Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Hostile witness – Acquittal -- When the main witness of the prosecution, i.e. the victim herself, has not supported the case of the prosecution, it is not open for the Court to presume that she did not support the case of the prosecution because the appellant-accused has won over the said witness -- Moreso, PW-2, i.e., the husband of the victim, also did not support the case of the prosecution -- Further, medical evidence also does not support the case of the prosecution -- Furthermore, three independent witnesses, though cited as prosecution witnesses in the chargesheet, were not examined by the prosecution – Held, Trial Court as well as the High Court committed an error by recording the order of conviction of the appellant-accused and therefore, the said orders are required to be quashed and set aside – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 376(2)(i), 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Acquittal -- Rape of four-year old girl – Circumstantial evidence -- Omission in FIR – Investigation lapses -- First Information Report, despite the informant’s professed complete knowledge of the incident, is bereft of even the most rudimentary details, neither the name of the accused person (appellant herein) nor those of the purported witnesses of the last seen together circumstance find mention -- Investigation hopelessly botched and a trial conducted with a  pedantic rigidity that obscured, rather than unveiled, the truth -- Highly unnatural conduct of the witnesses, marked by gross insensitivity/ rank apathy, contradictions and apparent concoctions raises serious doubts about the reliability of the prosecution’s case -- Yet, in face of this disturbing matrix, the accused-appellant stands convicted and has remained behind bars for nearly thirteen long years – Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-52, 78)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 393 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 354 -- Criminal trials – Judgment must contain -- More structured and uniform practice must be adopted to enhance the legibility of criminal judgments -- Directions issued to all trial Courts across the country for :  

Preparation of Tabulated Charts in all the judgments:

All trial Courts dealing with criminal matters shall, at the conclusion of the judgment, incorporate tabulated charts summarizing: -

a. Witnesses examined,

b. Documents exhibited, and

c. Material objects (muddamal) produced and exhibited.

These charts shall form an appendix or concluding segment of the judgment and shall be prepared in a clear, structured and easily comprehensible format.

Standardized Chart of Witnesses

Each criminal judgment shall contain a witness chart with at least the following columns:

a. Serial Number

b. Name of the Witness

c. Brief Description/Role of the Witness, such as: Informant, Eye-witness, Medical Jurist/Doctor, Investigating Officer (I.O.), Panch Witness, etc.

The description should be succinct but sufficient to indicate the evidentiary character of the witness. This structured presentation will allow quick reference to the nature of testimony, assist in locating the witness in the record, and minimize ambiguity.

Specimen Chart for Witnesses Examined

Standardized Chart of Exhibited Documents

A separate chart shall be prepared for all documents exhibited during trial. This chart shall include:

a. Exhibit Number;

b. Description of document;

c. The Witness who proved or attested the document.

Illustratively, the description may include: FIR, complaint, panchnamas, medical certificates, FSL reports, seizure memos, site plans, dying declarations, etc.

The requirement of specifying the witness who proved the document ensures traceability of proof and assist the Court in appreciating compliance with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/ Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

Specimen Chart for Exhibited Documents

Standard Chart for Material Objects (Muddamal)

Whenever material objects are produced and marked as exhibits, the trial Court shall prepare a third chart with:

a. Material Object (M.O.) Number;

b. Description of the Object;

c. Witness who proved the Object’s Relevance (e.g., weapon, clothing, tool, article seized under panchnama, etc.)

This enables clarity regarding the physical evidence relied upon.

Specimen Chart for Material Objects/Muddamals

Special Provisions for Cases Involving Voluminous Evidence

In complex cases, such as conspiracies, economic offences or trials involving voluminous oral or documentary evidence, the list of witnesses and exhibits may be substantially long. Where the number of witnesses or documents is unusually large, the trial Court may prepare charts only for the material, relevant, and relied-upon witnesses and documents, clearly indicating that the chart is confined to such items. This ensures that the charts remain functional reference tools rather than unwieldy compilations.

Application to Defence Witnesses and Evidence

The aforesaid directions shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to all witnesses examined and all evidence adduced by the defence.

Adoption of Specimen Format and Permissible Deviations

The specimen charts provided herein shall ordinarily serve as the standard format to be followed by trial Courts across the country.

Observations Regarding Applicability to Civil Proceedings

While these directions are primarily intended to streamline criminal trials, we leave it open to the High Courts to consider, wherever appropriate,  the adoption of similar tabulated formats in civil matters as well, particularly in cases involving voluminous documentary or oral evidence, so as to promote clarity, uniformity, and ease of reference.

High Court may consider incorporating the above directions in their respective rules governing the procedure of trial Courts.

(Para 86-90)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 304B, 328 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Dowry death – Presumption – Regular bail by High Court – Cancellation of -- Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage – Dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC -- Consequently, the presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1/ husband -- High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles -- Courts has to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail – Held, such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society -- Judicial passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice -- A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative, not only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry -- Bail cancelled.

 (Para 17.1, 17.2, 25-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 376(2)(n), 507 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Rape -- False promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married -- FIR also states that in September 2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and I will live my life” -- At that time, the appellant assured her that they would get married and asked for some time from respondent No.2, to which she refused -- However, despite her refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet him at Hotel and engaged in physical relations with him – Held, not a case where the appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished -- Relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time -- They remained close and emotionally involved -- In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage – FIR quashed.

(Para 24-28, 41)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Permissibility of -- Offence u/s 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature --  Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly -- However, the power of the Court u/s 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – FIR invoking Section 376 IPC, was filed immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the opposing side -- This sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations and suggests that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step -- More importantly, the complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case -- She has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability -- Her stand is neither tentative nor ambiguous -- Parties have amicably resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding -- Continuation of the trial would not serve any meaningful purpose -- It would only prolong distress for all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts without the likelihood of a productive outcome -- Continuation of the criminal proceedings would only amount to abuse of process -- FIR along with all proceedings arising therefrom, including Sessions Case, quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 69, 84 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Sexual intercourse through deceitful means with promise to marry -- Regular  bail -- De facto complainant is a married lady -- Prima facie, it is doubtful whether the offence u/s can be attracted -- If both of the parties are aware about a subsistent marriage it cannot be alleged that the sexual intercourse between them was with a promise to marry – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A(1)(i) – Sexual harassment -- In order to attract Section 354A(1)(i) IPC, it has to be shown that the petitioner has resorted to physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures – Thus it is of prime importance to show that the offender had committed the act with sexual intention.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – POCSO – Sexual assault -- To establish the offence of sexual assault as envisaged u/s 7 of the POCSO Act, it has to be shown that the offender had done the act with sexual intent.

(Para 5)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO – Allegation of sexual assault against Doctor – Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Victim complained about chest pain and abdominal pain -- Medical examination of the victim was conducted by the petitioner in the presence of the mother of the victim on the first occasion, and in the presence of the elder sister of the victim on the second occasion -- It is too hard to believe that the petitioner would have resorted to sexual advances upon the victim in the close presence of the victim’s mother and elder sister -- Neither the statement given by the victim to the Police, nor her statements to the learned Magistrate u/s 164 Cr.PC, contained any indication that the alleged act committed by the petitioner was with sexual intent – Chances of that adolescent girl getting misunderstood about the act of the petitioner, cannot be ignored -- Section 41 of the POCSO Act assumes much relevancy -- Provisions of Sections 3 to 13 shall not apply in case of medical examination or medical treatment of a child when such medical examination or medical treatment is undertaken with the consent of his parents or guardian – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(n) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- No material on record to substantiate the allegations of cheating or sexual intercourse under a false promise of marriage – de-facto complainant is a highly educated woman aged 30 year, in the chat, she admitted that she was manipulative and was trying to “get a green card holder” -- It would not be difficult for her to trap the next one -- She would not waste time with the accused appellant and needs to “invest on the next victim” -- She would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and she could happily start with the next one -- She also stated that she was using the accused-appellant -- Accused/ appellant was absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the proposed marriage upon coming to know of the aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of the de-facto complainant -- It cannot be said that the offence was committed by appellant/ accused with the de-facto complainant on the ground that she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community – FIRs and all proceedings consequence thereof quashed in entirety.

(Para 22-31)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- In a case of gang rape u/s 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention -- Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- Abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant along with J.K. acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’ -- Sentence u/s 376(2)(g) of IPC reduced from life imprisonment to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default sentence.

(Para 24, 45)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Acquittal -- No evidence to establish the fact that the victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence -- Appellant acquitted from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.

(Para 44)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Refusal to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Relationship was not merely of knowing each other but of living together as a couple under one roof in a rented accommodation -- FIR does not allege that physical relationship was established only because there was a promise of marriage -- Besides, physical relationship continued for over two years without a complaint in between -- A presumption would arise of there being a valid consent – In a long drawn live-in relationship, occasions may arise where parties in that relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or wish, by itself would not be indicative of relationship being a consequence of that expression of desire or wish – On ground of refusal to marry, the appellant cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence of rape -- First information report and the consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Promise to marry – Intention -- To establish a false promise, it would have to be demonstrated that the maker of the promise had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making the promise.

(Para 11)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(j) (ii), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties have settled the dispute amicably and have also verified the contents of the compromise -- Cognizance/ summoning order, charge-sheet as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 – Dowry case -- Summoning of additional accused – Quashing of -- Acquittal of main accused – Effect of -- If main accused are acquitted, no criminal proceedings can be sustained against other co-accused on the same set of witnesses – Whenever, there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction valuable time of the Court should not be wasted -- Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue – Petition allowed, summoning the accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. for facing trial quashed.

(Para 8-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(f), 417, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Promise to marry -- Discharge of accused -- Appellant and the Complainant came in contact in 2014, during the pendency of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Complainant’s marriage -- It is from day one, she had knowledge and was conscious of the fact, that the Appellant was in a subsisting marriage, though separated – Complainant was receiving financial help from the Appellant for herself and her son --  Complainant cannot plead ‘misconception of fact’ or ‘rape on the false pretext to marry’ -- No evidence to conclude that there was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement – No criminal intimidation -- There is a growing tendency of resorting to initiation of criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour -- Every consensual relationship, where a possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out -- It is such lis that amounts to an abuse of process of law -- Court deemed fit to terminate the proceedings at the stage of charge itself – Appeal allowed.

(Para 14-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375,  376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Discharge of accused – Rape – Promise to marry -- Mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case -- An offence u/s 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations – Ingredients of offences u/s 375/ 506 IPC not established -- Trial Court discharged the accused – High Court in revision set aside the order of discharge has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Charge-sheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record – Order of High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings terminated.

(Para 14-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Promise if any was after the first physical intercourse and even later the allegation was forceful intercourse without any consent -- Allegation of threat and coercion against the victim, to have sexual intercourse with the accused, which even as per the victim’s statement was repeated thrice in the same manner, when she willingly accompanied the accused to a hotel room -- High Court should have interfered u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C -- These proceedings cannot go on -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Injury to prosecutrix – Requirement of law -- Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this cannot a be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix -- It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case -- Absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Evidence of prosecutrix – Value of -- Evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.

(Para 13)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 42, 42A – POCSO – Greater punishment -- Section 42A of POSCO Act deals with the procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where, the two acts are inconsistent with each other -- Section 42A of POSCO Act, by no stretch of imagination, can be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of POCSO Act.

(Para 22)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) – POCSO -- Rape -- Imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life -- It is discretion to award punishment for a term sentence of minimum 10 years or of imprisonment for life -- There is no mandate of law that under these provisions, the convict must be awarded life imprisonment -- For the offences punishable u/s 376(2)(f) and 376(2) (i) of IPC, the accused sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- and in default, to further undergo imprisonment of two years -- Both the sentences shall run concurrently.

(Para 25-31)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 377, 328, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183, 528 -- Rape -- Habitual complainant – Quashing of FIR -- Apart from her statement in the FIR and her statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C./ 183 of BNSS, there is no other evidence on record -- Most concerning is that the same respondent has filed nearly identical cases at least against eight other individuals (nine cases in total) -- These FIRs, lodged in different Police Stations across Delhi, involve offenses u/s 34, 328, 354, 354A, 354D, 376, 377, 506, and 509 of IPC 00 -- After lodging the FIR, the complainant has not cooperated with the investigation and has not appeared despite being served with notice -- Appellant is a retired Army officer and the author of five books -- Considering the nature of the case and the cumulative circumstances, the criminal case initiated against the appellant is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- This is precisely the nature of case where the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (as per new act, under Section 528 B.N.S.S.) and should have quashed the proceedings -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Rape – No medical examination -- Acquittal -- Prosecutrix and her parents themselves never fully co-operated with the medical staff, thereby adversely impacting the credibility of their version of events -- Non-allowance of medical examination by an alleged rape-victim raises negative inferences against them – Prosecutrix was 19 years old at the time of the alleged occurrence – High Court has microscopically examined the entire evidence before firmly opining that the accused-respondent deserves the benefit of the doubt – Appeal against judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court, dismissed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Age of prosecutrix -- There are two contradictory opinions given by two medical experts – Doctor/ PW-3 states that according to the X-ray reports, the age of the prosecutrix was around 14 years, however, Chief Medical Officer/ DW-2 opined that the age of the prosecutrix was around 18 years -- In view of the two conflicting medical opinions, we are of the opinion that the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant-accused.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping – Acquittal -- From the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun – Held, High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction for the offences punishable u/s 363 and 366 of the IPC – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375(2), Exception 2, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape with wife – Quashing of FIR -- As per Exception 2 u/s 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant -- The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant -- No prima facie case constituting any offence is made out against the appellant and—FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed – Appeal allowed.

(Para 17)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Dowry case – Cruelty – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Appellant sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence u/s 498-A of IPC and one year imprisonment for the offence u/s 4 of DP Act, sentence to run concurrently -- Appellant has undergone approximately 3 months in custody – Incident pertains to the year 2006, marriage was solemnized on 31.03.2006 and the couple lived together exactly for three days -- Complainant is married and settled abroad -- Case prolonged for a period of nearly 19 years -- Sentence set aside, substituted for the period already undergone and Rs. 3,00,000/- payable as compensation.

(Para 13-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Kidnapping -- Procuration of minor girl – Acquittal -- Age of girl -- Prosecutrix herself indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant -- Age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out -- Evidence of the prosecutrix not supported the case of the prosecution -- Independent eye-witness (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution’s case on recovery -- Prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Dowry death – Acquittal -- For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv) the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry -- Both the witnesses have not deposed about the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating that there was a demand for dowry -- Version regarding the demand for dowry is an omission -- No legally admissible evidence of the demand for dowry  -- There is no specific evidence of any cruelty – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on his head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused -- When a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness -- Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Outrage modesty -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant – Held, mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court -- No direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant -- It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-12.4, 14-17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 503, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence --  For an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record -- At least the results of the investigation and the material gathered should disclose somewhat of an offence -- FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant – No prima facie offence is made out on the part of the appellant -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366, 376 (2)(n) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Rape -- Appeal against conviction – Delay of 1637 days -- Condonation of delay – High Court dismissed the appeal on delay – Held, right to appeal, particularly when it concerns the liberty of an individual, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution -- High Court's order dismissing the appeal solely due to delay, without properly examining the reasons for the delay warrants reconsideration – Dismissal of the appeal was erroneous -- Delay of 1637 days condoned -- High Court requested to dispose of the Criminal Appeal on merits in accordance with law.

(Para 5-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439(1A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3),376AB, 376DA, 376DB – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 15A(3) -- Rape – Regular Bail -- Victim’s right of hearing – SC/ST victim -- As per Section 439(1A) of Cr.P.C., the presence of the informant or any person authorised by him or her is obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under sub-section (3) of Section 376 or Section 376AB or Section 376DA or Section 376DB of the IPC -- It is also mandatory on the part of the Special Public Prosecutor of the State Government to inform the victim about the court proceedings, including bail proceedings as contemplated in sub-section (3) of Section 15A of the SC/ ST Act, 1989.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 363, 376DA, 506, 392 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 6 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3(2), 15(5A) – POCSO -- Regular Bail -- Victim’s right of hearing – SC/ST victim -- In gross violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 439(1A) of Cr.P.C. and Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act, High Court granted bail in a very casual and cursory manner and without assigning any cogent reasons, though the concerned respondents are prima facie involved in a very serious offences -- Impugned orders in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions contained in the Cr.P.C. as well as in the SC/ST Act, set aside.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Constitution of India, Article 142 – Transfer petition -- Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Contents of the FIR clearly suggest that both the parties being adult had consensual relations for years before the complaint was filed alleging that there was backing out of promise to marry -- No case is made out u/s 376 IPC -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 2, 6, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Quashing of FIR -- Whether demand of dowry is pre-requisite – Held, an unlawful demand for dowry is not a pre-requisite element to constitute "cruelty" under Section 498A IPC -- High Court's decision to quash the proceedings primarily influenced by the lack of a dowry-related demand in the case -- Allegations made by the Appellant, which detail instances of physical abuse and harassment, fall within the scope of "cruelty" as defined under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC – Appeal allowed, decision of High Court set aside.

(Para 13-18)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 397 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357C – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 124(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326A, 376, 376AB, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB, 376E – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6, 8, 10 – Rape – Grievous hurt by use of acid -- POCSO -- Treatment of victims – Directions issued:

(i) Whenever any victim/survivor of any of the said offences  approaches a medical facility, diagnostic facility, diagnostic lab, nursing home, hospital, health clinic etc., whether private and public/Government, such victim/survivor shall not be turned away without providing FREE medical treatment, including first aid, diagnostic tests, lab tests, surgery and any other required medical intervention;

ii. Such victim/survivor shall be immediately examined and if required, be given treatment even for sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV etc.;

iii. Such victim/survivor shall be provided physical and mental counselling as may be required;

iv. Such victim/survivor shall be checked for pregnancy, and provided with contraception, if required;

v. Further, if any tests are required to be conducted including ultrasound, etc., the same shall also be conducted. Proper medical advice shall be given to such victim/survivor by the concerned gynaecologist who shall also counsel the victim/ survivor and her family members;

vi. If the victim/ survivor has been brought in an emergent situation, the concerned medical establishment that is approached by or on behalf of such victim/survivor, shall not insist on ID proofs in order to admit the said victim/survivor and administer immediate treatment to the same;

vii. If such a victim/survivor requires in-patient medical treatment, no payment shall be demanded and admission shall be provided to the said victim/survivor;

viii. Every medical facility shall put up a board in the following terms:

“Free out-patient and in-patient medical treatment is available for victims/ survivors of sexual assault, rape, gang rape, acid attacks, etc.”.

The above board shall be put up at the- entrance, the reception, counters and all prominent places with in the medical establishment, in both English and vernacular language;

ix. All doctors, nurses, paramedical personnel, administrative staff of a medical establishment shall be sensitized about the relevant provisions being Section 397 BNSS (Section 357C of CrPC), Section 200 of BNS (Section 166B of IPC) and Rule 6(4) of POCSO Rules, 2020. Specific circulars shall be issued by the management of the medical establishments informing that anyone violating the above provisions would be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a period of one year or with fine or with both. Thus, non-providing such victim/survivor with required medical treatment is a criminal offence and all doctors, administration, officers, nurses, paramedical personnel etc., shall be informed of the same;

x. If any victim/survivor is required to be transferred from one hospital establishment or medical establishment to another, the transition shall also be made smooth and hassle free by providing ambulance, if required, along with certificate to the effect that the victim/survivor is entitled to free medical treatment as per law;

xi. If the police finds that any medical professional, para-medical professional, medical establishment, whether public or private, refuses to provide necessary medical treatment to such victims/survivors, then a complaint shall be immediately registered under Section 200 of BNS, 2023 (Section 166B of IPC) as the same is a punishable offence. The police may also inform the concerned DLSA or DSLSA to enable assistance to the victim/survivor;

xii. The concerned Police Station approached by or on behalf of such victim/survivor shall take the said victim/survivor to the nearest hospital, whether public or private, for obtaining the above medical treatment without any delay and in an expeditious manner;

xiii. Such victim/ survivor shall also be referred by the Police to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) /District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) for providing legal assistance including appointment of a lawyer for the complaint to be filed in respect of the offence committed upon the said victim/survivor;

xiv. In the city of Delhi, if such victims/survivors approach the DSLSA/DLSA for seeking assistance for availing free medical treatment, then the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme (DVCS), requires the DSLSA/DLSA to forward cases of such victims/survivors to Government of NCT of Delhi, to ensure free of cost treatment from any Government hospital, if the need so arises. However, the DSLSA/DLSA is also free to refer such cases to private hospitals, nursing home, laboratories, etc.;

xv. It is clarified that availing of free medical treatment by such victims/survivors from either Government/Public or Private hospitals is not dependent upon a referral by the DSLSA/DLSA under the DVCS, as the same is a statutory right of such victims/survivors under Section 357C of CrPC, Section 397 of BNSS and Rule 6 (4) of POCSO Rules, 2020.

xvi. The DSLSA upon receiving information on its “Sampark” email-id i.e., sampark.dslsa@gov.in regarding registration of an FIR in respect of any offence mentioned hereinabove, shall take necessary action and follow-up with the concerned victim/survivor in respect of receiving free medical aid. Further, the DSLSA shall take urgent steps to process such FIRs and communicate/circulate the same to the concerned DLSAs for taking appropriate steps in terms of the directions herein.

(Para 21)

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (14 of 2013), Section 13, 26 – Copy of Inquiry report – Right of victim -- Report of the Inquiry Committee was not given to the petitioner, as she was not an accused and the Inquiry Report did not find anything material against the accused person – Held, Inquiry Report ought to have been given to the victim as it is required to be given u/s 13 (1) to all the “concerned parties” -- Petitioner is a concerned party.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Compromise acquittal/ quashing of FIR in POCSO – Challenge by private party – Locus standi -- A private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution if the judgment of acquittal led to serious miscarriage of justice -- Such right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) – POCSO – Compromise quashing of FIR – Quashing by High Court – Challenge to -- Before exercising the power u/s 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime -- Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society -- Allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the same -- Order passed by High Court quashed -- Consequently, the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law.

(Para 25-33)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 31 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 – Proceedings under DV Act – Inherent Powers of High Court :

Questions referred to Larger Bench for adjudication:

(i) Once Section 28(1) prescribes that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can it be held that application of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is ousted?

(ii) In case Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not applicable, can an aggrieved person invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

(iii) In case the aggrieved person is entitled to invoke power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can it be said that the same is limited only qua the issue of jurisdiction as held by Madras High Court?

Questions referred by the Ld. Single Bech answered as under:

i) Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 B.N.S.S. is applicable qua proceedings arising out of complaint under Section 12 of the Act of 2005. The only exception is the cases where provisions of the Act of 2005 have been invoked in proceedings pending before Civil Court or Family Court.

ii) In view of answer to question No.(i), there is no need to answer question No.(ii).

iii) The power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are subject to self-restraint. The same can neither be curtailed by statute nor by judicial order. In terms of dictum of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar's case (1997) 3 SCC 261 and Surya Dev Rai's case  (2003) 6 SCC 675, Article 227 is part of basic structure of the Constitution of India and is even beyond Constitutional amendment.

(Para 3, 32)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4(2), 5 (n), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376(3), 376 (2)(n) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 439 -- POCSO – Rape – Regular bail – Applicant submitted hat the victim in her examination u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C. has stated that she was known to the applicant and she on her own left her house and joined the company of the applicant and they did not establish any physical relationship -- These facts admitted by State -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4(2), 5 (l), 6– Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376 (2) (n), 376 (3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164, 439 -- POCSO – Rape – Regular bail – In statement u/s 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., victim stated that the victim and the applicant both were in relationship and their relations were consensual – State submitted that the victim is a minor – Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 376D, 363, 366A, 120B -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO -- Short term bail – Liver transplantation of father – Applicant proposed to donate his liver -- Applicant ordered to be released on short term bail for a period of six weeks on humanitarian ground.

(Para 3, 5, 6)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – POCSO – Rape – Regular bail -- Petitioner is behind bars since 4.9.2022 – One is deemed to be innocent, till the time, his/her guilt is proved in accordance with law -- Guilt, if any, of the bail petitioner is yet to be proved in accordance with law -- No reason to let the bail petitioner incarcerate in jail, for an indefinite period, especially when co-accused stands enlarged on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 22-29)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand -- However as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record -- It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable -- The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because he/she is susceptible to tutoring.

(Para 23)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- Incident taken place on 13.10.2014 whereas the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2014 -- Delay in lodging the FIR could not be explained by the prosecution which creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution -- Since the evidence of the parents of the victim has been discredited by the defence in their cross- examination and there is no corroboration to the evidence of the child victim (PW12), therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of the child victim to convict the appellants.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Medical evidence – Acquittal -- Doctor had given the opinion that the possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled-out, but on that day the victim was not produced before her -- As per the FSL report, no blood and semen were detected on the shirt, pajama/ slacks, underwear, brassiere, vests, perineal swab and vaginal swab of the victim --  As there is no medical evidence on record to support the theory of the prosecution that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it becomes difficult to uphold the conviction granted by the trial Court.

(Para 30)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 29 – POCSO – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- It cannot be countenanced that the presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute -- Unless the prosecution is able to prove foundational facts in the context of the allegations made against the accused under the POCSO Act, the presumption u/s 29 of the said Act would not operate against the accused -- Statutory presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of our criminal jurisprudence system that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 33-35)

E. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(xii) &3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Offence u/s 3(1) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing an individual member -- An offence u/s 3(1) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

(Para 37, 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death -- Suicide with in seven years of marriage -- Deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband which compelled her to commit suicide -- However, witnesses did not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand for dowry -- With respect to the demand for dowry, witnesses have just made some general statements -- It has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry -- Trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established.

-- A case of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of IPC and cruelty u/s 498A of IPC made out against the husband, although the offence u/s 304B is not made out and consequently, conviction u/s 304B of IPC set aside – Appellant/ husband convicted u/s 306 and 498A of IPC, sentenced to three years of R.I. and a fine of Rs. 25000/- on each count -- Both the sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 4-8)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Rape -- Bail to juvenile in conflict with law/ CCL – Right of -- Penetrative sexual assault on minor prosecutrix --  Word “shall”, suggests that normally, prayer, if any, made for grant of bail deserves to be allowed -- No material worth credence was ever adduced on record by the prosecution to suggest that in the event of CCL being enlarged on bail, he may not only come in contact of hardened criminals but may again indulge in such activities – Principle of non-stigmatizing semantics is required to be followed -- Bail allowed with conditions.

(Para 8-18)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354, 506  -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 9, 10 – POCSO -- Bail to juvenile in conflict with law – Right of -- A juvenile in conflict with law has to be necessarily released on bail unless proviso is applicable -- No finding recorded by JJ Board that the proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 12 is applicable to the facts of the case -- Without recording the said finding, bail could not have been denied -- Psychological Assessment Report of the Juvenile records that the juvenile does not belong to high risk category and against the column “worry list of child” it is mentioned that there was “no worry” – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cruelty -- Matrimonial dispute – Anticipatory bail – Enormous conditions -- Purpose of putting conditions while granting pre-arrest bail is to secure the presence of the accused to ensure a fair trial and also for the smooth flow of the investigating process – Courts have to be very cautious in imposing conditions while granting bail upon finding pre-arrest bail to be grantable – Condition for release of petitioner on the provisional bail to give undertaking that the appellant would fulfil all physical and financial requirements by way of an affidavit set aside.

(Para 4-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482, 401 -- Outraging modesty of women – Female accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A female cannot be an accused under Section 354A of the IPC -- This offence is gender specific and only a male can be prosecuted under this offence – Proceedings against petitioner quashed.

(Para 2a, 20, 21)