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DEEPAK GUPTA, J. –

The petitioner, who is one of the plaintiffs before the learned trial Court, has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 04.06.2026 (Annexure P-3) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Charkhi Dadri, whereby his prayer for grant of ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC was declined, as well as the order dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P-4) passed by the learned District Judge, Charkhi Dadri, dismissing the appeal preferred against the said order.

2. Briefly stated, the plaintiffs instituted a suit for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering in their alleged peaceful use and enjoyment of a tube-well situated in land comprised in Mustatil and Khasra No.62//23/2 (5-4), Khewat No.257, Khatoni No.257, situated within the revenue estate of village Rambass, Tehsil and District Charkhi Dadri, as reflected in the jamabandi for the year 2020-2021.

3. The case set up by the plaintiffs is that the tube-well was originally installed by their predecessor-in-interest, namely Sheonand son of Chhaluram, in the land bearing old Khasra No.58//32 (0-4), which was joint between the predecessors of the parties. It was pleaded that the tube-well and the electricity connection had been installed for irrigation of the agricultural land and that the facility continued to be used by the members of the family. According to the plaintiffs, even after consolidation of holdings, they continued to use the tubewell for irrigating their agricultural fields and contributed towards payment of electricity charges. It was alleged that the defendants subsequently obstructed such use, necessitating institution of the suit and the accompanying application for temporary injunction.

4. The defendants opposed the prayer, asserting that pursuant to consolidation proceedings, the land in which the tube-well is situated, had fallen exclusively to their share. They further claimed that they had been operating the tube-well and paying the electricity charges. It was also asserted that the plaintiffs had their own independent source of irrigation and, therefore, had no occasion or right to use the tube-well situated in the defendants' land.

5. The learned trial Court, while declining the prayer for ad-interim injunction vide order dated 04.06.2026, noticed that the land bearing Khasra No.62//23/2 (5-4), wherein the tube-well is situated, admittedly stood allotted to the defendants during consolidation. The Court further observed that the defendants had produced receipts pertaining to payment of electricity charges as well as photographs showing separate bore-wells installed for irrigation. On the other hand, the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient material at that stage to substantiate their claim of continuous user or contribution towards electricity charges. Considering that the pleadings were yet to be completed, the learned trial Court declined to grant ad-interim protection.

6. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Charkhi Dadri, vide judgment dated 12.06.2026. The learned Appellate Court observed that the question regarding ownership and user of the tube-well was disputed and required adjudication on the basis of pleadings and evidence. However, the learned trial Court was directed to decide the injunction application expeditiously after considering the pleadings and material brought on record.

7. Assailing the above orders, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the admitted fact that the tube-well was installed by the common ancestors of the parties much before consolidation of holdings. According to learned counsel, the mere circumstance that the land containing the tube-well subsequently came to be allotted to the defendants would not extinguish the pre-existing right of the petitioner to use the same for irrigation. It is argued that the tube-well was a common facility and its use could not be denied merely on the strength of the subsequent revenue entries. Learned counsel accordingly submits that refusal of interim protection would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner, whose agricultural land requires regular irrigation.

8. Per contra, learned counsel representing the respondents supports the impugned orders. It is submitted that after consolidation, the land containing the tube-well stands allotted to the defendants and the petitioner cannot claim a right to enter upon or use the defendants' land merely because the tube-well was installed before consolidation. It is further contended that the petitioner has failed to establish continuous user of the tube-well after consolidation and that the defendants have placed on record electricity payment receipts and photographs indicating the existence of separate irrigation facilities. Accordingly, dismissal of the revision petition is prayed for.

9. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned orders.

10. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that learned counsel for both sides fairly concede that the tube-well in question was installed by the forefathers of the parties prior to consolidation of holdings and that, upon consolidation, the particular killa number, in which the tube-well is situated, came to be allotted to the share of the defendants. Thus, the original installation of the tube-well by the predecessors of the parties and the subsequent allotment of the land containing it to the defendants are not in dispute. The controversy essentially concerns the legal effect of such allotment upon the alleged right of the petitioner to continue using the tube-well.

11. There can be no dispute with the proposition that consolidation of agricultural holdings brings about a rearrangement of landholdings and confers rights upon the respective landowners in accordance with the allotments made during consolidation proceedings. Once a particular parcel of land is allotted to a landowner and the consolidation proceedings attain finality, another person cannot claim possessory rights over that parcel merely because the land was previously held jointly by their predecessors.

12. However, ownership of the land and the right to use a facility situated thereon are not necessarily identical concepts. In a given case, a person may establish a legally enforceable right to draw water from a tube-well situated on another person's land, notwithstanding that the ownership of the land vests in the latter. Such a right may arise from an express arrangement, a legally recognised easement or some other enforceable obligation. Whether any such right existed and survived consolidation would depend upon the nature of the right claimed, the relevant consolidation record and the evidence produced by the parties.

13. Equally, the mere fact that a tube-well was installed by the common ancestors before consolidation does not automatically establish a perpetual or independent right in favour of every descendant to continue using that facility, irrespective of the subsequent allotment of the land. The petitioner must establish the legal foundation of the right asserted by him. The earlier joint character of the land and the common origin of the tube-well may constitute relevant circumstances, but neither is conclusive of the petitioner's present entitlement.

14. In this context, it is significant that the petitioner has instituted a suit seeking permanent injunction against interference in the alleged use of the tube-well. The relief of temporary injunction is thus founded upon his assertion of an existing and legally enforceable right of user. For obtaining such relief, the petitioner was required to place sufficient prima facie material before the Court indicating not merely that the tube-well had been installed by the common ancestors, but also that he continued to enjoy a legally protected right to use the same after consolidation.

15. The material noticed by the Courts below does not, at this stage, sufficiently establish such a right. Although the petitioner asserts that the electricity charges were being shared and the tube-well was being used jointly, the defendants have specifically disputed these assertions. The learned trial Court noticed that the defendants had produced electricity payment receipts and photographs relating to separate bore-wells, whereas the petitioner had not produced corresponding receipts or other sufficient material establishing his alleged continuous user.

16. It is true that payment of electricity charges by the defendants would not, by itself, conclusively establish exclusive ownership of the tube-well or extinguish an otherwise existing right of user. Similarly, the existence of another source of irrigation with the petitioner would not necessarily defeat a legally established right to use the disputed tube-well. Nevertheless, these circumstances are relevant while examining whether the petitioner has demonstrated a sufficiently strong prima facie case for grant of immediate injunctive protection.

17. The question is not whether the petitioner can ultimately establish a right to use the tube-well. That issue remains open for determination in the suit. The limited question presently requiring consideration is whether the material placed before the Courts below justified an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the petitioner's use of a tubewell situated on land admittedly allotted to the defendants.

18. The principles governing grant of temporary injunction are well settled. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury are essential considerations governing the exercise of discretion under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. A prima facie case, by itself, does not entitle a party to an injunction unless the other requirements are also satisfied.

19. In Wander Ltd. and anr. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an appellate Court would ordinarily not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance merely because a different view is possible. Interference is justified where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or where the Court has ignored settled principles governing grant of interlocutory relief.

20. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the approach adopted by the Courts below cannot be characterised as arbitrary or perverse. The learned trial Court has taken into consideration the admitted allotment of the land to the defendants, the disputed claim of continuous user and the material placed on record regarding payment of electricity charges and availability of separate irrigation facilities. These were relevant considerations for deciding whether immediate ad-interim protection was warranted.

21. The submission that the petitioner's crops may suffer for want of irrigation has also been considered. Undoubtedly, availability of irrigation is important for agricultural operations, and denial of water may, in an appropriate case, result in serious prejudice. However, hardship alone cannot justify grant of an injunction in the absence of a sufficiently established prima facie legal right. The requirement of irreparable injury cannot be examined in isolation from the existence of such right.

22. There is another aspect of the matter. The injunction sought by the petitioner is couched in the form of a restraint against interference with the use of the tube-well. However, where the defendants dispute the petitioner's very entitlement to use the facility and the land containing it admittedly stands allotted to them, grant of the injunction may, in substance, confer upon the petitioner a right of access and user which is yet to be established. A Court exercising interlocutory jurisdiction must be cautious in granting relief which substantially anticipates the final adjudication of the disputed rights.

23. It is also material that the order dated 04.06.2026 is confined to refusal of ad-interim injunction at a stage when the defendants had not yet filed their written statement and detailed reply. The learned Appellate Court has expressly recognised that the rival claims require examination after completion of pleadings and has directed expeditious consideration of the injunction application. Thus, the impugned orders do not finally determine the petitioner's alleged right of user.

24. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not intended to operate as another appellate forum for reassessment of the factual material or substitution of a different discretionary view. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, and M/s Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, and not merely to correct every possible error of fact or law.

25. In the present case, neither has any jurisdictional error been shown nor has it been shown that the Courts below ignored any material circumstance of such significance as would render their conclusions manifestly perverse. The admitted installation of the tube-well by the common ancestors has been considered in the context of the subsequent consolidation and the disputed rights of user. The conclusion that the matter requires examination upon completion of pleadings and production of relevant evidence is a reasonably possible view.

26. At the same time, it is clarified that the allotment of the land containing the tube-well to the defendants shall not, by itself, be treated as conclusive against the petitioner's claim of an independently enforceable right of user, if otherwise established in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be at liberty to substantiate such a claim by producing relevant consolidation records, revenue entries, electricity records and other admissible evidence. The defendants shall likewise be entitled to contest the existence, nature and enforceability of the alleged right.

27. The learned trial Court shall consider the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, if still pending, on its own merits after completion of the necessary pleadings and after considering the material produced by both sides, uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned orders or herein regarding the ultimate rights of the parties. The trial Court shall also be at liberty to examine whether any right of user was recognised, reserved or otherwise preserved during consolidation proceedings.

28. Consequently, finding no patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned orders dated 04.06.2026 (Annexure P-3) and 12.06.2026 (Annexure P-4), warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the present revision petition is dismissed.

29. It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined exclusively to the question of grant of ad-interim injunction and shall not prejudice either party in the adjudication of the pending injunction application or the suit. The learned trial Court shall endeavour to decide the pending injunction application expeditiously, preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, subject to completion of necessary pleadings and reasonable opportunity to the parties.

30. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Order accordingly.

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