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VIRENDER SINGH, J. –

Appellant-Ram Lal has filed the present appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'M.V. Act'), against the award dated 06.11.2020, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-IV, Shimla, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the 'learned Tribunal'), in M.A.C.C. No.68-S/2 of 2015, titled as Shibi Devi & Another versus Ram Lal & Others.

2. By way of award dated 06.11.2020, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, filed by respondents No.1 and 2, and awarded a sum of Rs.8,26,000/-, along with interest @ 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition till the realization of the amount. However, the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation, along with interest, has been fastened upon respondent No.1 (appellant). It has also been held that initially the amount of compensation will be paid by the insurer and thereafter, the Insurance Company has given the right to recover the same on the principle of pay and recover.

3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Tribunal.

Brief Facts:-

4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:-

4.1. The petitioners, being parents of deceased Sapna, have filed the claim petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, before the learned Tribunal, against the respondents, being owner and insurer of vehicle No.HP06A-4881, (hereinafter referred to as 'the offending vehicle'), seeking compensation on account of their daughter Sapna, aged about 16 years.

4.2. According to the petitioners, their daughter Sapna was travelling in the offending vehicle and was on her way to her home in Village Baraoag. When the offending vehicle, being driven by its driver, in a rash and negligent manner, reached at Bhutti Kainchi near Naula, Kumarsain, then, he could not control the offending vehicle and the same met with an accident. In the accident, Sapna received fatal injuries and she died.

4.3. The matter was also reported to the police of Police Station, Kumarsain, where, FIR No.28/15, dated 30.03.2015, has been registered.

4.4. Since, the accident, in question, has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, as such, the petitioner has sought an amount of Rs.24,45,000/-, along with interest, as compensation from the respondents, by pleading their bright past and bleak future.

Stand of the respondents before the learned Tribunal

5. When, put to notice, the claim petition has been contested by the respondents.

5.1. Respondents No.1 and 2 have filed their joint reply, in which, they have admitted the factum of accident, however, according to them, the vehicle was insured with respondent No.3. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the claim petition.

6. Respondent No.3-Insurance Company has filed its separate reply, by taking the preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable; the driver of the offending vehicle was not holding a valid and effective license, at the time of accident; and the offending vehicle was being plied, in violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy.

6.1. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have been denied, mainly for want of knowledge, however, registration of the FIR has not been disputed.

7. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.

8. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated 21.06.2017:

1) Whether deceased Sapna died in a motor vehicle accident, which took place on 30.03.2015 at 6.10 p.m., at place near Bhatti Kainchi Tehsil Kumarsain, District Shimla, H.P., involving vehicle bearing No.HP-06A-4881 owned by respondent No.1 and being driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner, as alleged? OPP

2) Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation, if so, then what should be the quantum of compensation and from whom of the respondent? OPP

3) Whether the petition is not maintainable, in the present form, as alleged? OPR

4) Whether the driver was driving the aforesaid vehicle without possessing valid and effective driving license at the time of accident, as alleged? OPR

5) Whether the vehicle was being driven by the driver in violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy and in contravention of provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, as alleged? OPR-2

6) Relief.

9. Thereafter, parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence.

10. After closure of the evidence, the learned Tribunal, upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the claim petition of the petitioners, by awarding the compensation, as referred to above. However, the Insurance company has been directed to deposit the amount of compensation with liberty to recover the same from the owner.

Contentions of the appellant (Insured)

11. Aggrieved from the said award, the present appeal has been preferred by the owner of the offending vehicle, before this Court, mainly, on the ground that the learned Tribunal has erred in law while burdening the appellant with the liability to pay the amount of compensation, though with right of recovery.

The award has also been assailed, on the ground, that the driver of the offending vehicle, at the relevant time, was having the driving licence, whereas, the Insurance Company could not prove the same by examining witness and document from the office of District Transport Office, Tuensang, Nagaland.

13. The award has further been assailed, on the ground, that the learned Tribunal has based its findings on the inadmissible documents, as the learned Tribunal has issued summons to District Transport Office Tuensang, Nagaland, to prove on record that the license in question was, in fact, issued by the concerned office or not, however, on 12.04.2019, a letter was written to the Court from the office of DTO Tuensang, wherein, it was mentioned that the license in question was not issued from their office.

14. On the basis of the above grounds of appeal, Mr. Vinay Thakur, Advocate, has submitted that the learned Tribunal has wrongly fastened the liability upon the appellant and given the right to recover the amount, as, no willful violation has been proved by the insurer, in the present case.

Contentions of learned Counsel for the respondents (petitioners before the Tribunal)

15. Per contra, Mr. Deepak Bhasin, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Sambhav Bhasin, Advocate has supported the award, by virtue of which, the Insurance Company has been given the right to recover the amount and prayed that the learned Tribunal has rightly appreciated the evidence, so adduced by the parties.

16. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the appeal.

Discussion and Analysis

17. In order to decide the controversy, involved in the present appeal, it would be just and appropriate for this Court to discuss the evidence, so adduced by the parties, before the learned Tribunal.

18. Considering the fact that the award has not been assailed by the claimants and the same has only been assailed by the person, i.e., owner, who, as per the award of the learned Tribunal is liable to pay the amount of compensation, as such, the evidence so adduced by the respondents is liable to be considered, in this case.

19. In this case, respondent No.1 Ram Lal appeared in the witness-box as RW-1 and has deposed that the offending vehicle was owned by him, which met with an accident. He has also proved the copy of RC Ex.RW-1/A, copy of Insurance Policy Ex.RW-1/B, copy of Driving Licence Ex.RW-1/C. According to this witness, the accident, in question had taken place due to mechanical defect, which had occurred in the offending vehicle. He has further deposed that the Driving Licence of his son is valid.

19.1. In the cross-examination by learned counsel for the petitioner, this witness has admitted that in the accident, in question, daughter of the petitioners had expired and information to this effect was given to the Police and the FIR was also registered, copy of which is Ex.PW-5/A. However, he has denied that the accident, in question had taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of his son.

19.2. In the cross-examination by learned counsel for respondent No.3, this witness has deposed that Layak Ram is his son. At the time of the accident, he was 26 years of age. He has studied upto +2. On the day of accident, this witness was at his home and admitted that in the accident, in question, his son was neither rash nor negligent. His son used to drive other vehicles of the villagers. He has also used to take apple loaded vehicles to Chandigarh. His Driving License was issued from Nagaland, however, he could not disclosed about the place in Nagaland, from where, the said licence was issued. He has admitted that the Licensing Authority is also there at Rampur and other places. He could not tell the year, in which, the license has been issued by the authority, but, he has disclosed that the same was issued from the Nagaland. Offending vehicle was purchased in the year 2013.

20. Insurance Company has examined Vivek Suman, Administrative Officer, as RW-2, who has filed his affidavit Ex.RW-2/A, which is based upon the stand, as taken by the Insurance Company. In addition to this, he has also deposed that the Insurance Company has deputed Shri Prittam Singh Chandel, Advocate, to verify the Driving License of Layak Ram. He had applied under the RTI from the office of DTO Tuensang, Nagaland on 08.08.2017. Vide letter dated 01.09.2017, the DTO Tuensang replied to their counsel that this driving licence is not issued by them and the learned counsel has sent this letter along with his letter dated 09.09.2017.

20.1. In addition to this, this witness has also tendered, in evidence, the verification report Ex.RW-2/B, information received under RTI from DTO Tuensng, Nagaland, regarding Driving License No.38619/TV/T/2010, Ex.RW-2/C, copy of RTI application, Ex.RW-1/D, receipt of Postal Order amounting to Rs.10/-, Ex.RW-2/E, copy of authorization letter Ex.RW-2/F and copy of letter addressed to Ram Lal Ex.RW-2/G.

20.2. In the cross-examination by learned counsel for the petitioners, this witness had admitted that he is not the summoned witness, however, according to him, the accident had taken place on 30.03.2015, regarding which, the FIR, Ex,PW-5/A, was also registered. He has also admitted that the offending vehicle was insured with their company.

21. This is the entire evidence adduced by the respondents, before the learned Tribunal.

22. In order to seek exoneration from paying the amount of compensation, it is incumbent upon the Insurance Company to plead and prove that the owner of the vehicle willfully and negligently handed over the offending vehicle to a person, who was not having a valid and effective driving licence. In other words, in order to prove the fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, the Insurance Company has to probabilize the fact that the owner has knowingly handed over the vehicle to a person, whose licence is not valid.

23. Here, the driver of the offending vehicle is not a stranger, but, son of the owner. In his examination-in-chief, before the Court, he has produced the driving licence of his son and in the cross-examination, he has categorically stated that his son was also driving the pick-up vehicles of other villagers and also used to take apple loaded vehicles upto Chandigarh. He has also deposed that his driving licence was issued from Nagaland, however, he could not name the place, from where, the said licence has been issued. Even, a suggestion has not been given to this witness that he, being owner of the offending vehicle, despite knowing the fact that the licence of his son was not valid, handed over the vehicle to him.

24. Knowledge of the fake licence is sine qua non for burdening the owner with the liability to pay the amount of compensation. In this case, it has not been suggested that the son of respondent No.1 was not having the valid and effective driving licence, what to talk about his knowledge, with regard to the fact that the licence, copy of which is Ex.RW-1/C, is not valid.

25. The tone and tenor of the cross-examination of RW-1 does not demonstrate any intention of the Insurance Company, to even put a simple suggestion to the owner that he was having knowledge of the fact that the Driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW-1/C, is not valid.

26. Now, coming to the evidence of RW-2/A, admittedly, this witness has never seen the accident, nor, his statement falls within the definition of Section 60 of the Evidence Act (Section 55 of BSA). Furthermore, this evidence also does not fall within the definition of the exception to the direct evidence, i.e., hearsay evidence or res gestae.

27. Moreover, whatsoever, he has deposed, that has been stated on the basis of the report Ex.RW-2/C, which, admittedly, has not been submitted by him. The person, who has submitted the said report, in which, it has been mentioned that as per the verification report, DTO Tuensang, Driving Licence No.38619/TV/T/2010, is fake, is not the one, who has prepared it. The report Ex.RW-2/C, purported to be signed by District Transport Officer, Nagaland, addressed to Mr. Pritam Singh Chandel, Advocate, has not duly been proved by summoning the person, who has issued the same.

28. Learned Tribunal, in the present case, has exonerated the Insurance Company from paying the amount of compensation, on the basis of the report, submitted by the District Transport Officer, in pursuance of the summons, which were issued to the District Transport Officer Tuensang, Nagaland, calling upon him to put appearance, as witness, on behalf of the Insurance Company. The procedure, which has been adopted by the learned Tribunal is not known to the law.

29. Merely, because the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, are not governed by the strict rule of evidence, does not authorize the learned Tribunal to adopt any method to collect evidence, which is, in violation of the principles of natural justice. No opportunity to rebut the report has been given to respondent No.1, as well as, to the claimants.

30. Moreover, when, a witness has been summoned by the learned Tribunal to depose, it was incumbent upon the said witness to put appearance and to depose, on oath, and in that process, the deposition/assertion is to be subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party, in order to elicit the truth.

31. It is the deposition of the District Transport Officer, which would be having evidentiary value, and not his report, which has been submitted to the Court, in response to the summons issued to the said authority. Along with the report, the Notarized affidavit of District Transport Officer has also been annexed. Neither in the CPC, nor Cr.PC, permits that the witness, instead of appearing in the witness-box, may submit his deposition, by way of affidavit, as well as, in the shape of report. Such a practice is unknown to law.

32. The learned Tribunal, in the present case, has placed much reliance on the deposition of RW-2, as well as, documents submitted by this witness, during his examination-in-chief. Even, the report, which has been obtained, under the Right to Information Act, by the learned counsel representing the Insurance Company, would prove that the driving licence was not issued by the said authority. However, this does not, in any manner, attribute the knowledge to respondent No.1, qua the fact that the driving licence of his son was fake and he, knowing the said fact, had handed over the offending vehicle to him.

33. The documents Ex.RW-2/B and Ex.RW-2/C have been objected to, by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and without deciding those objections, the learned Tribunal has relied upon those documents.

34. The approach of the learned Tribunal, in not deciding the objections, raised to the documents, would go to the roots of the case, as the party, in case, objections are decided, in a particular manner, may take steps to prove the said documents, by leading some other evidence.

35. The learned Tribunal has given no reason as to how the report submitted by the District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland, in pursuance of the summons issued against him, can be taken into consideration, that too, without giving any opportunity to respondent No.1 to rebut the contents of the same.

36. This Court deprecates the said approach adopted by the learned Tribunal, by holding that such an approach is converse to the principles governing the proceedings under the M.V. Act.

37. Another unusual approach, which has been adopted by the learned Tribunal, in the present case, is that when, the learned counsel representing respondent No.1, relied upon the decision of learned MACT, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, dated 18.08.2018, arising out of the said accident, the learned Tribunal has simply discarded the said document, by observing that the same is not binding upon the learned Tribunal. To that extent, the learned Tribunal was correct, but, the persuasive value of that document has not been considered.

38. The learned Tribunal failed to distinguish between the fact that merely because the licence of the deceased driver was not proved, the same does not exonerate the insurer from liability, unless or until, it has been proved that there was a breach of contract of insurance, between the insurer and insured. Sine qua non, is the knowledge of the insured that he, despite being aware that the driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW-1/C, is fake and despite knowing that fact, he had handed over the offending vehicle to such person.

39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nirmala Kthari versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 1193 has held that employer, while hiring a driver, is required to see if driver has a driving licence, prima facie, appearing genuine and he is not expected to ascertain veracity of the same. Relevant paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:-

"11. While hiring a driver the employer is expected to verify if the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the employer is not expected to further investigate into the authenticity of the licence unless there is cause to believe otherwise. If the employer finds the driver to be competent to drive the vehicle and has satisfied himself that the driver has a driving licence there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) and the Insurance Company would be liable under the policy. It would be unreasonable to place such a high onus on the insured to make enquiries with RTOs all over the country to ascertain the veracity of the driving licence. However, if the Insurance Company is able to prove that the owner/insured was aware or had notice that the licence was fake or invalid and still permitted the person to drive, the insurance company would no longer continue to be liable.

12. On facts, in the instant case, the Appellant/Complainant had employed the Driver, Dharmendra Singh as driver after checking his driving licence. The driving licence was purported to have been issued by the licencing authority, Sheikh Sarai, Delhi, however, the same could not be verified as the concerned officer of the licencing authority deposed that the record of the licence was not available with them. It is not the contention of the Respondent/ Insurance Company that the Appellant/complainant is guilty of willful negligence while employing the driver. The driver had been driving competently and there was no reason for the Appellant/Complainant to doubt the veracity of the driver's licence. In view of above facts and circumstances, the impugned judgment is not liable to be sustained and is hereby set aside. The appeals accordingly stand allowed. The respondent/ Insurance Company is held liable to indemnify the appellant.

40. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4919 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No.24933 of 2019), titled as Rishi Pal Singh versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd & Others, Relevant paragraphs 3 to 9 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: -

"3. Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Lehru & Ors. as also three-Judge Bench judgment reported as National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Others that the owner has no mean to verify the genuineness of driving license produced before him, provided that the owner finds the driver is competent to drive the vehicle. Hence, once the appellant has deposed that he had taken test of the driver before employing him, he has taken sufficient precaution before employment. Therefore, there could not be any direction to recover the amount from the appellant.

4. The record of the Tribunal was requisitioned. A perusal thereof shows that the claimants have produced a driving licence of the driver before the Tribunal. The said driving licence is available at page 502 of the paper book. The genuineness of the said licence was investigated and in the report Ex. R3W2/D, the same was found to be not issued by the Licensing Authority Mandi in the State of Himachal Pradesh.

5. Thus, it was the claimant alone who relied upon the license issued by Licensing Authority Mandi. The same was not found to be genuine. The statement of the owner, that the license was from Nagaland is without any supporting documents and is thus meaning less. The fact remains, having appointing driver after taking test, the appellant was not expected to make enquiries from the licensing authority as to whether driving license shown to him is valid or not.

6. If the owner has stated that driver had produced the driving license from Nagaland but no such license was produced on record, it is obviously a mistake on the part of the owner. However, such aspect cannot be used to grant liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner when the driving license actually produced by the claimant themselves was from Una, Himachal Pradesh. It may be stated that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not the principle applicable in India. Therefore, even if a part of the statement that the driver has produced the license from Nagaland is not correct, it is wholly inconsequential.

7. To appreciate the contention of the appellant, the observations of this Court in Lehru (supra) have been reproduced as under:

"20. When an owner is hiring a driver he will therefore have to check whether the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a driving licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the owner is not expected to find out whether the licence has in fact been issued by a competent authority or not. The owner would then take the test of the driver. If he finds that the driver is competent to drive the vehicle, he will hire the driver. We find it rather strange that insurance companies expect owners to make enquiries with RTOS, which are spread all over the country, whether the driving licence shown to them is valid or not. Thus where the owner has satisfied himself that the driver has a licence and is driving competently there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii). The insurance company would not then be absolved of liability. If it ultimately turns out that the licence was fake, the insurance company would continue to remain liable unless they prove that the owner/insured was aware or had noticed that the licence was fake and still permitted that person to drive. More importantly, even in such a case the insurance company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia [(1987) 2 SCC 654], Sohan Lal Passi [(1996) 5 SCC 21: 1996 SCC (Cri) 871] and Kamla [(2001) 4 SCC 342: 2001 SCC (Cri) 701] cases. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view."

8. The issue has been examined by a larger Bench in Swaran Singh (supra) wherein it was argued that the observations in Lehru were in conflict with the earlier judgment in New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla and Ors.. This Court held as under:

"92. It may be true as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that a fake or forged licence is as good as no licence but the question herein, as noticed hereinbefore, is whether the insurer must prove that the owner was guilty of the wilful breach of the conditions of the insurance policy or the contract of insurance. In Lehru case [(2003) 3 SCC 338: 2003 SCC (Cri) 614) the matter has been considered in some detail. We are in general agreement with the approach of the Bench but we intend to point out that the observations made therein must be understood to have been made in the light of the requirements of the law in terms whereof the insurer is to establish wilful breach on the part of the insured and not for the purpose of it's disentitlement from raising any defence or for the owners to be absolved from any liability whatsoever. We would be dealing in some detail with this aspect of the matter a little later.

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99. So far as the purported conflict in the judgments of Kamla [(2001) 4 SCC 342: 2001 SCC (Cri) 701] and Lehru [(2003) 3 SCC 338: 2003 SCC (Cri) 614] is concerned, we may wish to point out that the defence to the effect that the licence held by the person driving the vehicle was a fake one, would be available to the insurance companies, but whether despite the same, the plea of default on the part of the owner has been established or not would be a question which will have to be determined in each case.

100. This Court, however, in Lehru [(2003) 3 SCC 338: 2003 SCC (Cri) 614] must not be read to mean that an owner of a vehicle can under no circumstances have any duty to make any enquiry in this respect. The same, however, would again be a question which would arise for consideration in each individual case."

9. Similar question again came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench in a judgment reported as Pappu and Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Anr.5 wherein it was held that the onus would shift on the Insurance Company after the owner of the offending vehicle pleads and proves the basic facts within his knowledge that the driver of the offending vehicle was authorized by him to drive the vehicle and was having a valid driving license at the relevant time. The valid driving license is the license which is produced before the owner. This Court held as under:

"12. This Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297: 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] has noticed the defences available to the insurance company under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The insurance company is entitled to take a defence that the offending vehicle was driven by an unauthorised person or the person driving the vehicle did not have a valid driving licence. The onus would shift on the insurance company only after the owner of the offending vehicle pleads and proves the basic facts within his knowledge that the driver of the offending vehicle was authorised by him to drive the vehicle and was having a valid driving licence at the relevant time.

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17. This issue has been answered in National Insurance Co. Ltd. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297: 2004 SCC (Cri) 733) In that case, it was contended by the insurance company that once the defence taken by the insurer is accepted by the Tribunal, it is bound to discharge the insurer and fix the liability only on the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer succeeds in establishing its defence, the Tribunal or the court can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimant(s) and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The three-Judge Bench, after analysing the earlier decisions on the point, held that there was no reason to deviate from the said well- settled principle. In para 107, the Court then observed thus: (SCC p. 340)

"107. We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued, despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realise the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given an opportunity to defend at all. Such a course of action may also be resorted to when a fraud or collusion between the victim and the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage."

41. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as referred to above, read with the discussion made hereinabove, the findings of the learned Tribunal, to that extent are not sustainable and the Insurance Company has miserably failed to prove the fundamental breach of Insurance Policy. As such, the learned Tribunal has wrongly burdened respondent No.1 to pay the amount of compensation.

42. Although, in this case, claimants have not filed appeal or cross-objections, for enhancement of compensation, but during the course of arguments, it has been argued by Shri Pramod Singh Thakur, Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 that the amount of compensation may kindly be enhanced so that the same could fall within the definition of 'just compensation'.

44. It is no longer res integra that the endeavour of the Court/Tribunal, while deciding the claim petition, should be to grant 'just compensation' as the M.V. Act, is a beneficial piece of legislation.

44. In order to achieve the said goal, now this Court would proceed further to determine whether the amount of compensation, awarded by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of 'just compensation' or not.

45. Learned Tribunal has taken the age of deceased Sapna, as 15 years, at the time of her death and taken the contribution towards her family as Rs.5,000/-. The said findings of the learned trial Court, do not require any interference by this Court as the petitioners are from a rural background. In rural areas, young girl of 15 years ordinarily contributes to her family income, by way of manual work. In the agricultural based society, young girls in the family are engaged in multifarious activities to support their household.

46. The learned Tribunal has rightly given the addition of 40% on the established income of the deceased on account of future prospects.

47. Learned Tribunal has also deducted 50% of the income of deceased, towards her personal expenses, had she been alive. The learned Tribunal, in the present case, has applied the multiplier of '18', which is the appropriate multiplier, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121.

48. Thus, the learned Tribunal has rightly calculated the amount of Rs.7,56,000/- towards 'loss of contribution'. The said findings also do not require any interference by this Court. However, the learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.40,000/-, under the head 'loss of consortium', whereas, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, all the petitioners are entitled to the compensation, under the head 'loss of consortium'.

49. Thus, the entitlement of the petitioners, is ascertained, as under:-

50. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the same is also required to be reduced to 7.5 % per annum, keeping in view the prevailing rates of interest of the nationalized banks.

51. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The awarded amount is enhanced from Rs.8,26,000/- to Rs.8,66,000/-, however, with interest @ 7.5%. The ultimate liability to pay the amount, with interest, is on the Insurance Company.

52. The award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified, in the above terms.

53. Memo of costs be prepared.

54. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.

Record be sent back.

Appeal allowed.

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