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AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. –

1. The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by Surjit Singh (appellant/plaintiff) against the judgment and decree dated 08.01.2001 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faridkot whereby the appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 04.09.1998 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridkot dismissing the plaintiff's civil suit, was also dismissed.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to herein as per their original status before the learned Trial Court.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff, Surjit Singh, instituted Civil Suit No. 35 on 21.01.1995 seeking a decree of declaration to the effect that he is the exclusive owner in possession of suit land measuring 6 Kanals 10 Marlas. The plaintiff asserted that he is the real nephew of defendant No. 1 (Jarnail Singh, son of Swaran Singh) and was serving him. Due to the services rendered, defendant No. 1 transferred his full share out of Khasra No. 118/119 in favor of the plaintiff through a consent decree dated 09.09.1991 passed in Civil Suit No. 393 of 13.03.1991 (Surjit Singh v. Jarnail Singh). On the basis of the said consent decree, Mutation No. 9868 was sanctioned in favor of the plaintiff, vesting ownership of the suit land in him. That defendant No. 1 executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of defendant No. 3 (Balihar Singh), who, on the basis of the said power of attorney, illegally executed a registered Sale Deed dated 20.10.1994 transferring 6 Kanals 10 Marlas of the suit property in favor of defendant No. 2 (Buta Singh). The plaintiff claimed that since he had already become owner of the suit property by virtue of the consent decree dated 09.09.1991, defendant No. 1 had no subsisting right to sell the property, rendering the sale deed dated 20.10.1994 illegal, null, and void.

4. Upon notice, defendants No. 1 to 3 appeared before learned trial Court and filed a joint written statement raising preliminary objections regarding locus standi and maintainability, stating that the plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession of the suit property. They asserted that defendant No. 2 (Buta Singh) is the lawful owner in possession having purchased the land from Defendant No. 1 through his SPA (defendant No. 3, Balhar Singh) via registered Sale Deed dated 20.10.1994. They further submitted that the consent decree dated 09.09.1991 relied upon by the plaintiff was collusive, unregistered, and created no legal rights in favor of the plaintiff. That the defendant No. 1 was the owner of land measuring 6 Kanals 10 Marlas purchased from Bhagwan Kaur and others. Defendant No. 1 had never validly transferred this suit land to the plaintiff along with any other share, and as absolute owner, he was well within his legal rights to sell the same to Defendant No. 2 through his attorney. A prayer was made for dismissal of the suit. Replication was filed by the plaintiff denying the contents of the written statement.

5. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff has become owner in possession of the suit land on the basis of judgment and decree dated 09.09.1991? OPP

2. Whether the defendant No.2 has become owner of the suit land through sale deed dated 20.10.1994? OPD.

3. Whether the sale deed is void? OPP

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and injunction prayed for? OPP

5. Whether the defendant No.2 is entitled to get his counter claim decree? OPD

5-A Whether the judgment and decree dated 09.09.1991 is result collusiveness, nullity and has not transferred any rights in favour of the plaintiff? OPD

6. Relief.

6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridkot dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 04.09.1998 by giving issue-wise findings. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge who, vide judgment and decree dated 08.01.2001, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court.

7. Still feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff knocked the door of this Court by way of filing a regular second appeal praying that the same be accepted, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff be decreed.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the courts below erred in law in treating the consent decree dated 09.09.1991 as compulsorily registrable. It was argued that the courts proceeded on the erroneous presumption that the decree created a fresh right for the first time. He further submitted that the correct legal test is whether the compromise decree created a right for the first time or merely recognized/declared a pre-existing right or arrangement. Since the appellant is the real nephew of Defendant No. 1 and rendered him services, he had a pre-existing family interest/right, and a consent decree recognizing such an arrangement does not require registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908. Learned counsel relies upon the judgment dated 20.12.2024, passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.14808 of 2024 (arising out of SLP (C) No.4293 of 2021), titled as Mukesh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Another. Lastly, a prayer was made for acceptance of the appeal and for decreeing the suit.

9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have carefully perused the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below along with the evidence available on record.

10. The main question of law that arises for determination in this appeal is whether a consent decree dated 09.09.1991 transferring immovable property worth over Rs.100 in favour of a nephew on account of "services rendered" creates a new right for the first time or merely recognizes a pre-existing right, and whether such a decree is compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

11. Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, any non-testamentary instrument which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish any right, title, or interest of the value of Rs.100 and upwards in immovable property is compulsorily registrable. Although Section 17(2)(vi) exempts court decrees from registration, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh & Ors [(1995) 5 SCC 548] categorically settled the law that the compromise decree creates a right, title, or interest in immovable property worth Rs.100 or above for the first time in favour of a party who had no prior independent legal right or title, the decree is compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908.

12. In the present case, the appellant asserts a pre-existing right based solely on being the real nephew of Defendant No. 1 and having rendered services to him. However, under Hindu Law and general principles of property law, a nephew has no coparcenary, ancestral, or legal right, title, or interest in the self-acquired or exclusive property of his uncle during the uncle's lifetime. Furthermore, "services rendered" may constitute moral consideration, but it does not confer a pre-existing legal title or coparcenary interest in immovable property.

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohammade Yusuf v. Rajkumar [(2020) 10 SCC 264] and Som Dev v. Rati Ram [(2006) 10 SCC 788] reaffirmed that a pre-existing right must be an existing, legally enforceable right recognized by law prior to the suit. Transferring property to a distant relative who possesses no prior title under the guise of "services rendered" or family closeness creates a new right and title for the first time. Therefore, the consent decree dated 09.09.1991 (Exhibit P4) created fresh title in favour of the plaintiff for the first time and was compulsorily registrable.

14. Since the consent decree dated 09.09.1991 was admittedly unregistered, the same could not, by itself, operate as an instrument creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest in the suit land, if the transaction embodied therein was one which required compulsory registration. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, specifically places a restriction on the use of an unregistered document which is required to be registered under Section 17 of the said Act, by providing that such document shall not affect the immovable property comprised therein and shall not be received in evidence so as to prove the transaction affecting such property, except for the limited purposes saved by the proviso to the said section. Therefore, an unregistered consent decree cannot be relied upon for the substantive purpose of establishing that ownership of the suit land stood transferred from Defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff, unless the decree itself falls within the recognised exceptions to the requirement of registration. The mere fact that the decree was followed by Mutation No. 9868 also does not alter the legal position. Mutation proceedings are primarily intended for incorporating a change in the revenue record for fiscal purposes and do not constitute a source of title. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner [(2007) 6 SCC 186] has categorically held that an entry in the revenue record or a mutation does not create or extinguish title in immovable property and that the question of title has to be determined by a competent civil Court on the basis of the substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the recording of the plaintiff's name in Mutation No. 9868, subsequent to the consent decree, could not confer upon him an independent title than what was legally conveyed to him. In the absence of a valid and legally enforceable instrument capable of transferring the ownership of the suit land, the mutation could not divest defendant No. 1 of his existing proprietary rights. Consequently, neither the unregistered consent decree dated 09.09.1991 nor the consequential mutation could, in law, be treated as sufficient to establish transfer of ownership of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the supra authority cited by the counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the case in hand.

15. In the present case, defendant No. 1 remained the absolute legal owner of the suit land and he was fully competent to execute the Special Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No. 3 (Balhar Singh) and defendant No. 3 validly transferred title of the 6 Kanals 10 Marlas of land to defendant No. 2 (Buta Singh) via the registered Sale Deed dated 20.10.1994 for valuable consideration. Since Defendant No. 1 had not been divested of his ownership rights by the unregistered consent decree dated 09.09.1991 or by the subsequent mutation, defendant No. 3, acting as his duly authorised attorney, had the requisite right to effect the sale deed dated 20.10.1994 in favour of defendant No. 2.

16. I find that the verdict given by the Courts below is based upon proper appreciation and correct interpretation of law. Both the Courts below had rejected the claim of the appellant/plaintiff. I do not see any reason to disagree with the Courts below and take a different view and further to interfere with the impugned judgments and decrees. Hence, the same judgments and decrees are upheld.

17. In view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others vs. Chandrika and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh and others (2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs v. Gurcharan Singh (dead) through LRs and others, questions of law are not required to be framed in second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

18. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly.

19. Since the main appeal stands dismissed, the miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

Appeal dismissed.

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