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RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. –

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.03.2014 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the present appeal are that the complainant, SI Joginder Singh (PW4), was checking the cleanliness of the police station compound on 10.10.2009 at 8:10 A.M. A servant of the accused had placed a tub beneath the tap, which was overflowing. The S.H.O. advised the servant not to waste water or open the gate. The accused arrived at the scene. The complainant requested that the accused refrain from throwing rubbish into the police station compound and from opening the police station gate, as cattle entered the compound through the open gate. The accused became angry and threatened the informant with transfer. ASI Vijay Kumar (PW1), HC Hari Singh, MHC Sultan Singh, Constable Sushil Kumar (PW3), Constable Pawan Kumar, and Constable Vishambhar Singh witnessed the incident. The accused obstructed the complainant in the exercise of his official duties. An entry (Ex.PW1/A) was made at the police station. An application was submitted to the Court for permission to investigate the matter. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra, granted permission by order dated 13.10.2009 (Ex. PW4/B). The investigation was carried out, a site plan (Ex. PW4/C) was prepared, statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their accounts, and after completing the investigation, a complaint was filed before the Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined four witnesses to prove its case.

5. ASI Vijay Kumar (PW1), Babu Ram (PW2) and Sunil (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Joginder Singh (PW4) is the complainant.

6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C) admitted that Joginder Singh was serving as SI/S.H.O. He stated that the police used his vehicle, and when he demanded petrol charges, a false case was made against him. He tendered documents in the defence.

7. Learned Trial Court held that the complaint and the statement on oath did not show that the accused had threatened to cause any injury to informant Joginder Singh or any person in whom he was interested. The accused had merely told the complainant that he would be transferred. This is insufficient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC. The S.H.O. was supervising cleanliness work in the compound, which was not shown to be a part of the official duty. Mere use of the intemperate language without any overt act did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. There were various contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The police did not join any independent person, even though the police station was located in the ‘bazaar’. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused was acquitted.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. There was no proof of enmity between the complainant and the accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in discarding the statements of official witnesses. No independent person would have deposed against the person who was openly threatening the police official. The testimonies of police officials cannot be ignored because they happened to be police officials. The threat to get the S.H.O. transferred was with the intent to obstruct him from discharging his duties. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Sanjeev Sood and Mr Rahul Gahtania, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The contradictions are bound to come with time, and they cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case. The accused had openly threatened the S.H.O. and obstructed him in the discharge of his official duties. Learned Trial Court wrongly held that the act of the accused did not constitute the offences punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

11. Mr Sanjeev Sood, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the allegations made in the complaint did not fulfil the requirements of Sections 186 and 189 of the IPC. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and  reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

“23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. The complaint reads that the accused threatened to get the S.H.O transferred by talking to the Chief Minister and Vypar Mandal, Dehra. Learned Trial Court rightly held that this allegation, even if accepted to be correct, does not constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC, which reads as follows:

Section 189: Threat of injury to public servant Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act, connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

16. It is apparent that a person should have threatened a public servant with any injury to him or any person in whom he is interested to induce him to do, forbear or delay the doing of an act to attract Section 189 of the IPC.

17. The word “injury” has been defined in Section 44 of IPC as any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property. The term “illegal” has been defined under Section 43 of the IPC to apply to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action. Getting a person transferred is not an offence. It is also not prohibited by law and does not furnish any ground for civil action. The transfer is an incident of service, and any government servant can be transferred at the discretion of the appointing authority to any place at any time in accordance with the service conditions applicable to him.

18. In Abdul Faqir Versus State of Rajasthan Crl. Misc.Petition No. 2755 of 2015, decided on 14th September 2017, the complainant was told that he would suffer serious consequences, and the accused shall ensure that he does not get the pension. It was laid down by the Rajasthan High Court that the threat to stop the pension is not an injury which falls within the definition of Section 189 of the IPC. It was observed:

“14. On a bare reading of the statement of the complainant as well as the witness, it is clear that the total allegation against the present petitioner was that he had threatened the complainant that if the complaint against the Jetha Ram driver was not taken back, then the complainant would suffer all serious consequences, which include the stopping of pension. This Court has also taken note of the fact that the incident of 09.11.2012 was reported on 14.02.2013 after a gross delay.

15. This Court finds that the necessary ingredients of the offence of Section 189 of IPC, i.e. the threat of injury as defined under Section 44 of IPC, clearly denote that there was no threat of any bodily, mind, reputation or property in the present complaint. It is also observed that the necessary ingredients of assault or criminal force also cannot be formed on the face of the FIR, and on the face of it, it is reflected that the complainant was called in court premises at 7:00 am when he was neither discharging his duties, which would constitute the performance of the duty”

19. If the Rajasthan High Court had not considered the threat to stop the pension as an injury to the property, mind or body, it is difficult to see how the threat to transfer can be considered an injury when the transfer is an incident of service and does not involve any penal or civil consequences. Hence, the submission of learned counsel for the accused has to be accepted as correct that the allegations, assuming them to be true, do not fall within the definition of Section 189 of IPC, and the learned Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused.

20. No person deposed on oath that any threat of injury was given to the S.H.O. to force him to do any act or forbear or delay to do an act. ASI Vijay Kumar (PW1) stated that the accused threatened the S.H.O. to get him transferred by calling a meeting with Vypar Mandal and talking to the Minister. Babu Ram (PW2) stated that the accused was saying that he would get the S.H.O. transferred. Sushil Kumar (PW3) stated that the accused told the S.H.O. that he would get him transferred by meeting the minister and talking to Vypar Mandal. Joginder Singh (PW4) stated that the accused threatened to get him transferred by talking to the Chief Minister and Vypar Mandal.

21. Therefore, all the witnesses have deposed on oath that the accused had threatened the complainant to get him transferred. It has already been found above that the threat to get a public servant transferred does not constitute any injury. Further, the other requirement that the S.H.O. should have been compelled to do something or omit to do something is missing, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the offence punishable under Section 189 of the IPC was not made out.

22. Section 186 of IPC reads as follows:

Section 186: Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

23. It is apparent from the Section that a public servant should have been obstructed in the discharge of his public function. The complaint mentions that S.H.O. was supervising the cleanliness work. ASI Vijay Kumar (PW1) stated that the S.H.O. was getting the police station compound cleaned. Sushil Kumar (PW3) stated that he, ASI Vijay, MHC Sultan, HC Hari Singh, Constable Pawan and Constable Vishambar Singh were carrying out the cleaning outside the compound of the police station. S.H.O Joginder Singh was checking the cleanliness. SI Joginder Singh (PW4) stated that the police officials of the police station were carrying out the cleaning on 10.10.2009 between 8:00 A.M. and 10:00 A.M., and he was supervising it. No witness stated that the S.H.O. was discharging the official duties. He was merely supervising the cleanliness work, which is not shown to be part of the official duty. Hence, the requirement that the public official should have been obstructed in the discharge of official duties was not satisfied.

24. This Court held in Surinder Singh Chauhan versus State of H.P., 2002 STPL 4637 [2002(1) Current Law Journal, (H.P.)332] that a mere threat advanced to a public officer is not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. It was observed:

“9. It may be seen that in order to make out an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, it must be shown:

(a) the accused voluntarily obstructed a public servant;

(b) such obstruction was caused in the discharge of public functions of such public servant.

10. The terms "voluntarily" contemplate the commission of some overt act; mere passive conduct of a person would not amount to causing obstruction. In the present case, it is not the case of the prosecution nor that of the Presiding Officer in a statement made to the Police Officer that the petitioner caused any obstruction in the poll process, nor by the action of the accused poll process was impeded. The grievance of the Presiding Officer of the polling booth as also the Police Officer was that when petitioner was asked about he having brought the camera and the mobile phone in the polling booth he stated that he being a candidate, can do so and that he knew his law being an advocate and that if any action is taken against him he would make them stand in the High Court and would cause strike in the High Court and the District courts at Solan.

11. In my view, it cannot be said, on the allegations made in the complaint and in the statement of the Presiding Officer of the polling booth, that the accused voluntarily obstructed either the Presiding Officer of the polling booth or the Police Officer, in the discharge of their public functions. The allegations against the petitioner are that he brought the camera and mobile phone inside the polling booth and took photographs in violation of the instructions contained in some pamphlet, but the accused is not sought to be prosecuted for the disobedience or violation of any instructions under the election law. It is true that the expression "obstruction" does not necessarily mean "physical obstruction". In my view, any action accompanied by either a show of force or threat, or having the effect of preventing the public servant from carrying out his duty, would constitute "obstruction" for the purpose of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case, it is the admitted position that neither the Presiding Officer nor the Police Officer were obstructed in any manner in the discharge of their duties. There was no threat of force by the petitioner. It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused either refused to hand over the camera to them or otherwise obstructed the Presiding Officer of the polling booth or the Police Officer. Mere protesting or using intemperate language without any overt Act will not be an offence punishable under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. Passive conduct, without resisting a public servant in the discharge of his functions or duties, will not amount to voluntary obstructing a public servant within the meaning of Section 186.

12. There is no allegation against the petitioner that he resisted the process of law. In fact, he was taken away by the Assistant Collector, who intervened in the matter.”

25. In the present case, the accused had only threatened the S.H.O. to get him transferred and not stated that the SHO should not supervise the cleanliness; hence, the act of the accused would not constitute any obstruction, and the ingredients of Section 186 of the IPC were not satisfied.

26. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against the acquittal.

27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

28. A copy of this judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court below, be sent back forthwith.

Appeal dismissed.

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