Statute Search Listing

307. (P&H HC) 18-07-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A, 148 – Cheque bounce case -- Directions to deposit certain percentage of compensation/fine – Adjustment of amount recovered under 'the SARFAESI Act' – Courts are well within their power to order adjustment -- Amount recovered under the SARFAESI Act shall be deemed to have been adjusted towards 20% of the compensation as ordered by the Court.

(Para 12-23)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 – Cheque bounce case – Interim compensation -- Non-deposit of – It is nowhere, specifically provided in the Act that if the payment as ordered has not been deposited, the bail granted shall be liable to be consequently cancelled – Recovery can be made of such defaulted amount as if it is a fine under Section 421 Cr.P.C. -- During the trial of the case, the Court should not cancel the bail already granted on this ground alone.

(Para 25)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Cheque bounce case -- Directions to deposit certain percentage of compensation/fine – Non-deposit of – Once the legislature or framers of the NI Act have not made any specific provision for automatic cancellation of the bail granted by the trial court or the appellate court on account of default of payment of interim compensation or certain percentage of compensation or fine, it would not be appropriate to hold it otherwise.

(Para 24,25)

314. (SC) 09-04-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Signature not denied on cheque -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Presumption of Complainant being holder of cheque and the signature on the cheque having not been denied by the accused, presumption shall be drawn that cheque was issued for the discharge of any debt or other liability – Presumption u/s 139 is a rebuttable presumption.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Law summarised in following manner:-

(i)      Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

(ii)     The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

(iii)    To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

(iv)    That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

(v)     It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant -- Evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts – Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 24-29)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During the period from 2009 to November, 2011, amount of Rs.18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it was questioned on behalf of the accused -- It was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity -- Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence -- Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 25-28)

315. (SC) 15-03-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Acquittal of accused in cheque bounce case – Setting aside of -- Jurisdiction of Appellate Court -- Ordinarily, the Appellate Court will not be upsetting the judgment of acquittal, if the view taken by Trial Court is one of the possible views of matter and unless the Appellate Court arrives at a clear finding that the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse, i.e., not supported by evidence on record or contrary to what is regarded as normal or reasonable; or is wholly unsustainable in law -- Such general restrictions are essentially to remind the Appellate Court that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt and a judgment of acquittal further strengthens such presumption in favour of the accused -- Same rule with same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence u/s 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt or liability -- Appellate Court is certainly entitled to examine the evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused.

(Para 11.1)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Onus of proof -- Accused-appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques in question -- It is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e., the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt -- Onus, therefore, shifts on the accused-appellant to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption.

(Para 14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Rebuttal of presumption – Probable defence -- On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist.

(Para 16)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Source of fund for loan – Requirement of law – After purportedly drawing the presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act, the Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused -- This approach of the Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law -- After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused-appellant.

(Para 17)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Creation of doubt is not sufficient -- Trial Court proceeded to pass the order of acquittal on the mere ground of 'creation of doubt' -- Trial Court appears to have proceeded on a misplaced assumption that by mere denial or mere creation of doubt, the appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption as envisaged by Section 139 of the NI Act -- In the scheme of the NI Act, mere creation of doubt is not sufficient.

(Para 20)

318. (SC) 06-02-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Object of Section 138 of NI Act -- Object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility to negotiable instruments including cheques and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments including cheques in financial transactions -- Penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque presented two times – Complaint after second default – Permissibility of -- Prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment of the cheque amount is not impermissible simply because no statutory notice had been issued after the first default and no proceeding for prosecution had been initiated.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction of accused – Revisional Jurisdiction of High court -- It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings -- It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Post-dated cheque – Rebuttal of presumption -- Onus to rebut the presumption u/s 139 that the cheque has been issued in discharge of a debt or liability is on the accused -- Fact that the cheque might be post-dated does not absolve the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(Para 36)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20,87,138,139 -- Cheque signed by drawer – Cheque filled by other – Effect of -- It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer -- If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.

(Para 37)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Blank signed cheque – Subsequent filing of cheque by other – Effect of --Rebuttal of presumption – Onus of proof -- Payee may fill up the amount and other particulars, this in itself would not invalidate the cheque -- Onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence -- Subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration.

(Para 38, 42)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Fiduciary relation -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Existence of a fiduciary relationship between the payee of a cheque and its drawer, would not disentitle the payee to the benefit of the presumption u/s 139 of the Act, in the absence of evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion.

(Para 39)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Blank cheque leaf -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption u/s 139 of the Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.

(Para 40)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Friendly loan without receipt – Effect of -- Fact that the loan may not have been advanced by a cheque or demand draft or a receipt might not have been obtained would make no difference.

(Para 41)

330. (P&H HC) 30-10-2018

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141  -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of summoning order and complaint – Maintainability of petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Revisional Jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy available – Objection of -- Held, in exercise of revisional power, Court of Sessions or the High Court is not vested with the power of quashing a criminal complaint -- This power is available to the High Court alone under Section 482 Cr.P.C., whereunder the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, can pass orders to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- Thus, the prayer made in this petition could not have been granted by the revisional Court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Court of Sessions in the first instance.

(Para 5)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Liability of Ex-officio Director -- Every person who was incharge of the business of the Company and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business is vicariously liable apart from the Company itself -- Such a person may be somebody other than a 'Director' so long as he is an officer of the Company -- However, an Ex-officio Director is not liable.

(Para 8)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Ex-officio-Director of the Company -- Petitioner-Director had resigned and cheque in dispute had been issued much later -- For imposing vicarious liability upon the petitioner, as a person responsible for the business of the company, it was necessary to make specific averments in the complaint regarding his role in the conduct of the business of the Company -- No such averment having been made, the Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioner.

(Para 21)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Summoning of accused -- At the stage of summoning of an accused person, the trial Court/Magistrate must be satisfied on the basis of material produced before it that prima facie the accused persons have committed an offence.

(Para 21)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482  -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company – Liability of Director of the Company – Quashing of Complaint and summoning order -- Averment made in the legal notice “You address No. 3 being Chairman/Director of addressee No. 1 are also being incharge and being responsible person of address No. 1 company for conduct to the business of the Company are also liable for the punishment prescribed under the Act ibid.” – Held, averments made in the legal notice u/s 138 of the Act cannot be construed to be averments made in the complaint -- Even the averments made in the legal notice, do not fulfill the requirement of law -- Summoning orders as well as Complaints alongwith consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 25-27)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 204 – Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Summoning of Directors of the Company -- Held in order to reduce litigation it would be appropriate for the concerned Magistrates to seek copies of Form No. 32 and the latest Annual Return filed by the Company so that only those persons who are Directors on the date of commission of the offence are summoned – Directions given that in all cases where the accused is a 'Company', before issuing summons to the accused persons the trial Court/Magistrate shall direct the complainant to produce a copy of Form No. 32 and the annual Return filed by the Company in order to determine the persons, who were Directors on the date of commission of the offence -- In cases where the accused–Director is the Chairman or Managing Director or Joint Managing Director or authorized signatory of the cheque, they may be summoned without any averment regarding their role in the conduct of the affairs of the Company -- For summoning of any other Director or officer of the Company the necessary averment regarding their role in the conduct of the business of the Company, must be insisted upon -- In respect of whole time Directors, mere reproduction of the words of Section 141 of the Act would be sufficient.

(Para 28, 29)

347. (SC) 05-12-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Advocate Client relationship – Issuance of cheque by client – Dishonour of – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Mere issuance of cheque by the client may not debar him from contesting the liability -- If liability is disputed, the advocate has to independently prove the contract.

(Para 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 --Advocate Client relationship – Professional misconduct -- Issuance of cheque by client as percentage – Dishonour of – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Maintainability of -- Claim based on percentage of subject matter in litigation cannot be the basis of a complaint u/s 138 of the Act -- Claim of the respondent advocate being against public policy and being an act of professional misconduct, proceedings in the complaint filed by him have to be held to be abuse of the process of law and have to be quashed -- Issue of professional misconduct is left to be dealt with at the appropriate forum.

(Para 18-20)

C. Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961), Section 35 – Constitution of India, Article 39A -- Advocate Client relationship – Professional misconduct -- Can justice be secured with the legal professionals failing to uphold the professional ethics? -- Commercialization to the extent of exploiting the litigant and misbehavior to the extent of browbeating the Court, breach of professional duties to the court and the litigant on the part of some members of the legal profession, affecting the right of the litigants to speedy and inexpensive justice, need to be checked – Court hoping that the concerned authorities in the Government will take cognizance of the issue of introducing requisite legislative changes for an effective regulatory mechanism to check violation of professional ethics and also to ensure access to legal services which is major component of access to justice mandated under Article 39A of the Constitution.

(Para 23-31)