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SUNISH BINDLISH, J. –

1. The present Letters Patent Appeal filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 05.05.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge vide which the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the eviction order dated 15.01.2020 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Collector, Sub Division, Kanina, and the consequential notices dated 24.12.2025 (Annexures P-4 & P-5) and 04.05.2026 (Annexure P-5A) issued by the Municipal Committee, Kanina, was dismissed at the threshold without formal notice being issued to the respondents.

2. The dispute concerns land comprised in Khasra No. 859, Khewat No. 1968, Khatauni No. 2232 (measuring 1 Kanal 14 Marlas), as reflected in the Jamabandi for the year 2013-14, situated in Village Kanina, Tehsil Kanina, District Mahendragarh, Haryana. The revenue record describes this land as 'Gair Mumkin Rasta' and stands vested in the Municipal Committee, Kanina, as a passage used by residents of the locality.

3. Proceedings were thereafter taken under the Haryana Public Premises (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972 in Case No. 208/PP Act. Vinod and Bir Singh, the appellant's half-brother and father respectively, were arrayed in those proceedings along with the Municipal Committee, Kanina. Vide order dated 15.01.2020 (Annexure P-2), the Collector, Sub Division, Kanina, relying upon the demarcation report dated 12.10.2017, directed removal of the encroachments. In relation to Khasra No. 859, the demarcation recorded a pucca house and boundary wall over an area of about 1,460 square feet. The order was not challenged by Bir Singh and Vinod and remained unassailed.

4. Before passing of the aforesaid order dated 15.01.2020, respondent No. 5, Deshbandhu Yadav, had initiated proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C. in Case No. 768 dated 06.11.2018/25.12.2018, alleging obstruction of the same passage. On 31.05.2019 (Annexure P-1), the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kanina, after a spot inspection, dismissed the said application while observing that no fresh/new nuisance had been created at the spot and that an old house and a wall already existed there. The said order neither decided ownership of Khasra No. 859 nor pronounced upon the title of any private party.

5. The appellant has claimed that the afore house belongs to him under a compromise decree dated 27.05.2015 passed in Civil Suit No. RT/186 dated 13.08.2012, titled as Bir Singh v. Vinod and others (Annexure P-3), followed by mutation and that he was never impleaded or served in the proceedings which culminated in the order dated 15.01.2020. Further, he was a minor when most of the proceedings were conducted. The Municipal Committee first issued notices dated 24.12.2025 to Bir Singh and Vinod under Section 181 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973. The appellant then submitted a representation dated 26.04.2026 and filed CWP No. 14067 of 2026 on 01.05.2026. Further notice dated 04.05.2026 required Bir Singh and Vinod to vacate the constructed house within two days, failing which coercive action was contemplated.

6. The learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition vide judgment dated 05.05.2026. In substance, the Court held that the challenge to the order dated 15.01.2020 had been brought after more than six years and was hit by delay and laches and that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order had not been availed and that the plea of minority on the date of the final order was not borne out because the appellant's own representation records his date of birth as 11.07.2001.

The Court further held that the compromise decree dated 27.05.2015 referred to Khewat No. 737, Khatauni Nos. 856 to 859 and Killa No. 66 and did not establish title in the appellant over Khasra No. 859. It also noticed that the order dated 31.05.2019 under Section 133 Cr.P.C. did not confer any ownership right upon the appellant in Khasra No. 859, which continued to be shown as Gair Mumkin Rasta in the ownership of the Municipal Committee. It was held that it was apparent that the petitioner has filed the writ petition with the oblique motive to prolong his unauthorized possession over Khasra No.859. Such unauthorized possession could not be permitted to continue. The appellant was accordingly directed to vacate Khasra No. 859 within four weeks.

7. The appellant thereafter filed an LPA No. 1356 of 2026. Vide order dated 08.05.2026, the said appeal was disposed of as having not been pressed because the impugned order had not been annexed. Liberty was expressly granted to challenge the said order by filing a fresh Letters Patent Appeal on the same cause of action. The present appeal has been filed in pursuance of that liberty.

8. By way of the present appeal, the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment dated 05.05.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge substantially on the following grounds:-

8.1. It is urged that the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed in limine without formal notice to the respondents and interim protection, particularly when the notice dated 04.05.2026 required vacation of the house within two days and demolition was apprehended.

8.2. It is further contended that the order dated 15.01.2020 and the subsequent municipal notices were directed against Bir Singh and Vinod, whereas the appellant claims to be the recorded owner. According to him, an order passed without impleading or hearing the person having title to the property is void and the defect cannot be cured merely by passage of time.

8.3. The appellant has contended that delay and laches cannot be used against him because he was not a party to the proceedings under the Haryana Public Premises (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972 and was a minor when those proceedings were initiated and for a substantial part of their pendency. It is pleaded that the notices dated 24.12.2025 and 04.05.2026 gave him a fresh cause to approach the Court and that a void order can be challenged when it is sought to be enforced.

8.4. Reliance is placed upon the compromise decree dated 27.05.2015, particularly clause 5 relating to the house constructed by Bir Singh on Rewari-Kanina Road. It is the case of the appellant that, when the decree is read as a whole, it covers the house in dispute and supports the appellant's claim of title and possession. According to him, the learned Single Judge read the decree too narrowly.

8.5. The appellant next relied upon the order dated 31.05.2019 of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kanina. It is contended that, since the SDM had carried out a spot inspection and found no new nuisance and since that order was never challenged, the subsequent proceedings could not take a contrary view on the same factual foundation. Reference is also made to Civil Suit No. 144 of 2018, in which respondent No. 5 has raised disputes concerning alleged encroachments on adjoining land and access through Khasra No. 859, to contend that parallel coercive action should not have been taken.

8.6. Another submission is that respondent No. 5 has pursued proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C., proceedings under the Haryana Public Premises (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972 and a civil suit arising out of the same broader dispute, which, according to the appellant, amounts to forum shopping and multiplicity of proceedings.

8.7. Lastly, it is contended that the impugned action is arbitrary and infringes Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. The appellant has also invoked the Haryana Abadi Deh (Vesting, Recording and Resolving of Ownership Rights) Act, 2025 and stressed that the structure is an old ancestral house. On that basis, it is contended that, at least, interim protection ought to have been granted before any irreversible action was permitted.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated the grounds raised in the present appeal and assailed the impugned judgment on the said grounds.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have sought to sustain the impugned judgment by placing reliance upon the observations and findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and have prayed for dismissal of the present appeal.

10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the paper book including the judgment under appeal and the documents relied upon by the parties.

11. There is no inflexible rule that every writ petition must be admitted and notice be issued before it can be dismissed. Where the petitioner's own material does not disclose a case for interference, the Court may decline relief at the admission stage, provided reasons are recorded. In the present case, the order of the learned Single Judge itself records the appearance of learned State counsel and that counsel were heard. The Court considered the revenue entry, the Collector's order, the appellant's age, the earlier proceedings under Section 133 Cr.P.C., the compromise decree and the availability of a statutory remedy. The mere fact that no formal notice was issued or that interim protection was not granted, would, therefore, by itself not vitiate the judgment.

12. The plea that the order dated 15.01.2020 is a nullity because the appellant was not impleaded, rests on the appellant’s assertion that he was the recorded owner of Khasra No. 859. The material placed before us, however, does not establish that assertion. Khasra No. 859 is shown in the record as Gair Mumkin Rasta in the ownership of the Municipal Committee, Kanina. Neither the compromise decree nor any mutation has been shown to identify Khasra No. 859 itself as land standing in the appellant's name. In the absence of such material, the appellant cannot establish a jurisdictional defect merely by describing himself as the recorded owner of the disputed Khasra number.

13. The appellant's representation dated 26.04.2026 records his date of birth as 11.07.2001. He, therefore, attained majority on 11.07.2019, about six months before the Collector passed the order dated 15.01.2020. It is true that the proceedings had begun while he was a minor and that he says he was never made a party. These are the explanations offered by him for approaching the Court later. Even so, the notices dated 24.12.2025 and 04.05.2026 expressly seek enforcement of the order dated 15.01.2020 and do not constitute a fresh adjudication of the rights of the parties. Once the plea that the 2020 order is void for want of jurisdiction, is not made out, those enforcement notices cannot reopen an order which had remained unchallenged for years. It is also undisputed that the statutory appeal available against the order dated 15.01.2020 was never availed.

14. The compromise decree (Annexure P-3) also does not carry the appellant's case any further. Civil Suit No. RT/186 was filed by Bir Singh, the appellant's father and the appellant was arrayed as a minor proforma defendant through Bir Singh as his natural guardian. The compromise refers to land in Khewat No. 737, Khatauni Nos. 856 to 859 and Kila No. 66, measuring 383 Kanal-18 Marlas and to a Release Deed dated 11.01.2000 concerning family shares. Clause 5 separately deals with houses constructed by Bir Singh on Rewari-Kanina Road and reference to ownership and possession of half share of Vinod on one side and ownership and possession of half share of appellant and his sister on the other. Significantly, however, the compromise does not identify the disputed Khasra No. 859 as property conveyed to the appellant. The figure '859' appearing as a Khatauni number cannot be treated as a reference to Khasra No. 859. Nor can a family compromise, by itself, confer title against the Municipal Committee over land which the revenue record shows as a public passage. The learned Single Judge was therefore justified in holding that the decree did not establish the appellant's title over the land in dispute.

15. The order dated 31.05.2019, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kanina, in the application filed under Section 133 Cr.P.C. must also be read for what it actually decided. The SDM, after a spot inspection, found that no new nuisance had been created and noticed the existing house and wall. The order neither determined title to Khasra No. 859, nor did it hold that the occupation of the land was lawful. The later proceedings before the Collector, though arising from the same locality and involving substantially overlapping parties, addressed a different statutory question - whether there was unauthorised occupation of land recorded as public premises, on the basis of the demarcation relied upon by the Collector. A finding in the application under Section 133 Cr.P.C. that there was no new nuisance is not the same as a finding that there was no encroachment upon public land. The plea of res judicata or issue estoppel is therefore not made out.

16. The pending civil suit also does not alter this conclusion. A reading of the plaint in Civil Suit No. 144 of 2018 shows that respondent No. 5 seeks relief principally in relation to alleged encroachments upon his land comprised in Khasra No. 209/2/2 and refers to Khasra No. 859 as the passage providing access to that land. The appellant is not shown as a party to that plaint. The pendency of that civil suit, therefore, does not by itself prevent the competent authority from proceeding under the Haryana Public Premises (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972 in relation to alleged unauthorised occupation of Khasra No. 859. The questions arising in the two proceedings are not identical.

17. Article 300-A protects a person against deprivation of property except by authority of law, but the protection necessarily proceeds on the existence of a legally recognisable right in the property concerned. For the reasons already recorded, the appellant has not been able to establish such a right in Khasra No. 859 on the material before us. Article 21 cannot, by itself, convert occupation of land recorded as a public passage into a lawful proprietary right, particularly where a statutory remedy against the eviction order was available but was not pursued.

The reliance on the Haryana Abadi Deh (Vesting, Recording and Resolving of Ownership Rights) Act, 2025 is equally unhelpful on the present record. Apart from referring to the enactment, the appellant has not placed any material to show that Khasra No. 859, which is recorded as Gair Mumkin Rasta, falls within its coverage or that any claim in respect of this land has been lodged before the competent authority under that enactment. No relief can, therefore, be found on that plea in the present appeal.

18. We are conscious that removal of an old residential structure may cause serious hardship. That consideration, however, cannot by itself create a legal right to retain possession of land recorded as a public passage or suspend the operation of an order which has remained unchallenged for years. Interim protection is discretionary and depends upon a prima facie case. In the circumstances noticed above, the refusal of such protection by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference in appeal.

19. For these reasons, we find no factual or legal error in the judgment dated 05.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge which would warrant interference in this Letters Patent Appeal.

20. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment dated 05.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 14067 of 2026 is affirmed.

21. Since the matter has remained pending in appeal, the time granted to the appellant by the learned Single Judge to vacate Khasra No. 859 is extended by two weeks from today. If the land is not vacated within that period, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 shall be free to proceed in accordance with law.

22. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgment are confined to the issues arising in the present appeal. Nothing stated herein shall be treated as an expression of opinion on any issue pending in Civil Suit No. 144 of 2018, which shall be decided by the competent Civil Court independently in accordance with law and on the basis of the material before it.

23. All pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Appeal dismissed.

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