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(2026) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 21586 = 2026:PHHC:195422
Reserved on: 30.10.2026 Decided on: 02.11.2026
Argued by:
Mr. Naveen S. Bhardwaj, Advocate and Mr. Lokendra Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Gaurav Mohunta, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Gaurav Gogna, Advocate and Mr. Pratyush Sood, Advocate for the respondents.
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Temporary Injunction – Interim injunction cannot be granted where revenue records prima facie support the respondents’ possession -- Proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. were preventive in nature and did not finally determine civil rights or title.
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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Temporary Injunction – Agricultural Land – Possession – Petitioner challenged the refusal of interim injunction during pendency of his first appeal against dismissal of a suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land – Petitioner claimed possession on the basis of proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. and revenue reports, whereas respondents relied upon registered sale deeds, mutations, jamabandis and khasra girdawaris – Held, revenue entries and contemporaneous evidence of cultivation prima facie supported the respondents’ possession; proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. were preventive in nature and did not finally determine civil rights or title – Earlier status quo order ceased to operate upon disposal of the suit unless expressly continued – No perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the Appellate Court’s refusal to grant injunction warranting interference under Article 227 – Revision petition dismissed, with direction to the Appellate Court to endeavour to decide the pending appeal preferably within six months.
(Paras 10–20)
Cases referred:
1. Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Sup SCC 727.
2. Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594.
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DEEPAK GUPTA, J. –
The petitioner-plaintiff has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 02.04.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kaithal, whereby his application for grant of ad-interim injunction during the pendency of the first appeal has been dismissed.
2. Briefly stated, the petitioner instituted a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land measuring 116 Kanals 14 Marlas, situated in village Narar, Tehsil and District Kaithal. He claimed that the suit property was ancestral coparcenary property and challenged the release deed No.2078 dated 30.07.2002 executed by his father Moman, in favour of defendant No.1 Hawa Singh (brother of petitioner), as well as the subsequent sale deeds executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 to 5. The suit was contested by the subsequent purchasers, who asserted their lawful title and possession over the property.
3. After appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 07.03.2026 (Annexure P-7), dismissed the suit, holding, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to establish the ancestral and coparcenary character of the property, that the contesting defendants were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and that the suit was barred by limitation.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred first appeal and simultaneously moved an application for interim injunction, primarily contending that an order directing maintenance of status quo regarding possession and alienation had remained operative during the trial and that the respondents were now threatening to dispossess him under the cover of the judgment dismissing the suit.
5. The learned Appellate Court, vide impugned order dated 02.04.2026, declined the interim relief, observing that the earlier order of status quo did not automatically continue after disposal of the suit. It further noticed that the revenue entries, including jamabandis and khasra girdawaris, prima facie supported the possession claimed by the contesting respondents.
6. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the courts below have failed to properly appreciate the material relating to his possession, including the proceedings conducted under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. and the orders passed therein. Attention is drawn towards various documents as placed on record, pertaining to those proceedings including order dated 7.4.2014 (Annexure P-20) passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal. It is contended that the petitioner has remained in possession and that the respondents are attempting to interfere with his cultivation of the suit land. Particular emphasis has been laid on the fact that crops are presently standing over the land, which the petitioner claims to have cultivated.
7. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents disputes the petitioner's possession and submits that respondents No.2 to 5 are the recorded owners in possession in revenue record including Jamabandi & Khasra Girdawaris, having purchased the property under registered sale deeds. It is asserted that the standing crop was sown by the respondents and that the petitioner, having failed in the suit, cannot seek an interim order, which would effectively confer possession upon him.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned orders, this Court finds no sufficient ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Appellate Court in declining the general relief of interim injunction.
9. The controversy requiring consideration in the present revision is whether the learned First Appellate Court committed any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in declining interim injunction to the petitioner during the pendency of his appeal against dismissal of the suit.
10. It is well settled that the grant of temporary injunction depends upon the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Sup SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that an appellate Court would ordinarily not interfere with a discretionary order unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or contrary to settled principles. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is still narrower.
11. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that possession over agricultural land may be established with reference to its actual use and cultivation. Thus, where rival parties claim possession over agricultural land, the relevant revenue entries, evidence of cultivation and other contemporaneous material assume significance.
12. Examining the present case in the light of these principles, it is evident that respondents No.2 to 5 purchased the disputed property through registered sale deeds executed during the years 2006 to 2008. The corresponding mutations were sanctioned in their favour. The jamabandi for the year 2012–13, subsequent revenue record and khasra Girdawari entries have been relied upon by the respondents in support of their possession. The learned First Appellate Court, upon examining the material, has specifically noticed that the revenue entries prima facie support the possession of the contesting respondents.
13. On the other hand, the petitioner relies upon the proceedings conducted under Sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C., the orders passed therein and certain reports of revenue officials to substantiate his claim of possession. However, proceedings under Sections 145/146 Cr.P.C., being essentially preventive in nature, do not finally determine the civil rights or title of the parties. The respondents have also disputed the petitioner's claim that possession was restored to him following the proceedings before the Executive Magistrate. In these circumstances, the material relied upon by the petitioner cannot, at this interlocutory stage, be regarded as sufficient to displace the prima facie inference arising from the revenue entries in favour of the respondents.
14. It is also relevant that the petitioner's suit has been dismissed after a full-fledged trial. The learned trial Court has returned findings against him regarding the alleged ancestral character of the property, the validity of the transactions in favour of the contesting defendants and limitation. Though these findings are subject to examination in the pending first appeal, they cannot be ignored while considering the petitioner's entitlement to discretionary interim relief.
15. The petitioner has also relied upon the order dated 12.06.2012 (Annexure P-5), whereby status quo regarding possession and alienation was directed to be maintained during the pendency of the suit. However, the said order was interlocutory in nature and ceased to operate upon disposal of the suit, unless expressly continued by a competent Court. Its mere existence during the trial does not establish that the petitioner was in possession, particularly when the very question of possession is disputed.
16. Having regard to the registered sale deeds, the corresponding mutations and the revenue entries noticed by the learned First Appellate Court, this Court finds that, for the limited purpose of considering interim relief, the material prima facie supports the respondents' claim of possession. The petitioner has failed to establish that the learned First Appellate Court overlooked any material of such decisive significance as would render its conclusion perverse or legally unsustainable.
17. The balance of convenience also does not favour the petitioner. Granting an injunction in his favour, despite the adverse findings recorded by the trial Court and the revenue entries supporting the respondents, would effectively confer upon him an interim advantage, which he has not established. Conversely, refusal of injunction would not prevent him from pursuing his statutory appeal or obtaining appropriate relief if he ultimately succeeds.
18. During the course of hearing, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that agricultural crops are presently standing over the disputed land and both parties claim the right to harvest the same. However, the question before this Court is confined to examining the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned First Appellate Court declining interim injunction. Having found that the said order is based upon a plausible appreciation of the material on record, particularly the revenue entries prima facie supporting the possession of respondents No. 2 to 5, this Court does not consider it appropriate to issue any independent direction concerning harvesting, cultivation or possession of the disputed land. Such a direction, in the face of competing claims, may itself become a source of further controversy.
19. It is pertinent that the petitioner has already suffered a decree of dismissal after a full-fledged trial. Although the said decree is under challenge in the pending first appeal, the petitioner has not been able to establish any ground warranting interference with the discretionary order of the learned First Appellate Court. The mere pendency of the appeal does not entitle him to continuation of the interim protection, which operated during the pendency of the suit.
20. Consequently, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order dated 02.04.2026 (Annexure P-1) warranting any interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
21. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of the petitioner's prayer for interim injunction and shall not be construed as a final determination of title or possession. The learned First Appellate Court shall decide the pending appeal independently on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made in the present order.
22. Having regard to the fact that the litigation has remained pending since the year 2012, the learned First Appellate Court is requested to make an endeavour to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of passing of this order.
23. Dismissed accordingly. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Petition dismissed.
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