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TRIBHUVAN DAHIYA, J. –

The petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 23.11.1979, Annexure P-1, passed by the Collector, Gurgaon (now known as Gurugram), under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Recovery) Act, 1956 (1959), whereby the petitioner was directed to vacate the house bearing municipal no.334, Ward no.3 in Gurgaon Town, and pay the outstanding amount of rent. Further, a writ of mandamus has been sought directing the respondents to restore possession thereof to the petitioner.

2. It is the petitioner’s pleaded case that he was in occupation of the aforementioned house since 19.01.1955; it had been let out to him by the District Board at a monthly rent of Rs.20, which was enhanced to Rs.27.62 in 1960. Later, the Board was abolished and the property vested with the Zila Parishad, and thereafter with the State Government. The petitioner did not pay rent from 01.06.1973 to 31.03.1979, whereupon proceedings under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Recovery) Act, 1959 (for short, ‘the 1959 Act’), were initiated against him by the State. Finally, an ex parte ejectment order dated 23.11.1979 was passed directing him to vacate the house and pay the outstanding amount of rent, which was deposited by him on 21.01.1981.

2.1. The petitioner thereafter approached the respondents with a request to sell the house to him, which was statedly agreed to by the Government vide letter dated 31.03.1983. Through this letter the petitioner was called upon to convey his willingness to purchase the house for a consideration of Rs.1,20,125, and the consent was to be conveyed in writing. After receipt of the consent, a draft sale deed, duly signed by the petitioner, was required to be sent to the Government for acceptance. The petitioner claims to have agreed to the terms by depositing the entire amount on 25.11.1985.

2.2. In order to defeat the sale, a suit for permanent injunction was instituted in the civil court at the instance of the respondents, titled Krishan Lal Yadav v. State of Haryana, restraining the Government from executing the sale deed. During pendency of the suit, the letter dated 31.03.1983 was cancelled by the Government on its own, without issuing any notice to the petitioner, vide letter dated 10.12.1986. The suit was, accordingly, withdrawn and dismissed as such on 13.08.1987.

2.3. Meanwhile, aggrieved by the said cancellation, the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance against the respondents on 10.12.1986, seeking for execution of the sale deed or, in the alternative, refund of the amount of sale consideration deposited by him.

2.4. An application for execution of the ex parte order of ejectment dated 23.11.1979 was filed by the respondents on 24/31.08.1992, Annexure P-2. Thereupon, warrants of possession dated 28.09.1992, Annexure P-3, were issued against the petitioner, and possession of the house was finally taken in his absence on 26.05.1993, Annexure P-5, as recorded in the proceedings of the same date. In these circumstances, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

3. In this factual background, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has raised two-fold submissions. Firstly, the order is per se illegal as it has been passed under the provisions of the 1959 Act, which already stood repealed by the Haryana Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Recovery) Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the 1972 Act’), notified on 06.07.1973. Therefore, the ex parte eviction order dated 23.11.1979 could not have been passed, as the 1959 Act was not in operation on the date of the order. The entire eviction proceedings against the petitioner are, accordingly, liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Secondly, the contention is that the eviction order was passed on 23.11.1979, whereas the application for execution was filed on 24/31.08.1992. The warrants of possession were issued without any notice to the petitioner on 28.09.1992, and the possession was ultimately taken on 26.05.1993, i.e., more than thirteen years after the passing of the eviction order. As per law of limitation, the maximum period to file an execution application is twelve years and, therefore, the ex parte order could not have been executed. The entire execution proceedings are illegal and liable to be set aside as such.

4. Learned State counsel, however, contended that reference to the 1959 Act, instead of the 1972 Act, in the ejectment order was merely an inadvertent clerical error, and the same ought to be ignored. Otherwise, there is no disparity between the two Acts, and the procedure prescribed under the 1972 Act was followed while directing eviction of the petitioner.

5. Submissions made by leaned counsel for the parties have been considered.

6. There is no denying the fact that the impugned order of eviction, dated 23.11.1979, is stated to have been passed under the 1959 Act, which had already been repealed by the 1972 Act. It has, however, been conceded by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the procedure for eviction prescribed under the two Acts is identical, and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of the procedure followed for ordering his eviction. Also, it is not the petitioner’s case that the order of eviction is not sustainable on merits. This makes it plausible that the Act of 1959, instead of Act of 1972, got wrongly typed in the order, as contended by learned State counsel. Accordingly, the impugned eviction order cannot be set aside on this account. Further, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek a direction to restore his possession on the ground that the warrants of possession were issued pursuant an execution application filed after more than twelve years of passing of the eviction order, on 24/31.08.1992. It was open for him to challenge the execution proceedings for want of jurisdiction while the same were pending, but he never did. And cannot be permitted to do so after the order has been duly executed by taking possession of the house. Besides, such a plea is impermissible on another ground. Vide eviction order dated 23.11.1979, the petitioner was directed to vacate the house and deposit the arrears of rent, which he deposited on 21.01.1981. Accordingly, he is taken to have accepted the order; it was never challenged by him either. This made his continuous occupation of the house illegal. In these circumstances, the respondents initiated the execution proceedings, and took possession of the house on 26.05.1993. At that time, the house was in a dilapidated condition and statedly no one had been residing therein for the last ten years. This fact has been recorded in the report of possession dated 26.05.1993, Annexure R-2. Additionally, it also needs to be mentioned that the suit for specific performance filed by the petitioner, seeking execution of the sale deed with respect to the house in question, was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 07.03.2001; however, he was held entitled to a decree for possession of the house. Appeals against the same were decided by the lower appellate Court vide judgment dated 07.08.2004, whereby his suit for specific performance as well as possession was dismissed. His regular second appeals against the judgment, heard alongwith the instant petition, have also been dismissed by this Court vide judgment of even date. In the light of these subsequent developments as well, the petitioner has no right with respect to the house in question.

7. In this view of the matter, finding no merit in the petition it is hereby dismissed.

8. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.

Petition dismissed.

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