***

DEEPAK GUPTA, J. –

The petitioners-defendants have invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 18.09.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar, whereby their application (Annexure P-4) under Order XXXVII Rule 4 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPC'), seeking setting aside of the judgment & decree dated 04.01.2022 (Annexure R-1), has been dismissed.

Brief facts and procedural history

2. Perusal of the paper-book reveals that the respondent-plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No.37 of 2020 under Order XXXVII CPC for recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- along with interest against the petitioners. The suit was founded upon cheque dated 20.03.2020, allegedly issued by petitioner No.2 Rajan Batra, proprietor of petitioner No.1 M/s Bear Bull Share Brokers, towards repayment of the amount borrowed from the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the cheque was dishonoured on presentation on account of insufficiency of funds. Despite service of legal notice, the amount remained unpaid, compelling the plaintiff to institute the suit.

3. Initially, ordinary summons were issued to the defendants, pursuant to which they entered appearance through counsel on 21.01.2021. Subsequently, vide order dated 21.09.2021, the learned trial Court noticed that although the suit had been instituted under Order XXXVII CPC, ordinary summons had inadvertently been issued. Accordingly, fresh summons in Form No.4 of Appendix B CPC were directed to be issued in accordance with the prescribed summary procedure.

4. The record reveals that the aforesaid summons were duly served upon the defendants on 25.10.2021. Thereafter, on 11.11.2021, the defendants filed an application seeking leave to defend, alleging that the cheque, pronote and receipt relied upon by the plaintiff were forged and fabricated.

5. Vide order dated 04.01.2022 (Annexure P-3), the learned trial Court declined leave to defend on the ground that the application had been filed beyond the prescribed period of ten days from service of summons. On the same date, by a separate judgment & decree (Annexure R-1), the suit was decreed for recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum and costs.

6. The defendants thereafter moved applications seeking review of the orders dated 21.09.2021 and 04.01.2022, contending that the refusal of leave to defend on the ground of limitation was contrary to the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court concerning extension of limitation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The applications were dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 05.09.2022 (Annexure R-3).

7. The defendants also preferred an appeal on 08.03.2022 against the order dated 04.01.2022, whereby leave to defend had been declined. The said appeal was eventually dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, vide order dated 12.08.2026 (Annexure R-2), as not maintainable. It was observed that after refusal of leave to defend and passing of the decree, the appropriate remedy was to challenge the judgment & decree by way of a regular appeal rather than filing an independent appeal against the order declining leave.

8. Meanwhile, on 06.04.2026, the defendants moved an application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC (Annexure P-4), seeking setting aside of the judgment & decree dated 04.01.2022 and stay of the execution proceedings. The application was contested by the respondent-plaintiff by filing reply (Annexure P-5).

9. During pendency of the aforesaid application, the defendants approached this Court by way of CR-6661-2026, seeking a direction for its expeditious disposal. Vide order dated 07.09.2026 (Annexure P-8), this Court directed the learned trial Court to decide the application in accordance with law, expressly leaving open the questions concerning its maintainability, the existence of special circumstances and the entitlement of the defendants to relief.

10. Pursuant thereto, the learned trial Court dismissed the application vide impugned order dated 18.09.2026 (Annexure P-1), holding that the defendants had failed to establish special circumstances warranting setting aside of the decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC.

11. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants have preferred the present revision petition. Vide order dated 08.10.2026, this Court stayed implementation of the decree. The respondent-plaintiff has moved an application seeking vacation of the interim order and has also placed on record certain documents, including orders passed in the execution proceedings, to reveal the conduct of the petitioners.

Submissions of the parties

12.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the judgment & decree dated 04.01.2022 (Annexure P-3) suffer from material procedural and jurisdictional defects. It is submitted that the defendants had already entered appearance pursuant to the ordinary summons initially issued and that the case had even been fixed for filing of written statement. According to learned counsel, the learned trial Court could not have subsequently directed issuance of fresh summons under Order XXXVII CPC and thereafter declined leave to defend merely on the ground of limitation.

12.2 It is further contended that the application seeking leave to defend was filed on 11.11.2021, during the period covered by the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020. The learned trial Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in rejecting the application as being time-barred.

12.3 Learned counsel further submits that the decree exceeds the amount specified in the summons issued under Order XXXVII CPC and that the plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of serving an affidavit verifying the cause of action along with the summons for judgment, as contemplated under Order XXXVII Rule 3(4) CPC. These irregularities, according to learned counsel, constitute special circumstances justifying exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 4.

13.1 Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff supports the impugned order and submits that the petitioners were duly served and had complete knowledge of the proceedings from the very beginning. They had entered appearance through counsel, filed an application seeking leave to defend and thereafter pursued successive proceedings by way of review, appeal and application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. It is submitted that the allegations of forgery are wholly unsupported by any material and do not disclose a substantial defence.

13.2 Learned counsel further submits that the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC was filed more than four years after passing of the decree, without any satisfactory explanation for the delay. Reference has also been made to the orders passed during execution proceedings, wherein the executing Court noticed repeated applications and assurances regarding payment of the decretal amount. It is urged that the present proceedings constitute yet another attempt to delay satisfaction of the decree.

Court's analysis and findings

14. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the material on record, this Court finds that the primary question requiring determination is whether the petitioners have established ‘special circumstances’ within the meaning of Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC, warranting setting aside of the judgment and decree dated 04.01.2022 (Annexure P-3).

15. Order XXXVII CPC prescribes a special summary procedure for adjudication of suits falling within its ambit. The object of the provision is to ensure expeditious disposal of claims founded upon specified classes of documents, while safeguarding the right of a defendant, who discloses a substantial defence or genuine triable issues.

16. Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC empowers the Court, after passing of a decree, to set aside the same under special circumstances and, if necessary, to stay or set aside execution and grant leave to the defendant to appear and defend the suit. The provision is exceptional in nature and cannot be invoked merely to obtain another opportunity to contest a decree already passed.

17. In Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra, (2003) 5 SCC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that a defendant seeking setting aside of a decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC must establish special circumstances justifying such relief and must also disclose facts, which would entitle him to leave to defend the suit. Both requirements are material. The provision does not contemplate automatic reopening of a decree merely because the defendant disputes the claim or points out an irregularity in the proceedings.

18. Similarly, in Ajay Bansal v. Anup Mehta, (2007) 2 SCC 275, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized the availability of the remedy under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC even after passing of a decree. However, recognition of the statutory remedy does not dispense with the requirement of establishing special circumstances and satisfying the conditions governing grant of leave to defend. Effect of the COVID-19 limitation directions

19. The main contention of the Ld. Counsel for the petitioners concerns the refusal of leave to defend on the ground of limitation. The record reveals that the defendants had entered appearance through counsel on 21.01.2021 pursuant to the ordinary summons initially issued. Subsequently, vide order dated 21.09.2021, the learned trial Court noticed that although the suit had been instituted under Order XXXVII CPC, ordinary summons had inadvertently been issued. Accordingly, fresh summons in the prescribed form were directed to be issued.

20. The said summons were served upon the defendants on 25.10.2021, whereafter they filed an application seeking leave to defend on 11.11.2021. It is, therefore, evident that the defendants had knowledge of the institution and pendency of the suit much before issuance of the fresh summons. They were represented through counsel and had been participating in the proceedings. The order dated 21.09.2021 was passed merely to rectify the procedural irregularity concerning the form of summons and to ensure compliance with the prescribed summary procedure.

21. Reliance has been placed upon the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2022) 3 SCC 117, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for the purpose of computing limitation in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Undoubtedly, the application seeking leave to defend was filed during the aforesaid period. The learned trial Court, therefore, ought to have considered the binding directions before declining leave solely on the ground that the application had been filed beyond ten days from service of summons.

22. To that extent, the reasoning adopted by the learned trial Court while declining leave to defend on 04.01.2022 was erroneous. However, the existence of an error in the original order does not, by itself, establish the petitioners' entitlement to have the decree set aside under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The scope of the present proceedings is not to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the order dated 04.01.2022, but to examine whether the petitioners have established special circumstances warranting reopening of the decree and disclosed a defence justifying grant of leave.

23. Pointedly, the defendants were not prevented from approaching the Court on account of the restrictions prevailing during the COVID-19 pandemic. They had entered appearance through counsel on 21.01.2021, when pandemic-related restrictions were already in force, and subsequently filed their application seeking leave to defend on 11.11.2021. Thus, this is not a case, where the defendants remained unaware of the suit or were unable to participate in the proceedings because of circumstances beyond their control.

24. The COVID-19 limitation directions undoubtedly protected their right to seek consideration of the application for leave to defend. However, such protection cannot be construed as conferring an automatic right to defend a summary suit, irrespective of the nature and substance of the proposed defence. The distinction between the right to have an application considered and the right to obtain leave to defend must be maintained.

Nature of the defence and entitlement to leave

25. The nature of the defence sought to be raised by the petitioners assumes considerable significance. In their application seeking leave to defend, they alleged that the cheque, pronote and receipt relied upon by the plaintiff were forged and fabricated. It was further alleged that petitioner No.2 was not present at Jalandhar on 27.02.2020, when the pronote and receipt were allegedly executed. However, beyond these assertions, no specific particulars or supporting material have been shown, which could lend prima facie credibility to the allegations.

26. In IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the principles governing grant of leave to defend in summary suits. A substantial defence or a fair and reasonable defence raising genuine triable issues ordinarily warrants grant of leave, whereas a defence, which is frivolous or vexatious does not. The mere use of expressions such as 'forged' or 'fabricated', without disclosure of material facts capable of supporting the allegation, cannot automatically establish a genuine triable issue.

27. In the present case, Ld. counsel for the petitioners has not pointed out any supporting material, which would prima facie substantiate their allegation that the cheque forming the foundation of the suit was forged. The plea regarding the absence of petitioner No.2 from Jalandhar on the date of execution of the pronote and receipt also remains unsupported. It is not necessary for a defendant seeking leave to defend to establish his defence conclusively at that stage. Nevertheless, he must disclose sufficient facts to validate that the defence is genuine and not merely illusory. The petitioners have failed to satisfy even this requirement.

28. Thus, although the original application seeking leave to defend ought not to have been rejected solely on the ground of limitation, it does not follow that leave to defend must necessarily be granted irrespective of the nature and substance of the proposed defence. In the absence of sufficient material disclosing a genuine triable issue, the petitioners have failed to satisfy an essential requirement for reopening the decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC.

Alleged decree in excess of the summons

29. The petitioners have further contended that the decree exceeds the amount specified in the summons. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) CPC, which provides that where the defendant fails to enter appearance, the plaintiff becomes entitled to a decree not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with permissible interest and costs.

30. However, the present case is not one, where the decree was passed solely on account of failure of the defendants to enter appearance. The defendants had entered appearance through counsel and had also filed an application seeking leave to defend. The decree followed refusal of such leave. Therefore, the petitioners cannot invoke the restriction contained in Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) CPC without regard to the distinct procedure governing disposal of the suit following refusal of leave to defend.

31. Moreover, the suit was instituted for recovery of Rs.4,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, whereas the learned trial Court decreed the principal amount of Rs.4,00,000/- with interest at the reduced rate of 6% per annum. No material has been pointed out establishing that the decree awarded any amount beyond the permissible scope of the claim or that the alleged discrepancy in the summons caused prejudice of such nature as would warrant setting aside the decree under Rule 4. The mere award of interest and costs in addition to the principal amount cannot, by itself, render the decree without jurisdiction.

Alleged non-compliance with Order XXXVII Rule 3(4) CPC

32. The petitioners have also alleged that the plaintiff failed to serve an affidavit verifying the cause of action along with the summons for judgment, as contemplated under Order XXXVII Rule 3(4) CPC. Reliance has been placed upon Bhagwati Prasad Gattani v. Swami Ramanand, Law Finder Doc Id # 2462807 to contend that such omission constitutes a fatal procedural defect.

33. The requirement of following the prescribed procedure under Order XXXVII CPC is undoubtedly important. However, every alleged procedural irregularity does not automatically constitute a special circumstance for setting aside a decree. The nature of the irregularity, its effect upon the proceedings and the prejudice, if any, caused to the defendant must be considered.

34. In the present case, the record establishes that the defendants were duly served in accordance with the prescribed procedure and were represented through counsel. They were fully aware of the claim and had actually filed an application seeking leave to defend, wherein they disputed the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the plaintiff. There is no material indicating that the alleged omission concerning the affidavit prevented them from disclosing their defence or otherwise deprived them of an effective opportunity to contest the claim. In these circumstances, the alleged procedural defect does not furnish sufficient ground for exercise of the exceptional jurisdiction under Rule 4. The authority relied upon by the petitioners does not advance their case in the absence of a corresponding factual foundation establishing material non-compliance and consequent prejudice.

Effect of earlier review and appellate proceedings

35. It is not in dispute that the petitioners had earlier sought review of the orders dated 21.09.2021 and 04.01.2022, which was declined on 05.09.2022 (Annexure P-3). They also preferred an appeal against the order refusing leave to defend, which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Jalandhar, on 12.08.2026 (Annexure R-2) as not maintainable.

37. It is significant that the learned Additional District Judge did not adjudicate the correctness of the refusal of leave to defend on merits. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the appropriate remedy was to challenge the judgment and decree itself. Therefore, the dismissal of the appeal cannot be construed as an appellate affirmation of the original order dated 04.01.2022 on merits.

37. At the same time, the mere fact that the earlier appeal was dismissed as not maintainable does not automatically entitle the petitioners to relief under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The remedy under the said provision remains available in an appropriate case, but its exercise is dependent upon satisfaction of the statutory requirements.

38. It is true that the learned trial Court, while passing the impugned order dated 18.09.2026, proceeded on the premise that the grounds raised by the petitioners could be examined in the pending appeal, although the appeal had already been dismissed on 12.08.2026. This observation is factually erroneous. However, the impugned order cannot be set aside merely on that account when, upon independent examination of the material available on record, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed to establish the requirements for setting aside the decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC.

39. The earlier order dated 07.09.2026 passed by this Court in CR-6661- 2026 also does not advance the petitioners' case. By that order, this Court had merely directed expeditious disposal of the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC, expressly leaving all questions concerning maintainability and merits open. No opinion regarding the entitlement of the petitioners to relief was expressed.

Delay in seeking reopening of the decree

40. Another relevant circumstance is that the decree was passed on 04.01.2022, whereas the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC was instituted only on 06.04.2026, after a lapse of more than four years. The petitioners have attempted to explain this delay by referring to the order dated 23.03.2026 passed in another suit and the alleged recent discovery of procedural discrepancies.

41. However, the material circumstances concerning issuance of summons, filing of leave to defend and passing of the decree were within the knowledge of the petitioners from the very inception. Indeed, these matters had already been raised in the earlier review and appellate proceedings. The subsequent order passed in another suit did not create a fresh cause of action for challenging the decree dated 04.01.2022. Nor could it transform previously known procedural objections into special circumstances within the meaning of Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC.

42. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged before this court that the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC was barred by limitation. It is submitted that the judgment and decree were passed on 04.01.2022, whereas the application seeking setting aside thereof was filed only on 06.04.2026. According to learned counsel, Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a period of three years, which had expired before the application was instituted.

43. Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC does not prescribe any specific period of limitation. In the absence of a specific provision governing an application for setting aside a decree passed under the summary procedure, the residuary Article 137, prescribing three years from the date when the right to apply accrues, is attracted. In the present case, the decree was passed on 04.01.2022. However, in view of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court concerning exclusion of limitation during the COVID-19 pandemic, the period of limitation would commence on 01.03.2022 and, ordinarily, expire on 28.02.2025.

44. The record further reveals that the petitioners had instituted an appeal on 08.03.2022 against the order declining leave to defend, which remained pending until 12.08.2026, when it was dismissed as not maintainable. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, recognizes exclusion of the period spent prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith, where such proceeding could not be entertained for want of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. The petitioners had approached the appellate Court shortly after passing of the decree and were pursuing their challenge to the refusal of leave to defend when the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC was instituted.

45. In these circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the earlier appeal was ultimately dismissed as not maintainable without adjudication on merits, this Court does not consider it appropriate to sustain the objection of limitation raised by learned counsel for the respondent as an independent ground for rejecting the application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The said objection is accordingly repelled for the purposes of the present proceedings. This conclusion does not, however, establish any entitlement of the petitioners to have the decree set aside, as the requirements of Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC must independently be satisfied.

46. Even assuming that the petitioners are entitled to exclusion of the entire period spent prosecuting the earlier appeal, and that their application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC is within limitation, they must still establish special circumstances justifying setting aside of the decree and disclose a defence warranting grant of leave to defend. As already discussed, the petitioners have failed to satisfy these substantive requirements. Consequently, the question of limitation does not alter the ultimate conclusion.

Conduct during execution proceedings

47. The respondent-plaintiff has also placed on record orders dated 28.04.2026, 30.04.2026 and 21.05.2026 (Annexure R-4 to R-6) passed during execution proceedings. These orders reveal that the petitioners repeatedly sought modification or recall of conditional warrants issued in execution of the decree. The record further indicates that a demand draft of Rs.1,00,000/- was tendered towards part satisfaction of the decretal amount but was subsequently sought to be returned, with an assurance that the entire amount would be deposited on the next date.

48. The executing Court also noticed repeated applications and assurances concerning payment of the decretal amount. The order dated 28.04.2026 (Annexure R-4) records that an application was moved questioning the endorsement of the word 'urgent' on the conditional warrants. Upon inquiry, the executing Court found that the endorsement had been made by the executing official for administrative convenience and had not been directed by the Court.

49. It must, however, be clarified that the mere filing of applications or pursuit of remedies available under law cannot be treated as misconduct. Equally, allegations concerning other criminal or civil proceedings cannot be accepted as established facts merely because they have been raised by the decree-holder. The present controversy must be decided on its own merits. Nevertheless, the orders passed in the execution proceedings may legitimately be considered to the limited extent that they reflect the petitioners' approach towards satisfaction of the decree and the discretionary relief sought by them.

50. The aforesaid conduct is not being treated as an independent ground for declining relief under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The conclusion regarding absence of special circumstances and failure to disclose a substantial defence rests upon the material pertaining to the original suit and the application under Rule 4. The execution proceedings merely provide additional context concerning the prolonged litigation between the parties.

Scope of supervisory jurisdiction

51. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory and not appellate. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the power of superintendence is to be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, and not merely to correct every error of fact or law. Similarly, in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between appellate jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

52. In the present case, although the original refusal of leave to defend on the ground of limitation was erroneous in view of the binding COVID-19 limitation directions, the petitioners have failed to establish the independent statutory requirements for setting aside the decree under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The learned trial Court was, therefore, justified in declining the relief, notwithstanding its erroneous observation regarding the pendency of the earlier appeal.

53. Considered cumulatively, the circumstances relied upon by the petitioners do not satisfy the requirements of Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC. The petitioners had knowledge of the suit from its inception, were duly represented through counsel, had availed successive remedies and have failed to disclose a substantial defence warranting grant of leave to defend. The alleged procedural irregularities and the order passed in another suit do not, either individually or collectively, justify reopening the decree after such a prolonged period.

54. Consequently, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, patent perversity or material irregularity in the ultimate decision of the learned trial Court warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion:

55. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present revision petition is dismissed. The impugned order dated 18.09.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar, declining the petitioners' application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 CPC, is upheld.

56. The interim order dated 08.10.2026, whereby implementation of the judgment and decree dated 04.01.2022 was stayed, stands vacated. The respondent-decree-holder shall be at liberty to pursue execution of the decree in accordance with law. The application filed by the respondent seeking vacation of stay is disposed of accordingly. All other pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

57. It is clarified that nothing observed herein shall be construed as an adjudication upon the legality of any particular coercive process issued in the execution proceedings, which shall remain subject to the applicable provisions of Order XXI CPC.

Petition dismissed.

********