Search By Topic: Crime against Child

8. (Delhi) 31-07-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor – Re-summoning of POCSO victim for cross-examination -- Bar u/s 33(5) POCSO Act may not be absolute and balance of rights needs to be maintained u/s 33(5) of POCSO Act and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. -- Court’s discretion in exercising its power to re-summon a witness for cross-examination has to be exercised with circumspection, caution and utmost sensitivity – Crucial word used in Section 33(5) of POCSO Act is “called repeatedly” -- This Section thus has to be interpreted to balance and applied with the right u/s 311 Cr.P.C. of accused and right to fair trial of an accused depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor -- Re-examination of POCSO victim for cross-examination – Change of counsel -- Victim was only seven years of age at the time of incident in the year 2016 -- Child victim re-lived the trauma of perverse sexual assault upon her at a very tender age of seven years, once, when she was sexually assaulted, thereafter while recording her statement before the police and u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate and thereafter before the learned Trial Court while recording her evidence – Victim cannot be directed to appear once again after six years to depose about the same incident, only on the ground that the previous counsel had cross-examined the witness in a manner which the new counsel does not find sufficient or appropriate -- Change of counsel cannot be a ground for re-summoning of the witnesses -- Though the accused has to be granted and ensured a fair trial, it cannot mean being afforded unjustified repeated opportunities of cross-examination in every case to indicate fair trial.

(Para 13-21)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned.

(Para 14)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Misuse of POCSO law – Ground of -- Any law, whether gender based or not, has the potential of being misused -- Legislature cannot stop enacting laws nor judiciary can stop applying such laws since they have been enacted to curb the larger menace of commission of such offences and getting justice to genuine victims.

(Para 15)

11. (Bombay HC) 10-07-2023

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

25. (SC) 02-11-2022

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19(1), 21, 27 – Reporting of offence -- Prompt and proper reporting of is of utmost importance -- Its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act -- Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act – Clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape – If it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault -- A conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

(Para 15, 22)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Medical evidence in sexual offences -- In relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO case – Quashing of FIR and charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.

(Para 18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145, 157 – Evidential value of statement u/s 161,  164 Cr.P.C. – Statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for such purposes.

(Para 20)

26. (SC) 01-11-2022

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 164-A, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Rape case Guidelines -- Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka by Nonavinakere Police vs. Shivanna alias Tarkari Shivanna, (2014) 8 SCC 913 exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution issued interim directions in the form of mandamus to all the Police Stations-in-Charge in the entire country to follow:

“10.1. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the investigating officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. A copy of the statement under Section 164 CrPC should be handed over to the investigating officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 CrPC should not be disclosed to any person till charge-sheet/report under Section 173 CrPC is filed.

10.2. The investigating officer shall as far as possible take the victim to the nearest Lady Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate.

10.3. The investigating officer shall record specifically the date and the time at which he learnt about the commission of the offence of rape and the date and time at which he took the victim to the Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate as aforesaid.

10.4. If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking the victim to the Magistrate, the investigating officer should record the reasons for the same in the case diary and hand over a copy of the same to the Magistrate.

10.5. Medical examination of the victim : Section 164-A CrPC inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in CrPC imposes an obligation on the part of investigating officer to get the victim of the rape immediately medically examined. A copy of the report of such medical examination should be immediately handed over to the Magistrate who records the statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC.”

Supreme Court gave suggestion to every High Court that the appropriate modifications/amendments be made to the Criminal Practice/Trial Rules incorporating provisions consistent with the directions issued in the decisions in Shivanna’s case (2014) 8 SCC 913.

(Para 1-7)

27. (P&H) 29-10-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused -- Power of Court -- Power u/s 319 Cr.P.c. is discretionary and extra ordinary, which is to be exercised very sparingly only when strong and cogent evidence has been led against a person, who is sought to be summoned -- Court must be satisfied from the evidence collected during the enquiry or in the trial that the person sought to be summoned as an additional accused has committed an offence for which he deserves to be tried alongwith already arraigned accused.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – POCSO matter -- Rape -- Summoning of additional accused – In the complaint there is no allegation whatsoever against MK (sister of main accused/ JS) – Only reference in the FIR is that MK is the sister of JS and she used to talk with the prosecutrix on phone -- In the statement recorded u/s 164 of the Code, the prosecutrix stated that MK used to say that she wants that the prosecutrix should become her Bhabi (sister-in-law), and that the prosecutrix revealed about the incident to MK but she assured her that there is nothing to worry as JS would get married to her -- However, in her deposition, the prosecutrix has stated that, it was MK, who had called her on phone and forced her to accompany them on a trip, but when she reached the hotel, she found that MK was not present there – It is evident that there is a consistent change in the version of the incident by the prosecutrix to enmesh the sister of JS in the criminal case -- Parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh’s case (2014) 3 SCC 92 and Manjeet Singh’s case 2021 SCC Online 632 are not fulfilled and the order passed by the Trial Court declining the application for summoning MK does not call for any interference -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 8-10)

29. (SC) 21-10-2022

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail –While granting bail High court observed “… Though on the one side, there is a possibility of such hugs and kisses being manifestations of affection by an uncle, one cannot ignore the possibility of such show of 'affections' being coloured by sexual overtones. However, those are all matters for investigation.” – Held, observations made are totally unwarranted and have been made overlooking the specific allegations contained in the FIR, duly supported with the Statement of the victim-girl child u/s 164 of the Code – High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction in granting protection against arrest, as the Investigating Officer deserves free-hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11, 29 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail –Victim-girl is traumatized to such a high degree that her academic pursuits have been adversely impacted alone, coupled with the legislative intent especially reflected through Section 29 of the POCSO Act, are sufficient to dissuade a Court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in granting pre-arrest bail.

(Para 12)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8, 9, 11, 29 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv), 354 A-(2) and 354-A(3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail -- Charge-sheet filed -- It will be unfair to presume that the Investigating Officer does not require Respondent No.1 for custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation.

(Para 14)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Custodial interrogation -- In many anticipatory bail matters, one common argument being canvassed that no custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be granted -- There appears to be a serious misconception of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail -- Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail.

(Para 15)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 438 -- POCSO matter – Anticipatory bail – Prima facie case – Nature of offence -- Custodial interrogation -- There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted anticipatory bail -- First and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused -- Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment -- Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail -- However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail.

(Para 15

F. Binding precedent – Judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of High Court --  Decision of the Kerala High Court rendered in the Joy’s case (2019) 1 KLT 935 deals with Section 29 of the POCSO Act -- When the learned Judge decided the anticipatory bail application, the decision of the coordinate Bench in the case of Joy was binding to him -- He could not have ignored a binding decision -- It is a different thing to say that if he may disagree with the view taken and accordingly refer it to a larger Bench.

(Para 16)

32. (Delhi) 20-09-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

44. (SC) 06-04-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)