Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18, Rule 17A – Additional evidence in rebuttal -- Categoric stand of the defendant in the written statement was that the agreement to sell was false, frivolous and a fabricated document -- Onus to prove the agreement to sell was on the plaintiff -- Attorney of the defendant-respondent stepped into the witness box and the documents were not put to the said attorney -- Held, bonafides on the part of the plaintiff-petitioner are questionable, he chose not to produce them in the affirmative -- No valid or cogent reasons are coming forth for not producing the documents earlier – Order dismissing application for leading additional evidence moved by plaintiff-petitioner affirmed.

(Para 5-7)

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), Section 16(1)(a)(i) -- Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Rule 14 – Sample in clean and dry bottle – Non-compliance of – Acquittal of accused -- Sample for the purposes of analysis has to be taken in clean and dry bottles -- Any violation would render the results of the analysis unreliable, therefore, due procedure must be followed under the rules – Equity demands that there must atleast be some evidence or supporting material to the effect that the jars were clean at the time of taking the samples -- In the absence of any testimony of any person, who had cleaned the jars, the only inference which can be drawn is that the jars were not cleaned at the time of taking of the sample for which the Court below rightly gave the benefit of doubt to the accused – Appeal against acquittal dismissed.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination -- Evidence untested by cross-examination can have no value but the evidence cannot be rejected as inadmissible.

(Para 3, 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination – Evidence is admissible but the weight to be attached to such evidence should depend on the circumstances of each case and that though in some cases the Court may act upon it, if there is other evidence on record, its probative value may be very small and may even be disregarded.

(Para 3, 11)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Examination-in-chief – Witness died after part cross-examination -- Court should look at the evidence carefully to see whether there are indications that by a complete cross-examination the testimony of the witness was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith to be successfully impeached -- If the evidence is inadmissible the Court is not entitled to consider it at all whereas if it admissible the Court must decide on the circumstances of each case whether any weight should be attached to it or not.

(Para 3, 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – High speed of car itself is not an offence -- Testimony that the offending car came from the opposite side and struck against the motorcycle, all witnesses clearly stated that the car was being driven at high speed -- None of them whispered even a single word as to how the car was being driven in rash or negligent manner -- Accident took place on a wide road, driving car on such road at high speed, in itself does not amount to rash or negligent driving – Conviction set aside.

(Para 7-13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Apparent from the testimony of eye-witnesses projected by the prosecution i.e. PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 that none of them saw the petitioner-accused driving the car at the spot -- Test Identification got conducted in the police station is of no relevance, as only accused was shown to PW-9 -- Identification of the accused for the first time in the Court, when the witnesses did not have the opportunity to see the face of the driver of the offending vehicle at the spot, is of no significance -- As per the FIR version, the car driver had fled from the spot after talking to ‘S’, who was occupying one of the motorcycle, prosecution gave up PW - ‘S’ for reasons best known to it -- Had ‘S’ been examined and established the identity of accused as car driver, then statement of other witnesses could have been believed that it is the accused, who was driving the car – Held, prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused – Conviction set aside.

(Para 10-13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rash and negligent driving – Criminal liability of owner of vehicle – Release of vehicle on superdari – Effect of -- Accused-petitioner is the registered owner of the offending car and he got the car released on superdari as owner but this in itself cannot be a reason to draw conclusion that he was driving the offending car at the relevant time -- PW-9 deposed that car was occupied by two persons and he cannot say as to who was driving the car – Ld. First Appellate Court fell in grave error by observing that as the accused was the owner of the car, so it was for him to explain u/s 106 of the Evidence Act as to who was driving his car -- Onus was on the prosecution to prove that it is the accused-petitioner, who was driving the offending car at the relevant time, which the prosecution has failed to establish -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 11-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 313, 482 – Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 12 -- Cheque bounce case – Handwriting expert – Closure of defence evidence -- Delay substantially attributable to the procedural formalities within the office of State Legal Services Authority for seeking production of handwriting expert – Even impugned orders shall cause serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioner, amounting to denial of fair trial -- Two effective opportunities granted -- State Legal Services Authority requested to take decision for the purpose of granting necessary financial assistance at the earliest so that the petitioner be able to avail her chance to defend herself.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Adulteration of tea with intoxicant substance – Burdon of proof -- Admission u/s 313 Cr.P.C. by the appellant-accused qua bringing tea does not absolve the prosecution from discharging the onus of proof regarding the tea, which was consumed by complainant, being adulterated with any stupefying or intoxicant substance -- No concrete evidence available on record, either forensic or medical, to support the version of the prosecution, except the bald statement of the complainant himself -- Appellant-accused deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed, verdict of conviction, and, order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Presumption u/s 113-A of Indian Evidence Act -- Principles

(1) The presumption carried in the Indian Evidence Act, is attractable only when the charge drawn against the accused is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC.

(2) The said statutory provision has a limited effect, in respect of a charge drawn under Section 304-B of the IPC, as the implied presumption, created through the words “shall be deemed to have caused her death”, which hence occur at the end of the relevant statutory provisions, yet do not discharge, the prosecution from adducing evidence qua the deceased being meted cruelty or harassment, in respect of demands of dowry, as, made upon her by her husband, or by his relatives.

(3) That the statutory phrase “and it is shown” which segregates the first, and, second component of the relevant discharging section, cast a conjunctive onus, upon the prosecution to prove the earlier, and, later components' of the relevant charging sections.

(4) That the word “shall be deemed to have caused her death” do not ever discharge the prosecution from adducing evidence rather for unflinchingly proving both the components, as carried in sub-Section (1) of Section 304-B of the IPC.

(5) The evidence necessary for proving the above foundational facts, rather for supporting the ingredients, as carried in Section 304-B IPC, is required to be always adduced by the prosecution, and, the implied presumption, gets strengthened only, when the defence omits to put the relevant exculpatory suggestions to the PWs concerned, and/or fails to secure a favourable answer thereto, rather from the PWs concerned.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court --Leave to appeal against the verdict of acquittal dismissed.

(Para 19, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 41 – Forged Will – Quashing of FIR – Genuineness of Will upheld upto Supreme Court  in probate proceedings – A judgment by a probate Court as per Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is in rem -- Whether any Court will be able to ignore the findings of the Civil Court regarding genuineness of the Will, answer is no – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6, 12-13)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, Order 41 Rule 27 -- First appeal – Application for additional evidence – Appeal decided without decision on application -- Non-deciding of the application filed by the appellant under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC has caused prejudice to the appellant -- Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court set aside and the case is remanded back to the Lower Appellate Court with a direction to decide the appeal as well as cross-objections filed by the respondents afresh after deciding the application filed by the appellant-Corporation under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3 – Handwriting Expert -- Rebuttal evidence -- Defendant-petitioner specifically averred in written statement that the document was forged and fabricated and that there was no compromise and signatures specifically denied – It was incumbent for the plaintiff-respondents to have led their evidence in the affirmative -- Not having led their evidence in the affirmative, no evidence could have been permitted in rebuttal.

(Para 7,8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 323, 302, 34 -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Death occurred 20 days after the attack -- Held, no stereotypical assumption or formula that where death occurs after a lapse of some time, the injuries (which might have caused the death), the offence is one of culpable homicide -- What is important is the nature of injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course to lead to death -- Doctor who conducted the post-mortem clearly deposed that death was caused due to cardio respiratory failures, as a result of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased -- Thus, the injuries and the death were closely and directly linked -- Conviction for murder do not call for interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 4, 26, 27)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161(3), 173, 207 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 74, 76 -- Right to Information Act, 2005 (22 of 2005), Section 4(1)(b) -- Public Interest litigation -- Free public access to chargesheets/ final reports u/s 173 of the Cr.P.C. on State websites :

– Conjoint reading of Section 173 Cr.P.C. and Section 207 Cr.P.C. the Investigating Agency is required to furnish the copies of the report along with the relevant documents to be relied upon by the prosecution to the accused and to none others -- It may as such violate the rights of the accused as well as the victim and/or even the investigating agency

-- Chargesheet/ documents along with the chargesheet cannot be said to be public documents u/s 74 of the Evidence Act, reliance placed upon Sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act is absolutely misplaced.

-- Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act -- Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced.

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief namely directing all the States to put on their websites the copies of all the chargesheets/challans filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 1-7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Last seen circumstance – Evidential value -- “last seen” doctrine has limited application, where the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused, and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on the basis of the “last seen” circumstance.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Murder – Acquittal of accused -- Last seen circumstance – Time gap -- Save the “last seen” theory, there is no other circumstance or evidence -- Importantly, the time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused and the probable time of his death, based on the post mortem report, which was conducted two days later, was silent about the probable time of death, though it stated that death occurred approximately two days before the post mortem, is not narrow -- Given this fact, and the serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, as well as the fact that the FIR was lodged almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on the “last seen” circumstance even if it were to be assumed to have been proved to convict the accused-appellants is not justified -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused set aside.

(Para 25)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Quarrel with deceased – Spur of moment -- Words uttered in a quarrel or in the spur of a movement if at all cannot be taken to be uttered with the necessary mens rea and would be an outcome of an emotional outburst or a fit of anger -- Same would not amount to abetment.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely having a dispute with the deceased or making a complaint to the Police against the deceased would not make out a case under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Reliance upon suicide note -- Suicide note does not refer to any act on the part of the accused amounting to abetment -- It only says that if something was to happen with the deceased, the accused would be responsible -- Suicide note therefore does not further the case of the prosecution.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Author of suicide note – Proof of – FSL asked for admitted document of the deceased so as to compare the writing on the suicide note along with that of the deceased, however, no such writing was dispatched to the FSL for comparison – Brother of the deceased identified the signatures of the deceased on the suicide note which would not be sufficient to affix the authorship of the suicide note.

(Para 10)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Merely mentioning the names of the accused in the suicide note in the absence of any specific role would not lead to the commission of an offence under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 337, 338, 427 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Acquittal of accused – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Once the accused was not known to any witness, they had seen him fleeing from the place of occurrence, it was necessary to hold test identification parade -- No test identification parade of the accused was got conducted from the complainant and witnesses of the case and this was fatal to the case of the prosecution – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 11-14)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42, 43 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- NDPS case – Appeal against conviction -- Acquittal of accused – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information not reduced into writing and not sent to the police station or higher authority -- Evidence clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance -- Explanation appended to Section 43 of the Act clearly shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression ‘public place’ -- Held, it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act; there was complete non-compliance of the said requirement of law -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Excise matter – Opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses -- Prosecution witnesses were examined but as per the petitioner, the said fact was unknown to him and therefore, the cross-examination could not be conducted by his counsel -- Held, in the absence of cross-examination, the prosecution evidence would go unrebutted -- No prejudice shall be caused to the prosecution if an opportunity is granted to the petitioner/accused to cross-examine the three witnesses in a time bound manner -- Petition allowed, one more opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine three witnesses -- Pursuant to their cross-examination, the Trial Court is directed to conclude the Trial within 08 weeks.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 33 – Criminal trial – Opportunity of cross-examination -- On the very first date, when PW-1 ASI was present and his examination-in-chief was recorded, his cross-examination was treated as NIL – Order passed by the trial Court set aside -- One effective opportunity granted to the petitioner to cross-examine PW-1 ASI.

(Para 5-8)

A. Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Regular Second Appeal in the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh, is governed by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and not by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Pankajakshi’s case (2016) 6 SCC 157 relied.

(Para 1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Registered Will – Un-registered Will – Value of -- Will is not required to be mandatorily registered -- Testator may get it registered, however, an unregistered Will has equal value and has to be proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Proof of Will -- Non-examination of Advocate – Adverse inference -- Trial Court erred in drawing an adverse inference on account of non-examination of Advocate, who merely introduced Testator with the scribe-Advocate – Advocate was not the attesting witness of the Will -- Hence, he was not required to be examined.

(Para 15)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Proof of Will -- Irregular spacing in the Will -- Will is typed on a manual typewriter -- The attention of the scribe or the attesting witness was never drawn to the aforesaid alleged irregular spacing -- If the plaintiff wants the Court to believe that there is irregular spacing, the plaintiff should have sought explanation from the scribe as well as the attesting witness -- In the absence thereof, it would not be appropriate to disbelieve the Will merely on account of alleged irregular spacing in-between the lines.

(Para 16)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 – Execution of Pronote – Proved by one marginal witness – Scope of Handwriting and finger print Expert report – It is not essential that both the witnesses should be examined – Held, once the marginal witness had proved the execution of the document, the handwriting and finger print expert who is expected to submit report in favour of the parties approaching it, has been rightly held to be not a substantive piece of evidence in the peculiar fact of the case that the marginal witness had already proved the pronote.

(Para 9)

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 28, 33 (1)(a) – Power of attorney – Place of registration -- Power of attorney can be executed and authenticated by the Registrar or the Sub-registrar within whose district or sub district the principal resides – General Power of Attorney does not fall within the scope of Section 28 of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Contention that only one attesting witness of the General Power of Attorney has been examined and therefore, its execution is not proved – Held, only limited documents require attestation by two attesting witnesses which primarily include a will, a gift and a mortgage -- A General Power of Attorney or a Special Power of Attorney does not require attestation by witnesses -- Hence, Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not applicable.

(Para 8)

C. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 33(4) --- Registered Power of attorney – Proof of -- A registered power of attorney is not only admissible in evidence but it can be proved by mere production of it as per Section 33(4) of the Registration Act, 1908.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) Section 32 – Acquittal of accused -- Multiple Dying declaration -- Second dying declaration rejected completely by the High Court, is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other accused – First dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured state to the hospital – Focus of the first dying declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire -- Second dying declaration, alone elaborates acts of cruelty -- That is the only piece of incriminating evidence against the accused -- Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/s 498-A IPC set aside.

(Para 20,21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 54 -- Cheque bounce case – Additional evidence -- Certified copy of judgment of previous conviction -- Evidence showing any previous conviction is also relevant as evidence of bad character -- Thus the evidence relating to previous conviction (past actions of a person) in a case of similar nature would be relevant -- However, the evidentiary value of the same would be evaluated by the ld. trial Court at the time of final disposal of a case – No prejudice would be caused to the accused if the aforesaid judgment is taken on record as the petitioner would get an opportunity to rebut the same – Impugned order in allowing application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. not suffering from illegality and infirmity – No interfere is called for.

(Para 11,12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 13 Rule 4 (as amended in Punjab and Haryana) – Exhibition of documents – Per-se admissible documents -- Duty of court -- If the documents are already a part of the record and they are per se admissible, the Court is itself required to mark those documents as exhibits -- For this purpose, no separate application is required -- The Court can mark the documents at any stage particularly when they are already a part of the record.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 3 -- Document Expert – Evidence in affirmative -- Rebuttal evidence -- Defendant No.1 in the written statement admitted the agreement to sell but has pointed out that date for execution of the sale deed was fixed as 5.5.2005 and not 5.8.2005 and there was cutting in the date, so as to make it appear as 5.8.2005 -- In that way, the plaintiff was aware of this objection having been taken right from the beginning and he could have led evidence in affirmative -- When defendants No. 2 and 3 had lead evidence including examining a document expert, plaintiff moved an application to rebut the evidence adduced by defendants No. 2 and 3, which is certainly not permissible -- Application was rightly declined and no reason is there to allow the same.

(Para 5-7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Acquittal – Appeal – Burden of proof -- Burden not only lies on the complainant (just like on prosecution in criminal trial), but it also lies on the accused -- So, it cannot be said that there is limited scope for interference in the judgment of acquittal particularly, when it is for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20 -- Cheque – Requirement of Stamp -- Section 20 of the Negotiable Instrument Act talks about giving the authority to the holder to make inchoate stamped instrument complete -- Even though the cheque is negotiable instrument, it does not require stamp.

(Para 25)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 87, 138 – Cheque bounce case – Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Security cheque – Material alteration -- Unilateral putting dates on cheques – Complainant unilaterally has put in dates on the cheques without the authority of the accused and even by not informing him -- So, it amounts to material alterations -- If it is so such negotiable instrument becomes void -- Hence prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act cannot be initiated.

(Para 27-32)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Dowry death – Regular bail to mother-in-law – Deceased died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage – As per allegations in the FIR itself on the day of death, the petitioner had informed the complainant about the deceased having locked herself inside the room – After the occurrence the in-laws had shifted the deceased to the hospital – Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the presumption u/s 113-B of Evidence Act is attracted or not would be subject to the outcome of the trial – Out of total 17 prosecution witnesses, 3 witnesses have been examined – Petitioner ordered to be enlarged on bail.

(Para 1,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 452, 323, 427, 34 – Non-appearance of official prosecution witnesses -- By closing the prosecution evidence and dismissing the application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. it is the complainant who has been penalised for the act and conduct of the State --  Trial Court should have taken coercive steps to secure the presence of the unexamined witness -- In case he plays truant with the Court and chooses not to appear, SSP shall take him into custody and produce him in the Court to depose as a prosecution witness.

(Para 1,3,12-14)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 59, 60 – Oral evidence – Medical evidence – Though, normally in case there is contradiction inter-se ocular account and medical account qua rather then the ocular account rendered in respect of the relevant crime does assume preponderance --  However, if the ocular account rendered qua the prosecution case is provenly false or is prevaricated, then the ocular account does loose its creditworthiness, and medical account assumes paramount evidentiary worth.

(Para 15 - I)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement before Investigation officer – Recovery from crime site -- If the recoveries are not made in pursuance to a provenly signatured disclosure statement recorded by the accused, before the investigating officer concerned, but are made from the crime site, which is but an open/un-secluded place, thereupon, the recoveries do not comprise any valid potent link in the chain of circumstances.

(Para 15 - II)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Dissolution of marriage – Witness-wife living in Canada – Cross-examination through video conferencing – Procedural aspects in conjunction with the latest technology have to be used, so as to help the parties to avail their remedies in the most efficient and effective manner, rather than curtailing their rights -- It would also ensure expeditious disposal of the proceedings including, avoid the burden of unnecessary expenses relating to the visit of petitioner, if any -- Trial court shall allow the petitioner-wife to appear as witness for the purpose of her cross-examination through video conferencing by following the procedure laid down under the aforesaid High Court Rules and orders.

(Para 10, 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Cheque bounce case – Admission of signatures on cheque -- Presumption of legally enforceable debt -- Petitioner/accused has not been able to disown the factum of issuance of cheques in favour of the complainant and nor has come out with any convincing explanation as regards the reasons for which the said cheques were issued by him -- Once the signatures of the petitioner on the cheques in question are not disputed, a presumption can safely be drawn in favour of the holder as regards the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

(Para 9)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 19, 21 -- Admission of document – Objection as to insufficient stamp duty -- Once a document admitted in evidence, such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped -- Objection as to admissibility of a document on the ground of sufficiency of stamp, has to raised when the document is tendered in evidence.

(Para 3)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- TIPs belong to the stage of investigation by the police -- It assures that investigation is proceeding in the right direction -- It is a rule of prudence which is required to be followed in cases where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant – Evidence of a TIP is admissible u/s 9 of the Indian Evidence Act -- However, it is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Instead, it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial -- Therefore, TIPs, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If identification in the TIP has taken place after the accused is shown to the witnesses, then not only is the evidence of TIP inadmissible, even an identification in a court during trial is meaningless -- Even a TIP conducted in the presence of a police officer is inadmissible in light of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 29)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 -- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3(2)(e) -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Investigating Officer stated that he has not taken any steps to ensure that the accused and the witnesses do not see each other -- Conduct of the TIP, coupled with the hovering presence of the police during the conduct of the TIP vitiated the entire process -- Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in relying on the evidence of the TIP witnesses for convicting and sentencing the Appellants -- Conviction and sentencing are not sustainable.

(Para 56)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 – Cheque bounce case -- Closing of cross-examination -- Trial Court closed the cross examination of CW-1 without taking note of the absence of the lawyer for the petitioners – Stated that non-appearance was due to demise of father of petitioners' counsel and this fact was also brought to the notice of the concerned Court -- Order set aside and parties permitted to appear before the trial Court subject to the condition that the petitioners shall not seek any further adjournment.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311, 482 – Cheque bounce case – Additional documents by complainant – Petitioner/ complainant moved an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. for leading further evidence by producing additional documents -- No doubt, the complainant had already closed the evidence -- Purpose of trial is to elicit truth -- Trial should not be fair only to the accused but it should also be fair to the complainant/prosecution -- Petitioner permitted to lead the evidence by way of additional documents.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dowry death – Regular bail to husband -- Marriage in May, 2014, wife committed suicide on 4th March, 2021 – In FIR allegations pertaining to harassment caused to the deceased on account of demand of dowry -- Material witnesses examined -- Two minor children are with the grandparents -- Allegations regarding demand of dowry are general in nature -- In the cross-examination, complainant deposed that he did not remember any specific date of harassment caused or demand of dowry made – No cash and vehicle was given in the marriage -- Out of 15 prosecution witnesses, 03 witnesses examined -- Nothing on record to show that the petitioner has any criminal antecedents -- Court cannot ignore the fact that there are two minor children whose future is also at stake – Bail allowed.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Hindu law -- Ancestral property -- Both the Courts below concurrently held that there is no evidence on record to establish ancestor property – Pedigree table in itself is no evidence of ancestry, nor can it be the basis to decide ancestral nature of property which can only be established by independent proof including the revenue records/ jamabandis -- It has to be proved beyond doubt that the property was undivided property of a Hindu family of four generations -- There is no such evidence on record -- No ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below on this issue.

(Para 8)

B. Evidence law -- Attorney appeared as witness – Original attorney -- Plaintiff himself not appeared to testify in support of the plaint – Power of attorney holder/PW-4 failed to produce the original power of attorney on record -- Opportunities afforded, still  could not bring the original on record -- It was, therefore, held that photocopy of the power of attorney cannot be read in evidence -- As the plaintiff himself has not deposed in the case, therefore, no exception can be taken to the adverse inference drawn against him on this account.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 29, 45, 47 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession – Handwriting expert -- When the extra judicial confession is not duly proved, or does not inspire confidence or is not corroborated by any other reliable evidence, the conviction could not be based solely on such weak piece of evidence -- Prosecution having not examined the handwriting expert for proving the handwritings of the accused no.1 contained in the Inland letter allegedly addressed to the PW-19, nor any expert’s opinion having been obtained, the High Court had rightly discarded the said piece of evidence.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Identification of accused after 6 months –When there was huge time gap of about more than six months between the date of the incident and the date of recording of statements of witnesses by the Investigating Officer, the Test Identification Parade would have assisted the police in identifying the accused seen by the PW-7, however no such TI Parade was held by the Investigating Officer -- Therefore, identification of the accused nos. 2 to 5 at the instance of these witnesses becomes very doubtful.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – It is well settled that if there is considerable time gap between the persons seeing together and the proximate time of the crime, the circumstances of last seen together, even if proved cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt of the accused.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Failure of the accused, in a case based on circumstantial evidence which included “last seen together theory”, to explain u/s 313 Cr.PC as to under what circumstances the victim suffered death, would also not be a ground to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the accused were involved in the commission of the alleged crime.

(Para 12)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),Section 45 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Identification of dead body -- Super-imposition report -- Since the super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the super-imposition test -- Dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.

(Para 13)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

(Para 14)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 8, 24, 29, 45, 47, 106 – Murder -- Acquittal of accused -- Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession not corroborated by handwriting expert opinion – Last-seen theory after six months of incident without Test Identification parade by I.O. becomes doubtful – Super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report of dead body – Witness to whom car of deceased sold become hostile – Evidence did not complete the chain to dispel the hypothesis of innocence of the appellants-accused -- Prosecution failed to establish through clinching, clear, cogent and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellants-accused could be established – Judgements and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 8-16)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19(1), 21, 27 – Reporting of offence -- Prompt and proper reporting of is of utmost importance -- Its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act -- Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act – Clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape – If it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault -- A conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

(Para 15, 22)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Medical evidence in sexual offences -- In relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.

(Para 15)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO case – Quashing of FIR and charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed u/s 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.

(Para 18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145, 157 – Evidential value of statement u/s 161,  164 Cr.P.C. – Statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 -- As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for such purposes.

(Para 20)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 116 -- Arrear of rent – Provisional assessment of rent – Disputing Landlord’s ownership – Provisional rent was tendered without reserving any right to dispute ownership of the landlord – At the time of assessment of provisional rent also, no dispute about the ownership was raised by the tenants – Besides, after attornment they/tenants are estopped from disputing ownership of the landlord.

(Para 7)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17, Order 14 Rule 5, Order 41 Rule 25 -- Additional issue – Disputing Landlord’ ownership -- Rent Controller declined the tenants’ application to raise additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord  -- Subsequently, by two orders, the tenants were again not permitted to amend their written statement to dispute the ownership -- Said orders have attained finality – No occasion for the tenants to agitate the issue again before High Court – It is an abuse of the process of law – Orders were passed by the Rent Controller based upon the reasoning given in the orders, declined to frame the Issues -- It cannot by any stretch of imagination, therefore, be said that the Controller has “omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact” --  Therefore, provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 CPC are not applicable – Held, tenants could not invoke by filing the application, beseeching the Appellate Authority to frame additional issues disputing ownership of the landlord and refer the same to the Rent Controller for recording evidence thereupon -- Nor could the tenant file the other application Order XIV Rule 5 CPC for framing of issues -- Revision dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-.

(Para 9-10)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Fake driving license -- Renewal of fake driving license – Liability of Insured-owner -- Merely because the driving license of the driver is fake, would not be a sufficient ground by itself to absolve the insurance company of its liability to indemnify the insured -- Driving license periodically renewed -- It can be safely inferred that owner while employing driver, had not only satisfied himself about his driving skills but also qua the validity of his driving license -- Owner could not be expected to carry out a roving enquiry into the authenticity of the driving license, more so, when driving license in question had been regularly renewed -- Insurance company is held liable to indemnify the insured  and pay the amount of compensation to the claimants.

(Para 12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused -- Seal of sample -- Scribe/witness of consent memo -- Independent witness – Sample was drawn in the presence of the learned JMIC on which seal was put, seal was never sent to the forensic laboratory -- Prosecution has, therefore, not been able to prove that there was a recovery of any contraband from the appellant -- No justification as to why two material witnesses ASI/scribe and HC/witness of consent memo were not examined -- Police party did not even care to join the witnesses, who were the shopkeepers of the vicinity and employees of the PRTC workshop which was only 200-300 yards from the place of occurrence, would also cast a shadow upon the prosecution story -- Evidence adduced by the defence through 4 DWs have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and there was no reason to discard the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses especially in view of the fact that the allegations were pertaining to the false implication of the appellant – Appellant, therefore, deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17,18)

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Deposition of wife – Non-cross-examination by husband – Effect of -- Right of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses of the appellant-original applicant was closed, as he had failed to appear before the Family Court despite the issuance of warrants -- Allegations made by the appellant-wife in her evidence before the Court had remained unchallenged and, therefore, there was no reason for the Family Court to disbelieve her version -- Family Court could not have passed the order believing the oral submissions of the respondent.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Able-bodied husband -- Respondent being an able-bodied, he is obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child -- Rs.10,000/- per month awarded to the appellant-wife from the date of filing maintenance petition over and above the maintenance allowance of Rs. 6,000/- granted by the Family Court to the son.

(Para 13)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce case – Proprietorship firm not made party – Effect of – In proceeding u/s 138 of N.I.Act, the arraying of a proprietor as an accused or a proprietary concern represented by the proprietor would be sufficient compliance with the requirements u/s 138 of N.I.Act, the proprietor and the proprietary concern is not required to be separately arrayed as a party accused.

(Para 11-11.6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce case – Complaint/ evidence through power of attorney – Permissibility of -- A power of attorney could file a complaint, could depose to an affidavit as also record his sworn statement in a proceedings u/s 138 of N.I.Act.

(Para 12-12.6)