JUDGMENT

RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK, J. (ORAL) –

1. Instant civil revision petition, at the hands of plaintiffs, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated 5.8.2017 passed by the learned trial court, dismissing the application of the plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (`CPC' for short), whereby amendment in the plaint was declined.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners.

3. Admittedly, suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 15.4.1998. It was a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction. This suit of the plaintiffs-petitioners was decreed ex parte vide judgment and decree dated 23.2.2005 passed by the learned trial court. Thereafter, defendants filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 23.2.2005. Said application as well as appeal of defendant-Iqbal Singh was dismissed by the learned courts below. Finally, he approached this Court by way of Civil Revision No.969 of 2015, which came to be allowed by this Court, vide order dated 11.1.2017. After setting aside ex parte judgment and decree dated 23.2.2005, this Court remanded the matter to the learned trial court.

4. Thereafter, suit of the plaintiffs-petitioners was dismissed in default vide order dated 9.3.2017. However, said suit was restored by the learned trial court vide its order dated 17.7.2017. Vide application dated 19.7.2017 (Annexure P-1), plaintiffs-petitioners sought an amendment in their plaint, pointing out that defendant has taken the possession of land measuring 5K-8M on 27.6.2017 under the garb of illegal orders dated 30.5.2017 and 14.6.2017 passed by the Collector-Prescribed Authority. By way of this amendment, plaintiffs-petitioners sought to convert their suit for declaration and mandatory injunction into a suit for possession. It was this application, which was dismissed by the learned trial court by passing the impugned order.

5. A bare perusal of the impugned orders passed by the learned trial court would make it crystal clear that the learned trial court was conscious of all these facts noticed hereinabove. The proposed amendment was neither necessary for effective adjudication of the suit filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners nor it was found to be justified on facts. In fact, petitioners-plaintiffs were found trying to abuse the process of law. Possession was taken by the defendant, in compliance of the orders dated 30.5.2017 and 14.6.2017 passed by the competent authority.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has stated during the course of hearing, that petitioners have also moved an application before the competent authority for recalling of the order dated 30.5.2017 and 14.6.2017. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the impugned orders passed by the learned courts below and the same deserve to be upheld.

7. So far as the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as judgments of this Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and another, 2002 (3) CivCC 364 (SC), Prithi Pal Singh and another Vs. Amrik Singh and others, 2014 (1) CivCC 797 (SC), Tarun Bahl Vs. Suman Bahl, 2013(3) CivCC 219 (P&H) and Maman etc. Vs. The Financial Commissioner etc., 1973 PLJ 138 (P&H), are concerned, there is no dispute about the observations made therein. However, on close perusal of the cited judgments, none of them has been found to be of any help to the petitioners, being distinguishable on facts. It is the settled principle of law that peculiar facts of each case are to be examined, considered and appreciated first, before applying any codified or judgemade law thereto. Sometimes, difference of even one circumstance or additional fact can make the world of difference, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533, Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda and others, 2004 (3) SCC 75, State of Orissa Vs. Md. Illiyas, 2006 (1) SCC 275 and State of Rajasthan VS. Ganeshi Lal, 2008 (2) SCC 533.

8. With a view to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 and 12 of its later judgment in Ganeshi Lal’s case (supra), reiterating its view taken in Amrit Lal Manchanda’s case (supra) and Mohd. Illiyas’s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-

11. “12….Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates; (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.

Coming to the peculiar fact situation obtaining on record of the present case, it is unhesitatingly held that learned Permanent Lok Adalat discussed, considered and appreciated each and every relevant aspect of the matter, before passing the impugned award. The only endeavour made by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat was to do complete and substantial justice between the parties and this approach adopted by learned Permanent Lok Adalat has been found well justified on facts as well as in law. Ed. See State of Orissa Vs. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 at p.282, para 12.

12. 15….Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: (AII ER p. 14 CD)

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."

16. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said (at All ER p.297g-h), "Lord Atkin’s speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in Shepherd Homes Ltd. V. Sandham (No.2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: (AII ER p. 1274d-e) "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said: (AII ER p. 761c)

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."

17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

15. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT, AIR 1962 SC 680

"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."

"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it Ed. See Union of India VS. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75, pp. 83-84, paras 15-18."

9. In case the instant application moved by the petitioners seeking amendment in their plaint would have been allowed by the learned trial court, very object and purpose of the amendment in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC carried out by way of Amendment Act 22 of 2002 would have been defeated. In fact, the learned trial court would have exceeded its jurisdiction, while allowing such an application for amendment of the plaint.

10. As noticed hereinabove, trial not only commenced earlier but the suit itself has been decreed, though ex parte. When the application moved by defendant-respondent under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was dismissed by the learned trial court as well as the learned first appellate court, it was this Court, who set aside the ex parte judgment and decree and remanded the matter back. As a consequence of the remand order dated 11.1.2017 passed by this Court, the learned trial court is again seized of the matter. Thereafter, even the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed in default, which came to be restored only on 17.7.2017. Under these undisputed circumstances of the case, it can be safely concluded that the learned trial court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason also.

11. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners could not point out any patent illegality or perversity in the impugned order, which may warrant interference, at the hands of this Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The impugned order is supported by sound reasons, because of which it deserves to be upheld, for this reason as well.

12. No other argument was raised.

13. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the instant civil revision petition is wholly misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance, thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

14. Resultantly, with the above-said observations made, the present civil revision petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.

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