Search By Topic: Cheque bounce cases

4. (J&K&L HC) 14-08-2026

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Closure of complainant’s evidence – Complaint u/s 138 NI Act – Material witnesses not examined – Complainant permitted to examine the Bank Manager and Postman.

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Closure of complainant’s evidence – Complaint u/s 138 NI Act – Age of the proceedings, by itself, cannot be decisive when examination of material witnesses is necessary for the ends of justice.

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A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138 and 145(2) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348,  528 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 311, 482 – Closure of complainant’s evidence – Complainant challenged the closure of his evidence and dismissal of his application seeking recall of the closure order in a cheque-dishonour complaint – Held, Trial Magistrate ought to have issued a binding direction requiring production of the remaining evidence, with a warning that the evidence could be closed in case of non-compliance -- Since the Bank Manager and Postman were material witnesses whose examination could facilitate a fair and just decision, the impugned orders were set aside and the complainant was permitted to examine them.

(Paras 1–2, 4, 6, 10–13)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 348 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summoning and examination of witnesses – Section 311 CrPC, corresponding to Section 348 BNSS, empowers a criminal court, at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon a person as a witness, examine a person in attendance, or recall and re-examine a witness where the evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case -- Held that the power could be exercised in the proceedings arising from a complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act to secure the examination of material witnesses.

(Paras 11–12)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 403 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362 – Criminal proceedings – Recall of order closing complainant’s evidence – Magistrate’s jurisdiction – Held, the view that a criminal court has no power to recall its own order was not justified; recall was permissible on justifiable grounds, as the order merely closed the complainant’s evidence and did not finally dispose of the case.

(Para 11)

6. (J&K&L HC) 17-07-2026

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Dishonour of cheque -- Conviction -- Plea of guilt -- Admission of issuance and signatures on cheque not amounting to unqualified, unambiguous and voluntary admission of guilt -- Mandatory procedure under Sections 251 and 252 Cr.P.C. not complied with -- Conviction unsustainable.

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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 251, 252 and 375 -- Dishonour of cheque -- Conviction -- Plea of guilt -- Statement of accused under Section 251 Cr.P.C. -- Accused admitting issuance and signatures on cheque but stating that cheque was given as security in connection with business transaction -- Such statement not constituting unqualified, unambiguous, clear and voluntary admission of guilt -- Magistrate required to state particulars of offence to accused and record plea as nearly as possible in words used by him -- Strict compliance with Sections 251 and 252 mandatory -- Mere admission of issuance of cheque and signatures thereon, without admission of legally enforceable debt or unconditional liability, insufficient to record conviction on plea of guilt -- Essential ingredient of offence relating to service of statutory demand notice not put to accused while recording plea -- Alleged admission, therefore, not sufficient to sustain conviction -- Payment of Rs.50,000 during pendency of complaint not amounting to admission of guilt -- Appellate Court having no jurisdiction to entertain appeal against conviction recorded on plea of guilt in view of Section 375 Cr.P.C. -- Impugned judgments set aside -- Matter remanded to Trial Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law.

(Paras 8–21)

11. (SC) 26-05-2026

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Dishonour of cheque -- Vicarious liability -- Complaint must be read as a whole -- Participation in antecedent financial transactions and execution of documents constitutes sufficient foundation for prosecution under Section 141 N.I. Act -- Mere status as office-bearer, without specific role in transaction, insufficient to attract liability.

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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Sections 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Dishonour of cheque -- Vicarious liability -- Society -- Office-bearers -- Quashing of complaint -- High Court quashed proceedings against Vice-President, Treasurer, Executive Member and Manager of borrowing Society on ground of absence of specific averments -- Complaint alleging respondents were in-charge of and responsible for affairs of Society -- MoU, promissory notes and allied financial documents showing participation of Vice-President, Treasurer and Manager in underlying borrowing transaction -- Treasurer also signatory to dishonoured cheque -- Complaint required to be read as a whole and not in isolated fragments -- Participation in antecedent financial transactions and execution of documents constituted sufficient foundational material for continuation of prosecution against Vice-President, Treasurer and Manager -- No specific role, document or material connecting Executive Member with transaction -- Mere status as office-bearer, without specific role in transaction, insufficient to attract liability -- Quashing set aside qua Vice-President, Treasurer and Manager and upheld qua Executive Member.

(Paras 27 to 43)

12. (All. H.C.) 22-05-2026

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Quashing of complaint -- Dishonour of cheque – Complaint by Director/Managing Director – Complaint not maintainable where the aggrieved payee company has not filed the complaint, as a company is a separate juristic person distinct from its directors – Proceedings quashed.

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Quashing of complaint -- Dishonour of cheque – Drawer company not impleaded as accused – Complaint not maintainable in the absence of the company that issued the cheque being arraigned as an accused – Proceedings quashed.

 

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Complaint by Director/ Managing Director -- Maintainability of complaint – A Company is a juristic person which is distinct and different from its Managing Director/Directors -- When the MOU was executed between the aforesaid two Companies, it cannot be said that it was executed between the complainant and the petitioners -- Complaint u/s 138 NI Act would not be maintainable if the Company in whose favour, the cheque was issued and which was aggrieved by non-payment of the amount of cheque, does not come forward to file the complaint -- Complaint filed by any other person including the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company, would not be maintainable -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 7, 17, 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Company not impleaded as accused -- Maintainability of complaint – In absence of the Company which had issued the cheque, being impleaded as an opposite party, a complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would not be maintainable – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 17, 18)

20. (P&H HC) 27-03-2026

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Multiple cheque bounce complaints -- Each dishonour constituting a distinct cause of action – Filing of two separate complaints held maintainable despite common transaction; conviction upheld and sentences directed to run concurrently.

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Security cheque given by husband – Cheque bounce complaint -- Loan liability of wife -- Drawer cannot escape from its liability merely on ground that debt was not personally incurred -- Conviction upheld.

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A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Two separate complaints – Maintainability of -- Common financial transaction -- Seven cheques issued towards repayment of loan – Two cheques issued jointly by both accused while remaining five issued solely by one accused – Cheques dishonoured on different dates and followed by separate statutory notices – Each dishonour giving rise to a distinct cause of action under Section 138 NI Act – Filing of two separate complaints based on different drawers of cheques held legally permissible – Mere fact that cheques arose out of a common transaction not rendering separate complaints impermissible – Conviction upheld, sentences of imprisonment awarded to revisionist in both complaint cases ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 14, 15, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – Security cheque -- Liability of drawer – Loan by wife – Cheque by husband as security – Accused admitted signatures on cheques and admitted handing over cheques for repayment of loan – Presumption under Section 139 NI Act operating in favour of holder – Drawer issuing cheque towards discharge of liability of another person cannot escape liability merely on ground that debt was not personally incurred – Plea of “security cheque” insufficient in absence of credible rebuttal evidence – Conviction upheld.

(Para 16)

22. (P&H HC) 13-03-2026

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Scope of S. 528 BNSS -- Inherent powers u/s 528 BNSS are to be exercised sparingly and cannot be used unless the order reflects patent illegality or miscarriage of justice

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Evidence -- Exhibiting a document does not amount to its proof; its execution and admissibility must still be established, failing which the Court may disregard it at final adjudication

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Evidence -- Attorney of complainant can tender documents, subject to the accused’s right to challenge their admissibility and proof and evidential value during cross-examination and at the stage of final arguments

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A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Inherent power u/s 528 of BNSS -- Scope of – Cane be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice -- Jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution and interference is warranted only where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or results in manifest miscarriage of justice -- Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible or to re-appreciate the factual aspects which have already been considered by the trial Court.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Marking or exhibiting of a document does not dispense with the requirement of proving the same in accordance with law -- Party relying upon the document still carries the burden to establish its execution, authenticity and admissibility -- If such proof is not forthcoming, the Court is always competent to eschew the document from consideration at the stage of final adjudication.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint  – Evidence by attorney -- Once the attorney had been duly substituted to prosecute the complaint on behalf of the complainant and the complainant’s evidence was still continuing, the tendering of documents during the course of such evidence cannot be said to be wholly impermissible – Contention that the documents could not have been tendered by the Special Power of Attorney without prior permission of the Court does not merit acceptance -- Other party retains full liberty to challenge the admissibility, mode of proof and evidentiary value of such documents during cross-examination and at the stage of final arguments.

(Para 11)

31. (P&H HC) 24-09-2025

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Suspension of sentence – 138, 148 NI Act & 415, 430 BNSS – 20% compensation deposit – Where the appellant is unable to furnish the deposit and continued incarceration would prejudice liberty, the Appellate Court should prioritize the appeal and endeavour to decide it preferably within 60 days and not later than 90 days, subject to extension where delay is attributable to the complainant.

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Suspension of sentence – 138, 148 NI Act & 415, 430 BNSS – 20% compensation deposit – Appellate Court’s discretion to exempt the statutory deposit also encompasses power to reduce it below 20%, having regard to the convict’s financial capacity and circumstances.

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Suspension of sentence – 138, 148 NI Act & 415, 430 BNSS – Deposit may be imposed as a condition for suspension of sentence, but non-compliance cannot defeat the pending appeal or extinguish the appellant’s right to have it decided; the 20% requirement is not absolute and may be reduced or waived in exceptional circumstances with reasons.

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A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty even when the first appeal is yet to be decided -- Appellate Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the convictions and decide those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators’ intentions -- However, the time of sixty days should be extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is delayed because of the complainant.

(Para 76)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415, 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – The words, “Whether sufficient ground has been made out by the appellants to persuade the Sessions Court not to order any deposit is left entirely to its discretion and satisfaction.”, used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, would include a reduction of the amount below 20%, because if the Appellate Court can exempt the entire 20%, it can also reduce the deposit below 20% depending upon the convict’s financial capacity -- Any other interpretation would imply that even if a convict is willing to pay some amount, e.g., 15%, 10%, or 5%, and the Appellate Court exempts the entire amount, thereby preventing the complainant from collecting whatever the convict can afford to pay.

(Para 22)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation :

First proposition -- “Whether imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable or not, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation?”

Answer to the first proposition is that the imposition of condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, is sustainable, while deciding the application for suspension of sentence in an appeal, when the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is still awaiting confirmation.

(Para 16-36)

Second proposition -- “Whether the right of the convict-appellant being on bail in pending appeal, can be subjected to the compliance of direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act?

Answer to the second proposition was once addressed by Surinder Singh Deswal supra [Second case] (2020) 2 SCC 514, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when an Appellate Court suspends the sentence on a condition, then the failure to comply with that condition adversely affects the continuation of the suspension.

The Appellate Court that has suspended the sentence on a condition, after observing non-compliance, could reasonably hold that the suspension stood vacated due to the non-compliance, and it is the responsibility of the said Appellate Court, which granted the suspension, to consider the non-compliance and make an appropriate decision. Nonetheless, non-compliance with the suspension condition is enough to declare that the suspension has been vacated.

(Para 37-41)

Third proposition -- “Whether the right of bail can be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance of the direction to pay 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act, for any justifiable or un-justifiable reason, as discussed in the cases of Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises ?

Answer to the third proposition is that the right of bail cannot be taken away by the Appellate Court, where final adjudication of the appeal is pending, due to non-compliance with the direction of paying 20% of the compensation amount under Section 148 of the NI Act. Whenever an Appellate Court directs a deposit under Section 148 of the NI Act and imposes conditions on the suspension of sentence, such conditions must be just conditions.

Here it requires to be understood that once the issue regarding deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount, payable under Section 148 of NI Act, is decided by the concerned Appellate Court by following the spirit of the observations made in the judgments of Jamboo Bhandari (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, and condition, if any, is imposed while suspending the sentence, the same would be deemed to be just and fair, and undoubtedly such condition requires its fulfillment at the end of the appellant, who seeks suspension of sentence.

(Para 42-52)

Fourth proposition -- “Whether it is a pre-condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the Trial Court, for getting an appeal decided?

From the judgments of Noor Mohammed (2002) 9 SCC 23: 2022 and Vijay D. Salvi (2007) 5 SCC 741), it is clear that non-deposit of 20% of the compensation or fine amount would not disentitle the accused from availing any of his substantive rights, including the right of appeal. The case of Vijay D. Salvi, (2007) 5 SCC 741, clearly answers the fourth proposition of law. Thus, to get the appeal decided, there cannot be any precondition for depositing the amount ordered under Section 148 of the NI Act by the Appellate Court. The fourth question is answered accordingly.

(Para 53-57)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 430 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal -- Suspension of sentence – Condition of deposit of 20% of compensation – Requirement to deposit 20% or more of the fine amount or compensation is not an absolute rule and is subject to exceptions mentioned in Jamboo Bhandari, (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and Muskan Enterprises (2024) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 19767, it can be reduced to below the statutory minimum of 20% or even waived in exceptional cases by assigning reasons.

(65-72)

35. (J&K&L HC) 20-05-2025

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Proclamation – 138 NI Act -- Attachment of property – Objections – Magistrate cannot defer consideration of objections by the claimed owner until implementation of attachment; objections must be decided expeditiously after hearing the parties, without awaiting compliance report.

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Proclamation – 138 NI Act -- Attachment of property – Objections – Section 84 Cr.P.C does not bar a third party from raising objections prior to attachment; Court is required to adjudicate such objections and, if the property is found not to belong to the accused, decline or withdraw the attachment.

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A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Petitioner claiming to be the owner of the attached property – Magistrate framed an opinion that the objections of the petitioner would be considered only after attachment order is implemented on spot – Held, procedure adopted by learned trial Magistrate is not countenanced by law -- Impugned order set aside -- Learned trial Magistrate directed to proceed ahead and decide the objections filed by the petitioner to the attachment order most expeditiously after hearing the parties, without waiting for the compliance report of the Deputy Commissioner.

(Para 6-8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83, 84 – Proclamation – Attachment of property – Objections to attachment – Decisioning upon – Requirement of – Section 84 of Cr.P.C. does not bar raising of objection prior to the attachment -- Thus, if a third party raises an objection prior to the attachment of the property, the court has to decide the same and if the court comes to the conclusion that the property does not belong to the accused, the court can pass an order, either declining to attach the property or withdraw the attachment order.

(Para 7)

39. (SC) 26-03-2025

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Cheque bounce complaint – Suppression of material facts – Quashing -- Complainant suppressed the accused’s reply letters to statutory notice u/s 138 of NI Act seeking documents, in the complaint and statement on oath u/s 200 CrPC – It amounts to abuse of process of law, complaint and the order of cognizance quashed.

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Complaint u/s 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS) -- Learned Magistrate is duty bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing, required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses.

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Complaint – Summoning -- Magistrate must examine the complainant to ascertain the truth and apply his mind to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to issue process or not.

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A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS), Section 482 (528 BNSS) – Complaint in cheque bounce case -- Suppression of facts -- Effect: Statutory notice u/s 138 NI Act was issued by the complainant’s advocate – Appellant/ accused’s advocate write twice within few days seeking supply of documents relied upon in the notice – Documents were not supplied – Complainant suppressed the reply letters sent by the accused in the complaint as well as in the statement on oath under Section 200 CrPC – As the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint – It is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – Held, High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside -- Complaint and the order of cognizance quashed and set aside.

(Para 13-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- After a complaint is filed u/s 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate is duty-bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing -- What is reduced into writing is required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses, if any.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- Recording the complainant's statement on oath u/s 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality, object is to ascertain the truth -- Learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth -- Learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused -- If he is satisfied, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC (227 BNSS) -- Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter.

(Para 10)

42. (P&H HC) 03-02-2025

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Suspension of sentence – Appeal -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Appellate Court imposed condition without recording reasons; condition set aside and matter remanded for fresh consideration after hearing parties in accordance with Jamboo Bhandari, (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 with coercive action stayed meanwhile.

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Appeal -- Deposit of 20% compensation – 138 NI Act -- Requirement – Deposit of minimum 20% of fine or compensation is not an absolute mandate; Appellate Court has discretion to waive or reduce the deposit in exceptional circumstances having regard to the facts of the case.

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A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- Petitioners/ convicts directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by trial Court by the Appellate Court -- No reason given by the Court while issuing directions -- Condition of depositing of 20% of compensation amount awarded by the trial Court imposed for the purpose of suspension of sentence, set aside -- Appellate Court directed to re-consider the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties and then to pass appropriate order in accordance with the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case (SC) 2024(2) L.A.R. 323 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and till then not to take any coercive action against the petitioners.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- According to Section 148 NI Act, the requirement to deposit a minimum 20% of the fine or compensation during an appeal is not mandatory, instead, it is discretionary power vested with the appellate Court meaning the said Court can choose to waive the said deposit in certain exceptional circumstances depending on the facts of the case.

(Para 7)

44. (SC) 19-12-2024

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Second petition -- 482 CrPC – Maintainability – Change in law constitutes a vital change in circumstances permitting a subsequent petition despite earlier withdrawal without liberty, subject to satisfaction that intervention is necessary to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice.

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 ‘May’ and ‘shall’ – Mandatory or directory – Use of ‘may’ or ‘shall’ is not conclusive; legislative intent must be gathered from the entire statute, relevant provisions and context to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory.

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Suspension of sentence – 148 NI Act -- Appeal against conviction – Interpretation of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ – Legislative use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same provision must be given their literal meaning where it does not cause absurdity; hence, ‘may’ means ‘may’ and ‘shall’ means ‘shall’.

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A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent powers of High court – Change in law -- Second petition – Maintainability of -- Change of law can legitimately be regarded as a vital change in circumstance clothing the high court with the power, competence and jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent petition notwithstanding the fact that the earlier petition was withdrawn without obtaining any leave, subject to the satisfaction recorded by the high court that the order prayed for in the subsequent petition ought to be made, inter alia, either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 19)

B. May – Shall – Interpretation of -- Use of the verbs ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in a statute is not a sure index for determining whether such statute is mandatory or directory in character -- The legislative intent has to be gathered looking into other provisions of the enactment, which can throw light to guide one towards a proper determination -- While the general impression is that ‘may’ and ‘shall’ are intended to have their natural meaning, it is the duty of the court to gather the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the entire statute, the section and the phrase/expression under consideration.

(Para 24)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Appeal – Conviction in Cheque bounce complaint – Suspension of sentence Since the self-same section, read as a whole, reveals that ‘may’ has been used twice and ‘shall’ thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the language -- Reading and understanding the words used by the legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided at all costs -- Therefore, read ‘may’ as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148.

(Para 27)