Search By Topic: Civil Procedural Law

103. (SC) 23-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Bar to appeal -- Proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before the Appellate Court, to attack the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded -- When the fact of compromise is not disputed, the bar in Section 96(3) is absolute.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Bar to appeal -- Compromise terms signed by Counsels -- Challenge to -- Both decrees rest on written compromise terms signed by counsel who held unquestioned vakalatnamas -- Signature of duly authorised counsel is the signature of the party -- Decrees are therefore consent decrees within the meaning of Section 96(3) -- Appellant never invoked the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; instead, she lodged Appeals from Orders on the footing of the deleted Order XLIII Rule 1(m) -- Appellant’s submission that allegations of fraud transform a consent decree into an ordinary decree cannot be accepted -- Fraud, want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs the Trial Court to examine -- Unless and until that route is pursued, the statutory bar in Section 96(3) of the CPC remains operative.

(Para 12, 13)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43, Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Maintainability of Appeal – The CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways -- If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful compromise ever took place, the CPC requires that person to go back to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid -- On the other hand, someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent decree, may approach the Appellate Court in a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, but only after obtaining leave -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create an independent appeal at all.

(Para 15)

105. (SC) 22-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law -- When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one.

(Para 12.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 – First Appeal -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit -- Authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103.

(Para 12.2)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Family property – Burdon of proof -- It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family -- The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property -- If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available -- That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.

(Para 13)

D. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Ancestral property -- For a property to be considered as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the paternal ancestors up to three generations.

(Para 14)

E. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Partition of ancestral property – Self-acquired property -- As per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish -- After the death of the father, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them -- Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property -- Properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers -- The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as joint family property.

(Para 17-19)

F. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Income and Sale consideration -- Expenses incurred for maintenance, marriage and education of children -- When the income derived from the joint family property or when a joint family property is sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and education within the joint family, the same are to be treated as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so -- Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the children -- That apart, under the customary practices and tradition, it is the father who performs the marriage of his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.

(Para 19.1)

G. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Separate/ self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family – Abandonment of status – From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation.

(Para 20)

106. (SC) 07-04-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Mandatory or discretionary -- Provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive -- They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory -- If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

(Para 28-30)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Stage of – Right of -- Rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim -- This can be done at any stage -- Plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence -- Defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

(Para 39)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 – Partial judgment/ decree on admissions – Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim” -- Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff -- In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Judgment on admissions – A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final.

(Para 43)

110. (H.P. HC) 20-03-2025

A. CCS Pension Rules, 1972, Rule 56 – Regularization of daily wage employee – Pensionary  benefits -- Petitioner was engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and his services were regularized thereafter -- Petitioner shall be deemed to have retired on attaining the age of 60 years i.e. w.e.f. 12.07.2012 – A period of two years is to be added towards the qualifying service of petitioner to the period of 7 years 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner rendered total eligible regular service of 9 years, 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner has rendered more than 8 years of service though less than 10 years of service and for such reason his service is to be reckoned as 10 years, which makes him qualified for pensionary benefits.

(Para 11-17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2—Constructive res-judicata -- Petitioner approached the Court in the year 2014 for grant of benefit of work charge/regularization -- His petition was not decided on merits and directions were issued to the competent authority to consider the case of the petitioner -- It was on such consideration that the benefit of work charge and regularization was granted to the petitioner -- Once the petitioner got such benefit, he immediately made a claim for pensionary benefits in the year 2015 which was finally rejected by the respondents in the year 2019 -- Petition cannot be said to suffer from principle of constructive res judicata or Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as the petitioner had sought the relief of pensionary benefits at the first available opportunity.

(Para 18)

120. (SC) 13-02-2025

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Cancellation of allotment -- Forfeiture of amount – Suit for declaration that cancellation was null and void -- HUDCO was in breach of several obligations as contemplated in the Allotment Letter, viz. failure to execute documents for securing approval under the ULCR Act and the IT Act; failure to execute the sub lease agreement in favour of the Appellant and; failure to secure the approval of the revised layout plan for the construction of the hotel -- It is a settled position of law that a commercial document ought not to be interpreted in a manner that arrives at a complete variance with what may originally have been the intention of the parties -- Respondent No. 1/HUDCO, was in breach of its reciprocal contractual obligations, thereby disentitling them from forfeiting the monies already paid by the Appellant towards the first instalment as enshrined in Clause 5 (iii) of the Allotment Letter – Appellant has blatantly engaged in forum shopping, and considering that their overall conduct does not in any manner reflect an approach aligning with the clean hands doctrine, they are not entitled to grant of any discretionary relief of interest in their favour -- Appellant held entitled to a refund of the principal amount, without any interest.

(Para 42-47, 60)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 34 – Interest -- It is trite law that u/s 34 of the CPC, the award of interest is a discretionary exercise steeped in equitable considerations.

(Para 49)

123. (SC) 17-01-2025

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28 – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Annulment of decree – Power of -- A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed -- Decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree -- Power u/s 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it -- Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Decree of appellate Court – Execution of -- Once the High Court as an appellate court in second appeal renders its judgment it is a decree of the second appellate court which becomes executable.

(Para 34)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28  – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Modification of decree -- When time for payment of money is extended, it does not mean a modification of the decree -- Trial court has power to extend the time, and the expression “such further period as the court may allow” would mean the court which had passed the decree, or, where the application u/s 28 of the Act of 1963, is filed.

(Para 44, 45)

124. (SC) 17-01-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Breach of injunction -- Imprisonment of a judgment-debtor – Attachment of property -- Once it is proved that J.D. had wilfully and with impunity disobeyed an order of injunction, the court owes it to itself to make the judgment-debtor realise that it does not pay to defy a decree of a court -- Court’s power under Order 21, Rule 32 is no more than a procedural aid to the harried decree-holder -- But the court has to record a finding that the judgment-debtor wilfully disobeyed or failed to comply with the decree in spite of opportunity afforded to him -- Absence of such finding is a serious infirmity vitiating the order.

(Para 44, 45)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Continuous breach of injunction – Res-judicata --  Each breach of injunction is independent and actionable in law making the judgment-debtor answerable -- Where there are successive breaches of decree, the judgment-debtor can be dealt with on every such breach and the doctrine of res judicata has no application.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Onus to prove of  willful disobedience -- Onus of placing materials before the executing Court for enabling it to record a finding that the person against whom the order of detention is sought, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree for injunction, but has wilfully disobeyed it, lies on the person seeking such order of detention, lest the person seeking deprivation of the liberty of another cannot do so without fully satisfying the Court about its need.

(Para 50)

D. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Detention of Judgment debtor – Revisional jurisdiction -- High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must ascertain before interfering with any order passed by a subordinate court or tribunal whether the same suffers from any jurisdictional error -- Court should be guided by its conscience, more particularly keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and not strictly go by the term “jurisdictional error” -- It is very easy for the High Court to say that there is no jurisdictional error and, therefore, no interference is warranted but before saying so, the High Court should be mindful of the consequences that would follow like arrest, detention in civil prison and attachment of property.

(Para 53)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Attachment of property -- Opportunity of hearing -- Executing court should have been a little more considerate while declining even to take the objections on record and give one opportunity of hearing to the appellants before passing the order of arrest, detention in a civil prison and attachment of the property -- This aspect overlooked even by the High Court while affirming the order passed by the executing court -- Supervisory jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is meant to take care of such situations -- Impugned orders set aside.

(Para 59, 60)

142. (SC) 19-11-2024

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 5 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Pleadings – Plea of Adverse possession – Admission of title -- Appellants did not specifically deny the plaintiffs' ownership of the suit property -- Instead, they primarily relied on the plea of adverse possession -- Allegations of fact not denied specifically are deemed to be admitted -- By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs' title.

(Para 8.1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 – Presumption of revenue record -- Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness -- While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.

(Para 8.2)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Onus of proof -- In a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership -- Plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries – Appellants/ defendants failed to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically and instead relied on adverse possession, the burden has shifted to the appellants/ defendant to prove their adverse possession.

(Para 9)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession of State -- It is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens -- Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government -- Therefore, the State/ appellants' plea of adverse possession is untenable in law.

(Para 10, 11)

E. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- Placing bitumen drums, erecting temporary structures, and constructing a boundary wall in 1980 do not constitute adverse possession -- Adverse possession requires possession that is continuous, open, peaceful, and hostile to the true owner for the statutory period.

(Para 12)