Search By Topic: Evidence Law

9. (P&H) 04-04-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Withholding of evidence -- Adverse inference – Presumption -- Section 114 enables the Court to presume existence of certain facts, which includes drawing of adverse inference particularly when the evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it -- Such presumption can be drawn only if the party intentionally withholds the best evidence.

(Para 6)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Non-examination of Landlady -- Adverse inference -- In each and every case, mere non-appearance of landlady/ landlord in the witness box would not necessarily require the Court to draw adverse inference -- It depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

(Para 7)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 – Non-examination of Landlady -- Adverse inference -- Landlady’s husband, who is also residing with her, appeared in evidence -- He has answered all the questions, which were put to him in his cross-examination -- Courts have not erred in refusing to draw adverse inference – Revision dismissed.

(Para 7, 11)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Eviction petition -- Titel of landlord -- Rent proceedings are summary and the landlord is not required to prove his title as in the civil case.

(Para 10)

15. (P&H) 30-01-2024

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Interference in finding on facts – Sub-clause No.(c) of Section 41 (1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, enables the High Court for the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, to reappreciate the evidence, if the decision is suffering from substantial error or defect resulting in defect in the decision of the case -- Consequently, it is permissible for the Court while deciding second appeal to re-appreciate the evidence if the decisions of the Courts suffer from perversity --  However, it is not permissible to interfere if two views are possible -- Interference in the second appeal has to be restricted to rare and exceptional cases where the court finds that the findings of fact stand vitiated by erroneous approach based on miss application of evidence or reliance on inadmissible evidence.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 73 – Agreement to sell – Handwriting expert -- It is well settled that invariably the Handwriting and Finger Print Expert gives a favourable opinion to the person who has engaged him – U/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Presiding Judge is not debarred from carefully comparing the signatures and finger prints on various documents -- Adverse inference could not be drawn against the defendants for failure to examine Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert.

(Para 27(17))

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32, 33 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C was neither relevant nor admissible in evidence as the plaintiff failed to fulfill the requirements of Section 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 27(18))

D. Agreement to sell -- Examination of the regular scribe was important.

(Para 27(21))

20. (SC) 04-01-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Normal approach in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C – Involvement of accused during deposition -- If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C – Improved fact during deposition -- Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation -- The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance.

(Para 26)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 136 -- Illiterate witness – Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses -- It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence -- If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- PW-5, a chance witness was in his village, answering the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen the accused persons going in a jeep -- The side-on view would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they were travelling in a jeep – It is not safe to rely on this testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping after having murdered his wife.

(Para 29)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Explanation u/s 313 Cr.P.C. -- Main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence – There was alive a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s 313 CrPC, and it is sufficient to create a doubt.

(Para 30)

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Evidential value -- Statement of an accused under Section 313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and, secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an opportunity to cross examine the accused – It cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

(Para 32, 33)

25. (P&H) 04-12-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- Preserving and requisitioning of the call details and tower location details would be necessary, otherwise the same would be lost forever -- Right of accused to invoke the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C. for obtaining documents in support of his defence has been recognized by the Constitutional Courts -- Legislative intent behind enactment of Section 91 Cr.P.C. is to ensure that no cogent material or evidence involved in the issue remains undiscovered in unearthing the true facts during investigation, enquiry, trial or other proceedings.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- While passing the appropriate direction for preserving and production of call details/tower location details under Section 91 Cr.P.C. would violate the right to privacy of the police officials but the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in ensuring free and fair investigation/trial would prevail over the right to privacy of the police officials.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- Denial of an adequate opportunity to the accused by non-production of the electronic record, which is admissible under Section 65-A and 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act in criminal trial, would amount to miscarriage of justice -- Power under 91 Cr.P.C. must be exercised for production of such evidence, which would assist the Court in discovering the truth in the pursuit of justice.

(Para 9)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Preserving of call details and tower location – Right of accused -- As principles of natural justice are integral part of fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, any denial of the best available evidence or effective and substantial hearing to accused in proving defence would amount to denial of free and fair trial.

(Para 10)

29. (SC) 08-11-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Murder -- Extra-judicial confession -- Extra judicial confession before PW-2 and PW-3/ real brothers of deceased -- It is not brought on record by the prosecution that the appellant/ accused had any relationship with both of them -- Normally, an accused would make a confessional statement before a person in whom he has implicit faith -- In the normal course, an accused would not make a confessional statement before the real brothers of the deceased -- When prosecution relies upon the evidence of extra judicial confession, normally, the Court will expect that the evidence of the persons before whom extra judicial confession is allegedly made, must be of sterling quality – Theory of extra judicial confession discarded – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 7, 8, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Blood stains on clothes of different Blood Group – Recovery of axe – Not believed -- Serology Report on record that the clothes on the person of the deceased were having blood stains of 'O' group -- As regards the trouser of the appellant, the opinion was inconclusive but as regards the other two items of clothes, it was found that the blood was of 'A' group -- This militates against the case of the prosecution that the blood stains on the clothes of the appellant were of the blood of the deceased -- Recovery of the axe at the instance of the appellant is of no relevance, as according to PW-2 and PW-3, the appellant was carrying a stick -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 9-11)

30. (P&H) 03-11-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery during police custody – Admission of guilt -- Evidential value -- It is only the factum of recovery of the articles which can be taken into account and the statement made, if any, while getting the articles recovered which is to the effect of admission of guilt is to be discarded.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Knowledge of PW/ Lambardar is in the nature of hear-say evidence that he had actually overheard some persons naming appellant as the murderer -- PW-3 with whom extra-judicial confession made stepped into the witness box did not support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile -- Recovery of the auto-rickshaw on its own cannot be said to be an incriminating piece of evidence – Nothing on record either to show that the blood stain found on the recovered ‘datar’ and on the cardigan were of the same blood group or that the same matched with the blood group of the deceased – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 21-25)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Law postulates two-fold requirements before reliance can be placed upon the same :

(i) Every link in the chain of the circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

(ii) All the circumstances must be consistent pointing only towards the guilt of the accused.

(Para 22)

31. (SC) 27-09-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration -- A conviction can be solely recorded on the basis of dying declaration -- Court must come to a conclusion that the dying declaration is trustworthy, reliable and one which inspires confidence.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 -- Dying declaration -- Dying declaration recorded by Executive Magistrate -- Deceased received burn injuries on 5th November 1991 but the dying declaration recorded on 8th November 1991 after an application was made by the relatives of the deceased to the SDM -- Boys, who had brought the application containing the order of the SDM had told him that the statement of the deceased should be recorded and that she was in a position to make the statement -- Those boys told him that whatever they had to tell the deceased, they had told her -- Those 2-3 boys related to the deceased and some other persons were also in the room in which he recorded the statement of the deceased – There is a grave doubt as to whether the dying declaration recorded was a voluntary one or tutored -- Executive Magistrate had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased on 8th November 1991 at 04.40 p.m. whereas the opinion with regard to her fitness was given by him at 06.00 p.m. on 8th November 1991 – It cannot be said that the dying declaration is free from doubt.

(Para 11-14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Dying declaration -- High Court disbelieved the dying declaration insofar as father-in-law of the deceased is concerned – Court failed to understand as to how the same dying declaration could have been made basis for conviction of the appellant when the same was disbelieved insofar as another accused is concerned -- For harassment with regard to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry, except the vague allegation, there is nothing in their evidence to support the prosecution case -- No evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was harassed on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry -- Case u/s 304-B of IPC is not made out by the prosecution – Judgment of conviction set aside -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-18)

43. (SC) 07-08-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If the accused are already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9, 105 -- Circumstantial evidence – Appellants already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful -- Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the mobile used by the accused to show that their location was at the place of incident -- Mobile numbers alleged to have been used by accused is not in his name but one person resident of Kanpur -- No evidence placed on record to show as to how the said SIM came to be in possession of the accused – Apart from that, if at the time of the incident both accused were at the same place and according to the prosecution inside the house of the deceased, and they were talking to each other on telephone, this itself creates a doubt on the prosecution version -- Evidence with regard to last seen theory is totally unreliable -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 14, 15, 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Guilt of accused – Circumstantial evidence -- Circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established -- Facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty -- Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused -- It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 18, 19)

47. (Delhi) 31-07-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor – Re-summoning of POCSO victim for cross-examination -- Bar u/s 33(5) POCSO Act may not be absolute and balance of rights needs to be maintained u/s 33(5) of POCSO Act and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. -- Court’s discretion in exercising its power to re-summon a witness for cross-examination has to be exercised with circumspection, caution and utmost sensitivity – Crucial word used in Section 33(5) of POCSO Act is “called repeatedly” -- This Section thus has to be interpreted to balance and applied with the right u/s 311 Cr.P.C. of accused and right to fair trial of an accused depending on facts and circumstances of each case.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Rape with minor -- Re-examination of POCSO victim for cross-examination – Change of counsel -- Victim was only seven years of age at the time of incident in the year 2016 -- Child victim re-lived the trauma of perverse sexual assault upon her at a very tender age of seven years, once, when she was sexually assaulted, thereafter while recording her statement before the police and u/s 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate and thereafter before the learned Trial Court while recording her evidence – Victim cannot be directed to appear once again after six years to depose about the same incident, only on the ground that the previous counsel had cross-examined the witness in a manner which the new counsel does not find sufficient or appropriate -- Change of counsel cannot be a ground for re-summoning of the witnesses -- Though the accused has to be granted and ensured a fair trial, it cannot mean being afforded unjustified repeated opportunities of cross-examination in every case to indicate fair trial.

(Para 13-21)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned.

(Para 14)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Misuse of POCSO law – Ground of -- Any law, whether gender based or not, has the potential of being misused -- Legislature cannot stop enacting laws nor judiciary can stop applying such laws since they have been enacted to curb the larger menace of commission of such offences and getting justice to genuine victims.

(Para 15)

48. (P&H) 27-07-2023

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Execution of Will – Proof of -- A person propounding the Will has to prove that the Will was duly and validly executed -- That cannot be done simply by proving that the signatures on the Will were that of the testator but it must also be proved that attestations were also made properly as required by Section 63 of the Act, 1925 -- One attesting witness so examined should be in a position to prove the execution of Will – Such witness in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a Will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove due execution of the Will.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Execution of Will – Proof of -- Test to be applied is test of satisfaction of a prudent mind -- What is required to be seen is whether the propounder of the Will has produced satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator who at the relevant time was in a sound or disposing state of mind, understood the nature and effect of the disposition and had put his signatures/thumb impressions with his own free Will.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Execution of Will – Onus on propounder -- A person challenging the Will alleging fabrication, fraud, undue influence or coercion has to prove such pleas but it is also well settled that even in the absence of such pleas, it is a part of initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubt in the matter.

(Para 15)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Execution of Will – Suspicious circumstances -- A circumstance is suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation -- While applying the test of satisfaction of judicial conscience, with regard to execution of a Will, the Court has to address itself to the solemn question as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of dispositions of the Will.

(Para 15)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65, 68 -- Will -- Secondary evidence -- As per Section 65 of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of a document, when the original has been lost or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his/her own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time -- Once the appellant was allowed to prove the Will by way of secondary evidence and once she had examined the attesting witness of this Will as a witness, the requirement of law for formal proof of this document had been fulfilled.

(Para 16)