A. Indian Easement Act, 1882 (V of 1882), Section 52 – License – Licensee – Defendants are occupying the disputed premises on the basis of permission granted by its owners, who are the real brothers or their legal representatives, without any condition to pay any rent – Since there is no lease nor any rent deed, it is nothing more than a license, which means to give a license or permit a person to occupy when the land owner allows to do work or perform an act on the land owner’s property – Visitor has a license to enter into the property – This kind of license need not be written, signed and registered – It may be oral or it may be implied by the relationship or actions of the parties.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2 – Ex-parte Decree – Compromise Decree – Decree after contest – Binding effect -- A decree of a Court of law either passed after contest or passed without contest or passed ex-parte or passed on the basis of compromise or any other form is a decree, which is, by all means, binding on all the Courts.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2 – Compromise decree – Change of Presiding officer – Effect of -- Trial Court declared the said decree as void and non-est and is not binding upon the court -- This is obviously perverse, as the decree has been passed by the same Court -- Though, the Presiding Officer might have been changed, yet 'Court' means 'Court' and not the Presiding Officer -- In either case, the said decree was passed by a co-ordinate Bench, which has not been challenged anywhere, nor even in present suit, thus, it has attained finality.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Easement Act, 1882 (V of 1882), Section 52 – Licensee – Compromise decree – Non-registration of – Objection to -- A licensee has no right to claim that any memorandum of understanding of family settlement among the owners was not registered, and the suit filed on the basis of it earlier, was not maintainable, in which the defendants were not parties nor their right or title has been affected by that decree.

(Para 12)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 9 Rule 6, 13 – Arrears of Rent – Ex-parte ejectment order -- Non-supply of ejectment petition alongwith summons is merely an irregularity cannot be ground for setting aside ex-parte ejectment order.

For the sake of argument, even if it is  presumed that no copy of the ejectment petition was received by the tenant-petitioner, it would at best be a mere irregularity within the meaning of proviso to Rule 8 of Order IX of the Code because on 8.8.1997 the tenant-petitioner was apprised that the date of appearance before the Court is 23.8.1997, as has been held by this Court in Dev Karan's case (supra).  Therefore, no ground is provided to set aside the impugned order.

 (Para 8)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i) – Arrears of Rent – Deposit of – Question of grant of opportunity to the tenant would not arise who has refused to appear before the court after summons have been duly served upon him alongwith ejectment petition – Benefit of Rakesh Wadhawan’s case, 2002(1) RCR 514 is not available.

The argument of learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner based on the judgment in the case of Rakesh Wadhawan's case (supra) would not be available because the question of grant of opportunity would not arise to a tenant who has refused to appear before the Court after summons have been duly served on him along with a copy of the ejectment petition.  It is evident that he was aware of the date of appearance before the Court which was fixed for 23.8.1997 and the summons were served on him on 8.8.1997.  There was ample opportunity given but the tenant-petitioner has failed to avail it.  In such an eventuality, the principles laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Wadhawan's case (supra) would not be attracted.  The argument is wild and is imaginative.

 (Para 9)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13, 15(5) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1 Rule 10 – Necessary party – Ejectment petition against the tenant – Application by another person for impleading him as party, claiming possession as tenant under some one else – Not a necessary party to be impleaded as no relief has been clamed by the landlord against him – Landlord/Petitioner is dominus litus and cannot be compelled to fight litigation against him.

(Para 4)

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 11 – Code of Civil Procedure, Section 11 – Resjudicata – In earlier petition the Assistant Collector held that the petitioners are not in illegal occupation and that the suit land does not fall within the definition of Shamlat Deh – Subsequent application by Gram Panchayat u/s 11 read with section 7 would not operate as resjudicata because Gram Panchayat was not the party in the earlier petition.

(Para 6)

A. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 15(6) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 9, Rule 6(1)(a), 7 – On the date fixed for service of summons the Court declared that service is complete – From the endorsement made on the summons, it is clear that the sub-tenant was not interested in contesting the case – There cannot be any other conclusion except that he was proceeded ex-parte – Merely, there is no specific order in this regard is no ground for setting aside ex-parte proceedings.

 (Para 7)

B. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 15(6) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1 Rule 10, Order 6 Rule 17, Order 9, Rule 6(1)(a), 7 – Ex-parte proceedings -- Ex-parte proceedings initiated against the sub-tenant – During the pendency of the case, suit property was sold – Not necessary to issue fresh notice, on application moved by Vendee under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 6 Rule 17.

(Para 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 15(6) -- Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 47, Order 21 Rule 97 -- Execution -- Objection -- Order of ejectment passed -- Execution proceedings initiated – Objections raised under Section 47 of the Code, rejected – Again objections under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code, raised, which were either subject matter of the judgement and decree or objection raised under 47 of the Code -- Objection cannot be allowed to be raised again and again -- Petition dismissed with cost Rs. 10,000/-.

The judgement debtor petitioner has sheerly mis-used the process of the Court as the ejectment order has already been passed on 16.12.1997 which has been upheld by this Court in C.R. No. 832 of 1998 decided on 2.11.1999. The rent receipts produced by him (Exs. R-1 to R-3) were found to be forged. Thereafter the judgement debtor petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition which was dismissed. The decree holder respondents filed the execution petition against the judgement debtor petitioner being execution No. 323 of 2000 instituted on 9.12.2000. The judgement debtor petitioner raised same objections under Section 47 of the Code which have again been raised under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code. Those objections were dismissed on 3.4.2001 and his revision petition being C.R. No.2411 of 2001 was dismissed by this Court on 20.2.2002. He filed and withdrew S.L.P. No. 12828 of 2002 on 26.7.2002. It has also been found by the executing Court that the objection sought to be raised before the executing Court under Order XX1 Rule 97 of the Code were the same which were either the subject matter of consideration in the judgement and decree dated 16.12.1997 or the objection petition filed under Section 47 of the Code which was dismissed on 3.4.2001 and upheld by this Court on 20.2.2002. It is well settled that similar objections either under one provision or the other cannot be permitted to be raised time and again. In this regard reliance may be placed on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and another 2003 (8) S.C.C. 289. In that case also what was decided in the ejectment proceedings and later in the execution petition was sought to be raised again.

When the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur’ case (supra) are applied to the facts of the present case, the alleged compromise dated 31.5.2000 has already been adjudicated upon when the judgement debtor petitioner filed objections under Section 47 of the Code and those objections were dismissed on 3.4.2001. As already observed in the preceding paras his revision petition was dismissed by this Court on 20.2.2002. The other objection with regard to the receipt dated 30.10.1986 and 5.1.1987 or the municipal record have already been adjudicated upon by the Appellate Authority in its ejectment order dated 16.12.1997 as upheld by this Court in its order dated 2.11.1999 passed in C.R. No. 832 of 1998. Infact the judgement debtor petitioner has made all efforts to put off the execution of the judgement and decree dated 16.12.1997 on one pretext or the other. The observations of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur’s case (supra) shows that such a delaying tactics should not permitted to succeed as the same are wholly frivolous and vexatious. Therefore, this petition is nothing else but a frivolous piece of litigation with a malafide motive to delay the execution of the decree.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/-.  

 (Paras 9-10-11)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 15 – Revisional jurisdiction -- In the revisional jurisdiction conferred by the Section 15 of the Act, the court can examine the legality as also proprietary of the order passed by the concerned authority.

(Para 8)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(v) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908), Order 26 Rules 9 and 10 -- Ceased to occupy – Ex-parte Local Commissioner’s Report -- Local Commissioner was appointed and he visited the demised shop without giving notice to the opposite party – Shop found locked – He was examined in the court and cross-examined as well – Report cannot be discarded on this ground alone that no notice was issued to the opposite party – Ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller restored.

There is no embargo in the rules aforesaid to appoint a Local Commissioner without first issuing notice to the other side. Ex-parte appointment of the Local Commissioner, who may even submit his report without issuing notice to other party, is permissible under the law. All that is required in such matters is that the report of Local Commissioner would not become admissible or relied upon unless the Local Commissioner is examined in Court giving adequate opportunity to the other party to cross-examine him. In the present case, it is conceded position that Local Commissioner was examined as AW4 and was cross-examined as well. If the report of the Local Commissioner, who may visit the spot without notice to the other party, is discarded on that ground alone, the same would defeat the very purpose of appointing a Local Commissioner in the cases, as the one in hand, inasmuch as the other party, after coming to know of the visit of Local Commissioner, would only open the lock of the shop, thus, defeating the cause of its adversary.

 (Para 9)  

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(iii) – Eviction -- Material alteration – Tenant  admitted opening of a door in the wall adjoining another shop – It is possible only by breaking a common wall, which would certainly impair value and utility of the building – The shop as such lose its identity being a single shop – Tenant liable to be evicted.

On the dint of the evidence led by the parties and, in particular, that once the respondent had admitted the opening of a door from the adjoining shop, in considered view of this Court, second ground seeking eviction was proved to the hilt. An opening of the door from the adjoining shop, as mentioned above, has since been admitted. That the said adjoining shop belongs to some body else, is also an admitted position. The opening of the door from an adjoining shop could only be by breaking the common wall and that would certainly result in diminishing the value of the shop beyond measures. The shop as such would lose its identity being a single shop. This kind of alteration would obviously materially impair the value and utility of the shop, thus, entailing an order of eviction on the second ground pleaded in the petition for eviction.

(Para 10)

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section, 2(g)(ii-a), 7 – Amended by Punjab Act No. 8 of 1995 – Scope thereof – The word “transfer” mentioned in clause (ii-a) would not mean leasing the land for a limited period -- The transfer has to be by a sale -- The words “by any other manner whatsoever” as mentioned in the clause would means analogous to a sale -- A perpetual lease or a lease for a period of 99 years, which virtually means sale, may come within the sweep of clause (ii-a), lease for a period of 10 years, would certainly not be covered by the said clause.

 (Para 7)  

B. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 11 – Res-Judicata – Dismissal of earlier two application for ejectment of the Panchayat -- Applications were not decided on merit – Principle of res-judicata, therefore not applicable.

(Para 10)

C. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 111(g) – Lessee – Title of the landlord -- Petitioner after expiry of the lease involved the Gram Panchayat in multifarious litigations, based upon contradictory stands  -- Being the Lessee, tenant cannot deny the title of their landlord – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 11)

Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), Section 39 – Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 (46 of 1959), Section 6, 7, 8(2) – Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 370 -- National Saving Certificates – Nominee -- Effect on succession -- Language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law – It is difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee -- Though language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is different than the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same -- Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased -- Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder -- Nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of national savings certificates received by him u/s 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, 1959. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 8, 15.

(Para 11, 13)