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MANISHA BATRA, J. (ORAL) –

1. The present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking setting aside of the order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Tarn Taran, whereby his application under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, 2023, seeking statutory/default bail in case arising out of FIR No.150 dated 13.11.2025, registered under Sections 21 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, at Police Station Valtoha, District Tarn Taran, was dismissed. The petitioner further prays for his release on default bail.

2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of this petition are that on 13.11.2025, a police party was on patrolling duty when, at Bus Stand Wada Telian, a secret informer informed the police that the petitioner, Robindeep Singh alias Deepu, who used to pick up heroin from the border and supply it further, was travelling in a white-coloured car bearing registration No.PB-02-DP-6778 carrying a large quantity of heroin. The secret information was reduced into writing and proceedings were initiated in accordance with law. The petitioner was arrested on 13.11.2025 and recovery of 03 kgs. 43 grams of heroin was effected from his conscious possession. Since the investigation could not be completed within statutory period of 180 days, which expired on 12.05.2026, the petitioner moved aforesaid application on 13.05.2026 before the learned trial Court seeking concession of default bail but the same was dismissed, vide impugned order dated 13.05.2026. The order dated 13.05.2026 reads as follows:

“This order of mine shall dispose of the bail under section 187(3) of BNSS filed by the accused/applicant in FIR no. 150 dated 13.11.2025, U/s 21/25/61/85 of NDPS Act and 21-C/29 of NDPS added later on vide Rapat no. 38 dated 13.11.2025, P.S Valotha.

Heard. Record received and perused. As per report of Ahlmad, 182 days has been elapsed and till date no challan has been presented against the accused/applicant in the present case but the extension application of two months was allowed vide order dated 11.05.2026 by this Court.

In view of the report of Ahlmad, the application has been filed by prosecution for extension of time in filing, of the challan before this Court and same has been allowed and further two months were granted for filing of the challan in the present case., Accordingly, the present application u/s 187(3) of NSS stands declined being not maintainable at this stage and papers be attached with the main file.”

3. Aggrieved from the above mentioned order, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as while passing the same, the learned trial Court ignored the material facts. The petitioner was admittedly arrested on 13.11.2025 and the prescribed period for completion of investigation and presentation of challan had expired on 12.05.2026, whereas the challan could not be presented by that date. It is argued that the petitioner had, therefore, acquired an indefeasible right to be released on default bail. It is further argued that the order dated 11.05.2026 granting extension of 60 days is legally unsustainable as the application seeking extension was filed on 08.05.2026 and was allowed on 11.05.2026 without issuing notice to the petitioner or his family members and without affording him an effective opportunity to oppose the prayer for extension. His presence was secured through video conferencing facility without granting him opportunity to appear through his counsel. It is also argued that the application seeking extension was not available on the e-Court record and that the order granting extension did not properly record the progress of investigation or sufficient reasons warranting extension of time. It is, thus, argued that the extension granted by the learned trial Court cannot be relied upon for defeating the petitioner's right to default bail. Hence, it is urged that the petition deserves to be accepted, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner deserves to be released on default bail.

5. Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the petition by submitting that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. The petitioner cannot claim default bail as a valid extension of time had already been granted by the learned trial Court before the expiry of the statutory period. The application for extension was supported by a report of the learned Public Prosecutor, who, after considering the progress of investigation and the material on record, recorded his satisfaction that the investigation could not be completed within the prescribed period for sufficient reasons. The report specifically disclosed the investigation already completed as well as the aspects which were still pending, including the FSL report, verification of the source and destination of the contraband, analysis of CDR and bank-account evidence, and tracing of other links. The order dated 11.05.2026 itself records the presence of the accused through video-conferencing and that the contents of the report seeking extension were conveyed to him. Thus, the contention that the extension was granted wholly behind the back of the petitioner is not borne out from the record. Hence, it is urged that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

6. This Court has heard the rival submissions.

7. The short question which arises for consideration is whether, on the date when the petitioner moved the application for default bail, he had acquired an indefeasible right to be released on default bail on account of non-presentation of the challan within the initial period of 180 days. There is no dispute that the petitioner was arrested on 13.11.2025 and the case involves alleged recovery of 3 kg 43 grams of heroin, which is commercial quantity. Thus, the provisions of Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act are attracted and the prosecution was entitled to seek extension of time for completion of investigation, subject to fulfilment of the statutory requirements. The record shows that before expiry of the prescribed period, an application was moved on behalf of the prosecution seeking extension of time. The application was accompanied by a report of the learned Public Prosecutor. The said report does not merely seek extension in a mechanical manner. It sets out the investigation already conducted and also mentions the steps which were still required to be taken, including receipt of the FSL report, verification of the source and destination of the contraband, collection and analysis of CDR and bank-account evidence, arrest and interrogation of other persons and tracing of the forward and backward links. The learned Public Prosecutor also recorded his satisfaction that the investigation could not be completed within the prescribed period for sufficient reasons.

8. The main grievance of the petitioner is that he was not given notice of the application seeking extension and that the order granting extension was passed behind his back. This submission, however, is not borne out from the record. The order dated 11.05.2026 specifically records that the petitioner was produced through video-conferencing and that the contents of the report filed by the learned Public Prosecutor were conveyed to him. The petitioner stated that he had engaged a counsel but no counsel appeared on his behalf. Thereafter, the learned Court considered the report and granted a further period of two months. The fact that the counsel engaged by the petitioner did not appear cannot, by itself, render the extension order invalid when the petitioner himself was produced before the Court through video-conferencing and was informed of the report seeking extension. The petitioner was, therefore, not wholly unaware of the proceedings.

9. The requirement laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1290 also stands duly complied with in the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, while considering an application seeking extension of time for completion of investigation, it is mandatory to procure the presence of the accused before the Court, either physically or through video-conferencing, and to inform him that the prayer for extension is being considered. The purpose of such production is to enable the accused to raise the limited objections available to him in law. In the present case, the petitioner was duly produced through video-conferencing before the learned trial Court and was apprised of the report/application seeking extension of time. The fact that the petitioner stated that he had engaged a counsel, who did not appear, would not render the proceedings invalid, particularly when the petitioner himself was present before the Court and was made aware of the prayer for extension. Thus, the safeguard contemplated in the aforesaid authority stood duly satisfied.

10. The contention that the order granting extension does not record sufficient reasons also cannot be accepted when the order is read along with the report of the learned Public Prosecutor, which forms the basis of the order. The statutory requirement is that the Court should consider the progress of investigation and the reasons for seeking further time. The report placed before the learned Court contains the relevant details and the learned Court, after considering the same, granted extension. It is well settled that an extension under Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act cannot be granted mechanically and that the report of the Public Prosecutor must reflect application of mind, progress of investigation and the reasons necessitating further time and so was the report of the Public Prosecutor.

11. Once the order dated 11.05.2026 granting extension of two months is found to be valid, the very basis of the petitioner's claim for default bail disappears. The right to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS is no doubt an important right. However, such right accrues when the statutory period expires without a valid order extending the period for completion of investigation. In the present case, the competent Court had already granted extension before expiry of the original statutory period. Consequently, no indefeasible right in favour of the petitioner had crystallized when he moved the application for default bail. The mere fact that the challan had not been presented by the date of filing of the default-bail application would, therefore, not entitle the petitioner to default bail, once the period for completion of investigation already stood validly extended. In view of the discussion made above, this Court also finds no patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Petition dismissed.

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