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DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) –

The present regular second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-Gram Panchayat against the judgment and decree dated 17.03.2020 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Narnaul, whereby the suit ?led by the plainti?s was decreed, and notices issued by the Gram Panchayat under Sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 were set aside, and the defendant was restrained from dispossessing the plainti?s from the suit property. The judgment and decree have been a?rmed by the learned District Judge, Narnaul vide judgment dated 30.04.2026 which are also assailed.

2. The dispute essentially concerns the nature of the suit property comprised in Khasra No. 98/2/4/2/2, situated in the revenue estate of village Amarpur Jorasi. The plainti?s claimed to be in possession of the property for several decades and asserted that the same forms part of abadi deh. The Gram Panchayat, on the other hand, claimed the property to be Panchayat/Shamilat land and sought to justify the notices issued under Sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

3. The trial Court, upon consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence, particularly the Jamabandi for the year 2015-16 (Ex.PW1/G), found that the suit property was recorded as Gair Mumkin Abadi of abadi deh. It further noticed that the plainti?s were in possession for a long period and had raised residential structures thereon. The trial Court also recorded that the defendant had failed to establish that the property was being used for a common purpose of the villagers.

4. The said ?ndings have not merely been mechanically a?rmed by the ?rst appellate Court. The ?rst appellate Court independently examined the evidence. It noticed, inter alia, the admission of DW-1 that the houses/tin shed of the plainti?s were very old and that the entire village was situated over Khasra No. 98/2/4/2/2. It also noticed that the defendant had not got the relevant khasra number demarcated. On such appreciation of evidence, the ?rst appellate Court concurred with the conclusion of the trial Court that the defendant had failed to establish any right over the suit property.

5. At this stage, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. A second appeal is maintainable only when the case involves a substantial question of law. The existence of such a question is a condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court. A substantial question of law is not synonymous with a question of fact or a mere question of law; it must have a material bearing upon the rights of the parties and satisfy the tests laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and others, (2020) 19 SCC 57.

6. Equally well settled is the principle that concurrent ?ndings of fact cannot ordinarily be interfered with in second appeal merely because another view of the evidence is possible. Interference may be justi?ed where the ?ndings are shown to be based on no evidence, to be contrary to the pleadings or material documentary evidence, to have been arrived at by misapplication of law, or to be such that no reasonable judicial approach could have produced them. Reliance may be placed on State of Rajasthan and others v. Shiv Dayal and another, (2019) 8 SCC 637; C. Doddanarayana Reddy (dead) by LRs and others v. C. Jayarama Reddy (dead) by LRs and others, (2020) 4 SCC 659.

7. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, no such in?rmity is discernible in the concurrent ?ndings recorded by the Courts below. The ?nding regarding the character and possession of the suit property is founded upon the revenue record as well as oral evidence. The Jamabandi relied upon by the plainti?s records the property as abadi deh, while the evidence of the Panchayat's own witness supports the existence of old residential structures and the fact that the entire village is situated over the relevant khasra number. The ?rst appellate Court has also noticed that the Panchayat failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the particular parcel in possession of the plainti?s was reserved for or was being used for a common purpose.

8. The statutory position also does not assist the appellant. Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as applicable to Haryana, excludes abadi deh from the ordinary description of Shamilat Deh. At the same time, clause 2(g)(4a) deals with vacant land situated in abadi deh or gorah deh, which is not owned by any person. Thus, the mere fact that land is situated within abadi deh is not by itself conclusive in every case; the statutory conditions have to be satis?ed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Patram v. Gram Panchayat, Katwar and others, AIR 2020 SC 1253, has emphasised the need to examine the statutory ingredients and the revenue record in determining whether particular land constitutes Shamilat Deh.

9. In the present case, however, both Courts below have recorded a categorical ?nding, based upon the evidence, that the land in question is not vacant, that the plainti?s have been in possession for a long period and that residential structures exist thereon. There is also no concurrent ?nding that the particular property is being used or reserved for a common purpose of the village. Consequently, the appellant cannot convert a challenge to these factual ?ndings into a substantial question of law merely by placing reliance upon the general assertion that the land belongs to the Panchayat.

10. The plea regarding the bar of jurisdiction under Section 13 of the 1961 Act also does not give rise to a substantial question of law in the facts of the present case. The bar of jurisdiction necessarily presupposes that the dispute is one falling within the ?eld entrusted to the authorities under the Act. Once the Courts below have concurrently found, on the evidence, that the suit property has not been established to be Shamilat Deh land vesting in the Gram Panchayat, the appellant cannot invoke the exclusionary jurisdiction of Section 13 merely by asserting such vesting. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has also recognised that where the property is found to be within abadi deh and the suit is essentially to protect possession against interference, the civil Court's jurisdiction is not excluded merely by reference to Section 13, as held by this court in Basakhi Ram v. Suresh Kumar, (1998) 3 RCR (Civil) 175.

11. There is another aspect, which deserves notice. Section 24 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 empowers a Gram Panchayat to require removal of encroachment, inter alia, on a public street, place or drain. The mere issuance of a notice under the said provision cannot, by itself, establish the Panchayat's title or right to dispossess a person from a residential property. The very foundation for exercising such power has to exist. In the present case, the Courts below have concurrently found that the Panchayat failed to establish the foundational fact that the suit property was Panchayat property or a public/common place over which it could exercise the asserted power.

12. The appellant also relied upon the alleged proceedings/order of the revenue authorities of the year 1995. However, the ?rst appellate Court has noticed that the proceedings referred to by the appellant were against Laxman son of Bhoja Ram and Nar Singh son of Gajanand, whereas the present plainti?s are Nathu Ram and Sant Lal. In any event, no such material has been demonstrated before this Court which could displace the concurrent factual ?ndings regarding the identity, character and possession of the suit property.

13. The grievance of the appellant, in substance, therefore seeks a re-appraisal of the evidence and substitution of the ?ndings recorded by the two Courts below with another possible view. Such an exercise is outside the permissible scope of Section 100 CPC. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a second appeal cannot be converted into a third trial on facts.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any perversity in the concurrent ?ndings, any material evidence having been ignored, any material document having been misread, or any ?nding which is contrary to a binding statutory provision or precedent. The ?ndings recorded by the Courts below are ?ndings of fact based upon the evidence available on record and cannot be characterised as perverse.

15. Consequently, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Appeal dismissed.

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