Search By Topic: Civil Procedural Law

2. (SC) 20-05-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 2(8)(9), 4 – Rejection of plaint -- Benami properties -- Whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception -- It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred -- However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint -- Defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 27-29)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Absolute property of hindu female -- Plea that plaint is hit by Section 14 of the Act -- No such specific plea was taken by the defendants in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- Such a plea was never raised and argued before either of the courts below -- There is no finding by any court on the above aspect -- Defendants cannot be permitted to raise such a plea for the first time in the Special Leave Petition without there being any foundation to that effect.

(Para 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Absolute property of hindu female -- Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner -- It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property -- Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.

(Para 31)

7. (P&H HC) 14-05-2025

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135-140, 145, 150, 154 – Electricity actionable matters -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Purposive interpretation -- All the actionable matters become amenable for exercising of jurisdiction thereover by the statutorily created special authorities/ special bodies -- There is complete ouster of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the Civil Courts.

(Para 30-32, 34)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135, 145, 154 – Theft of electricity – Jurisdiction of Civil court -- Not only in respect of Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act of 2003 but also in respect of the matters falling within the ambit of Section 135 of the Act of 2003, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

(Para 33)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 151A, 153, 154 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Investigation by police – Offences tried by the Special Courts – Summary trial – Cross-examination of witnesses – Permissibility of -- Powers of investigations conferred upon the investigating officers serving in the police stations stems from the mandate enclosed in Section 151-A -- Reports prepared u/s 173 Cr.P.C., are to be filed before the Special Courts – Even a summary trial, does require the assigning of an opportunity to the accused to make effective cross-examination(s) upon the prosecution witnesses, as right to fair trial becomes envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 39-41)

D. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Theft of electricity – Civil liability – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Only pursuant to a binding and conclusive verdict of conviction becoming made by the Special Court, vis-a-vis the errant consumer, the Special Court in terms of sub-Section (5) of Section 154 of the Act of 2003, shall proceed to determine the compensation amount to be paid by the consumer concerned, to the supplier.

(Para 44)

E. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 152, 154(5), 155 – Composition of offence – Civil liability -- Makings of composition(s) of an offence in terms of Section 152 of the Act of 2003, would tantamount to acceptance of the guilt by the errant consumer -- Post the making of an order of composition, if the compounding fee, does not also cover the civil liability, the Court concerned may proceed to determine the civil liability against the errant consumer.

(Para 48)

F. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Prosecution in Special court – Acquittal – Compensation for malicious prosecution – Jurisdiction of civil court -- There is no remedy to the accused, to post the making of a binding and clinching verdict of acquittal by the Special Court -- As such, in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, a suit in the said regard can be laid before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 53)

G. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 145 -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Jurisdiction of High Court – Judicial review -- Jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs of various genres, is a constitutionally invested power, and, the said power is an in-segregable component of judicial review of administrative actions, or of the quasi-judicial actions, besides is the basic structure of the constitution -- As such, the power of judicial review of High Courts cannot be snatched even through the occurrence of Section 145 in the Act of 2003.

(Para 54)

10. (SC) 05-05-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Recall/ further examination of witness – Stage of – Scope of -- If it appears to a court trying the suit at any stage of the proceedings that it is necessary to recall and further examine a witness it can always do so -- This power can be exercised even at the stage of writing a judgment by the court -- Power is to be used for removing ambiguities, for clarifying the statement and not for the purposes of filling up the lacuna in a party's case -- Power can be exercised by the Court at its own initiative and may even be so done at the instance of a party.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17, Section 151 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Recall/ further examination of witness – Cross-examination – Permissibility of -- Section 165 of the Evidence Act provides that a Judge may in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness about any fact relevant -- If the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 are read along with the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is clear that the power to recall and re-examine a witness is exclusively that of the court trying the suit -- The parties to the suit cannot take any objection to the question asked nor can they be permitted to cross-examine any witness without the leave of the court -- If circumstances warrant, an opportunity to a party to re-call a witness for examining, cross-examining or re-examining can be granted by a Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.

(Para 7, 10)

13. (SC) 23-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Bar to appeal -- Proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before the Appellate Court, to attack the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded -- When the fact of compromise is not disputed, the bar in Section 96(3) is absolute.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Bar to appeal -- Compromise terms signed by Counsels -- Challenge to -- Both decrees rest on written compromise terms signed by counsel who held unquestioned vakalatnamas -- Signature of duly authorised counsel is the signature of the party -- Decrees are therefore consent decrees within the meaning of Section 96(3) -- Appellant never invoked the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; instead, she lodged Appeals from Orders on the footing of the deleted Order XLIII Rule 1(m) -- Appellant’s submission that allegations of fraud transform a consent decree into an ordinary decree cannot be accepted -- Fraud, want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs the Trial Court to examine -- Unless and until that route is pursued, the statutory bar in Section 96(3) of the CPC remains operative.

(Para 12, 13)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 1A, 3, 43,  Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Maintainability of Appeal – The CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways -- If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful compromise ever took place, the CPC requires that person to go back to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid -- On the other hand, someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent decree, may approach the Appellate Court in a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, but only after obtaining leave -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create an independent appeal at all.

(Para 15)

15. (SC) 22-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law -- When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one.

(Para 12.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 – First Appeal -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit -- Authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103.

(Para 12.2)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Family property – Burdon of proof -- It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family -- The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property -- If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available -- That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.

(Para 13)

D. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Ancestral property -- For a property to be considered as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the paternal ancestors up to three generations.

(Para 14)

E. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Partiton of ancestral property – Self-acquired property -- As per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish -- After the death of the father, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them -- Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property -- Properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers -- The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as joint family property.

(Para 17-19)

F. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Income and Sale consideration -- Expenses incurred for maintenance, marriage and education of children -- When the income derived from the joint family property or when a joint family property is sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and education within the joint family, the same are to be treated as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so -- Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the children -- That apart, under the customary practices and tradition, it is the father who performs the marriage of his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.

(Para 19.1)

G. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Separate/ self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family – Abandonment of status – From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation.

(Para 20)

16. (SC) 07-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Mandatory or discretionary -- Provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive -- They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory -- If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

(Para 28-30)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Stage of – Right of -- Rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim -- This can be done at any stage -- Plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence -- Defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

(Para 39)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 – Partial judgment/ decree on admissions – Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim” -- Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff -- In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Judgment on admissions – A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final.

(Para 43)

29. (SC) 17-01-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Annulment of decree – Power of -- A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed -- Decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree -- Power u/s 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it -- Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Decree of appellate Court – Execution of -- Once the High Court as an appellate court in second appeal renders its judgment it is a decree of the second appellate court which becomes executable.

(Para 34)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 28, 35(c) – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Modification of decree -- When time for payment of money is extended, it does not mean a modification of the decree -- Trial court has power to extend the time, and the expression “such further period as the court may allow” would mean the court which had passed the decree, or, where the application u/s 28 of the Act of 1963, is filed.

(Para 44, 45)

30. (SC) 17-01-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Breach of injunction -- Imprisonment of a judgment-debtor – Attachment of property -- Once it is proved that J.D. had wilfully and with impunity disobeyed an order of injunction, the court owes it to itself to make the judgment-debtor realise that it does not pay to defy a decree of a court -- Court’s power under Order 21, Rule 32 is no more than a procedural aid to the harried decree-holder -- But the court has to record a finding that the judgment-debtor wilfully disobeyed or failed to comply with the decree in spite of opportunity afforded to him -- Absence of such finding is a serious infirmity vitiating the order.

(Para 44, 45)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Continuous breach of injunction – Res-judicata --  Each breach of injunction is independent and actionable in law making the judgment-debtor answerable -- Where there are successive breaches of decree, the judgment-debtor can be dealt with on every such breach and the doctrine of res judicata has no application.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Onus to prove of  willful disobedience -- Onus of placing materials before the executing Court for enabling it to record a finding that the person against whom the order of detention is sought, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree for injunction, but has wilfully disobeyed it, lies on the person seeking such order of detention, lest the person seeking deprivation of the liberty of another cannot do so without fully satisfying the Court about its need.

(Para 50)

D. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Detention of Judgment debtor – Revisional jurisdiction -- High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must ascertain before interfering with any order passed by a subordinate court or tribunal whether the same suffers from any jurisdictional error -- Court should be guided by its conscience, more particularly keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and not strictly go by the term “jurisdictional error” -- It is very easy for the High Court to say that there is no jurisdictional error and, therefore, no interference is warranted but before saying so, the High Court should be mindful of the consequences that would follow like arrest, detention in civil prison and attachment of property.

(Para 53)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Attachment of property -- Opportunity of hearing -- Executing court should have been a little more considerate while declining even to take the objections on record and give one opportunity of hearing to the appellants before passing the order of arrest, detention in a civil prison and attachment of the property -- This aspect overlooked even by the High Court while affirming the order passed by the executing court -- Supervisory jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is meant to take care of such situations -- Impugned orders set aside.

(Para 59, 60)