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PANKAJ JAIN, J. –

1. By way of present writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 28.05.2001 (Annexure P-7) passed by respondent No.1 affirming the orders dated 20.12.2000 (Annexure P-6), 16.05.1988 (Annexure P-5) and that dated 26.06.1987 (Annexure P-4) passed by the authorities below.

2. As per the facts pleaded in the writ petition, one Beant Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents No.5 to 8, was allotted 487 Bigha 9 Biswas of land in village Khokhran in the year 1949 as a displaced person in lieu of the land abandoned by him in Western Punjab at the time of partition.

2.1. Beant Singh died. Mutation qua his inheritance was entered on 09.09.1963 in favour of Mohinder Singh, Jagmeet Singh and Jasmeet Singh. The authorities, later, discovered that Beant Singh was allotted land in excess of his entitlement. Consequently, a reference was made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for setting aside excess allotment of land allotted to Beant Singh. Allotment of land measuring 251 Bigha 17 Biswas in favour of Beant Singh was cancelled vide order dated 16.06.1977.

2.3. Successors of Beant Singh assailed order dated 16.06.1977 before the Financial Commissioner, who accepted their petition filed under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1954 Act’) and remanded the case to Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision.

2.4. Chief Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 02.07.1982 again cancelled P. Rights qua 59 standard acres 8-1/4 units of land. One of the LRs of allottee, namely, Avtar Singh Puri challenged order dated 02.07.1982 by filing a revision petition under Section 33 of the 1954 Act before the Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary Rehabilitation. The petition was dismissed vide order dated 17.03.1987.

2.5. Order passed by Financial Commissioner was further assailed by Avtar Singh Puri before this Court in CWP No.3589 of 1987. Orders passed by Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated 02.07.1982 and that passed by Financial Commissioner dated, 17.03.1987 were set aside. The case was remanded back to Chief Settlement Commissioner.

2.6. Chief Settlement Commissioner decided the matter afresh vide order dated 11.11.1994 complying with the orders passed by the High Court. By the said order, the P. Rights of the land to the extent of 59 standard acres 8-1/4 units were again annulled

3. Concededly, the cancellation of allotment has attained finality upto Supreme Court. After the allotment was cancelled vide order dated 11.11.1994, the cancelled area now stands allotted to some other allottees.

4. Vide impugned order dated 20.12.2000 (Annexure P-6), Chief Settlement Commissioner decided Revision Petitions bearing No.43, 44, 45, 46 of 1996 and Revision Petition No.13 of 1997 filed at the behest of the persons, who purchased the land from LRs of Beant Singh during the year 1982-83 to 1986. The sale deeds in favour of the petitioners pertain to the land qua which allotment in favour of Beant Singh stands cancelled. The revision petitions stand dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners sought review of the order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The review application stands dismissed vide order dated 28.05.2001 (Annexure P-7).

5. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners has assailed the orders passed by the authorities. He contends that the petitioners were oblivious of the legal proceedings pending qua the land in dispute. They are bona fide purchasers and are entitled for benefit under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1882 Act’). He submits that at the time of purchase of land by the petitioners from the successors of Beant Singh, the name of vendors was reflected in the Record of Rights as absolute owners of the land in question. The petitioners had no reason to doubt the Record of Rights which has presumption of truth attached thereto. Thus, the impugned orders passed by the authorities, cannot be sustained. In order to hammer-forth his contention, counsel for the petitioners has drawn attention of this Court to Daily Diary Report dated 22.03.1979 (Annexure P-1). As per the same, the area qua which allotment was cancelled, was ordered to be restored in the name of allottee Beant Singh.

5.1. Mr. Ghai further relies upon instructions issued by Punjab Government (Department of Rehabilitation), dated 12.08.1961 reproduced in the replication to contend that where an allottee has disposed off his total holding, the transfer/sale made by him needs to be ignored while retrieving excess area keeping in view the inconvenience faced by a vendee.

5.2. Mr. Ghai further submits that there is a registered sale deed w.r.t. Khasra No.469, allotment qua which has not been cancelled. Thus, area comprised in Khasra No.469 admeasuring 3 Bigha 17 Biswas, needs to be excluded from the order. In order to buttress his contention, he relies upon ratio of law laid down in the case of ‘The State of Haryana and others vs. Smt. Savitri Devi and others’, 1986 P.L.J. 656, ‘Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and others’ – CWP No.1958 of 1981, decided on 06.02.1996 and ‘Achhar Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others’, 1979 P.L.J. 278.

6. Per contra, Mr. Jindal, learned Sr. Counsel representing respondents No.5 to 11 would submit that the issue w.r.t. availability of plea of bona fide purchaser to a vendee from allottee under 1954 Act is no more res integra and has been answered by a Full Bench of this Court in ‘Smt. Niranjan Kaur and others vs. Financial Commissioner, Revenue & Secretary to Government, Punjab and others’, 2010(4) RCR (Civil) 610. He submits that Beant Singh was an allottee under the 1954 Act. Part of allotment made in his favour was cancelled. Cancellation has already attained finality upto Supreme Court. Petitioners are the persons who purchased land from the successors of Beant Singh during the time proceedings in re: cancellation of land were pending before the authorities. Thus, the petitioners cannot claim to be bona fide purchasers.

7. After the matter was reserved by this Court on 7th of August, 2026, the petitioners by moving CM No.18872-CWP-2026 have placed on record various documents to prove that they are in continuous possession of land in dispute.

8. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners further relies upon Annexure P-21, i.e., Rapat Roznamcha No.503 dated 26.06.1987 in which the factum of cancellation has been recorded. He submits that the cancellation of allotment was first recorded in the year 1987, i.e., after 10 years of cancellation of allotment. Thus, the petitioners being bona fide purchasers are entitled to benefit under Section 41 of 1882 Act.

9. I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case.

10. From the chronology of events stated herein-above, it is evident that excess allotment of land made in favour of Beant Singh was cancelled vide order dated 16.06.1977. From 16.06.1977 till 1994, the issue w.r.t. cancellation of allotment remained sub-judice before various authorities including this Court and Supreme Court. The sale deeds in favour of the petitioners are dated 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1987. Petitioners themselves rely upon Rapat Rojnamcha dated 22.03.1979 (Annexure P-1) which shows that the allotment qua area in dispute made in favour of Beant Singh was cancelled vide order dated 16.06.1977. Even though, the Rojnamcha reports of the restoration, but the fact w.r.t. cloud on allotment is evident. In the entire writ petition, there is not even a whisper that any inquiry was made by the petitioners before purchasing the land in dispute.

10.1. That apart, the issue w.r.t. availability of plea of bona fide purchaser to a vendee from an allottee under the 1954 Act, already stands answered by a Full Bench of this Court in Niranjan Kaur’s case (supra), observing as under:

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41. It cannot be disputed that the Act is a special Act, whereas the Transfer of Property Act, is a general Act. Therefore, the provisions of the Property Act, would have no application to orders passed under Sections 19 and 24 of the Act.

42. In support of this conclusion, reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harishchandra Hegde v. State of Karnataka and others, (2004)9 SCC 780, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 vis-a- vis Section 51 of the Property Act, has laid down as under :-

"13. By reason of an order passed under Section 4 of the Act, the lands are directed to be restored in the event the illegalities specified therein are discovered. The consequences contained in Section 5 of the Act apply automatically in the event an order under Section 4 of the Act is passed. Section 4 of the Act contains a non obstante clause. The said provision would, thus, apply notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or any other Act for the time being in force. The Act is a special Act whereas the Transfer of Property Act is a general Act and in that view of the matter also Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act will have no application and the consequences contained in Section 5 would prevail."

43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (dead) by LRs., (2007)2 SCC 404, while interpreting the scope of provisions of Sections 41 and 42 of the Property Act, has laid down as under:-

"9. Application of Section 41 of the Act is based on the law of estoppel to the effect that if a man has represented that the transferor consents to an act which has been done and that he would not offer any opposition thereto, although the same could not have been lawfully done without his consent and he thereby induces others to do that from which they might have abstained, he could not question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct.

10. The ingredients of Section 41 of the Act are :

(1) the transferor is the ostensible owner;

(2) he is so by the consent, express or implied, of the real owner;

(3) the transfer is for consideration;

(4) the transferee has acted in good faith, taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer.

11. Section 43, on the other hand, embodies a "rule of feeding the estoppel" and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts thereupon and it is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation.

12. In order to get the benefit of the said provision, the conditions which must be satisfied are :

(1) the contract of transfer was made by a person who was competent to contract; and

(2) the contract would be subsisting at the time when a claim for recovery of the property is made.

13. However, the provisions would have no application if the transfer was invalid as being forbidden by law or contrary to public policy, as envisaged under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thus, no estoppel can be pleaded contrary to the provisions of a statute. The "rule of feeding the estoppel" shall apply in absence thereof."

44. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, question No. 2 is answered against the petitioners, by holding, that the provisions of the special statute, would override the provisions of Section 41 of the Property Act.

45. On the third question it is held that the "person" would include Union or the State Government, as the "person" has not been defined in the statute, therefore, would need liberal interpretation. In support of this finding, reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3297, wherein it has been held as under:-

"There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State Government". The maxim "reddendo singula singulis" will apply to the interpretation of the word 'person" so that the general meaning of the word "person" in its generic sense with its width would not be cut down by the specific qualification of one species, i.e., natural "person" when it is capable to encompass, in its ambit, natural persons, juristic persons and constitutional mechanism of governance in a democratic set up. It has already been held, and bears no repetition, that the State, by Cabinet form of Government, is a persona ficta a Corporate sole. Constitution empowers the State to acquire, hold and dispose of their property. The Governor in his personal responsibility is empowered to maintain peace and good Government scheduled area. The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution empowers him to regulate allotment of the land by para 5 (2)(b) read with Section 3 of the Regulation of the land be it between natural persons, i.e., tribals and non- tribals; it imposes total prohibition on transfer of the land in scheduled area. The object of the Fifth Schedule and the Regulation is to preserve tribal autonomy, their culture and economic empowerment to ensure social, economic and political justice for preservation of peace and good Government in the Scheduled Area. Therefore, all relevant clauses in the Schedule and the Regulation should harmoniously and widely be read so as to elongate the aforesaid constitutional objectives and dignity of person to the Scheduled Tribes, preserving the integrity of the Scheduled Areas and ensuring distributive justice as an integral scheme thereof. Clauses (a) and (c) of sub para (2) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule prohibits transfers Inter vivos between tribals and non-tribal natural persons and prevents money-lenders to exploit the tribals. Clause (b) intends to regulate allotment of land not only among tribals but also prohibits allotment of the land belonging to the Government to the nontribals. In that behalf, wider interpretation of "regulation" would include "prohibition" which should be read into that clause. If so read, it subserves the constitutional objective of regulating the allotment of the land in Scheduled Areas exclusively to the Scheduled Tribes. Clause 5(2)(b) ensures distributive justice of socio-economic empowerment which yields meaningful results in reality. If purposive construction, in this backdrop is adopted, no internal or external contradiction would emerge. The word "person" would include both natural persons as well as juristic person and constitutional Government. This liberal and wider interpretation would maximise allotment of Government land in scheduled area to the tribals to make socioeconomic justice assured in the Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 46, a reality to the tribals. The restricted interpretation would defeat the objective of the Constitution. The word "person" would be so interpreted as to include State or juristic person Corporate sole or persona ficta. Transfer of land by the juristic persons or allotment of land by the State to the nontribals would stand prohibited, achieving the object of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Regulation. If the word 'person' is interpreted to mean only natural persons, it tends to defeat the object of the Constitution, the genus and the Regulation, its species. As a corollary, by omission in the final draft of the Fifth Schedule of the power of the State Government to transfer its land to the non-tribals with the sanction of a competent authorised officer or authority would, by interpretation brought into effect and the object of the Constitution would easily be defeated. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the word 'person' includes the State Government. The State Government also stands prohibited to transfer by way of lease or any other form known to law, the Government land in scheduled area to non-tribal person, be it natural or juristic person except to its instrumentality or a Co-operative Society composed solely of tribes as is specified in the second part of Section 3(1) (a). Any other interpretation would easily defeat the purpose exclusive power entrusted by the Fifth Schedule to the Governor. If the Cabinet form of Government would transfer the land of the Government to non-tribals peace would get disturbed, good governance in scheduled area would slip into the hands of the non-tribals who would drive out the tribals from scheduled area and create monopoly to the well-developed and sophisticated non-tribals; and slowly, and imperceptible, but surely, the land in the scheduled area would pass into the lands of the non-tribals. The letter of law would be an empty content and by play of words deflect the course of justice to the tribals and denude them of the socio- economic empowerment and dignity of their person."

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10.2. The precedents relied upon by counsel for the petitioners are all prior to the pronouncement of the Full Bench judgment in Niranjan Kaur’s case (supra). Thus, they stand impliedly overruled and do not advance the cause of the petitioners.

10.3. In view of the binding ratio of law laid down by Full Bench, this Court finds that the remedy available to the petitioners shall be to claim refund of sale consideration or damages from their vendors.

10.4. So far as the issue w.r.t. exclusion of area comprised in Khasra No.469 admeasuring 3 Bigha 17 Biswas, is concerned, if the order of cancellation of allotment does not hit the said land, the sale deed qua the said land shall remain in operation.

11. In view of above, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is ordered to be dismissed.

12. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.

Petition Dismissed.

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