Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 397(B)(2), 34 – Robbery – Regular bail -- Petitioner is behind the bars for a period of 01 year 04 months and 02 days -- Involvement of accused in other criminal cases cannot be the sole ground to deny him the concession of bail -- Trial is at the stage of prosecution witness and out of 19 PWs, only 01 has been examined till date -- Further detention without the prospect of conclusion of trial in the near future, would be violative of his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Bail allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Acquittal in criminal case – Effect of -- Although the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal cases, however, once a person with clean image/ antecedents available, then no fault can be found in the choice of the Collector in appointing respondent No.4 as lambardar.

(Para 8)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Choice of Collector – Interference in – Permissibility of -- In the matter of appointment of lambardar, the choice of the Collector is not to be lightly interfered with even if two views are possible unless there is patent illegality or perversity therein.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaints – FIR u/s 420 IPC by accused against complainant party – Quashing of FIR – Finding recorded by the jurisdictional criminal court in 138 NI Act proceedings between the parties would be binding to both the parties in any subsequent proceedings involving the same issue – Respondent cannot maintain a prosecution on the basis of allegations which were precisely his defence in the earlier proceedings wherein he was an accused -- Criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed on this ground alone -- Impugned criminal proceedings instituted against the appellant for offences u/s 420 of the IPC, quashed.

(Para 12, 20-25)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Transfer of employee – Challenge to -- Writ jurisdiction -- It is settled proposition of law that scope of interference in transfer matters is very limited -- It is the employer or higher authorities who have to decide posting of employees -- The Court cannot determine place of posting of employees -- The authorities, in the interest of administration as well public interest has to transfer its employees -- Transfer is an integral part of service -- There is no evidence disclosing that the petitioner has been transferred with mala fide intention or there is violation of policy – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 4-7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Eviction petition under rent law -- Amendment of reply – Due diligence – Trial is at fag end -- Case was fixed for arguments, but the arguments were not addressed, even after availing almost 10 opportunities and only thereafter,  the application was filed -- Respondent not able to show that in spite of due diligence, the respondent could not raise the pleas before the commencement of the trial – Proposed amendment application is not bonafide and is only a malicious attempt on the part of the respondent-tenant to prolong the lis – Application for amendment of reply dismissed.

(Para 13-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 324 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Offence under other sections 323, 504, 427, 447 and 506 of the IPC are compoundable as per Section 320 of the CrPC -- In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the offences alleged against the appellant u/s 307 and 324 IPC shall also be quashed as the other offences alleged against the appellant are compoundable u/s 320 of the CrPC – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Injury case – Just compensation -- Rs.16,34,400/- with 9% interest awarded by Tribunal by adopting the functional disability to be 100% -- Age of victim was 22 years when he was rendered almost immobile by the injuries suffered in an accident -- A prosthetic limb would cost approximately Rs.2 lakhs and it would have to be changed in every five years -- Victim would require the change of at least five prosthetic limbs in his lifetime considering his age -- Provision of wheelchair would also take approximately Rs.40,000/- which also would have to be changed every five years -- Hence, the total amount of Rs.10 lakhs for the prosthetic limbs and another Rs.2 lakhs for the wheelchair would take care of the future wellbeing of the victim -- Insurance Company to pay an additional amount of Rs.12 lakhs to the victim with simple interest @ 6% -- Amount increased in appeal of Insurance Company.

(Para 6, 7)

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Age of candidate – Choice of Collector – Writ jurisdiction -- Respondent No.4 was appointed as the lambardar by the learned Collector -- Said appointment further affirmed by the learned Commissioner and Financial Commissioner -- Respondent No.4 is younger in age than the petitioner and has studied up to 10+2 along with an ITI diploma and he also owns 28 kanals of land in the Village and is an agriculturist – Held, in the matter of appointment of the lambardar age of a candidate is a relevant consideration and also the choice of the learned Collector is not to be lightly interfered with even if two views are possible unless there is patent illegality or perversity therein -- No illegality or perversity in the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities -- Writ petition fails and dismissed.

(Para 5-8)

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, Section 38B(v) – Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (17 of 1960), Section 8 -- Allotment of land to Society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act – Plaintiff-ISKCON Bangalore is a society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act -- All the documents, from the application for allotment to the grant of exemption under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, indicate that the application for allotment was made on behalf of ISKCON Bangalore and that allotment was made to the said Society -- In the entire correspondence in relation to the allotment of Schedule ‘A’ property, the name of ISKCON Bangalore appears – No application was made by ISKCON Mumbai to correct the BDA record -- Even assuming that ISKCON Bangalore did not possess funds, and even if money came from ISKCON Mumbai, it cannot claim ownership -- Only because the existence of the Bangalore branch of ISKCON Mumbai was proved, one cannot jump to the conclusion that allotment of Schedule ‘A’ property was to ISKCON Mumbai through the Bangalore branch -- Sale deed was executed in favour of ISKCON Bangalore -- High Court's finding that ISKCON Mumbai, through its branch in Bangalore, was the owner of the schedule A property is completely erroneous and deserves to be set aside -- It is completely contrary to the documentary evidence – Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside.

(Para 34, 46-58)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 491 -- Non-deposit surety bond amount – Conviction for 6 months – Challenge to -- Appellant stood surety for convict in appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Accused not appeared -- Being a poor person, appellant was unable to pay the amount of bail bonds and pleaded guilty -- Appellate Court should have taken a lenient view -- Punishment imposed on the appellant was too harsh, disproportionate -- Courts should impose monetary penalties or should adopt other measures -- Sentence reduced to the period already undergone by him (1 month and 18 days).

(Para 6, 7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 397, 401 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Settled amount paid to bank -- Respondent-Bank shown no objection to compounding of offence -- Object and purpose of enactment is to provide a compensatory mechanism for expeditious recovery of money as opposed to punishing the accused -- Amendment carried out in the year 2002 in the NI Act intended to make the nature of offence u/s 138 of the NI Act as a civil wrong while making it compoundable -- Conviction and order of sentence quashed/ set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 3, 5-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Appeal against conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation amount – Challenge to -- Ld. Lower Appellate Court suspended the sentence of the petitioner subject to depositing 20% of the compensation amount within 03 months – Held, appellate Court was required to consider whether the case falls in the exception or not -- Imposition of the condition of depositing 20% of the compensation amount set aside – Matter remanded back to the learned Lower Appellate Court with a direction to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law in the light of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jamboo Bhandari's case 2013 (12) SCALE 611.

(Para 4-6)

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Allegation of encroachment over Panchayat land -- Collector appointed petitioner as Lambardar -- Ld. Commissioner as well as the Financial Commissioner remanded the matter to the learned Collector for verifying the illegal encroachment over the Panchayat land by the petitioner – There is considerable basis for remanding the matter to the learned Collector for verifying the illegal encroachment over the Panchayat land by the petitioner especially considering the fact that certain ejectment orders were produced before the learned Financial Commissioner -- No merit in writ petition dismissed.

(Para 7)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 8 -- Jurisdiction of Arbitration – Fraud – Criminal wrong doing – Statutory violation – Ground of -- Allegations of fraud or criminal wrongdoing or of statutory violation would not detract from the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to resolve a dispute arising out of a civil or contractual relationship on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by the arbitration agreement.

(Para 15)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 8 -- generalia specialibus non derogant -- Once an application in due compliance with Section 8 of the Act of 1996 is filed, the approach of the civil court should be not to see whether the court has jurisdiction -- It should be to see whether its jurisdiction has been ousted -- The general law should yield to the special law -- Once there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, a judicial authority before whom an action is brought covering the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement is under a positive obligation to refer parties to arbitration by enforcing the terms of the contract.

(Para 16, 17)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 226 -- Reservation in Public appointment – Certificate of caste – Requirement of -- Irrespective of whether an aspirant for public employment belongs to a particular community like SC/ ST/ OBC, the status claimed by him for being accorded the benefit of reservation is per se not decisive -- Such status has to be certified by the competent authority upon following due process and identification that the aspirant is what he claims to be -- Requirement in question is no less mandatory and must be scrupulously followed -- Once a process of recruitment is set in motion, all aspirants are entitled in law to equal treatment -- There cannot be different yardsticks for different sets of aspirants -- Non-compliance with the terms of the advertisement/ notification is bound to trigger adverse consequences of rejection of the aspirant’s claimed status by the selecting body/ appointing authority, should he choose not to adhere to the same.

(Para 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 226 -- Advertisement for public appointment – Challenge to – Scope of -- Terms of an advertisement issued in connection with a selection process are normally not open to challenge unless the challenge is founded on the ground of breach of Article 16 of the Constitution or, for that matter, Article 14 -- Once an advertisement is issued inviting applications for public employment, it is the responsibility, nay duty, of an aspirant to read and note the terms and understand what its requirements are -- If any aspirant finds any of the terms ambiguous and there is scope for an inquiry inbuilt in the advertisement or is provided by any rule/regulation, an effort ought to be first made to obtain clarity for understanding the requirements accurately.

(Para 19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379B, 325, 341, 34 – Appeal against conviction – Compounding after conviction in snatching case – Matter has been amicably settled between the parties -- Appeals allowed, as a result of compounding, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence under Sections 379-B, 325, 341, 34 IPC, whereby appellant sentenced to RI for five years and a fine of Rs. 10,500/- along with all consequential proceeding quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Corruption case -- In a case of alleged criminal conspiracy, the prosecution is duty bound to prove by cogent, credible, and admissible evidence that the accused persons had a meeting of minds and participated in a common design.

(Para 14)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Corruption case – Demand and acceptance of bribe -- In the absence of demand and acceptance, the presumption u/s 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise and conviction cannot be thus sustained.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B – Corruption case – Conspiracy – Presumption – Reversal of burden -- Tehsildar, who employed co-accused BK and was shown to be one of the primary beneficiaries, was not accorded sanction and therefore, did not face trial -- Appellants, despite not being shown to be actual beneficiaries or participants, were convicted on a generalized theory of “connivance” – Held, mere association or presence of a person in a place where a crime is committed does not ipso facto establish participation or conspiracy -- Reversal of burden, in a trial u/s 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and Section 120-B of the IPC, where prosecution has not discharged its primary burden is certainly not permissible in law – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Consortium to parents/ Children -- Compensation for loss of consortium to the children and the parents awarded by Tribunal, upheld.

(Para 5)

Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 --  Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Hereditary claim -- Petitioner was wrongly appointed as Lambardar (BC) on the ground of his hereditary claim by Collector – Divisional Commissioner rightly set aside the order  of Collector being ultra vires the Constitution -- Respondent No. 4 is more meritorious than the petitioner in terms of his age and educational qualification and his name was recommended by lower revenue officials – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by learned Divisional Commissioner in appointing respondent No. 4 as Lambardar.

(Para 7-9)

Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (15 of 1872), Preamble, Section 5 -- Special Marriage Act, 1954 (43 of 1954), Section 4 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 2(c), 5 – Hindu girl conducted marriage under Christian Marriage Act -- Chairman of Town Panchayat -- Reservation as Scheduled caste – Effect upon -- Having voluntarily embraced Christianity,  she cannot blow hot and cold, claiming to be a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of 'public employment' -- She cannot identify herself a 'Hindu' after solemnization of marriage under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 -- Conferment of scheduled caste communal status to the 4th respondent, who is a Christian by religion, is nothing but a fraud on the Constitution -- To retain the socio-religious identity of a personality in case of marriages between two persons from two different religions, the only way out which could be adopted by the persons concerned to retain their original religion is to resort to a civil marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

(Para 71-75)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator -- Bisecting the claim – Arbitrable and non-arbitrable – Permissibility of -- Held, High Court fell in error in bisecting the claim of the appellant into two parts, one arbitrable and the other not arbitrable, when it found arbitration agreement to be there for settlement of disputes between the parties -- The correct course for the High Court was to leave it open to the party to raise the issue of non-arbitrability of certain claims before the arbitral tribunal, which, if raised, could be considered and decided by it –  Parties are, at liberty to take the plea of non-arbitrability of certain claims before the arbitral tribunal.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341, 323, 307, 302, 120B, 147, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 3, 25, 5, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Regular bail -- Common intention – Overt Act -- Merely because no overt act was attributed to the respondent/ accused in the F.I.R., the same cannot be the sole consideration for grant of bail -- First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia of facts -- An FIR is a starter point to set the investigation in motion -- Respondent/accused hatched a conspiracy so as to eliminate the victim and engaged a contract killer to kill the victim  -- High Court failed to consider that the accused are the main accused in the matter and cannot be enlarged on bail because the other co-accused persons have been granted bail -- High Court order granting bail set aside.

(Para 16-20)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- UAPA Case – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence -- The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable -- Rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive -- However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case

(Para 23, 24)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS/ UAPA Case – Regular bail – Despite no direct recovery of contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of narcotics concealed as talc -- Investigative narrative does not rest solely on physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and facilitation – Absence of direct seizure is not dispositive, particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious entities, and barter-based compensation – Bail declined.

(Para 25-27, 35)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), (2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 109 -- Disproportionate of assets to the income -- Even a non-public servant can be convicted u/s 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

(Para 15)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), (2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 108, 109 -- Disproportionate of assets to the income -- Appellant’s husband acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name – It is not clear, whether the appellant and her husband entered into a prior conspiracy to amass a huge bulk of wealth through bribery, but there is no doubt that after such disproportionate wealth was amassed, the appellant has been actively involved in concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name -- By doing so, the appellant is guilty of offence of abetment falling u/s 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

(Para 14, 15)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Tractor-trailer – Liability of Insurance company -- Trailer was being pulled by/ attached to the tractor and then the trailer on which the deceased was present, turned turtle/upturned, resulting in his death -- Tractor which was insured was the reason for the accident -- Had the trailer been stationary at a place and due to some reason, it overturned or a mishap happened, then without the trailer being specifically insured the Appellant would not be liable to pay -- Accident was caused by the tractor, as during the course of being driven/pulled by the tractor, the accident occurred -- Liability of the tractor/ its insurer extended to the accident -- If an insured vehicle hits another vehicle which in turn hits a third vehicle, then for the entire chain of accidents, the liability would pass on to the vehicle which was the root cause of the accident -- No infirmity in the Impugned Order in fixation of liability on the insurer-Appellant for the accident.

(Para 11, 12, 19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 407, 420 – Cheating – Sentence of imprisonment reduced -- Appellant is a 71-year-old individual who is afflicted with various age-related ailments -- Medical documentation further reveals that the Appellant is a diabetic person and has a history of having suffered three heart attacks -- That apart, the incident is of the year 1994 i.e. more than 30 years old causing mental trauma and agony as faced by the Appellant -- All these factors in the facts and circumstances of this case persuade Court to take a lenient view -- Sentences imposed u/s 407 and 420 of IPC reduced to 2 years and 6 months of rigorous imprisonment from 5 years with fine and default punishment unchanged.

(Para 29, 30)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11, 21 – Notice for arbitration – Impleadment of parties to whom notice not issued – Power of Arbitration Tribunal – Summary of Conclusions:

I. A notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the ACA is mandatory as it fixes the date of commencement of arbitration, which is essential for determining limitation periods and the applicable law, and it is a prerequisite to filing an application under Section 11. However, merely because such a notice was not issued to certain persons who are parties to the arbitration agreement does not denude the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to implead them as parties during the arbitral proceedings.

II. The purpose of an application under Section 11 is for the court to appoint an arbitrator, so as to enable dispute resolution through arbitration when the appointment procedure in the agreement fails. The court only undertakes a limited and prima facie examination into the existence of the arbitration agreement and its parties at this stage. Hence, merely because a court does not refer a certain party to arbitration in its order does not denude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal from impleading them during the arbitral proceedings as the referral court’s view does not finally determine this issue.

III. The relevant consideration to determine whether a person can be made a party before the arbitral tribunal is if such a person is a party to the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal must determine this jurisdictional issue in an application under Section 16 by examining whether a non-signatory is a party to the arbitration agreement as per Section 7 of the ACA.

IV. In the facts of the present appeal, respondent nos. 2 and 3 are parties to the arbitration agreement in Clause 40 of the LLP Agreement despite being non-signatories. Their conduct is in accordance with and in pursuance of the terms of the LLP Agreement, and hence, they can be made parties to the arbitral proceedings.

(Para 40)

Haryana Canal and Drainage Act, 1974 (29 of 1974), Section 2(15), 24 -- Restoration of watercourse -- Once the authority upon consideration of the matter has come to the conclusion that restoration of the watercourse on permanent basis was called for on account of the fact that the watercourse was running for more than 20 years and even the warabandi stood sanctioned thereon, no exception can be taken to the said course.

(Para 4)

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17, 49 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for specific performance -- Un-registered agreement to sell with possession – Dismissal of interlocutory application filed by the appellant seeking permission to place on record a document/ agreement to sell -- Prayer of the appellant in the interlocutory application falls under proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act which provides that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance -- Proviso also enables the said document to be received in evidence of a collateral transaction -- Appellant permitted to introduce the said document.

(Para 3, 9-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Petition for quashing of complaint – Reasoned order – Requirement of – Duty of High Court -- If the Division Bench of the High Court was not inclined to even issue notice to the respondents, then reasons ought to have been assigned for that purpose, or in the alternative, notice should have been issued to the respondents and after giving a fair opportunity to both sides, dismissed the complaint on merits – In the absence of any of the aforesaid options, impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice -- Matter remanded back to High Court with a request to dispose the same on its own merits and in accordance with law.

(Para 6, 7)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) -- Corruption case -- Demand of bribe – Presumption – Tests were conducted on the hands of the Appellant which proved negative --  However, money was recovered from the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank of the Appellant’s motorcycle -- Factum of demand, in the backdrop of an element of animus between the Appellant and complainant not proved -- In such circumstances, the presumption u/s 20 of the Act would not militate against the Appellant -- Conviction and sentence set aside, extending to him the benefit of doubt.

(Para 6, 21, 22)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS -- Search by temporary charge of SHO – Legality of -- SHO was absent on the relevant date and therefore, he has handed over the charge of the SHO to the Circle Inspector (Sub-Inspector) who has carried out the search -- Person holding temporary charge as Station House Officer at the relevant time is competent to carry out the search -- Submission that the Officer ought to be actually posted as SHO and not as In-Charge SHO is of no substance and cannot be accepted -- High Court manifestly erred in interpreting Section 42 of the Act and in holding that the In-Charge SHO was not competent to conduct the search -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and the trial is directed to continue in accordance with law, expeditiously. Bheru Lal’s case (2013) 11 SCC 730 relied.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 14 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Insolvency proceedings – Effect of -- Cheques were dated 15.01.2020 and 15.03.2020 and the Interim Resolution Professional/ IRP was appointed on 31.10.2019, prior to these dates -- Account was blocked due to the order issued by the NCLT -- As a result of the NCLT’s order, the authority and control of the account holder over the account ceased to exist – Cheques were dishonoured for the reason ‘Drawer Signature to operate account not received’ – Offence occurred post imposition of moratorium -- Petitioners cannot be held vicariously responsible for dishonour of cheque – Summoning order along with consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1, 10-13)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- It may be true that Order 7 Rule 11 even though authorizes the Court to reject a plaint on failure on the part of the plaintiff to disclose a cause of action but the same would not mean that the averments made therein or a document upon which reliance has been placed although discloses a cause of action, the plaint would still be rejected on the ground that such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Plaint is not to be looked in isolation distinct from the documents relied upon with the plaint.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – “does not disclose the cause of action” -- The phrase “does not disclose the cause of action” has to be very narrowly construed -- Rejection of plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences -- This power therefore has to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and ought to be used only when the Court is absolutely sure that plaintiff does not have any arguable case at all.

(Para 18)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Deceased was Student of MBBS – Notional income @ Rs.70,000/- per-month -- MACT awarded Rs. 12,52,429 based on the minimum wage for a skilled worker (Rs.7,774/- per month), even though the deceased was a second-year MBBS student, having cleared NEET – It would be fair and reasonable to assess the income potential of the deceased at the time of his death in 2019 as Rs. 70,000/- per month -- 40% added for future prospects – Deduction of 50% made towards self-expenses -- Applying the multiplier of 18, the compensation for the death of the deceased would come to Rs. 1,05,84,000/- -- Loss of Consortium for the two parents (Rs.44,000 × 2) = Rs. 88,000/- -- Loss of Estate Rs. 33,000 (Estate) and Funeral Expenses Rs. 16,500 (Funeral) -- Rs. 1,07,13,500 with intertest @ 7 % p.a. from the date of filing claim petition awarded.

(Para 8, 11-16)

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 9(5) -- Auction purchaser – Forfeiture of earnest money – Challenge to -- Re-instatement of SERFAESI proceedings – Effect of -- Petitioner/ auction purchaser is seeking refund of the forfeited amount on the ground of reinitiation of the SARFAESI action by the bank upon the borrower – Held, it would not come within the contours of an ‘exceptional circumstance’, leading to dilution of the statutory consequence of forfeiture under Rule 9(5) of the 2002 Rules -- Petitioner has not indicated any extenuating circumstances that resulted in failure on the part of the petitioner to deposit the balance amount within the prescribed time -- No question of any equity in his favour – Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-11)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3, 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Damages to public property – Encroachment over Gram Panchayat land – Adjudication of rights -- Necessity of -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- As far as criminal proceeding for illegal encroachment, damage or trespass over the land belonging to Gram Sabha is concerned, the same can be undertaken but it would be subject to the adjudication of rights of the parties over the land in dispute as the said determination can be done only by the revenue court -- Continuation of criminal proceedings, being an abuse of process of the Court, ends of the justice requires that the said proceedings be quashed -- Entire proceedings of the Criminal Case quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Scope of – Nature of -- The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that emerges in Court -- It is an exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material now available, appears to share criminal liability -- Power is extraordinary and therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must act.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Summoning as additional accused – Challenge to -- Plea of alibi by accused -- An alibi, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused -- Parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip, have yet to be formally proved -- Until that exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces of paper -- Abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment -- It may consist of a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs – Order of the Trial Court summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC revived.

(Para 9-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Refusal to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Relationship was not merely of knowing each other but of living together as a couple under one roof in a rented accommodation -- FIR does not allege that physical relationship was established only because there was a promise of marriage -- Besides, physical relationship continued for over two years without a complaint in between -- A presumption would arise of there being a valid consent – In a long drawn live-in relationship, occasions may arise where parties in that relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or wish, by itself would not be indicative of relationship being a consequence of that expression of desire or wish – On ground of refusal to marry, the appellant cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence of rape -- First information report and the consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Promise to marry – Intention -- To establish a false promise, it would have to be demonstrated that the maker of the promise had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making the promise.

(Para 11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Divorce -- Irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Having considered the prolonged period of separation and the multiple failed attempts at reconciliation, which clearly indicate that there is no possibility of reunion, as well as their age (both are quinquagenarian) – It would be in the best interest of both the parties, and their daughter too, to put a quietus to this protracted litigation --  Marriage between the parties dissolved by a decree of divorce.

(Para 9-11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Divorce -- Irretrievable breakdown of marriage -- Respondent-husband has vehemently opposed the prayer for dissolution of marriage contending that none of the available grounds on which a Hindu marriage could be dissolved is present – Held, same is not a bar to exercise powers under Article 142 of the Constitution; more particularly when Court is satisfied that it is a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Divorce granted.

(Para 12, 13)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Recall/ further examination of witness – Stage of – Scope of -- If it appears to a court trying the suit at any stage of the proceedings that it is necessary to recall and further examine a witness it can always do so -- This power can be exercised even at the stage of writing a judgment by the court -- Power is to be used for removing ambiguities, for clarifying the statement and not for the purposes of filling up the lacuna in a party's case -- Power can be exercised by the Court at its own initiative and may even be so done at the instance of a party.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17, Section 151 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Recall/ further examination of witness – Cross-examination – Permissibility of -- Section 165 of the Evidence Act provides that a Judge may in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness about any fact relevant -- If the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 are read along with the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is clear that the power to recall and re-examine a witness is exclusively that of the court trying the suit -- The parties to the suit cannot take any objection to the question asked nor can they be permitted to cross-examine any witness without the leave of the court -- If circumstances warrant, an opportunity to a party to re-call a witness for examining, cross-examining or re-examining can be granted by a Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.

(Para 7, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a)(b)(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of defamation complaint – Appellant-homebuyers, dissatisfied with the services provided by developer, erected a banner detailing their grievances -- Peaceful and orderly protest made without using offensive or abusive language -- It could not be said that the appellants transgressed into the offending zone -- Their case wholly falls within the sweep, scope and ambit of exception 9 to Section 499 -- Their peaceful protest is protected by Article 19(1)(a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India -- Criminal proceedings levelled against them, if allowed to continue, will be a clear abuse of process -- Complaint along with the order issuing summons to the appellants u/s 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC quashed and set aside.

(Para 30-35)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 37 -- Modification in award – Power of -- Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award -- This limited power may be exercised under the following circumstances:

I. when the award is severable, by severing the “invalid” portion from the “valid” portion of the award.

II. by correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record.

III. post award interest may be modified in some circumstances.

IV. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power must be exercised with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power.

(Para 85)

(Reference answered with majority opinion 4:1)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 -- Arbitration award -- Post award settlement -- Parties are entitled to enter into an agreement or settlement even after an award is pronounced -- Such a settlement should be in accordance with the provisions of Order XXIII of the Code -- The law of the land does not bar the parties from entering into a post award or post decree settlement -- Only legal requirement is that such settlement must be verifiable and in accordance with law i.e., the settlement is not a result of undue influence, force, fraud, coercion, etc.

(Para 80)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31, 34, 37 – Arbitration award – Scope of interference -- If two views are possible, there is no scope for the court to re-appraise the evidence and to take the view other than the one taken by the arbitrator -- View taken by the arbitral tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and allowed to prevail – Scope of interference in arbitral matters is only confined to the extent envisaged u/s 34 of the Act – Court exercising powers u/s 34 has perforce to limit its jurisdiction within the four corners of Section 34 -- It cannot travel beyond Section 34 -- Proceedings u/s 34 are summary in nature and not like a full-fledged civil suit or a civil appeal -- Award as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provisions of law or Section 34 of the 1996 Act or the terms of the agreement -- Arbitral autonomy must be respected and judicial interference should remain minimal otherwise it will defeat the very object of the 1996 Act.

(Para 23, 24)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law -- When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one.

(Para 12.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 – First Appeal -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit -- Authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103.

(Para 12.2)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Family property – Burdon of proof -- It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family -- The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property -- If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available -- That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.

(Para 13)

D. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Ancestral property -- For a property to be considered as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the paternal ancestors up to three generations.

(Para 14)

E. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Partiton of ancestral property – Self-acquired property -- As per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish -- After the death of the father, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them -- Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property -- Properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers -- The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as joint family property.

(Para 17-19)

F. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Income and Sale consideration -- Expenses incurred for maintenance, marriage and education of children -- When the income derived from the joint family property or when a joint family property is sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and education within the joint family, the same are to be treated as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so -- Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the children -- That apart, under the customary practices and tradition, it is the father who performs the marriage of his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.

(Para 19.1)

G. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Separate/ self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family – Abandonment of status – From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation.

(Para 20)

Waqf Act, 1995 (43 of 1995), Section 14(1)(b)(iii) -- Muslim Member of Bar Council – Appointment as member of Waqf Board – Challenge to – Appellant been elected as a member of Bar Council – As such elected as a Member of the Board, in accordance with Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act -- Respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the Board -- Appellant is the only Muslim Member in the Bar Council, a fact that has been rightly taken note of by the State of Manipur, while appointing him as a Member of the Board -- No dispute with respect to the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board – Appointment upheld.

(Para 1, 18-21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 3.4 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Civil dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the FIR, the goods were to be exported out of India -- Respondent no. 2, since did not possess an import/export license, the appellant had asked respondent no. 2 to export the goods through M/s. Oswal Overseas -- Respondent no. 2 has in all exported sarees worth Rs. 34,71,344/- -- U/s 482 of the Code, Court will examine the crux of the complaint -- Question is whether such non-payment of the sale price can be an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating at the hands of the second respondent -- Answer is clearly no -- Continuation of the FIR against the appellant is an abuse of the process of law, and at best, the non-payment of the sale price could be a civil dispute – Appeal allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 12-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- In a case of gang rape u/s 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention -- Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- Abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant along with J.K. acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’ -- Sentence u/s 376(2)(g) of IPC reduced from life imprisonment to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default sentence.

(Para 24, 45)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Acquittal -- No evidence to establish the fact that the victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence -- Appellant acquitted from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.

(Para 44)