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DEEPAK GUPTA, J. –

The present regular second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Palwal, whereby the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 15.05.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Palwal, dismissing their suit for declaration and consequential permanent injunction, has also been dismissed.

2. The dispute arises out of a registered sale deed dated 09.10.2006 executed by the appellants in favour of the respondents in respect of the suit property. The case set up by the appellants was that they had agreed to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs.65,00,000/- under an agreement dated 12.08.2006; that an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- had been paid as earnest money; that at the time of registration of the sale deed only about Rs.2,90,000/- was paid; and that the balance consideration was never paid. It was pleaded that the sale deed had been got executed by fraud by mentioning a much lesser consideration of Rs.17,93,000/- and that the same was, therefore, liable to be declared null and void.

3. The defendants contested the suit. Their specific stand was that the registered sale deed had been executed after its contents had been read over and explained to the appellants and that the entire consideration mentioned therein had been paid. The defendants also disputed the very execution of the alleged agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006.

4. On the pleadings, the trial Court framed issues, inter alia, as to the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and the validity of the sale deed. The plaintiffs examined Kuldeep as PW1 and other witnesses. However, the original agreement to sell was never brought on record. The application seeking permission to lead secondary evidence in respect thereof had also been declined by this High Court vide order dated 23.07.2016.

5. The learned trial Court noticed, in particular, the admissions made by plaintiff Kuldeep. He admitted his signatures on the sale deed; admitted that its contents had been read over to him; admitted that he had understood and accepted those contents; admitted that the sale deed had been prepared with his consent; admitted that he himself had presented it before the Sub-Registrar for registration; and also admitted delivery of possession to the purchasers. On that basis, the trial Court concluded that the registered sale deed had been voluntarily executed and that the plea of fraud was not established.

6. The learned First Appellate Court independently considered the evidence and affirmed the findings of the trial Court. It noticed that execution of the sale deed stood proved not only from the testimony of the plaintiff himself but also from the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the registration record. It further noticed the admissions made by the plaintiffs in proceedings arising out of litigation instituted by their brother, wherein they had acknowledged that they had sold their share to the defendants by the registered sale deed dated 09.10.2006.

7. Assailing the concurrent findings, Learned counsel for the appellants has primarily contended that the Courts below failed to appreciate that the respondents had not established payment of the entire consideration. It is submitted that the sale deed did not mention the cheque numbers or the bank particulars; there were contradictions in the statements of the defendants' witnesses regarding the alleged payment; and, therefore, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shanti Devi (since deceased) through LRs v. Jagan Devi and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1961, the sale deed ought to be treated as void for want of consideration.

8. The submission, attractive as it may appear at first blush, cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case.

9. In Shanti Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a fundamentally different factual situation. There, the concurrent findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court were that the plaintiff had never executed the sale deed at all, the thumb impression attributed to her was not hers, and the defendant had also failed to establish payment of the alleged consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, held that the transaction was void ab initio. The Court thereafter considered the principle flowing from Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and reiterated, on the basis of Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar, (2022) 18 SCC 489, that payment of price is an essential element of a sale; and that where a sale deed is executed without payment of price and without provision for payment of price in future, there is no sale in the eye of law.

10. The ratio of Shanti Devi (supra), therefore, cannot be divorced from the factual foundation on which it rests. The Hon’ble Supreme Court itself recorded that there was no witness, who could substantiate the alleged payment, no evidence that the initial payment had ever been received by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's assertion of non-receipt of consideration had not been disproved. It was in those circumstances that the sale deed was held void for want of consideration.

11. The factual position in the present case is materially different. The appellants do not dispute execution of the registered sale deed. On the contrary, plaintiff Kuldeep himself admitted that the document had been read over and explained to him, that he had signed it after understanding its contents, that it had been prepared with his consent and that he himself had presented it for registration. He also admitted the recital regarding payment and delivery of possession. These admissions have been concurrently noticed by both the Courts below.

12. More importantly, the challenge to the sale deed is not founded upon a case that the appellants never executed the document. Their case is that they executed it but that the consideration agreed between the parties was Rs.65,00,000/- whereas a lesser consideration was reflected in the registered document and the balance was not paid. Thus, the challenge is essentially to the contents and financial consequences of an admittedly executed conveyance, and not to the character of the instrument itself.

13. This distinction assumes considerable significance in the light of the law reiterated in Shanti Devi (supra).The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while referring to Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353, has itself distinguished between a fraud going to the character of the document and a fraud relating to its contents. Where the document is void ab initio, it may be ignored; but where the instrument is otherwise valid and the grievance concerns the contents or obligations arising therefrom, the legal consequences are different.

14. In the present case, the appellants' own conduct negatives their attempt to treat the sale deed as a nullity. They executed the document, admitted its execution, presented it for registration and, according to the concurrent findings, admitted in their evidence that possession had been delivered to the purchasers. The Courts below have further found that the appellants had themselves acknowledged the sale deed in earlier proceedings. Such admissions are substantive pieces of evidence and could not have been brushed aside merely because the appellants subsequently sought to explain them differently.

15. It is also significant that the alleged agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006, on which the entire plea of a total consideration of Rs.65,00,000/-rests, was never proved in accordance with law. The original agreement was not produced and the prayer to lead secondary evidence in respect thereof had been declined by this High Court. The First Appellate Court specifically noticed this circumstance while affirming the findings of the trial Court.

16. Consequently, the appellants cannot, in a second appeal, seek to revive an unproved agreement and ask this Court to substitute a different factual conclusion for the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The question whether the alleged agreement for Rs.65,00,000/- was executed, whether the sale deed was procured by fraud, and whether the alleged balance consideration was actually paid are essentially questions of fact. Both the Courts below have concurrently found against the appellants on the material issues after appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence.

17. Even otherwise, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require the entire price necessarily to be paid simultaneously with execution of the sale deed. A sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. The crucial question is whether the parties intended that ownership should pass upon execution and registration of the conveyance. The trial Court, relying upon the principle stated in Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and another 2009 (2) CCC 322 (SC), noticed that where the intention of the parties is that title should pass upon execution and registration, non-payment of the whole or part of the price does not, by itself, enable the vendor to avoid the sale; the remedy may lie in recovery of the unpaid price.

18. The present case is even stronger for the respondents because the appellants themselves executed and registered the conveyance after its contents had been explained to them. The concurrent factual finding is that the transaction was intended to operate as a sale and was not a sham or nominal transaction. The plea that some part of the agreed amount remained unpaid, even if assumed for the sake of argument, would not by itself convert an otherwise validly executed and registered conveyance into a nullity, particularly when the parties intended title to pass under the registered instrument.

19. The reliance placed upon the judgment in Shanti Devi’s Case (supra) is, therefore, misplaced. That judgment does not lay down a proposition that every allegation of non-payment of consideration renders a registered sale deed void irrespective of the intention of the parties, the terms of the conveyance, the admissions of the executant and the findings on evidence. Rather, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with a case, where the very execution of the sale deed by the alleged vendor had been disproved and where the alleged consideration had also not been established.

20. The further submission that the defendants' witnesses gave inconsistent statements regarding the alleged cheques also does not give rise to a substantial question of law. The First Appellate Court considered the argument that the sale deed did not contain cheque numbers or bank particulars and also noticed the evidence relied upon by the appellants. It nevertheless affirmed the ultimate finding against them. Whether those discrepancies were sufficient to displace the concurrent factual findings is a matter of appreciation of evidence and does not, in the circumstances of the present case, constitute a substantial question of law.

21. The appellants had also sought, before the Courts below, recovery of the alleged unpaid amount. The First Appellate Court noticed that the application seeking amendment for incorporation of a recovery claim had been dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 16.01.2014 and that the said order had not been challenged. The First Appellate Court consequently held that the recovery relief could not be granted in the appeal, while leaving it open to the appellants to avail an appropriate remedy, if otherwise permissible in law.

22. This Court is conscious that the subsequent pronouncement in Shanti Devi’s Case (supra) is binding and has been considered in the present appeal. However, a precedent is to be applied to the factual situation to which its ratio relates. The distinguishing feature here is that the appellants themselves admit the execution of the sale deed and the concurrent findings are that the deed was voluntarily executed after its contents were understood and that the transaction was intended to operate as a conveyance. There is, therefore, no basis to treat the registered instrument as a non-est document merely on the strength of the disputed plea regarding payment.

23. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law. A second appeal is not an occasion for reappraisal of evidence merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily warrant interference only where they are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or founded upon a palpable misapplication of the law. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the present case.

24. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are affirmed.

25. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall          also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

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