raise any grievance against direction to pay the amount of enhanced market value of the land, particularly so; because there is not even an argument that the land which was left out of mention in the Reference filed by the landowner, was having a different market value; than the land qua which the market value was determined by the Reference Court – Revision dismissed.

(Para 3-5)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Violation of terms of Permit – Principe of pay and recover -- Offending vehicle did not have the permit to enter the City, where the accident took place -- Purpose of an insurance policy in the present context is to shield the owner/ operator from direct liability when such an unforeseen/unfortunate incident takes place -- To deny the victim/ dependents of the victim compensation simply because the accident took place outside the bounds of the permit and, therefore, is outside the purview of the insurance policy, would be offensive to the sense of justice, for the accident itself is for no fault of his -- High Court applying the pay and recover principle, is entirely justified and requires no interference.

(Para 8-10)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 14A, 18 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023),  Section 482, 528 – Offence under SC/ST Act – Anticipatory bail – Maintainability -- Remedy of – Maintainability of appeal against rejection order -- Section 14-A merely provides a statutory right of appeal against orders passed by the Special or Exclusive Special Courts, primarily in the context of regular bail, conviction, or trial-related orders, and cannot be interpreted to override or nullify the specific bar contained in Section 18 – Appeal not maintainable u/s 14-A of the Act -- A petition under Section 482 BNSS, 2023 (Section 438 Cr.P.C.) would not lie, in view of the absolute bar created vide Section 18 of the Act and since that provision is binding, mandatory and not directive -- In case the arrest of the accused is found to be illegal or is challenging the quashing of FIR being illegal may seek stay of arrest or get the arrest declared illegal and violative of constitutional law -- Appropriate relief can be sought u/s 528 of BNSS (earlier Section 482 Cr.P.C.,).

(Para 32,33)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance to child – Matrimonial settlement – Effect of -- While there may have been a Settlement for the maintenance past, present and future between the Husband/ Petitioner and wife/ Respondent No.1, but while entering into such matrimonial Settlement, the right of the child cannot be compromised and these Settlements do not impact the independent rights of the child -- If the wife/ Respondent No.1 is able to prove changed circumstances, she may get entitled to maintenance -- Rights of the child to claim maintenance from the father, cannot be rejected at the outset.

(Para 33-38)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Talaq-e-Khula -- Maintenance to wife – Entitlement of -- Petitioner’s assertion that the wife/ Respondent No.1 having voluntarily taken a divorce by Talaq-e-Khula, is not entitled to any maintenance u/s 125(4) Cr.P.C – Held, once a wife is divorced, she is per se entitled to maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C irrespective of the ground or the manner in which the divorce is taken -- This contention of the Petitioner is, therefore not tenable.

(Para 37)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintainability of maintenance petition – Interim maintenance -- Maintainability of the Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C and question of award of Interim Maintenance are inseparable -- Question of grant of maintenance can be determined only after the determination of maintainability of the Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Interim maintenance – Consideration of -- Ld. Family Judge before granting any Interim Maintenance, would have to answer the pertinent question of whether the husband has neglected or refused to give maintenance to the wife and whether she is unable to maintain herself -- Matter is listed for Interim Maintenance and these questions would naturally be answered by the Ld. Judge before granting or declining the Interim Maintenance.

(Para 42)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Severability of contract – Performance of part of contract -- While adjudicating suits, or when examining the validity of agreements or contracts, the Courts generally have the power to sever the invalid portion of an agreement from its valid portion and give effect to the latter -- No bar on the application of the doctrine of severability in suits for specific performance, however, this power must be exercised with great caution and only in exceptional cases -- Court cannot remove the essential part of an agreement or the very object for which it was executed -- While exercising such power, the Courts must refrain from re-writing or re-constructing the agreement between the parties to make it work.

(Para 20-22)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Severability of contract – Performance of part of contract -- Agreement for construction of eight flats – Agreement was contrary to law and therefore unenforceable – Trial Court applied Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, directing transfer of the ‘rights over the land’ to the Plaintiff, subject to compliance with the Building Regulations limiting construction to three flats -- Held, Trial Court was not justified in reworking the agreement to make it enforceable by removing its essential object-namely, the construction of eight flats on the subject land -- Trial Court re-wrote the agreement, which it could not have done since the very essence of the agreement was the construction of eight flats -- Respondent is a public sector bank and it is not expected from the State or its instrumentalities to enter into camouflage agreements and especially where the object of the agreement would result in law being violated – Suit dismissed.

(Para 19, 24-27)

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), Section 4 -- Assam Financial Corporation (Amendment) Staff Regulations, 2007, Regulation 107 – Assam Financial Corporation (Payment of Gratuity to Employees) Regulation, 1964 -- Gratuity to AFC employee -- Ceiling for gratuity as per AFC’s internal regulations not in sync with the Act -- State Government employees ceiling enhanced to Rs.15,00,000/- -- Interpretation of the regulation must be made which is in favor of the employees -- Regulation 107 of the 2007 Regulations states ‘…maximum of Rs.3.50 lacs or as notified by the Govt. of Assam from time to time…’ -- Appellant’s submission that the payment of enhanced pay scale / allowances must first be approved by the Board of Directors rejected – Held, in case where the limit prescribed by the State Government is higher than the limit set by the AFC, the import of Regulation 107 has to be interpreted in such a manner that the benefit of the higher limit set by the State Government has to be given to the employees of the AFC – High Court granted benefit of the enhanced gratuity in terms of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Appeal of AFC dismissed.

(Para 5, 6, 10, 16, 17)

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), Section 2(1)(d)(iii)(d) – Dependent – Employee’s Compensation Act was enacted in the year 1923 – Definition of word ‘dependent’ in Section 2(1)(d)(iii)(d) means “a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor” – In the present time, no one will normally find a widowed sister who is a minor, especially after enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Held, matter needs to be considered by the Law Commission of India for suitable amendment of the aforesaid provision or any other in the 1923 Act.

(Para 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 25 -- Transfer of suit -- Suit for groundless threat of infringement instituted by the petitioner before the Bombay High Court on 01.07.2025 is prior in time to the institution of the suit for infringement by the respondent no.1 on 07.07.2025 at Delhi High Court -- Jurisdiction at Delhi was invoked by the respondent no.1 by purchasing the product from an online portal and getting it delivered in Delhi -- Question of fact, law, and the issues to be determined in the suit for groundless threat of infringement instituted by the petitioner and the suit for infringement instituted by the respondent no. 1 are substantially overlapping -- In the interest of saving precious judicial time and to avoid duplication and multiplicity of proceedings, it would be expedient to transfer the suit for infringement instituted by the respondent no.1 pending before the Delhi High Court to the Bombay High Court where the suit instituted by the petitioner for Groundless Threat of Infringement is pending – Transfer petition allowed.

(Para 10-12)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 --  Multi-Purpose Worker (MPW) on contract basis – Non-release of salary after expiry of contract – Shifting to the web-portal of the HKRNL – Further engagement – Inquiry Committee of DEEO, Section Officer under the Chairmanship of Class-1 Officer of the Directorate constituted -- Petitioners permitted to represent before the said inquiry committee for establishing the dates upto which they actually worked in the respective schools  -- Respondents directed to conclude the enquiry after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and to release remuneration for the period they have worked after 31.03.2024 within three months – Department is at liberty to take disciplinary action against the officer(s)/official(s), in case anyone is found negligent or deficient in performance of duty -- Further direction given for porting the MPWs to the HKRNL in terms of the applicable policy in accordance with law, within one month thereafter.

(Para 2-6)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 20 -- Corruption case – Presumption – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification -- Just because money changed hands, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the same was pursuant to a demand -- For conviction under the Act, an entire chain, beginning from demand, acceptance, and recovery has to be completed -- When the initial demand itself is suspicious, even if the two other components of payment and recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain would not be complete -- Since the factum of demand itself has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the acquittal of the Respondent by the Impugned Judgment cannot be termed perverse or unwarranted – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 25-27)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3, 65B – Electronic records – Document – Exhibition of Compact Disc (CD) – Playing of CD during deposition – Requirement of -- Author of the video not only deposed that he recorded the video, but he also gave a certificate, as contemplated under subsection (4) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, to make the CD admissible in evidence – High Court did not dispute that the electronic record was duly exhibited -- High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video – Held, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s) -- It is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video.

(Para 19)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – NDPS – Chemical examiner – Deposition of – Requirement of – As far as non-production of Chemical Examiner as a witness is concerned, u/s 293 of CrPC, report of a Chemical Examiner is admissible even if he is not produced as a witness though, the Court may summon and examine him as to the subject matter of the report -- There is no requirement of law that Chemical Examiner would have to be called in each NDPS case to prove the report when it is otherwise admissible under sub-section (1) of Section 293 of CrPC.

(Para 21)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS – Production of contraband in Trial – Requirements of – Mere non-production of the seized contraband during trial may not be fatal if there is reliable evidence in respect of its seizure, drawing of samples therefrom, and FSL report relating to the sample drawn from the seized material – However, to ensure that no adverse inference is drawn against the prosecution for non-production of the seized contraband, documents prepared in terms of the provisions of Section 52-A, inter alia, evidencing preparation of inventory of seized contraband and drawing of samples therefrom, would have to be brought on record – Likewise, evidence should be there that the sample drawn from the inventory was sent to FSL in a sealed container/ envelop, as per guidelines, and that the seal was found intact at the end of FSL – This is to obviate any doubt regarding sample being tampered in transit – Similarly, FSL’s report along with the sample tested by it is to be placed on record so that there remains no doubt regarding the sample tested.

(Para 30, 31)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386(b)(i), 391 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 52A – NDPS -- Re-trial – Additional evidence -- High Court, observed that the representative sample was not opened before the Court at the time of recording of statement of the concerned witness -- Be that as it may, this was not a ground to direct for a retrial when the appellate court has power to take additional evidence u/s 391 of CrPC, which, inter alia, can be exercised to exhibit a document or material already on the record of the Court -- And if those defects are fatal to the prosecution, the appellate court is free to take its decision as may be warranted in the facts of the case. But, in any event, it cannot be a ground to direct a re-trial.

(Para 33)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for Specific performance -- Termination of contract – Effect of -- A contract may give right to the parties, or any one of the parties, to terminate the contract on existence of certain conditions -- In terms thereof, the contract is terminated, a doubt over subsistence of the contract is created and, therefore, without seeking a declaration that termination is bad in law, a decree for specific performance may not be available -- However, where there is no such right conferred on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conferred is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such termination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggrieved may, by treating the contract as subsisting, sue for specific performance without seeking a declaratory relief qua validity of such termination.

(Para 32)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for specific performance – Termination of contract – Effect of – Declaration that termination of contract was invalid – Requirement of -- By accepting Rs.1,95,000 after expiry of six months, D-1 and D-2, firstly, waived their right, as available to them under the contract, to forfeit the advance consideration/ earnest money,

Secondly, by such acceptance and endorsement on the back of the agreement they treated the contract as subsisting and,

thirdly, by transferring part of the subject matter of the agreement in favour of D-3, even before serving a forfeiture notice, they committed a breach of the contract.

In such circumstances, the plaintiff had an option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance more so when termination was a void act, no longer permissible under the varied contract -- Suit for specific performance was maintainable even without seeking a declaration that termination of the contract was invalid in law.

(Para 33)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 – Suit for specific performance -- Evidence on record that the Tehsildar had reported regarding possession of the plaintiff over the suit property though that report was subject to final adjudication in the suit – In such circumstances, merely because plaintiff’s claim that property was in his possession was not accepted, the relief of specific performance cannot be declined, particularly, when the plaintiff had already paid over 90% of the agreed consideration and paid additional amount also as demanded by D-1 and D-2 -- Further, D-3 was a related party of D-1 and D-2 and, therefore, not a bona fide purchaser -- Not a fit case where discretionary relief of specific performance should have been denied – High Court erred in law by interfering with the decree of specific performance passed by the first appellate court -- Judgment and decree(s) of the High Court is/are set aside and that of the first appellate court is/are restored.

(Para 39, 40)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 37, 38 -- Permanent injunction – Plaintiff paying Betai -- Rent agreement of tenancy – Requirements of – Suit decreed by both the Courts Trial Court as well First Appellate Court -- Plaintiff duly proved his possession over the suit land by producing extensive revenue record in the form of Jamabandis, Khasra Girdawaris from which it is evident that the plaintiff is in cultivating possession of the suit property -- In the Jamabandi it is also recorded that plaintiff is paying ‘Batai’ – Held, if plaintiff is paying Batai, there is no requirement for the plaintiff to produce rent slip or any Agreement in respect of his tenancy -- From the revenue record, it is also established that the plaintiff is in possession of suit property as Gair Marusi -- Plaintiff has shown his possession over the suit property since 1970 -- Defendants have not only been unable to dispute or controvert the above said comprehensive evidence by way of revenue record produced by the plaintiff – No ground made out to interfere in the impugned judgments and decrees – RSA dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, Section 195(1)(b)(i), 340 -- Threatening Witness – Offence u/s 195A IPC – FIR  by police -- Permissibility of -- Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as an offence distinct and different from those u/ss 193 IPC, 194 IPC, 195 IPC and 196 IPC -- Those offences require a complaint to be made only by those named in Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC and they were all non-cognizable offences -- However, an offence u/s 195A IPC was a cognizable offence -- Threatened witness or other person may take immediate steps by either giving oral information of the commission of this cognizable offence to the concerned police officer, u/s 154 CrPC, or by making a complaint to a jurisdictional Magistrate, u/s 195A CrPC, so as to set the process of criminal law in motion.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 386 -- Appeal against acquittal – Power of Appellate Court -- Appellate Court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal u/s 378 and 386 of the Cr.P.C. -- However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited -- If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed -- Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice -- Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own.

(Para 12)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 20 – Corruption case -- Demand of illegal gratification and acceptance – Presumption -- Statutory presumption u/s 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 20 – Corruption case -- Acquittal by Trial Court – Conviction in appeal by High Court -- Demand of illegal gratification and acceptance – Proof of – Sole basis of the prosecution to prove demand and acceptance is the narration of the complainant, a close scrutiny of which reveals serious infirmities -- Both, the DSP and the Inspector of ACB, admit they did not question the complainant on this point, and till date no explanation has ever been offered for keeping Mediator/ R out of the room -- They also admit that they did not question any of the other office staff or visitors -- Other mediator B was not examined by the prosecution at all -- These circumstances are nowhere addressed by the High Court -- Such omissions cannot be brushed aside lightly, as they strike at the root of the prosecution version and cast serious doubt on whether demand and acceptance were proved beyond reasonable doubt – Order of acquittal restored.

(Para 20-22, 35)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 59 -- Injured eye witness version -- Ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it -- Testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a special status in law -- As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be doubted -- Deposition by the injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies -- Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical evidence, testimony does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants.

(Para 33-37)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Motive -- Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons -- Motive even in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the prosecution’s case -- Fact of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available -- Fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception 4, 302 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Nature and extent of injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted -- Use of the sharp edges of spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder -- Thus, the circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC do not exist.

(Para 45)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Delay in FIR -- It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the delay in filing the FIR is well explained.

(Para 46)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular evidence.

(Para 49)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 -- Omission by Investigation officer – Effect of -- Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution’s case -- Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors such omission by the investigating agency -- Otherwise, it would shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice.

(Para 50)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- For conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the chain should be completed and a missing link shall prove fatal to the case of prosecution.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Last seen theory is a weak piece of evidence – PW-1 husband of the deceased had seen the deceased going with the appellant -- There was a gap of thirty five days in recovery of remains of the deceased -- Blood smeared clothes of the deceased were not sent for Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) examination -- Recovery of skeleton of the deceased at instance of appellant in itself cannot lead to only one logical conclusion that the appellant had killed the deceased -- Circumstantial evidence dented by following missing links thereby leaving the chain incomplete;

(i) recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant from an open space had not enhance the case of the prosecution and there were no blood stains on the knife; no fingerprints were taken and in absence of determination of cause of death there was no link of the knife being used in the incident;

(ii) the kadiya recovered concealed in the floor of the room of the appellant were easily available in the market as per deposition of PW-2 and PW-4. Further PW-4 in cross-examination admitted that the kadiya at the first instance was shown to him in the police station prior to identification;

(iii) the blood smeared clothes recovered from the spot of recovery of the skeleton of the deceased were not sent for FSL and there was no proof that the clothes having human blood stains or that of the deceased. The recovery of the blood smeared clothes is of no help to the case of the prosecution;

(iv) the evidence of last seen set up by the prosecution remained uncorroborated with other evidence and there was a time gap of thirty five days between the appellant being last seen with the deceased and recovery of the skeleton and lastly;

(v) recovery of the skeleton of the deceased does not prove the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, moreso, in absence of the cause of death having not been determined in the post-mortem report.

Appellant given benefit of doubt and acquitted.

(Para 13-20)

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (25 of 1987), Section 2(d)(j), 14 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Landlord-tenant relationship – Agreement to sell/ Lease -- Agreement to Sell does not create any title in favour of the purchaser -- Nothing on record that JD or his successor-in-interest ever took any step, including filing a suit for specific performance, in furtherance to Agreement to Sell -- Not proved that Agreement to Sell was pertaining to the entire premises in reference -- Agreement was not exclusively an Agreement to Sell but it was having alternative either to sell out or lease out the property -- In the agreement, it is nowhere stated that tenancy had come to an end -- It would be wrong to construe that, for execution of agreement, relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end -- Objections preferred by respondent (JD) allowed by Ld. Executive Court, with finding that at the time of filing the Rent Petition, status of parties stood changed in view of Agreement to sell – Impugned order set aside.

(Para 1, 17-30)

A. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Appeal beyond the statutory period of limitation of 30 days – Condonation of delay – Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act -- General provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked -- Payment of Wages Act, being a beneficial and self-contained legislation, prescribes not only the manner and mode of appeal but also the conditions precedent for its maintainability, including the mandatory requirement u/s 17(1A) of furnishing a certificate of deposit of the amount payable under the direction appealed against -- This requirement is not directory but mandatory in nature, as it seeks to protect the rights of the workman and ensure that the employer does not frustrate the benefit of the award by filing dilatory appeals.

(Para 19-22)

B. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Appeal -- Certificate of deposit of the amount – Requirement of -- Respondent did not file any such certificate – Ld. Appellate Court, proceeded to entertain the appeal on the strength of a mere receipt of a cheque issued by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, which by no stretch of interpretation can be equated with the statutory requirement of a certificate of deposit -- Failure to comply with such mandatory statutory precondition renders the appeal itself non-maintainable in the eyes of law, and consequently, the entire proceedings before the Appellate Court stand vitiated.

(Para 24)

C. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Appeal – Condonation of delay – Rule of natural justice – Opportunity of hearing -- Ld. Appellate Court, while allowing the application for condonation of delay, also proceeded to decide the main appeal on merits in a single composite order  without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard -- Such a course of action is contrary to the fundamental principles of natural justice -- Petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to contest the appeal on merits, and the ld. Appellate Court acted in undue haste by deciding both matters together, which amounts to a gross procedural irregularity.

(Para 27)

D. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), Section 15, 17 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Appeal – Condonation of delay – Violation of Rule of natural justice – Finding of fact without calling records – Effect of -- Learned Appellate Court has misdirected itself both on law and facts:

Firstly, it wrongly invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act despite clear statutory exclusion under the Payment of Wages Act.

Secondly, it entertained the appeal without compliance of the mandatory deposit certificate requirement under Section 17(1A).

Thirdly, it decided the condonation and the appeal together without hearing the petitioner, thereby violating natural justice.

Fourthly, Ld. Appellate Court recorded findings of fact without calling for the original record, thus acting beyond jurisdiction.

These cumulative infirmities render the impugned judgment legally unsustainable.

(Para 28, 29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part 2 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sentence – Appellant rushed to a nearby house, picked up an axe and struck a blow on the neck of deceased -- Sessions court ordered imprisonment of the appellant for 10 (ten) years -- High Court has been indulgent towards the appellant and granted relief to him by reducing the term sentence by 8 (eight) years – Appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of the incident and that there may have been some exasperation in his mind -- Nevertheless, the courts are obligated to adopt a balanced and principled approach in matters of sentencing -- Undue leniency can cause public confidence in the justice system to plummet, while excessive severity may lead to injustice – Held, sentence imposed by the High Court does not call for any interference and that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

(Para 8, 27-28)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Threatening the police officer to get him transfer – Whether attract Section 186 of IPC -- Allegations are that S.H.O. advised the servant of accused not to waste water or open the gate -- Accused arrived at the scene -- Complainant requested that the accused refrain from throwing rubbish into the police station compound and from opening the police station gate, as cattle entered the compound through the open gate -- Accused became angry and threatened the informant with transfer – Held, accused had only threatened the S.H.O. to get him transferred and not stated that the SHO should not supervise the cleanliness; hence, the act of the accused would not constitute any obstruction, and the ingredients of Section 186 of the IPC were not satisfied – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17 -- Translated version of Exhibited documents to be on record – Procedure of -- Ld. Appellate Court misdirected itself by construing as if the prayer of the petitioner was to be construed on the parameters of Order XVIII, Rule 17 of the CPC -- In a case where a document already stands exhibited and a prayer is to place on record a translated copy thereof, there is no requirement of filing any application to place on record the translated version of the document and all that the Court has to ensure is that the translated version is the true translated version of the document concerned -- Opportunity should be given to both the parties to file translated version of the document and/or to agree on a correct translation filed by a party -- Alternatively, the Court can also get the translation done on the expense of the party through the official Translator.

(Para 6, 8)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 349 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) -- Voice sample – Ritesh Sinha’s case (2019) 8 SCC 1 and Kathi Kalu Oghad’s case AIR 1961 SC 1808 permit furnishing of handwriting, signature and finger impressions – Mere furnishing of a sample of the fingerprint, signature or handwriting would not incriminate the person as such – It would have to be compared with the material discovered on investigation, which alone could incriminate the person giving the sample, which would not fall under a testimonial compulsion, thus not falling foul of the rule against self-incrimination – Said sampling is similar to voice sampling, as now possible by reason of the advancing technology – Magistrate allowed voice sample, High Court reversed the order – Appeal allowed reversing the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Magistrate.

(Para 3, 4, 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 354, 354B, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 10 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Regular bail – POCSO – Rape -- Appellant is presently seventy two years of age and has been in custody since 05.07.2024 -- Charges have not yet been framed – Contended that there are seventeen witness to be examined and the trial would inevitably be delayed – Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(5) – Evidence law -- CDs containing call records not produced with report u/s 173 Cr.P.C -- Production of the CDs by invoking Section 173(5) of Cr.P.C. -- CDs were seized and referred for forensic analysis to the CFSL along with voice samples of the accused -- The CDs were referred to in the supplementary chargesheet -- After the report of the CFSL was received, the supplementary chargesheet was filed for placing on record the said report -- Therefore, when the CDs were sought to be produced, in a sense, they were not new articles; the CDs were very much referred to in the supplementary chargesheet -- There was only an omission on the part of the respondent-CBI to produce the CDs --  Learned Special Judge allowed the application of the respondent-CBI to place the two CDs on record affirmed by High Court -- However, the issue of whether the CDs produced were the same which were seized on 4th May 2013 and 10th May 2013, the issue regarding the validity of the certificate u/s 65B of the Evidence Act and the issue of the authenticity of the CDs kept open.

(Para 6, 15-17)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- It is mandatory that the demand in the statutory notice has to be the very amount of the cheque -- After mentioning the exact cheque amount, the sender of the service may claim in the notice amounts such as legal charges, notice charges, interest and such other additional amounts, provided the cheque amount is specified to be demanded for payment -- When the cheque amount is not mentioned in the Proviso (b) notice or the amount different than the actual cheque amount is mentioned, in the notice, such notice would stand invalid in eye of law -- In the event of the main ingredient not being satisfied on account of discrepancy in the amount of cheque and one mentioned in the notice, all proceedings u/s 138 of the NI Act would fall flat as bad in law.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- Cheque which was drawn by the respondent was for Rs.1,00,000/- whereas in the notice issued under Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act against the respondent, appellant mentions the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- -- Rigours of law on this score being strict, the defence would not hold good that the different amount mentioned in the notice was out of inadvertence -- Even if the cheque number was mentioned in the notice, since the amount was different, it created an ambiguity and differentiation about the ‘said amount’ -- Any elasticity cannot be adopted in the interpretation -- It has to be given technical interpretation -- Typographical error can be no defence -- Notice stood invalid and bad in law -- Order of quashment of notice was eminently proper and legal.

(Para 8.1, 8.2, 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 Proviso (b) – Cheque bounce complaint – Demand notice u/ 138 of NI Act – Validity of -- When the provision is penal and the offence is technical, there is no escape from holding that the ‘said amount’ in proviso (b) cannot be the amount other than mentioned in the cheque in question for dishonour of which the notice is received, nor the mentioning of omnibus amount in the notice would fulfil the requirement -- It has to be held that in order to make a valid notice under the Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act, it is mandatory that ‘said amount’ to be mentioned therein is the very amount of cheque, and none other.

(Para 9)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 6 -- Issuance of Passport – Procedure of -- Trial in FIR case pending – Keeping in view the Government Instructions issued vide GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993, the writ petition disposed of by relegating the petitioner to approach the concerned Court where the trial in FIR is pending against him, in order to seek permission to depart from India, and further submit the same to the Passport Authorities so as to enable them to process the passport application submitted by him, in accordance with law.

(Para 7)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 25(a), 32(2) – Termination of arbitration proceedings – Whether such order can  be considered as an award -- An order u/s 25(a) does not and cannot amount to an Award as it does not deal with the rights of the parties before the Arbitrator -- Such an order merely terminates the arbitral proceedings on account of the claimant’s default in filing the statement of claim and does not involve any adjudication or determination of the rights or obligations of the parties -- For an order to qualify as an Award, it must decide, either finally or on an interim, an issue forming part of the dispute referred to arbitration -- An order under Section 25(a), being procedural in nature and not addressing the substantive lis between the parties, lacks the essential attributes of an Arbitral Award -- Order terminating the proceedings for non-filing of a statement of claim cannot be considered an award under Sub-section 2 of Section 32.

(Para 16, 19)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Rejection of plaint – Suit barred by law -- While considering rejection of the plaint thereunder only the averments made in the plaint and nothing else is to be considered to find out whether the suit is barred by law -- At this stage, the defense is not to be considered -- Thus, whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint.

(Para 15)

B. Mutation entries -- It is well settled that mutation entries do not confer title -- They serve a fiscal purpose, that is, to realize tax from the person whose name is recorded in the revenue records.

(Para 16)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 – Suit for declaration and possession – Limitation -- Suit was not for a mere declaration of the Will being null and void but for possession as well -- Plaintiff claimed title over the suit land by natural succession and sought possession based on title – Where a suit is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title, the limitation period is 12 years when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

(Para 17)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 65 – Rejection of plaint -- Limitation – Adverse possession -- When a suit is instituted for possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on the ground of adverse possession, the burden is on the defendant to prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period -- This, therefore, cannot be an issue on which the plaint could be rejected at the threshold.

(Para 18)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Partial rejection of plaint – Permissibility of -- Where several reliefs are sought in suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

(Para 19)

F. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Rejection of plaint -- Suit barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC – Plea of -- First suit instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was not tried -- In fact, the plaint of that suit was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC as not being properly framed -- In such circumstances, a fresh suit with appropriate relief cannot be, prima facie, barred by Rule 2 of Order 2 of CPC -- Therefore, the trial court was justified in directing that the issue, whether the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC, shall be considered and decided during trial.

(Para 22)

Constitution of India, Article 14 – Recovery from retired employee – Permissibility of -- Petitioner had already retired and there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner qua fixation of his salary, which was re-fixed after his retirement – Held, excess amount paid to him during service period could not have been recovered and therefore, any recovery made from the petitioner out of his pensionary benefits cannot be sustained and the same is, accordingly, set aside -- Sum recovered from the petitioner ordered to be refunded back to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks.

(Para 6-10)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 16 – Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21 – Award of Lok Adalat – Refund of Court fee – Right of -- Once a settlement has been arrived at between the parties to the lis before the Permanent Lok Adalat, the entire Court Fee needs to be refunded.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372 -- Acquittal – Cheque bounce complaint dismissed in default -- Appeal against an order of acquittal in a proceeding u/s of the N. I. Act preferred by the complainant squarely falls within the ambit of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. -- Petition along with the accompanying application ordered to be remitted to the Court of learned Sessions Judge.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151, Order 18 Rule 3 -- Additional evidence – Expert-examination by Plaintiff in rebuttal – Permissibility of -- Once defendant-respondent No.1 had not denied her signatures/ thumb impression in the written statement and for the first time denied the same in her cross-examination, the plaintiff-petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to lead additional evidence to counter the same – In the absence of any such stand having been taken, there was no question of the plaintiff-petitioner leading any evidence to prove that the signatures were hers – Plaintiff-petitioner granted one effective opportunity to lead his evidence.

(Para 7, 8)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C -- Insurance Policy, Condition No. 1 -- Insurance claim for stolen vehicle – Late intimation to Insurance company – Repudiation of claim -- Vehicle was stolen on 18.11.2016 and respondent No.2/ claimant intimated the police to register an FIR, but vehicle could not be recovered -- Intimation was given to the insurance company on 06.12.2016, but claim was repudiated on the ground that there had been a violation of Condition No.1 of the insurance policy, which required the insured to intimate the insurance company in writing immediately upon the occurrence of any loss or damage to the vehicle – Police authorities investigated the FIR, but could not trace the vehicle and Untraced Report submitted by them was accepted by the learned Magistrate -- Insofar as the delay in the intimation to the insurance company is concerned, it is immaterial -- Repudiation of the claim is therefore unjustified -- No interference is called for in the award of PLA – Insured/ respondent No.2 held entitled to an amount of Rs.7,99,892/-.

(Para 6-9)