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VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J. –

1. The present revision petition was initially assigned to a Coordinate Bench; however, as the said Bench was not holding court, the matter stood adjourned on several occasions. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petition be taken up for hearing on merits at the earliest, contending that the learned Executing Court is actively proceeding with the execution of the decree and that, in the event of its execution, the revision petition would be rendered infructuous. The petition is being contested by the respondents, who have entered appearance on caveat.

2. The present civil revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned order dated 16.01.2026, passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ludhiana, in Case No. EXE-526-2017. By the said order, the objections filed by the petitioner were dismissed summarily, without even framing the necessary issues, despite the fact that the objections raised are, on a prima facie basis, triable in nature.

3. Briefly stated, the predecessor-in-interest of the decree-holders filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 28.12.1974 in respect of the suit land for a total consideration of Rs.50,000/-. The suit was initially decreed in the alternative vide judgment and decree dated 11.09.1980, granting recovery of Rs.20,000/-, while the relief of specific performance was declined. On appeal, the suit was decreed for specific performance. A Regular Second Appeal filed by respondent No.3, Sant Ram, was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 17.01.2006, and in the proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the matter was amicably settled. It was recorded that respondent No.1/decree-holder gave up his claim in respect of the land sold to Sant Ram on 11.07.1975, and the remaining dispute was settled with Karam Singh, who agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff upon receipt of Rs.50,000/- along with interest at 18% per annum. On the basis of the said decree, the decree-holders filed execution proceedings. During the pendency thereof, the petitioner, along with other similarly situated purchasers, filed third-party objections, contending that the decree was collusive and obtained without disclosure of prior transfers of the land. It was pleaded that the suit land had already been sold to various purchasers, including the petitioner, who had constructed houses and were residing there. The petitioner claims title through a chain of registered sale deeds: Karam Singh sold the land to Balvir Kumar vide sale deed dated 01.07.1980; Balvir Kumar sold it to the petitioner’s husband vide registered sale deed dated 17.11.1986 (registered on 25.11.1986); and part of the land was subsequently transferred in favour of the petitioner vide transfer deed dated 11.09.2020. Mutations in respect of all the said transactions have been duly sanctioned. The objection petition was dismissed by the learned Executing Court, primarily on the ground that the petitioner’s sale deed is hit by the principle of lis pendens, as it was executed during the pendency of the original suit. The impugned order is assailed on the grounds that it violates the mandate of Order XXI Rule 101 CPC and that the learned Executing Court failed to adjudicate the objections on merits, including the petitioner’s plea that the decree is collusive and vitiated by fraud, which, according to the petitioner, can be challenged even in collateral proceedings.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent-caveator, and gone through the paper-book carefully.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is unsustainable in law, as the learned Executing Court failed to take into consideration the existence of a valid and subsisting sale deed in favour of the petitioner. It was further argued that the factum of prior sale of the suit land by Karam Singh was allegedly concealed from the Hon’ble Apex Court at the time the consent decree was obtained. Placing reliance on the provisions of Order XXI Rule 101 CPC, learned counsel submitted that the Executing Court is statutorily obligated to adjudicate all questions relating to right, title, and interest in the suit property, in cases where third-party objections are raised under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. Accordingly, it was urged that the impugned order be set aside and the learned Executing Court be directed to decide the objection petition afresh, after framing appropriate issues and affording the parties a fair and adequate opportunity to lead evidence in support of their respective claims.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-caveators contended that the revision petition is not maintainable. It was argued that the impugned order, by which the petitioner’s objection petition was disposed of, amounts to a decree. Being a decree, it is appealable, and the proper remedy available to the petitioner is to file a regular appeal under Section 96 CPC. In such circumstances, it was submitted that the present revision petition is not maintainable.

7. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a revision petition is maintainable in cases where the Executing Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sameer Singh and another vs. Abdul Rab and others, AIR 2015 Supreme Court 591. In that case, all third-party objections were dismissed by the learned Executing Court on the ground that the execution case had already been disposed of to the full satisfaction of the decree-holder on 19.12.2008. The Executing Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to reopen and adjudicate matters relating to the title of the parties in execution proceedings at the instance of a third-party. The matter went upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after examining the provisions of Rule 103 of Order XXI CPC, held that where the Executing Court declines to adjudicate third-party objections on the ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction, such refusal constitutes a failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Consequently, such an order cannot be treated as a decree, and the aggrieved party is entitled to approach the High Court, which may then exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It was emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the High Court, in such cases, can examine whether the Executing Court has discharged its duty in accordance with law and has to ensure that the rights of third-party objectors are adequately protected. The Apex Court summarized the principle as under:

21. xx xx xx…… If a Court declined to adjudicate on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction, the said order cannot earn the status of a decree. If an Court only expresses it inability to adjudicate by stating that it lacks jurisdiction, then the status of the order has to be different. In the instant case the executing Court has expresses an opinion that it has become functus officio and hence, it cannot initiate or launch any enquiry. The appellants had invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution assailing the order passed by the Executing Court on the foundation that it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. The appellants had approached the High Court as per the dictum laid down by this Court in Surya Devi Rai Vs Ram Chander Rai and others, 2004 (1) RCR (Civil) 147: (2003) 6 SCC 675.

8. It is well-settled that where a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court fails to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, the High Court possesses the power to intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This principle ensures that subordinate courts act within their lawful mandate and that parties are not deprived of justice due to inaction or neglect by such courts. However, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. In the instant matter, the learned Executing Court has not refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. On the contrary, it has adjudicated the third-party objection filed by the petitioner under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, albeit in a summary manner. The mere fact that the order was passed summarily does not amount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, as the Executing Court has actively examined the objection and rendered a decision on its merits.

9. Further, Rule 103 of Order XXI CPC provides that any application adjudicated under Rule 98 or Rule 100 shall be subject to the same conditions regarding appeal or other remedies as if it were a decree. In other words, once the Executing Court disposes of an application or objection under these provisions, the resulting order is treated as equivalent in effect to a decree for purposes of appeal and review. Rule 103 is reproduced below for reference:

“Rule 103. Orders to be treated as decrees:-Where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.”

10. In the present circumstances, the learned Executing Court has disposed of the objection petition on its merits. In view of the provisions of Order XXI Rule 103 CPC, such an order carries the same force and effect as that of a decree and, therefore, constitutes an appealable order. Since the petitioner has an efficacious and statutory remedy in the form of a regular appeal, the present revision petition before this Court is not maintainable. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner is granted the opportunity to avail remedy of appeal in accordance with law, subject to the law of limitation, so as to protect his rights. Further, in order to preserve the status quo and safeguard the interests of all parties, the execution petition shall be kept in abeyance for a period of 10 days from the date of uploading of this order on the official website of this Court. This will provide the petitioner a fair opportunity to file an appeal and seek appropriate relief in accordance with law.

Petition dismissed.

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