JUDGMENT

G.S. SANDHAWALIA, J.—

C.M. No. 17897 of 2013

1. Present application has been filed under Order 22 Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC for impleading legal representatives of deceased-respondent no. 4-Sh. Abhey Ram, who is stated to have died on 31.12.2011 leaving behind legal representative mentioned in para no. 2 of the application. The application is also supported by an affidavit.

2. In view of the above, the application is allowed. Person mentioned in para no. 2 of the application is allowed to be brought on record as legal representative of deceased respondent no. 4-Abhey Ram, only for the purpose of pursuing this litigation. Amended memo of parties filed alongwith the application is taken on record.

CWP No. 9344 of 1993

3. The present petition has been filed for quashing an order dated 13.08.1991 (Annexure P-5) passed by Additional Director, Consolidation, Haryana, Rohtak wherein, he has refused to interfere in the orders of the Consolidation Officer on account of the fact that earlier orders had been passed by his predecessor-in-interest directing the Consolidation Officer and the said officer had merely complied with the directions given earlier.  Accordingly, it was held that there is no power under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (in short 'the Consolidation Act') to review or change the order passed under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act.

4. Perusal of the writ petition would show that respondent no. 3-Smt. Moto, resident of Golagarh, initially filed a petition under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act impleading one Nanhu Ram and the State as respondents with the grievance that she had been allotted land adjoining the village pond and also near the land of Nanhu and due to separation of two parcels of land, she was subjected to inconvenience. It was pleaded by her that her grievance could be removed if her land adjoining land of Nanhu is allotted to him and equivalent land in equal value was transferred from Nanhu to the village pond and petitioner could be compensated with transfer of land in equal value from the pond. The said request was accepted by respondent no. 1 on 10.03.1988 (Annexure P-1) as Nanhu had no objection and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer, Bhiwani with the directions to make necessary consequential changes in revenue record after inspecting the spot and hearing the interested parties. In compliance with the directions passed by respondent no. 1, the Consolidation Officer, in the presence of Tara Chand, Sarpanch of village Golagarh, passed necessary orders on 07.01.1989 (Annexure P-2) and accepted the remand case.

5. Thereafter, respondent no. 4-Abhey Ram also filed a petition under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act requesting that he had deficiency in the area allotted and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer to make up the remaining deficiency of land from the Bachat land and make consequential changes vide order dated 13.10.1988 (Annexure P-3). That in compliance with the order of respondent no. 1, the Consolidation Officer made good the deficiency in favour of respondent no. 4 in the presence of Tara Chand, Sarpanch of village Golagarh on 14.02.1989. The petitioner namely Gram Panchayat Kherpura (Majra Golagarh) filed petition under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act challenging the orders dated 07.01.1989 (Annexure P-2) and 14.02.1989 (Annexure P-4) whereby, the deficiency had been made good of respondents no. 3 and 4 on the ground that they had not been heard at the time of passing of the order and were adversely affected. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 13.08.1991 (Annexure P-5) was passed declining to interfere in the orders on the ground that it would amount to review or changing the order under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act. The relevant part of the order dated 13.08.1991 reads as under:-

“3. But I consider the amendment made by the Consolidation Officer as correct because the Consolidation Officer has completed the directions given by Additional Director, Consolidation under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act. Additional Director, Consolidation, in his order dated 10-3-88 has given direction that land from Pond's land be given to Shrimati Motan. Therefore, there is no scope for any interfere in the order of Consolidation Officer. I have no power under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act to review or change the order of Additional Director Consolidation under Section 42. Keeping in view my jurisdiction, I dismiss the petition.”

6. While issuing notice of motion on 09.02.1994, the contention of counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner-Gram Panchayat was not a party-respondent and the order was passed without hearing it. The order reads as under:-

“Learned counsel submits that Gram Panchayat, Kherpura (Majra Golagarh), was not a party-respondent to the petition under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 in Case No. 148/1988 and the order was passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Chandigarh, without hearing the petitioner.

Notice of motion for May 12, 1994.”

7. In the written statement filed by the official respondents, it has been specifically stated that Tara Chand, Sarpanch of village Golagarh, was present before the Consolidation Officer and the orders were passed in compliance with the earlier orders passed by respondent no. 1 and no legal or statutory right of the petitioner has been infringed and it had not come to Court with clean hands.

8. Similarly, in the written statement filed by respondents no. 3, 5, 7 and 8, it has been alleged that not only that there is delay in approaching this Court since the impugned order was passed on 13.08.1991 whereas, the petition was filed in this Court in December, 1993 and the petitioner had no locus standi as at the time of the proceedings, the Gram Panchayat, Golagarh was the owner of the disputed land. It was further averred that the petitioner-Gram Panchayat did not have any right since the principal Gram Panchayat was of Golagarh. The estate of Gram Panchayat Kherpura was at that time represented by Gram Panchayat Golagarh, who was the recorded owner of the land in dispute. Later on, some area had been given to the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, Kherpura and, therefore, it had no cause of action. Tara Chand, Sarpanch of village Golagarh was present at the time when the orders were passed.

9. After hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the present writ petition is misconceived and notice of motion was got issued on concealment of facts. That the petitioner-Gram Panchayat came into existence subsequent to the passing of the orders and at that point of time was not in existence and Sarpanch of the principal Gram Panchayat, Golagarh was present on both the occasions. This factual averment in the written statement filed by the private respondents has not been controverted by filing any replication. As noticed above, the order of issuing notice of motion dated 09.02.1994 was on the ground that principles of natural justice were violated and without disclosing to this Court that the petitioner-Gram Panchayat was not in existence at that point of time. Thus, the petitioner has no right to be heard in view of the observations of the Apex Court in Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India (2007) 8 Supreme Court Cases 449, wherein, it observed on similar lines and the judgment of the High Court wherein petition had been dismissed in limine was upheld by holding that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief due to suppression of material facts. The relevant observations read as under:-

“33. It is thus clear that though the appellant- Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.

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35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss Displaced Persons Action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

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37. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that by dismissing the petition in limine, the High Court has neither committed an error of law nor of jurisdiction. The appellant-Company is not entitled to any relief. Though the respondent-Bank is right in submitting that the appellant has suppressed material facts from this Court as also that it has not complied with interim order passed by the Court and it has, therefore, no right to claim hearing on merits, we have considered the merits of the matter also and we are of the considered view that no case has been made out for interference with Displaced Persons Action taken by the respondent- Bank or the order passed by the High Court.”

10. Secondly, perusal of the impugned order, which has been reproduced above, would go on to show that respondent no. 1 was correct in holding that the orders dated 07.01.1989 (Annexure P-2) and 14.02.1989 (Annexure P-4) were passed in compliance with the directions of predecessor-in-interest passed on 10.03.1988 and 13.10.1988 (Annexures P-1 and P-3) respectively. Once that was so, respondent no. 1 rightly held that he had no power to review. It has been settled by a Bench of this Court consisting of five Judges in Deep Chand and another vs. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, 1964 PLR 318 that the power of review can only be exercised where there is specific provision and in the absence of any such power in the Statute, the Authorities do not have any such power of review. The relevant observations read thus:-

“To concede such a wide power of review would, in my opinion, introduce into judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, disconcerting element of permanent uncertainty and unpredictability tending to given an impression of quasi-judicial lawlessness, which I cannot persuade myself to uphold. If Courts do not possess such a wide and sweeping power, it is difficult to concede such a wide power in statutory judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals.”

11. A three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Bhajan Singh vs. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 641, while considering the provisions of Section 42 of the Consolidation Act, also held that the Director, Consolidation of Holdings has no power to review his previous orders and upheld the order of this Court quashing the subsequent order.

12. Accordingly keeping in view the above settled position, no ground is made out for interference and the writ petition is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

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