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VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J. (ORAL)–

1. Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 19.03.2025 (Annexure P-10), passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kurukshetra, whereby the application (Annexure P-9) preferred by the petitioners under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint, has been dismissed.

1.1. It is further prayed that, during the pendency of the present petition, further proceedings in Civil Suit No. 197 of 2025 (Annexure P-7), pending before  the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kurukshetra, be stayed in the interest of justice.

2. The brief facts of the present revision petition are that respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration, claiming ownership and possession of the suit land on the basis of an alleged oral gift by Bindra Rani, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners/defendants No. 1 to 5, besides seeking setting aside of the impugned mutations (Annexures P-4 to P-6), the Will dated 20.07.2006 (registered on 30.05.2013) (Annexure P-1), the settlement/transfer deed (Annexure P-2) and the transfer deed (Annexure P-3). The petitioners sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC (Annexure P-9), inter alia, contending that the alleged oral gift was impermissible under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the suit was barred by limitation in view of the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the mutations by the Collector, Thanesar, vide order dated 16.01.2020 (Annexure P-8), and the plaintiffs, being strangers to Bindra Rani, lacked locus standi to challenge the aforesaid instruments. The application was dismissed vide order dated 19.03.2025 (Annexure P-10), which is impugned in the present revision petition.

3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that the Civil Judge has failed to properly appreciate the pleadings and material on record, which unequivocally reveal that the plaintiffs’ claim is founded upon an alleged oral gift, impermissible in law under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, absent a duly executed and registered instrument. It is further argued that the Court has erred in treating the issue of limitation as invariably a mixed question of law and fact, notwithstanding the settled position that a plaint is liable to rejection where the bar of limitation is apparent from its own averments. In the present case, the plaintiffs have themselves pleaded that they acquired knowledge of the Will, family settlement and consequential mutations soon after their execution in 2013; hence, the suit instituted after an inordinate delay is ex facie barred by limitation. Accordingly, the impugned order is legally unsustainable and warrants interference by this Court.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the impugned order suffers from no illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that a Mandir exists over the suit land and that half share thereof has been transferred to the respondent-plaintiffs through a registered instrument. It is further submitted that, although an earlier suit instituted by the respondent-plaintiffs was dismissed, the regular second appeal arising therefrom is pending adjudication before this Court and, therefore, the findings recorded therein have not attained finality. Learned counsel further contends that the question of limitation constitutes a mixed question of law and fact, requiring adjudication on merits, and that the plaintiffs cannot be non-suited at the threshold on that ground. In support of these submissions, reliance is placed upon Babasaheb Ramdas Shirole and Others vs. Rohit Enterprises and Others, 2026 (1) RCR (Civil) 60, and P. Kumarakurubaran vs. P. Narayanan and Others, 2025 INSC 598. Accordingly, dismissal of the present revision petition is sought.

5. Section 123 of Transfer of Property Act reads as under:-

123. Transfer how effected:-

For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property, the  transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.

For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered.

5.1. The law enunciated by this Court in Jagdev Singh vs. Ganga Devi, 2014(1) Law Herald 822, reiterates that a gift of immovable property can be effected only through a registered instrument, duly signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. Similarly, in Chanan Singh vs. Pritam Kaur and Another, AIR 1984 PHHC 153, this Court held that immovable property cannot be transferred by way of an oral gift.

6. In the present case, the respondent-plaintiff claims right, title and interest in the suit property on the basis of an alleged oral gift made by Smt. Bindra Rani. Significantly, in paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff itself averred that Bindra Rani had been assuring the institution that she would transfer her share in the land through a registered instrument. This averment prima facie indicates the plaintiff’s awareness that a valid transfer of immovable property by way of gift requires compliance with the statutory formalities and cannot be founded merely upon an oral assertion. Admittedly, no registered gift instrument was executed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff during the lifetime of Bindra Rani.

6.1. Further, as pleaded in paragraph 7 of the plaint, defendants No. 1 and 2 had instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the respondent-plaintiff on the basis of an unregistered Will allegedly executed by Bindra Rani in their favour. Paragraph 9 of the plaint further records that the plaintiff had sought framing of an issue in those proceedings concerning the defendants’ status as legal heirs of Bindra Rani and the validity of the Will propounded by them. The plaintiff also pleaded that, upon making inquiries, it learnt that Mutation No. 26807 dated 15.12.2012 had been sanctioned in favour of defendant No. 1 to the extent of 34/43 share on the basis of Tamleeque Nama Nos. 1614/1 and 1611/1, both dated 11.05.2012, pertaining to land measuring 9 kanals and 1 marla. It was further averred that another mutation had been sanctioned in favour of defendants No. 1 to 5 on the basis of a registered Will dated 30.05.2013, stated to have been drafted on 20.07.2006 under registered deed No. 110/3, concerning the same land.

6.2. The aforesaid pleadings, read cumulatively, raise a substantial question as to the legal foundation of the respondent-plaintiff’s asserted entitlement, particularly when its claim rests upon an alleged oral gift of immovable property, which is not recognised by law. The plaintiff’s own averments regarding the absence of a registered gift instrument assume significance in examining whether the plaint discloses a legally enforceable cause of action. The scope and parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, have been authoritatively delineated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2020) 7 SCC 366, wherein it was held as under:-

23.2 The remedy under Order 7, Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.

23.3 The underlying object of Order 7, Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

23.4 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315 followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC Online Guj 281: (1998) 2 GLH 823, this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words:

"12....The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action."

23.5 The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7, Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

23.6 Under Order 7, Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint (Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512], read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law..…

23.9 In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

23.10.At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137].

23.11.The test for exercising the power under Order 7, Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as: (SCC p. 562, para 139)

"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed."

23.12.In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint primafacie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941].

23.13.If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC.

23.14.The power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before State of conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai Maharashtra [Saleem Bhal v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557]. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC Online Guj 281: (1998) 2 GLH 823).

23.15. The provision of Order 7, Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint".

6.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467, has authoritatively delineated the principles governing rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and held as under:-

"5.. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits..."

6.2. In the light of the aforesaid settled legal principles, the question that arises for consideration is whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the petitioners’ application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The relevant extract of the impugned order reads as under:-

8. Firstly as far as maintainability of oral gift is concerned, it pertains to a procedural compliance and does not constitute a valid ground for rejection of plaint under Order 7 rule 11 CPC. More so, the question of whether an oral gift is permissible or legally valid is a substantive issue requiring interpretation of personal laws, statutory provisions, and evidence. This issue goes to the merits of the case and cannot be decided at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 clarified that procedural objections or defences, including maintainability, must be adjudicated during trial and do not constitute valid grounds for rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

9. Secondly, coming to the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action. Upon perusal of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiffs have pleaded a detailed case regarding the oral gift. These averments establish a prima facie cause of action. Moreso, the test for determining the existence of a cause of action does not require the Court to assess the merits or truthfulness of the allegations. As held in Liverpool & London S.P. &l Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success 1, (2004) 9 SCC 512, the cause of action should be taken at face value without delving into disputed questions of fact. Further held that whether the plaint disclose a cause of action or not, is essentially a question of effect. However. whether it does or does not must be found from the reading of the plaint itself and the averments made in the plant in their entirety must be held to be correct. In other words, the plaint must be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words.

10. Thirdly, so far question of limitation is concerned, this court is here guided by the dictum of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as 'Salim D. Agboatwala & Ors., Versus Shamal Ji Oddavji Thakkar and Others LL 2021 SC 476, wherein, it has been held that the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC, if the limitation issue is a mixed question of fact and law. In the case in hand, as well the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and tac and cannot be decided at this stage without any evidence and therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at this stage on this ground. Further, coming to the question of suit barred under Order 1 Rule 9 CPC for not impleading all partners is concerned, it is a procedural defect and do not defeat the suit and can be adjudicated during the trial proceedings.

11. Lastly, the applicant has sought rejection of plaint on the ground of deficient advalorem Court fees. It has been argued by learned counsel for applicant that the plaintiff have challenged the sale deed no. 5883 dated 28.10.2024, and the value of the suit property is Rs.7,65.00.000/-. Therefore, the plaintiffs are required to affix the court fee as per the value of the property. The Court here placed reliance on case of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh and others, 2010(2) RCR (Civil) 564; 20102) Rai 436 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed in invalid, or nonest, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B'- two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C". Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B' who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it. he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and non-est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the florin is different and court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay advalorem, court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B. who is a non executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if B', a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v)of Section 7." In the present suit, the plaintiffs are non-executant and prima facie are in possession and has filed suit for a declaration that the deed is null or void. Therefore, in view of authority cited above, they has to merely pay a fixed nominal court fee.

6.3. In the present petition, the petitioners have assailed the impugned order, contending that the respondent-plaintiff lacks locus standi and a subsisting cause of action to maintain the suit, which is also alleged to be barred by limitation. It is well settled that a plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the statutory conditions for such rejection are satisfied, including where the plaint, read as a whole, fails to disclose a legally enforceable cause of action. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tej Bahadur vs. Shri Narendra Modi, 2021(14) SCC 211, has held as under:-

“It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an internal part of cause of action.”

7. In the present case, the respondent-plaintiff asserts right, title and interest in the suit property exclusively on the basis of an alleged oral gift of immovable property by Smt. Bindra Rani. In view of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the law enunciated by this Court in Jagdev Singh vs. Ganga Devi (supra) and Chanan Singh vs. Pritam Kaur and Another (supra), such an oral gift cannot confer a valid title to immovable property. Since the respondent-plaintiff has founded its claim to the suit property and the estate of Smt. Bindra Rani solely upon the alleged oral gift, without asserting any independent legal basis for such entitlement, the plaint fails to disclose a legally sustainable claim to the estate in question. Consequently, the respondent-plaintiff lacks a legally enforceable cause of action on the basis pleaded. Permitting the suit to proceed to trial in these circumstances would serve no useful purpose and would needlessly prolong litigation. The plaint is, therefore, liable to rejection at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on this ground.

8.As regards limitation, it is well settled that the question whether a suit is barred by limitation may involve a mixed question of law and fact. Where such a bar cannot be conclusively established from the averments contained in the plaint itself, rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, would not be warranted on that ground. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal, 2017(13) SCC 174, has held as under:-

7.The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage."

9. As regards limitation, although paragraphs 5 to 10 of the plaint indicate that the respondent-plaintiff may have been aware of the Will executed by Smt. Bindra Rani and the consequential mutations, no specific date establishing such knowledge has been disclosed. Conversely, paragraph 27 of the plaint specifically alleges that the cause of action arose on 30.11.2024 and 09.12.2024, when the petitioners allegedly attempted to interfere with the respondent-plaintiff’s possession and threatened to transfer the suit property. The suit was instituted on 10.02.2025. In the absence of unequivocal pleadings demonstrating that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation, the issue requires adjudication. Accordingly, the Trial Court rightly declined to reject the plaint on this ground.

9.1. The respondent-plaintiff’s claim is founded exclusively upon an alleged oral gift of immovable property by Smt. Bindra Rani. In view of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, such a gift cannot legally confer title in the absence of a duly executed and registered instrument. Admittedly, no such instrument was executed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Consequently, the alleged oral gift cannot furnish a legally sustainable basis for the relief claimed, rendering the plaint deficient in disclosing a legally enforceable cause of action. The respondent-plaintiff’s locus standi to maintain the suit on the basis pleaded is, therefore, unsustainable.

9.2. Accordingly, the present civil revision petition is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside insofar as it declines to reject the plaint for want of a legally enforceable cause of action under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC.

10. It is clarified that the observations made hereinabove are confined strictly to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute or any substantive issue requiring determination in the main proceedings. Nothing stated herein shall prejudice the rights or contentions of either party in any other proceeding.

11. In view of the final disposal of the principal matter, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly. No further orders are called for.

Petition Allowed.

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