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KIRTI SINGH, J. –

1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the award dated 12.07.2016 (Annexure P-3) passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Gurdaspur, whereby the reference made at his instance has been answered against him and no relief has been granted in respect of the orders dated 08.04.1997 and 12.05.1997 passed by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Batala. Vide order dated 08.04.1997, three increments of the petitioner were stopped with cumulative effect, whereas vide order dated 12.05.1997, he was brought to the minimum of the time scale of pay for a period of ten years.

2. Briefly stated, as per the pleaded case, the petitioner was working as a Conductor with Punjab Roadways. The first disciplinary action arose from a checking report according to which twelve passengers travelling from Batala to Mehta were found without tickets and the petitioner had allegedly charged Rs.4/- from each of them without issuing tickets, resulting in alleged embezzlement of Rs.48/-. The petitioner disputed the allegation and maintained that the bus had actually been checked at Achal Sahib and that he was in the process of issuing tickets. In the departmental enquiry, the departmental witnesses were examined and cross-examined and the petitioner examined Surjit Singh, the driver of the bus, in support of his defence. The enquiry officer, however, found the charge proved and, after issuance of show-cause notice and consideration of the petitioner's reply, order dated 08.04.1997 was passed stopping three increments with cumulative effect. The second disciplinary proceeding arose out of another checking report concerning an incident at Kharar, wherein fourteen passengers, twelve travelling from Jalandhar and two from Ropar towards Chandigarh, were allegedly found without tickets and the fare involved was stated to be Rs.522/-. The petitioner explained that the passengers had boarded his bus after a private bus had suffered a tyre puncture near Kharar and that the fare had not yet been collected. He examined Gurmukh Singh, the driver of the bus, in support of his version. The enquiry officer did not accept the defence and found the charge proved. After issuance of show-cause notice and affording an opportunity of personal hearing, order dated 12.05.1997 was passed whereby the petitioner was brought to the minimum of the time scale for a period of ten years.

3. The legality of the aforesaid two orders was thereafter referred for adjudication to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Gurdaspur. The Tribunal, vide award dated 26.03.2012, answered the reference against the petitioner. The said award was challenged before this Court in CWP No.880 of 2013. Vide order dated 13.03.2015, this Court set aside the award and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, particularly noticing the absence of discussion regarding the effect of order dated 12.05.1997 upon the increments during the period of reduced time scale and the position regarding future increments. On remand, the Tribunal again answered the reference against the petitioner vide the impugned award dated 12.07.2016.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal, even after remand, has failed to properly comply with the directions issued by this Court. It is contended that the earlier award had been set aside specifically because the effect of order dated 12.05.1997 upon the petitioner's increments had not been examined and that the Tribunal, on remand, has not determined the precise effect of the punishment upon his entitlement to annual increments during the ten-year period as well as thereafter. According to learned counsel, the order dated 12.05.1997 is vague and non-speaking since it does not clearly spell out the consequences of bringing the petitioner to the minimum of the time scale, particularly in relation to the increments which would otherwise have fallen due to him. Reliance has been placed upon State of Punjab v. Mohan Singh, 2007 (3) SCT 751, in support of the submission that an order of punishment having continuing consequences upon an employee's pay and service benefits must be clear and unambiguous. It is further submitted that the findings recorded in the departmental enquiries cannot be sustained as the petitioner's defence was not fairly appreciated. Learned counsel points out that the respective drivers, Surjit Singh and Gurmukh Singh, had supported the petitioner's version in the two incidents, but their evidence was discarded without proper consideration. It is argued that none of the passengers allegedly found without tickets was examined and that the cash in hand of the petitioner was also not checked, although the allegations related to non-issuance of tickets and alleged collection of fare. Learned counsel further alleges that the enquiry officer was not impartial and had himself cross-examined the defence witness. Reliance is also placed upon the correspondence of the enquiry officer concerning the presence of departmental Inspectors and upon the fact that the statement of one Inspector was ultimately not recorded. According to learned counsel, the aforesaid circumstances, cumulatively considered, demonstrate that the enquiry was conducted in a manner inconsistent with the principles of natural justice

5. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, submits that the impugned award has been passed after the matter was remanded by this Court and that the Tribunal has specifically considered the aspect for which the earlier award had been set aside. It is submitted that the order dated 12.05.1997 itself deals with the consequences of the punishment and that the petitioner is essentially seeking re-appreciation of the evidence, which is beyond the permissible scope of interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. It is further submitted that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity during the departmental proceedings to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. The allegation that the enquiry officer himself cross-examined the defence witnesses has also been specifically denied.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and including the earlier award dated 26.03.2012, perused the relevant material on record specifically the order dated 13.03.2015 passed by this Court in CWP No.880 of 2013.

7. The principal contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal, even after remand, failed to undertake the exercise for which the earlier award had been set aside. The contention, however, is not borne out from a reading of the impugned award. The order dated 13.03.2015 specifically noticed that the earlier award did not examine the effect of the punishment imposed vide order dated 12.05.1997 upon the petitioner's increments during the period for which he was brought to the minimum of the time scale and the position regarding future increments.

8. On remand, the Tribunal specifically considered this aspect in paragraph 21 of the impugned award. After examining the punishment order, the Tribunal recorded that during the period of punishment the petitioner was not to be granted annual grade increments and that, after completion of the period of punishment, he would be entitled to the increments falling due thereafter. Thus, the very aspect which had occasioned the remand was considered and decided by the Tribunal.

9. It is well settled that an authority to which a matter is remanded is required to act in conformity with the directions of the remanding Court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal, AIR 1961 SC 182.

10. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle, no non-compliance with the order of remand is made out in the present case. The Tribunal has undertaken the very exercise for which the matter was remanded. Merely because the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is adverse to the petitioner cannot be construed as a failure to comply with the remand order.

11. The reliance placed upon State of Punjab v. Mohan Singh, 2007 (3) SCT 751, in support of the plea that the punishment order was vague, also does not carry the matter any further. The material consideration in the present proceedings is that, pursuant to the remand, the Tribunal examined the effect of the order dated 12.05.1997 upon the petitioner's increments and recorded a specific conclusion in that regard. The grievance of the petitioner, therefore, is essentially against the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal from the punishment order and not against any failure to undertake the exercise mandated by the order of remand.

12. Still further, the petitioner has also questioned the findings recorded in the departmental enquiries on the ground that his defence was not properly appreciated. In the first enquiry, he examined Surjit Singh, the driver of the bus, whereas in the second enquiry he examined Gurmukh Singh, also the driver of the bus, in support of his respective explanations. The fact that the enquiry officer ultimately did not accept their versions cannot, by itself, amount to denial of a fair opportunity of defence. The material  noticed  in  the  impugned  award  shows  that  the  petitioner participated in the proceedings, the departmental witnesses were examined and cross-examined, and the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to lead evidence in support of his defence.

13. The objections regarding non-examination of the passengers and non-checking of the cash in hand of the petitioner also essentially relate to the evidentiary value and appreciation of the material relied upon in the departmental proceedings. These circumstances, by themselves, do not establish that the enquiry stood vitiated. No specific procedural prejudice caused to the petitioner on account thereof has been shown.

14. Equally, the allegation of bias against the enquiry officer is not substantiated from the material placed on record. The correspondence relied upon by the petitioner regarding the presence of departmental Inspectors may show the steps taken to secure their presence, but the mere fact that the statement of one Inspector was ultimately not recorded cannot, without something more, establish a predetermined approach on the part of the enquiry officer. As regards the allegation that the enquiry officer himself cross-examined the defence witness, the same has specifically been denied by the respondents, who have stated that the defence witnesses were cross-examined by the presenting officer. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate from the record any circumstance showing that he was denied a fair opportunity of defence.

15. The principles governing the scope of judicial review in matters arising out of departmental proceedings are well settled. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has delineated the limited scope of interference with findings recorded in disciplinary proceedings. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, does not sit as an appellate authority over the departmental enquiry or undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence. Interference is called for where the findings are unsupported by evidence, are perverse, or where the proceedings suffer from a violation of natural justice or other jurisdictional infirmity.

16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case in hand, no such infirmity is made out. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity to contest the allegations, cross-examine the departmental witnesses and lead evidence in defence. His defence evidence was considered, though not accepted. The objections regarding the non-examination of passengers, non-checking of cash and the manner in which the evidence of the two drivers was appreciated do not disclose any procedural violation. Likewise, the material relied upon to allege bias does not establish that the enquiry officer had predetermined the outcome or that the petitioner was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

17. More importantly, the Tribunal, upon remand, specifically addressed the effect of the order dated 12.05.1997 upon the petitioner's increments, which was the precise aspect left unaddressed in the earlier award. Learned counsel for the petitioner, despite his able assistance, has not been able to show either non-compliance with the order of remand or any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of the principles of natural justice in the proceedings culminating in the impugned award. What is sought, in substance, is a re-appreciation of the evidence and substitution of the view taken in the departmental proceedings and affirmed by the Tribunal, which does not warrant interference in exercise of the jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

18. Consequently, no ground for interference with the impugned award dated 12.07.2016 is made out.

19. Finding no merit in the present petition, the same is dismissed.

20. Pending civil miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Petition dismissed.

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