Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 384, 420, 120(B) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute  -- Quashing of FIR – Misue of State machinery – One FIR at Hisar – Other at Udaipur – Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 misusing their official position by lodging complaints one after the other – Further, their conduct of neither appearing before the Trial Court at Hisar nor withdrawing their complaint at Hisar, would show that their only intention was to harass the appellant by first making him face a trial at Hisar and then again at Udaipur – Argument that no offence was committed in Hisar but only at Udaipur was also not correct – Court deprecated this practice of state machinery being misused for ulterior motives, imposed cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- on the respondent No.2 – FIR at Udaipur quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 469, 471, 180, 120-B -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 23 -- Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Section 67B -- POCSO -- Permanent exemption from personal appearance – Charges framed on 14.07.2023 and only 5 PWs out of 15, have been examined so far – Personal appearance of the petitioners before the learned trial Court exempted subject to conditions.

(Para 6, 7)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15, 18 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 342, 302, 201 – Acquittal -- POCSO – Murder -- Child in conflict with law/ CCIL – Preliminary assessment – Mandate of – Investigating Officer and Trial Court was aware of the fact that Accused/ appellant was juvenile -- In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused – Held, procedure adopted by the Sessions Court in conducting the trial of the accused appellant is de hors the mandatory requirements of JJ Act -- Entire proceedings stand vitiated – Such an exercise at this stage would be sheer futility because now the appellant is nearly 23 years of age – Impugned judgment quashed and set aside -- Appellant ordered to be released forthwith.

(Para 25, 26, 38-51)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 501, 182, 183 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Discharge in rape case – Defamation -- Discharged by holding that there is no incriminating evidence  -- No finding that the petitioner had been falsely implicated on the basis of false statements and fabrication of evidence – No finding of any Court or any Investigating Officer that false statements had been made – For offence u/s 193 IPC, the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. were to be resorted to which had not been done -- Offence u/s 182 IPC is also not made out -- Even otherwise, the charge were framed -- No evidence of the filing of a false complaint to defame the petitioner – Dismissal of complaint upheld.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Regular bail -- Speedy trial -- “Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception” -- Right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained person -- However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal jurisprudence, which is “the presumption of innocence”, besides the gravity of offence(s) involved.

(Para 8)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 18 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO -- Attempt to unnatural offence -- Regular bail -- Petitioner is not involved in any other criminal case -- Statement of victim (minor child), recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C, does not support the case of prosecution -- No fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars, who has faced incarceration of about 07 months and 10 days -- Trial is not likely to conclude anytime soon – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3/4, 5(d)/6, 42 -- Rape of minor girl aged 7 years – Sentence of punishment -- Appellant was aged 40 year at the time of offence -- High Court commuted Capital sentence to life sentence -- Court are also to take into account the present age of the petitioner and the fact that he has already undergone the incarceration – Life sentence modified to a fixed term of sentence of 30 years with fine of Rs.1 lac.

(Para 7, 16, 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376 AB – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3/4, 5(d)/6, 42 -- Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age – Sentence for 30 years -- Fine for medical expenses -- When a sentence of imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years which may extend upto life imprisonment is imposed, the convict is also liable to suffer a sentence of fine which shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim which quantified as Rupees One Lakh and the same shall be paid to the victim with respect to the conviction u/s 363, IPC -- No separate sentence for the aforesaid offence under POCSO Act is to be imposed on the petitioner-convict.

(Para 11, 16, 17, 20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8), 190 – Further investigation – Protest petition -- Second respondent was not put up for trial for offences u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC – Appellant, instead of moving protest petition, moved an application captioned as “under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.” -- Averments made in that application reveal that the appellant protested against deletion of charges u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC and she made an endeavour to bring on record the material which would prima facie establish the commission of these offences – Magistrate can treat it as Protest Petition and then decide the same on merits -- A technicality like the caption of the application/petition could not be an impediment.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – False promise to marry -- If the consent of the victim is based on misconception, such consent is immaterial as it is not a voluntary consent -- If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2), 377, 504, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – False promise to marry – Quashing of charge-sheet -- Physical relationship started in 2012, though prosecutrix claimed that it was a forced relationship, she did not make any grievance about it till February 2018 -- In February 2013 and in December 2017, the prosecutrix was pregnant -- It is not the case of the prosecutrix that from February 2013 to December 2017, the appellant forced the second respondent to maintain the physical relationship -- In July 2017, there was an engagement ceremony between the appellant and the prosecutrix – Taking the prosecution case as correct, it is not possible to accept that the prosecutrix maintained a physical relationship only because the appellant had given a promise of marriage – Charge-sheet and further proceedings quashed.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cruelty to wife -- Anticipatory bail – Non-performing of conjugal rights – Ground of -- High Court dismissed the petition by observing that in view of the adamant attitude of the appellant in not resuming the conjugal life with the opposite party No.2 in the house of the appellant, where the opposite party No.2 was staying, his petition could not be considered – Held, neither such condition should have been imposed by the High Court while granting an anticipatory bail, nor such could be a ground for rejection of the petition filed by the appellant – Order set aside, in case of arrest of the appellant, he ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 34 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- It was a matrimonial dispute which has been amicably settled and thus the parties must be given a chance to move on with their lives -- FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Mediation settlement – Printed Performa -- Settlement agreements drafted by the Mediation Centres on a printed proforma – Settlement on the printed proforma sometimes gives an impression that there is no application of mind and the settlement deed has been drafted mechanically -- Mediation Centres and the Family Courts directed to ensure that the settlement deeds are drafted properly and it should not be on a printed proforma.

(Para 11)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005),  Section 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Domestic violence case – Speedy disposal – Case of 2019 -- Petitioner is a senior citizen of 82 years of age, falls in a distinctive category, qua which directions have been given by High Court, from time to time, for expeditious disposal of the matters relating to the senior citizens i.e. who are 65 years of age or above – Ld. Lower Court shall remain sensitized about the said instructions and proceed further to decide the application for interim relief and to hear the arguments on the application on 04.08.2023 and if not possible to hear the arguments on the said date, the same shall be heard and decided, within a period of one week thereafter – Ld. Lower Court shall ensure expeditious disposal of the main petition.

(Para 4, 5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366 -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Penetrative sexual assault – Marriage with minor girl – Acquittal -- In statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC, the victim deposed that she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized because she was adamant to live with the appellant -- No doubt, she resiled from her statement, yet, the medical evidence indicated that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts – Prosecution was not able to establish that there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant – Held, M’s statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events -- Impugned judgment set aside the charge u/s 366 IPC against the appellant -- Charges u/s 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 20-22)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Penetrative sexual assault -- Rape on woman under 12 years of age/Section 376AB IPC – Regular bail -- During the trial, victim aged about 14 years (PW1) and informant (PW2), mother of the victim, have been examined – Victim (PW1) and her mother (PW2) did not support the case of the prosecution and applicant has no criminal history – Held, there is no reason to keep the applicant behind the bars for an indefinite period, therefore, without expressing any opinion as to the merit of the case, applicant deserves bail at this stage -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 363, 377, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO matter – Regular bail -- FSL report has shown the offence having been committed by the petitioner -- However, it is not disputed that the complainant and the father of the victim have not supported the case of the prosecution and that the petitioner is in custody for the past about more than two years and two months -- No other case -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail pending trial.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Aggravated penetrative sexual assault – Punishment – Amendment of 2019 – Effect of -- On the date of the commission of the offence, R.I. for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed -- From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years -- However, the amended provision will not apply as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019.

(Para 10)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Less than minimum sentence – Power of Court -- When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence - - Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence -- No such provision in the POCSO Act -- No question of showing any leniency.

(Para 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of Final report/ Police report -- Consensual relationship – Prosecutrix was a married woman having her husband and children and was fully aware that the petitioner was also a married man -- She maintained sexual relationship with the accused on many occasions and stayed with the petitioner/ accused in a room in a hotel -- It is difficult to conclude that the prosecutrix had not given consent for the sexual relationship -- Impugned criminal proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed, exercising the inherent power conferred on the Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. – Petition allowed.

(Para 22-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Delay of 28 days in giving the complaint – To commit the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC no sane person would take two accomplices, that too after committing a similar offence earlier -- Complainant was not present on both the occasions -- There is no attempt to recover the knife from the appellant as it is a specific case of the prosecution that he committed the offence by threatening to harm the prosecutrix -- No reason as to why the sole eye-witness has not been examined – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 8-13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Statement of prosecutrix -- Evidence of the prosecutrix will have to be kept at a higher pedestal but then, such a testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court -- It has to be seen contextually in the light of the other evidence available.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(N), 506, 294, 323 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 – Rape – Quashing of FIR – Delay in lodging of FIR – Long standing relationship between prosecutrix and petitioner – There is no allegation that there was false promise to marry – There is also FIR against other men by prosecutrix which shows that FIR has been lodged malafidely due to break in their relationship or for some other ulterior motives – FIR quashed, writ petition allowed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 325 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Miscarriage – No medical evidence -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though wife of the complainant, was pregnant, there is absolutely no evidence on record of a miscarriage having taken place on account of beatings being meted out by the petitioners and their co-accused -- Similarly, there is absolutely no evidence of the injured suffering an injury attracting Section 325 IPC -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 342, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful confinement -- House trespass – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Complainant party and the accused reside on different floors of the same house -- Therefore, while on the one hand, it is doubtful if either of the offence was made out, on the other hand, it would be a travesty of justice to allow the instant proceedings to continue against the petitioners given the fact that there are multiple litigations pending between the parties, and therefore, their false implication cannot be ruled out – Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Hurt – Long delay -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though prima facie, the medical evidence would suggest that an offence is made out, however, the occurrence pertains to September 2006, the present complaint came to be instituted in June 2012, the summoning order came to be passed in August 2016 and the matter has come up for hearing now in May 2023 -- Therefore, it would be a travesty of justice to permit the prosecution of the petitioners for an offence u/s 323 IPC alone after 17 years of the alleged occurrence -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail -- Rape – Consenting party --  Misrepresentation -- In statement u/s 164 prosecutrix has categorically stated that they became friends through Facebook; he told her that he is Hindu and on his Facebook profile also he used his surname as “Dixit” and at the inception of the relationship applicant/ accused misrepresented himself and trapped the prosecutrix in his love; had applicant/accused not misrepresented to be of her faith, the prosecutrix would not have given in to the applicant/accused – Anticipatory Bail rejected.

(Para 4-6)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Proof -- It is a basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however, strong cannot take place of proof – In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof -- Large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution.

(Para 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Acquittal -- Dowry death – Demand of dowry – Presumption -- Prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassed by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry – In order to presume the dowry death, it is a condition precedent that there must be unimpeachable evidence in relation to dowry demand -- As per evidence on record, there is no positive and cogent evidence about demand of dowry, and, nexus between demand of dowry and harassment could not be established -- Therefore, conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 38-41)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 19, 21 -- Child rape victim – Marital status -- There is no distinct category within child victims of rape as those who are married and those who are not.

(Para 12)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21, 42A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198(1), 198(3) – Child victim -- Mandatory reporting of an offence -- Held, Section 19 read with Section 21 of the POCSO Act shall override the restrictions imposed under Section 198(1) read with Section 198(3) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 16)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 472, 473 -- Child victim – Delay in reporting of offence – Extension of limitation -- In appropriate cases where minor victims are not able to file their complaints within time, the Trial Court has the power to extend the period of limitation, if it deems appropriate.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 34, 406, 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent – Cruelty -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- Alleged offences are of pre-dominantly private in nature and no moral turpitude or interest of public at large is involved -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – FIR under Sections 313, 34, 406 and 498A of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2)(n), 376-C, 506, 34, 201, 384 -- Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Section 66E, 67A, 67-C – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Rape – Forwarding of Video recording in compromising position – Anticipatory bail -- Prosecution case against the petitioner is that he re-forwarded video recording of prosecutrix with other accused in compromising position to many persons -- On the contention that petitioner is not accused of commission of offence punishable u/s 376, 376-C, 506, 34, 201 and 384 IPC, however, he, at the most, is responsible for commission of offence punishable u/s 66E of IT Act wherein maximum prescribed sentence is three years granted interim bail – Petitioner has joined investigation and no custodial interrogation is required – Petition allowed and the interim bail granted to the petitioner made absolute.

(Para 1-3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 354-A, 376(2)(n), 450, 506 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(w), 14-A (2) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape – Regular bail – Appellant is in custody since 03.06.2021 and he is not involved in any other offence -- As per medical report, no human semen detected -- Material witness i.e. prosecutrix stands examined – 8 out of 19 prosecution witnesses examined, thus, there is abysmally low possibility of conclusion of trial in near future -- Accused in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India has right to defend himself and put forth his stand which cannot be possible while in custody -- Appellant ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 377 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Rape – Unnatural offence – Regular bail -- Petitioner and the prosecutrix were in relationship and the only reason for lodging of FIR was that the petitioner had shown his inclination to marry some other girl – 7 out of 14 witnesses examined and the testimony of the prosecutrix is also complete coupled with the fact that the petitioner is a young boy of 21 years and is in custody for the last more than 1 ½ years and trial is likely to take long time, he is entitled to the concession of regular bail – Petition allowed.

(Para 4-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 377, 498A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Matrimonial dispute – Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A, 376(2)(N) – Regular bail – Cancellation of bail – Earlier bail u/ss 363, 366-A IPC – Later Section 376(2)(N) IPC added -- Section 376(2)(N) of IPC was not in the picture at the time of consideration of bail – Held, simply because the offence u/s 376(2)(N) of IPC has been added is no ground to cancel the bail -- Petition dismissed -- State is at liberty to take the requisite action if so required in accordance with law.

(Para 1, 2, 5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 437(5), 439(2) – Bail -- Addition of offence – Arrest of accused -- Addition of a serious offence can be a circumstance where a Court can direct that the accused be arrested and committed to custody -- Recourse available to an accused is to surrender and apply afresh for bail in respect of the newly added offences -- Investigating agency is also entitled to move the Court for seeking the custody of the accused by invoking the provisions of 437(5) and 439(2) Cr.P.C. -- Court that may have released the accused on bail or the Appellate Court/superior Court in exercise of special powers conferred on it, can direct a person who has been released on bail earlier, to be arrested and taken into custody.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354, 354-B and 506 (Section 376 added later) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438, 437(5), 439(2) – Anticipatory bail – Rape -- High Court granted anticipatory bail having been swayed by the “star variations in the narration of the prosecutrix” implying thereby that what was originally recorded in the FIR, did not make out an offence of rape, as defined in Section 375 IPC, which is an erroneous assumption – Prosecutrix was not afforded a hearing, no doubt, the State was present and was represented in the said proceedings, but the right of the prosecutrix could not have been whittled down for this reason alone -- Orders granting anticipatory bail to the respondent No. 2/accused quashed and set aside.

(Para 22-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 376(2)(n), 34 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(5), 14A(2) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Rape – Regular bail -- Prosecutrix stands examined, in her examination as well as FIR, the allegation that physical relations with appellant on the pretext of marriage and now he is not solemnizing marriage -- Prosecutrix is major, she met appellant in Jail which prima facie shows that there was consensual relation -- Appellant is in custody since 25.02.2022 and he is not involved in any other offence – Out of 12 prosecution witnesses till date only 5 have been examined, thus, there is abysmally low possibility of conclusion of trial in near future -- In view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India appellant has right to defend himself and put forth his stand which cannot be possible while in custody -- Prosecution has not led any convincing/plausible documentary or oral evidence indicating possibility of appellant being flee from justice or tampering the evidences or winning over/threatening the witnesses – Appeal allowed, appellant ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO -- Gang rape -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioner solemnized marriage with the victim and she is happily cohabiting with the petitioner, thus, denial of prayer of the petitioner not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members -- Further, there appears to be no chance of conviction, thus, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – FIR u/s 376D and 506 of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 1-5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 375 Exception 2, 376 – POCSO – Rape – Consensual sex with wife aged above 15 years -- Acquittal of accused -- Incident of August-September, 2012 -- Parents and prosecutrix have not supported the prosecution case -- Prosecutrix specifically denied that she was kidnapped forcibly -- Prosecutrix married to the appellant and have also begotten a child out of the said wedlock -- Sexual act by the appellant with the prosecutrix, who are husband and wife, with the latter being above 15 years of age would not amount to rape as per Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC -- Conviction is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, appellant is directed to be set at liberty.

(Para 4, 8-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 365, 376, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR – Ordinarily FIR u/s 376 of IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise, however, in the present case, prosecutrix is duly wedded wife of one of the petitioners and others are close relatives of her husband – It further appears that FIR was outcome of family discord – Denial of prayer of the petitioners not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members – Further, there appears to be no chance of conviction, thus, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR u/s 365, 376 and 120B of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 193, 209 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328, 376, 377 – Rape – Cancellation report -- Cognizance of offence in protest petition u/s 193 Cr.P.C. -- Jurisdiction of Special Court -- Cancellation report filed before the Special Court on oral directions issued by the Judicial Magistrate – Offences exclusively triable by a Special Court – Special Court issued notice to the complainant, whereupon she filed a protest petition and produced preliminary evidence by way of her and her friend’s testimony, and also brought relevant documentary evidence on record -- Cognizance of the offences was taken by the Special Court in exercise of original jurisdiction u/s Section 193 Cr.PC, and the impugned summoning order was passed – Held, Special Court taking cognizance of the offences without any order of committal, has neither caused any prejudice to the petitioner, nor has it resulted in any failure or miscarriage of justice -- It is only an irregularity committed by the Magistrate on the administrative side, in not formally passing the order committing the case -- Such an administrative lapse of procedure cannot divest the Special Court of its original jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and summon the petitioner -- Impugned order cannot be held to be without jurisdiction.

(Para 11-14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11 -- Void marriage – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC – Sustainability of -- Marriage found to be null and void, as such the conviction u/s 498-A IPC would not be sustainable. Shivcharan’s case (2007) 15 SCC 369 relied.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Acquittal of accused – Interference in -- Ld. trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – High court reversed the judgment – Held, in an appeal/revision, the High court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible – No perversity in the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge -- Held, High Court ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Judge -- Appeals allowed, judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357 -- Haryana Victims Compensation Scheme, 2013 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)Section 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Compensation to rape victim under repealed scheme – Writ jurisdiction -- Victim cannot be denied benefit merely due to an act of oversight by the Court -- Act of Court should not prejudice her claim to just compensation -- Victim being a minor and 10 years of age, the Court is the supreme guardian of her best interests as parens patriae -- Hence, the deprivation is now being undone in exercise of the power of prerogative writ -- Sending of the petitioner to avail alternative remedy of appeal would be an exercise in futility as the authorities under the scheme cannot award compensation under a repealed scheme – Petition allowed, respondent-District Legal Services Authority directed to award a total compensation of Rs.4,50,000/- as per the Haryana Victim Compensation Scheme, 2013 -- Amount of Rs.4,00,000/- already disbursed be adjusted from the amount above.

(Para 14-16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Breach of promise to marry – Rape -- Difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise -- In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise -- So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence u/s 376 IPC – Appellant/ accused acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 20-25)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 277 – Language of record of evidence – General direction to all Courts -- Evidence of the witness has to be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness as may be practicable and then get it translated in the language of the court for forming part of the record --  However, recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible -- As such, the text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness -- Original deposition of the witness has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge – Directions given to all courts that while recording the evidence of the witnesses, shall duly comply with the provisions of Section 277 of Cr.PC.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Presumption u/s 113-A of Indian Evidence Act -- Principles

(1) The presumption carried in the Indian Evidence Act, is attractable only when the charge drawn against the accused is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC.

(2) The said statutory provision has a limited effect, in respect of a charge drawn under Section 304-B of the IPC, as the implied presumption, created through the words “shall be deemed to have caused her death”, which hence occur at the end of the relevant statutory provisions, yet do not discharge, the prosecution from adducing evidence qua the deceased being meted cruelty or harassment, in respect of demands of dowry, as, made upon her by her husband, or by his relatives.

(3) That the statutory phrase “and it is shown” which segregates the first, and, second component of the relevant discharging section, cast a conjunctive onus, upon the prosecution to prove the earlier, and, later components' of the relevant charging sections.

(4) That the word “shall be deemed to have caused her death” do not ever discharge the prosecution from adducing evidence rather for unflinchingly proving both the components, as carried in sub-Section (1) of Section 304-B of the IPC.

(5) The evidence necessary for proving the above foundational facts, rather for supporting the ingredients, as carried in Section 304-B IPC, is required to be always adduced by the prosecution, and, the implied presumption, gets strengthened only, when the defence omits to put the relevant exculpatory suggestions to the PWs concerned, and/or fails to secure a favourable answer thereto, rather from the PWs concerned.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court --Leave to appeal against the verdict of acquittal dismissed.

(Para 19, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 342, 376-D, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Rape – Regular bail – Petitioner neither named in the FIR, nor in the complainant's statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C., nor in her deposition before the trial Court -- Complainant/prosecutrix is aged about 46 years, investigation completed and the petitioner is in custody since 15.07.2022 -- Case is not likely to conclude in near future – Bail granted.

(Para 3-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 506 and 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise/ partial quashing of FIR  -- Petition qua petitioner no. 2 already withdrawn -- Contesting parties amicably resolved their issue -- There appears to be no chance of conviction -- Continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and courts are already over-burdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua petitioner no. 1 and 3.

(Para 2-10)

            Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 12 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Juvenile in conflict with law – POCSO Case – Regular bail -- Mere suggestion of vulnerability of the juvenile, in the opinion of a Probation Officer, to physical, psychological or immoral danger, as also opinion of the Clinical Psychologist regarding cognitive development of the juvenile, are alien to the requirements of Section 12 of the Act -- Being professional advice/opinion cannot afford reasonable ground for believing that the juvenile's release from custody is likely to bring him in association with any known criminal or expose him to physical, psychological or immoral danger – Nothing on record, which can even prima facie afford a ground to so believe -- Not the case that the juvenile's release from custody will defeat the ends of justice and does not fall in any of the exceptions carved out under Section 12 of the Act for declining bail -- Petitioner/juvenile in conflict with law is ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 3, 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties have solemnised marriage -- No useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- No chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – Petition allowed – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 5-9)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A, 376 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1), 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- POCSO -- Rape – Regular bail – Out of 14 prosecution witnesses till date only 02 material witnesses i.e. prosecutrix and complainant have been examined -- Petitioner has suffered incarceration of 02 years, 05 months and 08 days – Petitioner has prima facie case -- A person who seeks to be liberated must take judgment and serve sentence in the event of his conviction -- Detention or arrest not only deprives a person from his fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by article 21 but also freedom guaranteed by article 19(1) of Constitution – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail -- Respondent granted anticipatory bail subject to deposit of Rs. 75,000/- on offer made by him – Co-accused paid Rs.6,00,000/- to the petitioner to get concession of bail – Held, process of criminal law cannot be utilised for arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for bail -- Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings – Criminal proceedings are being prosecuted only as money recovery proceedings -- Hence, the order granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents stands affirmed but, the condition therein, of payment of Rs.75,000/- by the respondent No.2, stands annulled.

(Para 10-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Anticipatory bail -- Rape -- Petitioner married the complainant though he had not obtained a divorce from a prior marriage – Charge-sheet submitted, after investigation – Interim stay confirmed -- In the event of the arrest, petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 1-5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 439 -- Intent of arrest -- Reason of denial of bail are:

– to secure the appearance of the accused at the time of trial;

– to  allay possibility of repeating of offence & jeopardising own life on account of grim prospect of being convicted;

-- to avoid possibility of tampering of evidence and security of witnesses who may be pressurised or maltreated.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2) (N), 343, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1), 21 -- POCSO case – Rape – Regular bail – Detention or arrest not only deprives a person from his fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 but also freedom guaranteed by article 19(1) of our Constitution – Keeping in mind, the Petitioner is in custody since 27.02.2021, police report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C. stands filed and charges stand framed, prosecution stands examined as well cross-examined, out of total 24 witnesses till date 06 have been examined, thus, there is abysmally law possibility of conclusion of trial in near future, the petitioner is not involved in any other criminal case, petitioner is permanent resident of District Sirsa and have family members and prosecution has not led any convincing/plausible documentary or oral evidence indicating possibility of petitioner being flee from justice or tempering the evidences or winning over/threatening the witnesses, petitioner ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 – Notice without Domestic incident report -- Domestic incident report is not mandatory -- Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate has not committed any illegality or irregularity by issuing notice to the petitioner without waiting for the report of Protection Officer.

(Para 13)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127 -- Acquittal u/s 498A IPC – Award of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Acquittal u/s 498A IPC will not create a bar for his wife to seek relief under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -- Payment of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. or other application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. will not effect the application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as the respondent can claim maintenance under the one case subject to adjustment of maintenance already paid by him.

(Para 14, 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Application u/s 12 of DV Act, 2005 after more than 8 years – Limitation -- Violation of any order passed under the DV Act is punishable u/s 13 of D.V. Act, 2005 -- Mere filing of complaint u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act not barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C -- This section will come into operation when any order passed u/s 12 of the Act is violated – Petition seeking quashing of complaint u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 dismissed. Kamatchi’s case 2022(2) L.A.R. 222 = (2022) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16975 relied.

(Para 16-19)