A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Delay of 28 days in giving the complaint – To commit the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC no sane person would take two accomplices, that too after committing a similar offence earlier -- Complainant was not present on both the occasions -- There is no attempt to recover the knife from the appellant as it is a specific case of the prosecution that he committed the offence by threatening to harm the prosecutrix -- No reason as to why the sole eye-witness has not been examined – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 8-13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Statement of prosecutrix -- Evidence of the prosecutrix will have to be kept at a higher pedestal but then, such a testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court -- It has to be seen contextually in the light of the other evidence available.

(Para 10)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 375 Exception 2, 376 – POCSO – Rape – Consensual sex with wife aged above 15 years -- Acquittal of accused -- Incident of August-September, 2012 -- Parents and prosecutrix have not supported the prosecution case -- Prosecutrix specifically denied that she was kidnapped forcibly -- Prosecutrix married to the appellant and have also begotten a child out of the said wedlock -- Sexual act by the appellant with the prosecutrix, who are husband and wife, with the latter being above 15 years of age would not amount to rape as per Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC -- Conviction is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, appellant is directed to be set at liberty.

(Para 4, 8-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Breach of promise to marry – Rape -- Difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise -- In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise -- So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence u/s 376 IPC – Appellant/ accused acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 20-25)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 277 – Language of record of evidence – General direction to all Courts -- Evidence of the witness has to be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness as may be practicable and then get it translated in the language of the court for forming part of the record --  However, recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible -- As such, the text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness -- Original deposition of the witness has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge – Directions given to all courts that while recording the evidence of the witnesses, shall duly comply with the provisions of Section 277 of Cr.PC.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Leave to appeal -- Granting of special leave to appeal against acquittal is a discretionary power.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452, 506, 166, 167 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 12 -- Rape -- Cancellation report in FIR –  Ld. JMIC dismissed the complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Applicant/ prosecutrix was alleged to be raped on 07.01.2016 and 10.02.2016 – She opted to remain silent after alleged incident of 07.01.2016 and approached police on 10.02.2016 i.e. after second incident -- There is gap of one month between first incident and second incident -- Applicant attempted to implicate police officials who did not agree with her complaint -- MLR was not supporting the case of the applicant -- No injury was found over the body of the applicant -- Complainant/applicant failed to make out prima facie case warranting summoning of alleged accused – There is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has dismissed the complaint -- Permission for special leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act -- Same transaction -- While pointing out that the question as to whether a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact -- Core elements like proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design, which are of relevant considerations and when these factors are applied to common sense and ordinary use of language, the vexed question of ‘same transaction’ could be reasonably determined.

(Para 20.3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 220 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 506, 376 – Rape – Threat and abuses – Joint trial for more than one offence – One series of act – Same transaction -- Alleged acts of sexual relationship took place at Delhi in the months of February and March, 2016 -- Other alleged acts of hurling abuses and extending threats in or around the month of November, 2016, which the appellant received over telephone at her village in Chamoli (Uttarakhand) – Acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either -- No allegation of such an activity having continued later or having taken place at Chamoli or even any threat having been extended to the appellant to again submit to such an activity -- Alleged offence u/s 376 IPC and the other offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC do not fall within the ambit of ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 CrPC -- Thus, the learned Sessions Judge, had rightly discharged the accused-respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 IPC for want of territorial jurisdiction.

(Para 22.1-25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 – Acquittal of accused -- Double jeopardy – Accused having gone through the trial in relation to offences u/s 504 and 506 IPC and having been acquitted, cannot be subjected to another trial for the same charges on the same facts -- Any such process would be in blatant disregard of the settled principles which disapprove double jeopardy and are precisely contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as also Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 24.2.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 365, 452, 366, 506 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 3(i), 101(3)(a) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Acquittal of juvenile in rape case – Criminal writ petition against -- Place of occurrence i.e. the shop of the accused is situated in a public place, however, as per the deposition of the victim she was forcibly taken from her home to the shop by forcibly making her to sit on the motorcycle of the accused is also improbable as there was strong possibility of the family members coming to know of the same -- Besides this, the ocular version is not even medically corroborated beyond reasonable doubt -- Once the accused is acquitted there lies double the presumption of innocence in his favour -- Interference can be in a situation when there are perversities in the findings arrived at by the Trial Court -- If there are two views possible then the one favouring the accused should be adopted -- Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and evidence adduced on record on the anvil of the law settled, Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Juvenile Justice Board in acquitting the accused -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376(2) (N), 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Sections 3 (W) (I) and 3 (2) (V) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Rape case – Repeated complaints – Regular bail -- Prosecutrix is a married woman -- She lodged F.I.R. u/s 376 IPC against another person, who has been acquitted in the case -- Further got registered an F.I.R u/s 376 IPC against another, who was also acquitted -- Similarly she got one more F.I.R registered – Petitioner is behind bars for more than eight months and petitioner is not said to have any past criminal record, Court find it a fit case to accept the present petition and grant benefit of regular bail to the petitioner.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Rape with mentally retarded girl -- Acquittal by Trial Court – High Court reversed the judgment and convicted the appellant for 7 years R.I. -- Victim had mild mental retardation and she was not in a position to understand the good and bad aspect of sexual assault – Appellant-accused had taken disadvantage of the mental illness of the victim -- Accused is found to be the biological father of the baby child delivered by the victim -- Despite the above, in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement the case of the accused was of a total denial -- It was never the case of the accused that it was a case of consent -- High Court has rightly observed that case would fall u/s 375 and convicted u/s 376 IPC -- Some contradictions with respect to language known by the victim cannot be said to be the major contradictions to disbelieve the entire medical evidence on the mental status of the victim – High Court is justified in reversing the order of acquittal and convicting the accused for the offences under Sections 376 & 506 IPC -- Imposing the minimum sentence of seven years RI, upheld.

(Para 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – No false promise of marriage – Physical relationship on pretext of marriage -- Allegation of rape -- Acquittal of accused -- Appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship -- Prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles because of different religious beliefs -- An engagement ceremony was also held but unfortunately differences arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the Church or in a Temple and ultimately failed -- Prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant’s family was always very nice to her -- Conviction of the appellant unsustainable and set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – Acquittal in rape case – Leave to appeal – Accused was driver of the official vehicle of husband of prosecutrix – She was pregnant on the date of alleged incident – Prosecutrix and her husband did not report about the alleged incident dated 04.03.2014, to the police, till 02.02.2015 -- Even during the next 15 days after the alleged incident, she kept on accompanying accused in the official vehicle for medical check-up -- There is no corroborative evidence in the shape of medical report, to strengthen the testimony of prosecutrix regarding the alleged rape -- No reliable evidence for continuously giving threats to the prosecutrix, on her mobile phone -- Trial Court appreciated the evidence led by the parties in right perspective, while giving benefit of doubt to respondent No.2/accused -- There is no illegality in the impugned judgment – Application seeking grant of leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 2, 17-19)