Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 132(1)(a), 132(1)(i), 132(5) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Offence under GST law – Regular bail – Onerous condition – Condition to deposit Rs.2.5 crores after release on bail -- When attempts are made to foreclose consideration of bail application on merits by voluntarily offering deposits of amounts and thereafter reneging on it by stating that a counsel had no authority and/or that the condition is onerous – Court strongly deprecated this practice -- Today the petitioner is approbating and reprobating, Court cannot allow parties to play ducks and drakes with the Court -- Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits -- Ordinarily the consequence would have been to put the petitioner back in jail -- However, considering the averments made in the modification application, Court granted a limited interim protection to the petitioner from surrendering.

(Para 4-11)

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135-140, 145, 150, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Electricity actionable matters -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Purposive interpretation -- All the actionable matters become amenable for exercising of jurisdiction thereover by the statutorily created special authorities/ special bodies -- There is complete ouster of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the Civil Courts.

(Para 30-32, 34)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135, 145, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Jurisdiction of Civil court -- Not only in respect of Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act of 2003 but also in respect of the matters falling within the ambit of Section 135 of the Act of 2003, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

(Para 33)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 151A, 153, 154 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Investigation by police – Offences tried by the Special Courts – Summary trial – Cross-examination of witnesses – Permissibility of -- Powers of investigations conferred upon the investigating officers serving in the police stations stems from the mandate enclosed in Section 151-A -- Reports prepared u/s 173 Cr.P.C., are to be filed before the Special Courts – Even a summary trial, does require the assigning of an opportunity to the accused to make effective cross-examination(s) upon the prosecution witnesses, as right to fair trial becomes envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 39-41)

D. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Civil liability – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Only pursuant to a binding and conclusive verdict of conviction becoming made by the Special Court, vis-a-vis the errant consumer, the Special Court in terms of sub-Section (5) of Section 154 of the Act of 2003, shall proceed to determine the compensation amount to be paid by the consumer concerned, to the supplier.

(Para 44)

E. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 152, 154(5), 155 – Composition of offence – Civil liability -- Makings of composition(s) of an offence in terms of Section 152 of the Act of 2003, would tantamount to acceptance of the guilt by the errant consumer -- Post the making of an order of composition, if the compounding fee, does not also cover the civil liability, the Court concerned may proceed to determine the civil liability against the errant consumer.

(Para 48)

F. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Prosecution in Special court – Acquittal – Compensation for malicious prosecution – Jurisdiction of civil court -- There is no remedy to the accused, to post the making of a binding and clinching verdict of acquittal by the Special Court -- As such, in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, a suit in the said regard can be laid before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 53)

G. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 145 -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Jurisdiction of High Court – Judicial review -- Jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs of various genres, is a constitutionally invested power, and, the said power is an in-segregable component of judicial review of administrative actions, or of the quasi-judicial actions, besides is the basic structure of the constitution -- As such, the power of judicial review of High Courts cannot be snatched even through the occurrence of Section 145 in the Act of 2003.

(Para 54)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- UAPA Case – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence -- The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable -- Rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive -- However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case

(Para 23, 24)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS/ UAPA Case – Regular bail – Despite no direct recovery of contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of narcotics concealed as talc -- Investigative narrative does not rest solely on physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and facilitation – Absence of direct seizure is not dispositive, particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious entities, and barter-based compensation – Bail declined.

(Para 25-27, 35)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341, 323, 307, 302, 120B, 147, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 3, 25, 5, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Regular bail -- Common intention – Overt Act -- Merely because no overt act was attributed to the respondent/ accused in the F.I.R., the same cannot be the sole consideration for grant of bail -- First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia of facts -- An FIR is a starter point to set the investigation in motion -- Respondent/accused hatched a conspiracy so as to eliminate the victim and engaged a contract killer to kill the victim  -- High Court failed to consider that the accused are the main accused in the matter and cannot be enlarged on bail because the other co-accused persons have been granted bail -- High Court order granting bail set aside.

(Para 16-20)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 491 -- Non-deposit surety bond amount – Conviction for 6 months – Challenge to -- Appellant stood surety for convict in appeal against conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Accused not appeared -- Being a poor person, appellant was unable to pay the amount of bail bonds and pleaded guilty -- Appellate Court should have taken a lenient view -- Punishment imposed on the appellant was too harsh, disproportionate -- Courts should impose monetary penalties or should adopt other measures -- Sentence reduced to the period already undergone by him (1 month and 18 days).

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 324 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Offence under other sections 323, 504, 427, 447 and 506 of the IPC are compoundable as per Section 320 of the CrPC -- In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the offences alleged against the appellant u/s 307 and 324 IPC shall also be quashed as the other offences alleged against the appellant are compoundable u/s 320 of the CrPC – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Scope of – Nature of -- The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that emerges in Court -- It is an exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material now available, appears to share criminal liability -- Power is extraordinary and therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must act.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Summoning as additional accused – Challenge to -- Plea of alibi by accused -- An alibi, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused -- Parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip, have yet to be formally proved -- Until that exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces of paper -- Abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment -- It may consist of a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs – Order of the Trial Court summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC revived.

(Para 9-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Civil dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the FIR, the goods were to be exported out of India -- Respondent no. 2, since did not possess an import/export license, the appellant had asked respondent no. 2 to export the goods through M/s. Oswal Overseas -- Respondent no. 2 has in all exported sarees worth Rs. 34,71,344/- -- U/s 482 of the Code, Court will examine the crux of the complaint -- Question is whether such non-payment of the sale price can be an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating at the hands of the second respondent -- Answer is clearly no -- Continuation of the FIR against the appellant is an abuse of the process of law, and at best, the non-payment of the sale price could be a civil dispute – Appeal allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 12-17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Refusal to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Relationship was not merely of knowing each other but of living together as a couple under one roof in a rented accommodation -- FIR does not allege that physical relationship was established only because there was a promise of marriage -- Besides, physical relationship continued for over two years without a complaint in between -- A presumption would arise of there being a valid consent – In a long drawn live-in relationship, occasions may arise where parties in that relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or wish, by itself would not be indicative of relationship being a consequence of that expression of desire or wish – On ground of refusal to marry, the appellant cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence of rape -- First information report and the consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Promise to marry – Intention -- To establish a false promise, it would have to be demonstrated that the maker of the promise had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making the promise.

(Para 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a)(b)(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of defamation complaint – Appellant-homebuyers, dissatisfied with the services provided by developer, erected a banner detailing their grievances -- Peaceful and orderly protest made without using offensive or abusive language -- It could not be said that the appellants transgressed into the offending zone -- Their case wholly falls within the sweep, scope and ambit of exception 9 to Section 499 -- Their peaceful protest is protected by Article 19(1)(a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India -- Criminal proceedings levelled against them, if allowed to continue, will be a clear abuse of process -- Complaint along with the order issuing summons to the appellants u/s 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC quashed and set aside.

(Para 30-35)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3, 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Damages to public property – Encroachment over Gram Panchayat land – Adjudication of rights -- Necessity of -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- As far as criminal proceeding for illegal encroachment, damage or trespass over the land belonging to Gram Sabha is concerned, the same can be undertaken but it would be subject to the adjudication of rights of the parties over the land in dispute as the said determination can be done only by the revenue court -- Continuation of criminal proceedings, being an abuse of process of the Court, ends of the justice requires that the said proceedings be quashed -- Entire proceedings of the Criminal Case quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 204, 438 -- Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(6), 447 -- Anticipatory bail – Serious Economic offences – SFIO investigated over 125 companies and filed a criminal complaint involving Rs. 4120 crores in fraudulent loans -- The Special Court issued bailable and later non-bailable warrants against the accused, many of whom deliberately evaded service -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 CrPC were initiated -- Despite prior knowledge of the case many accused concealed themselves and avoided appearance -- High Courts granted anticipatory bail to several accused.

Held, High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering the anticipatory bail application of such accused -- As per Section 212 (6), the offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act not entitled to be released on bail or on his bond, unless twin conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. The twin conditions are:-

(i) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

These twin conditions are mandatory in nature.

Economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside.

(Para 23-26, 31)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 457, 427, 323, 504, 506, 448, 511, 120B -- Cognizance by court -- Summoning order in printed form – Effect of -- Summoning order passed in a printed proforma by filing up the blanks reveals that the Trial Court has not applied its judicial mind and in a very cursory manner the Trial Court took cognizance -- Summoning order is cryptic -- Cognizance/ summoning order quashed, Trial Court directed to exercise discretionary power and decide afresh while taking cognizance on the charge sheet after taking into consideration the entire materials and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

(Para 5-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2)(a), 173 -- Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Default bail after 60 days – Non-prescribing of minimum punishment/ maximum upto 14 years -- Non-filing of challan -- Effect of – Section 3 of the Act though, prescribes maximum punishment up to 14 years, there is no minimum punishment provided under the said provision -- Punishment prescribed for the offence punishable u/s 5 of the said Act is maximum up to three years -- Since, the investigation was not completed in sixty days, the Respondent had become entitled to the default bail under Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C -- High Court has rightly followed the Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 case and released the Respondent on bail.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Prosecution of Public servant – Sanction from Government – Requirement of -- Alleged offence must have been committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their official duties -- Protective mantle of Section 197 of the CrPC is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto -- Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not attract the bar imposed u/s 197 of the CrPC.

(Para 30)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (4 of 1964), Section 170 -- Prosecution of Public servant/ police officers – Sanction from Government not taken – Ground of – Quashing of summoning order:

(1) abuse of official authority by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or vendetta;  

(2) physical assault and ill-treatment of the complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged police excess;  

(3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and  

(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.

Allegations levelled against the accused persons, though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of the CrPC respectively -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 37-42)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR -- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC.

-- It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.

-- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

(Para 42(i)(ii))

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196, 197, 299, 302 – Promoting enmity – Prejudicial to national integration – Intent to insult religion feelings -- Registration of FIR – Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- Police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out -- Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence -- Same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of BNS -- To ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words -- This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

(Para 42 (iii))

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 – Life and liberty – Freedom of speech – Reasonable restrictions – Preliminary enquiry for FIR -- Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression -- Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution -- Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution -- They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens -- Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 -- If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) -- When an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused -- This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected -- Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

(Para 42(iv)(v))

D. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity – When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds -- The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

(Para 42(vi)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is at a nascent stage -- There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS --   When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage -- It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence -- There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage.

(Para 42(vii)

F. Constitution of India, Article 19(1(a) -- Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society -- Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution -- In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view -- Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected -- Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India -- If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights -- There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

(Para 42(viii)

G. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity/ hatred – It cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities -- Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.

(Para 42(ix)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS), Section 482 (528 BNSS) – Complaint in cheque bounce case -- Suppression of facts -- Effect: Statutory notice u/s 138 NI Act was issued by the complainant’s advocate – Appellant/ accused’s advocate write twice within few days seeking supply of documents relied upon in the notice – Documents were not supplied – Complainant suppressed the reply letters sent by the accused in the complaint as well as in the statement on oath under Section 200 CrPC – As the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint – It is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – Held, High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint -- Impugned order of the High Court set aside -- Complaint and the order of cognizance quashed and set aside.

(Para 13-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- After a complaint is filed u/s 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate is duty-bound to examine the complainant on oath and witnesses, if any, present and reduce the substance of such examination into writing -- What is reduced into writing is required to be signed by the complainant and witnesses, if any.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 (223 BNSS) – Complaint – Examination of complainant/ witness -- Recording the complainant's statement on oath u/s 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality, object is to ascertain the truth -- Learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth -- Learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused -- If he is satisfied, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC (227 BNSS) -- Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter.

(Para 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 439 -- Bail application – Direction to CBI to register FIR -- High Court directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to register a case based on the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C and conduct investigation thereon; in a bail application – Held, there can be no such direction in a bail application -- Impugned order set aside to that extent.

(Para 1-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190 – Police report – Cognizance by Magistrate – Direction for inclusion name in charge-sheet – Permissibility of -- Court has the power to differ from the Final Form submitted by the Police and take cognizance of a crime and also against persons who may not have been sent up for trial by the Police after investigation -- Court is then required to issue summons instead of directing for inclusion of the name of the person in the charge-sheet.

(Para 3)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 304, Part II – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge -- Accidental death – Causing death by negligence -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Allegations that accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc. -- Two deceased employees were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop -- As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level -- While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death -- It was purely accidental -- On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC – Discharge application allowed.

(Para 13-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge – Nature of -- At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal -- Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.

(Para 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 419, 420, 467, 468, 20B – Rajasthan Public Examination (Measures for Prevention of Unfair Means in Recruitment) Act, 2022 (6 of 2022), Section 3, 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dummy candidate in recruitment competitive exam -- Regular bail -- Since there must have been thousands of people who appeared for the exam, and the respondent-accused persons, for their own benefit, tried to compromise the sanctity of the exam, possibly affecting so many of those who would have put in earnest effort to appear in the exam in the hopes of securing a job – Respondents are not entitled to the benefit of bail – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside -- Respondent-accused to surrender to surrender before the concerned Court in two weeks.

(Para 3, 11-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003) – Direction to register HECIR -- High Court had no reason to pass a drastic order of directing the Enforcement Directorate to register an ECIR only because the High Court prima facie came to a conclusion that a predicate offence exists -- ECIR registered on the basis of the impugned judgment quashed and set aside – Left open for Enforcement Directorate to take a call on the question of initiating proceedings under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

(Para 5)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 397, 401, 482 -- Discharge by Trial Court – Revision -- Ex-parte stay by High Court – Permissibility of -- Ex-parte order of stay of the order of discharge should not have been passed by the High Court -- Ex-parte order of stay is entirely illegal --  Impugned order set aside.

(Para 22-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 377, 328, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183, 528 -- Rape -- Habitual complainant – Quashing of FIR -- Apart from her statement in the FIR and her statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C./ 183 of BNSS, there is no other evidence on record -- Most concerning is that the same respondent has filed nearly identical cases at least against eight other individuals (nine cases in total) -- These FIRs, lodged in different Police Stations across Delhi, involve offenses u/s 34, 328, 354, 354A, 354D, 376, 377, 506, and 509 of IPC 00 -- After lodging the FIR, the complainant has not cooperated with the investigation and has not appeared despite being served with notice -- Appellant is a retired Army officer and the author of five books -- Considering the nature of the case and the cumulative circumstances, the criminal case initiated against the appellant is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- This is precisely the nature of case where the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (as per new act, under Section 528 B.N.S.S.) and should have quashed the proceedings -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-9)

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 360, 361 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 401, 402 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 – Grievous hurt – Probation to accused – Compensation to complainant -- Keeping in view the antecedents of the petitioner and the fact that he is not a previous convict, it is obligatory upon the Court to extend the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the convict – Petitioner ordered to be released on probation – To balance the rights of the complainant with the benefit of probation extended to the petitioner, Court directed the petitioner-accused to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the complainant.

(Para 7-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- When the Presiding officer's opinion is sought, the Presiding Officer must submit his opinion at the earliest considering the fact that the issue of liberty of the convict is involved.

(Para 20)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- Duty of Government -- It is the obligation of the appropriate Government to consider cases of all convicts for grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the policy -- It is not necessary for the convict or his relatives to make a specific application for grant of permanent remission -- District Legal Services Authorities shall maintain the relevant date of the convicts and as and when they become eligible to a consideration for grant of premature release, they shall do the needful -- The State Legal Services Authorities shall endeavour to create a portal on which the data as aforesaid can be uploaded on real time basis.

(Para 21(a)(g))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Policy for -- States and Union Territories that do not have a policy dealing with the grant of remission in terms of Section 432 of the CrPC or Section 473 of the BNSS to formulate a policy within two months.

(Para 21(b))

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Speaking order -- Communication of -- Order granting or refusing the relief of permanent remission must contain brief reasons -- The order containing reasons should be immediately communicated to the convict through the office of the concerned prison -- The copies thereof should be forwarded to the Secretaries of the concerned District Legal Services Authorities -- It is the duty of the prison authorities to inform the convict that he has the right to challenge the order of rejection of the prayer for the grant of remission.

(Para 21(d))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Remission – Cancellation of – Opportunity of hearing -- An order granting permanent remission cannot be withdrawn or cancelled without giving an opportunity of being heard to the convict -- An order of cancellation of permanent remission must contain brief reasons.

(Para 21(e))

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating – Acquittal – Money taken for sending abroad -- Incident happened in the year 2001, however, written complaint made after two years -- In the complaint, nowhere, mentioned that complainant or his father had arranged an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- by taking loan or by arranging the same from their relatives -- Nothing brought on record to show that any travel agency is being run by the accused persons -- Prosecution has neither proved source of amount nor the fact that who induced the complainant to pay the amount and to whom the payment was made -- As such, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 5, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- Power of the Appellate Court to unsettle the order of acquittal on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidence is subject to the settled law that where two views are possible and out of the two, one points towards the innocence of the accused, the view which favours the accused should prevail over the other pointing towards his guilt -- Presumption of innocence further gets entrenched on the acquittal of accused by the trial Court.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Expedite decision on appeal – Suspension of sentence -- On joint request of the parties, petitioners exempted from depositing an amount of Rs.43,65,125/- i.e. 20% of the amount of compensation during the pendency of the appeal, before the Appellate Court -- Since the complaint was initially filed on 11.01.2018 and a period of 7 years has lapsed, after the institution of the complaint, the Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal within a period of 04 months.

(Para 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 24 -- Duty of Public Prosecutor -- A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case -- The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well -- If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it -- On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused -- Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

(Para 96)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Murder – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction in revision – Power of -- Sub-section (3) of Section 401 CrPC prohibits/ bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Defence counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to correct the Court if the Court is falling in some error and for all this, the State Government is responsible -- It is the State Government who appointed the concerned Public Prosecutor -- High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants -- Appeals allowed -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside -- State Government directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the three appellants towards compensation within a period of four weeks.

(Para 1-3, 40-46, 97-99)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 225 – Cheque bounce complaint – Enquiry u/s 225 BNSS – Requirement of -- Drill of Section 225 BNSS (erstwhile Section 202 Cr.P.C.) was not followed before issuance of process -- Intention is to ensure that sufficient grounds exist in order to proceed against an accused in a private complaint -- It is pertinent that the concerned Court passes an order indicating substantial compliance of the aforementioned provision, in view of the directions issued in In re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 NI Act 1881 2021(2) L.A.R. 366 = (2021) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16184 -- Matter remanded back to concerned Court to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law, by taking recourse to Section 225 BNSS.

(Para 4-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173, 175(3) – Registration of FIR -- Investigation by Police – Power of Judicial Magistrate – Hearing to Police officer – Mandate of -- By requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions u/s 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs u/s 173 -- Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

(Para 34, 35)

A. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Criminal proceedings against unauthorised agent – Quashing of -- Respondent/ accused alleged, had created hundreds of fake user IDs to sell tickets without any authorisation from the railways -- Although the internet and e-tickets were unknown in India when the Act was brought into force, this conduct of accused (who is neither a railway servant nor an authorised agent) nevertheless attracts criminality under Section 143(1)(a) of the Railways Act -- Mere fact of the system of e-reservation and e-tickets being introduced after the enactment of the Act does not render the provision in Section 143 toothless to combat the illegal sale of e-tickets – Criminal proceedings restored.

(Para 15, 19, 28)

B. Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Criminal proceedings against authorised agent – Quashing of -- Fraudulent activities such as supply of Tatkal e-tickets by creating multiple personal-user IDs and issuing unauthorised e-tickets procured through IRCTC website, contrary to IRCTC Rules -- Section 143 only deals with the actions of unauthorised persons and does not mandate a procedure to be followed by the authorised agents for procuring or supplying tickets to its customers – Section 143 would not be attracted insofar as he is concerned – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 35, 39)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 51 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 457 – Return of seized vehicle – Superdari – There is no specific bar/ restriction under the provisions of the NDPS Act for return of any seized vehicle in the interim pending disposal of the criminal case -- In view of Section 51 of NDPS Act, the Court can invoke the general power under Sections 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. for return of the seized vehicle pending final decision of the criminal case -- Trial Court has the discretion to release the vehicle in the interim.

(Para 22, 23)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 51, 60 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 451, 457 – Return of seized vehicle – Superdari – Vehicles in police custody are stored in the open -- If the Vehicle is not released during the trial, it will be wasted and suffering the vagaries of the weather, its value will only reduce -- On the contrary, if the Vehicle in question is released, it would be beneficial to the owner (who would be able to earn his livelihood), to the bank/financier (who would be repaid the loan disbursed by it) and to the society at large (as an additional vehicle would be available for transportation of goods) – Appeal allowed, trial Court directed to release the Vehicle in the interim on superdari after preparing a video and still photographs of the vehicle and after obtaining all information/documents necessary for identification of the vehicle, which shall be authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner of the Vehicle and accused by signing the same – Conditions imposed.

(Para 34-36)

Criminal jurisprudence – Contradiction in statement/ prosecution story -- ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ -- Principle of ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ does not apply to the Indian criminal jurisprudence and only because there are some contradictions which in the opinion of this Court are not even that material, the entire story of the prosecution cannot be discarded as false -- It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff -- In a given case, it is also open to the Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted where there are a number of accused persons.

(Para 25)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005) – Bailable warrants in DV Act matter – Permissibility of -- Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi criminal proceedings which do not have any penal consequence except where there is a violation or breach of a protection order -- Learned Magistrate was absolutely unjustified in directing issuance of bailable warrants against the petitioner.

(Para 5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 –Additional accused – Who can be summoned -- Trial Court has jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial -- Initially named in the F.I.R. as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face the trial.

(Para 21(a))

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Evidence – Charge-sheet/ Case Diary -- Consideration of -- Trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence.

(Para 21(b))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – 'any person not being the accused’ – Meaning of -- Phrase 'any person not being the accused' occurred in Section 319 covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court -- Persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the Criminal Court are included in the said expression.

(Para 21(c))

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Satisfaction of Investigation Officer – Requirements of -- It would not be proper for the trial court to reject the application for addition of new accused by considering records of the Investigating Officer -- When the evidence of complainant is found to be worthy of acceptance then the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer hardly matters -- If satisfaction of Investigating Officer is to be treated as determinative then the purpose of Section 319 would be frustrated.

(Para 21(c))

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366, 376 (2)(n) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Rape -- Appeal against conviction – Delay of 1637 days -- Condonation of delay – High Court dismissed the appeal on delay – Held, right to appeal, particularly when it concerns the liberty of an individual, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution -- High Court's order dismissing the appeal solely due to delay, without properly examining the reasons for the delay warrants reconsideration – Dismissal of the appeal was erroneous -- Delay of 1637 days condoned -- High Court requested to dispose of the Criminal Appeal on merits in accordance with law.

(Para 5-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Inherent powers of High court – Change in law -- Second petition – Maintainability of -- Change of law can legitimately be regarded as a vital change in circumstance clothing the high court with the power, competence and jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent petition notwithstanding the fact that the earlier petition was withdrawn without obtaining any leave, subject to the satisfaction recorded by the high court that the order prayed for in the subsequent petition ought to be made, inter alia, either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 19)

B. May – Shall – Interpretation of -- Use of the verbs ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in a statute is not a sure index for determining whether such statute is mandatory or directory in character -- The legislative intent has to be gathered looking into other provisions of the enactment, which can throw light to guide one towards a proper determination -- While the general impression is that ‘may’ and ‘shall’ are intended to have their natural meaning, it is the duty of the court to gather the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the entire statute, the section and the phrase/expression under consideration.

(Para 24)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 – Appeal – Conviction in Cheque bounce complaint – Suspension of sentence Since the self-same section, read as a whole, reveals that ‘may’ has been used twice and ‘shall’ thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the language -- Reading and understanding the words used by the legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided at all costs -- Therefore, read ‘may’ as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148.

(Para 27)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 340 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 193, 199, 200 – False evidence before Tribunal – Private complaint – Maintainability of --- An offence u/s 193/199/200 of IPC can theoretically be committed inside as well as outside a court -- Proceedings which are taking before the Tribunal is not a Court, as defined under the law – It is not empowered to entertain such an application as prescribed under the law u/s 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. -- Only way such an application can be entertained and that too, for the precise offences of Sections 193, 199 and 200 is through a private complaint and only relating to the offences before the Tribunal -- Complaint shall be entertained by the concerned Tribunal and thereafter, the orders shall be passed.

(Para 10,11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 14 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Insolvency proceedings – Effect of -- Cheques were dated 15.01.2020 and 15.03.2020 and the Interim Resolution Professional/ IRP was appointed on 31.10.2019, prior to these dates -- Account was blocked due to the order issued by the NCLT -- As a result of the NCLT’s order, the authority and control of the account holder over the account ceased to exist – Cheques were dishonoured for the reason ‘Drawer Signature to operate account not received’ – Offence occurred post imposition of moratorium -- Petitioners cannot be held vicariously responsible for dishonour of cheque – Summoning order along with consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1, 10-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 58 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 -- NDPS case -- Punishment for vexatious entry, search, seizure or arrest – Jurisdiction of Special Judge -- Special Judge could not have conducted the proceedings against the appellant/ Superintendent of Police  for the offence punishable u/s 58 of the NDPS Act inasmuch as such proceedings could have been conducted only by a Magistrate -- Procedure as required under Chapter XX i.e. Sections 251 to 256 of the Cr.P.C. has also not been followed -- Notice issued by the learned Special Judge to the appellant u/s 58 of the NDPS Act and all subsequent proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 2, 26)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged In Black-Marketing Of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (LV of 1981), Section 3(2) -- Detention order -- Pubic disorder -- Every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder -- When a person can be dealt with in exercise of powers to maintain the law and order, unless the acts of the proposed detainee are the ones which have the tendency of disturbing the public order a resort to preventive detention which is a harsh measure would not be permissible -- Six cases are registered for selling illicit liquor, the Excise Authority did not find it necessary to arrest the appellant even on a single occasion -- It would have been a different matter after releasing on bail, appellant continued with his activities -- Statements of witnesses do not show that the said witnesses were threatened by the appellant in the presence of the villagers which would create a perception in the mind of the villagers that the appellant herein is a threat to the public order -- Detention order set aside.

(Para 13-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(c), 2(d), 156 (1), 156(3), 200, 202 – Cognizable offence -- Non-registration of FIR -- Complaint to Magistrate – Procedure of -- When a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he has the option either to order an investigation as provided u/s 156(1) of Code or to proceed u/s 200 of Code, examine the complainant and his witnesses and then proceed further under the provision of Section 202 of Code -- An order u/s 156(3) of Code which is the second option is in fact in the nature of reminder to the police to perform its duty and reinvestigate into the alleged cognizable offence u/s 156(1) of Code.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(c), 156(3) – Cognizable offence – Complaint u/s 156(3) of CR.P.C. -- Duty of Magistrate -- While disposing of a complaint moved u/s 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind to the bare contents of the application regarding disclosure of cognizable offence, though he is not bound to proceed to decide whether or not there are sufficient grounds for proceeding further to satisfy himself regarding commission of cognizable offence.

(Para 5)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 2(g), 156(1), 156(3) – Cognizable offence -- Complaint -- Complaint u/s 156(3) of CR.P.C. -- Duty of Magistrate -- The Magistrate may treat an application under Section 156(3) of the Code as a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Code and is not bound to pass an order for registration of FIR -- He can also dismiss the complaint if no cognizable offence is made out and can also pass an order after going through the contents of the complaint and on analyzing the preliminary evidence appended with the complaint, by recording a finding that a prima facie cognizable offence appears to have been committed or not.

(Para 5)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d), 2(g), 156(1), 156(3) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Cognizable offence -- Complaint u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Treated as private complaint – Quashing of -- Though in the complaint, a specific prayer made for sending the same u/s 156(3) of the Code for registration of FIR but after receipt of action taken report, instead of applying its mind on the question as to whether a case for sending the case for registration of FIR was made out or not or that it was a case, which was to be treated as a private complaint, the learned trial Court straightway proceeded to pass the order for recording preliminary evidence and adjourned the case for that purpose -- Impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as it has not been passed in consonance of the well-established principles of law -- Order set aside, matter remanded to the learned trial Court for hearing the arguments on the question as to whether the prayer made by him for sending the complaint to SHO concerned for registration of an FIR deserves to be allowed or not and to pass an order afresh by recording reasons thereof.

(Para 6, 7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 239 -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Public view – Backyard of private house -- Place of occurrence was at the backyard of the appellant’s house -- Backyard of a private house cannot be within the public view -- Persons who accompanied the second respondent/ complainant were also the employees or the labour force she had engaged for the purpose of carrying out repairs to her house which is adjacent to the appellant’s house -- They cannot also be termed as public in general – Appellant discharged from the offence.

(Para 13)

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (14 of 2013), Section 13, 26 – Copy of Inquiry report – Right of victim -- Report of the Inquiry Committee was not given to the petitioner, as she was not an accused and the Inquiry Report did not find anything material against the accused person – Held, Inquiry Report ought to have been given to the victim as it is required to be given u/s 13 (1) to all the “concerned parties” -- Petitioner is a concerned party.

(Para 8, 9)