Search By Topic: Juvenile Law

1. (SC) 07-05-2024

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 14(3), 15 -- Child in conflict with law -- Preliminary assessment – Time limit -- The provision of Section 14(3) of the Act, providing for the period of three months for completion of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act, is not mandatory -- The same is held to be directory -- The period can be extended, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or, as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

(Para 18(i))

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(20), 19, 101 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, Rule 10, 10A, 11, 13 – ‘Children’s Court’ -- ‘Court of Sessions’ -- The words ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules shall be read interchangeably -- Primarily jurisdiction vests in the Children’s Court -- However, in the absence of constitution of such Children’s Court in the district, the power to be exercised under the Act is vested with the Court of Sessions.

(Para 18(ii))

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15, 101 -- Child in conflict with law -- Appeal – Limitation -- Appeal, under Section 101(2) of the Act against an order of the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act, can be filed within a period of 30 days -- The appellate court can entertain the appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided sufficient cause is shown -- Endeavour has to be made to decide any such appeal filed within a period of 30 days.

(Para 18(iii))

D. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(20), 14, 15, 18, 19, 17, 101 – Duties of Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the Quasi-Judicial Authorities -- In all the orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the Quasi-Judicial Authorities the names of the Presiding Officer and/or the Members who sign the orders shall be mentioned -- In case any identification number has been given, the same can also be added -- The Presiding Officers and/or Members while passing the order shall properly record presence of the parties and/or their counsels, the purpose for which the matter is being adjourned and the party on whose behalf the adjournment has been sought and granted.

(Para 18 (vii, viii))

9. (SC) 13-07-2022

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15 -- Child in conflict with law – Preliminary assessment -- Obligation of the Board in making the preliminary assessment on the four counts largely dependent upon the wisdom of the Board without there being any guidelines as to how the Board would conduct such preliminary assessment -- In the absence of any such framework or guidelines, the Board has to use its discretion in taking into consideration whatever material it deems fit for assessing the four attributes.

(a) mental capacity to commit the offence.

(b) physical capacity to commit the nature of the alleged assault.

(c) maturity and ability to understand the consequences of his action.

(d) circumstances in which the offence was committed.

(Para 62)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15 -- Child in conflict with law – Preliminary assessment -- Mental Capacity to commit offence -- Ability to understand the consequences of offence – Both are different.

(Para 67)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15 -- Child in conflict with law – Preliminary assessment -- Consequences of offence – Language used in section 15 is “the ability to understand the consequences of the offence” -- Expression used is in plurality i.e., “consequences” of the offence and, therefore, would not just be confined to the immediate consequence of the offence or that the occurrence of the offence would only have its consequence upon the victim but it would also take within its ambit the consequences which may fall upon not only the victim as a result of the assault, but also on the family of the victim, on the child, his family, and that too not only immediate consequences but also the far-reaching consequences in future -- Consequences could be in material/physical form but also affecting the mind and the psychology of the child for all times to come.

(Para 68)

D. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15 (1) -- Child in conflict with law – Preliminary assessment – Mental capacity -- Consequences of offence – Evaluation of -- Children may be geared towards more instant gratification and may not be able to deeply understand the long term consequences of their actions -- They are also more likely to be influenced by emotion rather than reason -- While they do consider risks cognitively (by weighing up the potential risks and rewards of a particular act), their decisions / actions may be more heavily influenced by social (e.g. peer influences) and/or emotional (e.g. impulsive) tendencies -- Lack of experience coupled with the child’s limited ability to deeply understand the long term consequences of their actions can lead to impulsive / reckless decision making -- Individualised assessment of adolescent mental capacity and ability to understand the consequences of the offence is one of the most crucial determinants of the preliminary assessment -- This evaluation of ‘mental capacity and ability to understand the consequences’ of the child in conflict with law can, in no way, be relegated to the status of a perfunctory and a routine task -- Process of taking a decision on which the fate of the child in conflict with law precariously rests, should not be taken without conducting a meticulous psychological evaluation.

(Para 71-75)

E. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15(1) – Child in conflict with law – Preliminary assessment -- Child psychologist/ psychiatrist/ expert – Expression “May” – Interpretation as mandatory -- Where the Board is not comprising of a practicing professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry, the expression “may” in the proviso to section 15(1) would operate in mandatory form and the Board would be obliged to take assistance of experienced psychologists or psychosocial workers or other experts -- However, in case the Board comprises of at least one such member, who has been a practicing professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry, the Board may take such assistance as may be considered proper by it; and in case the Board chooses not to take such assistance, it would be required of the Board to state specific reasons therefor.

(Para 76)

F. Interpretation of Statute – Expression “May” as Mandatory -- It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the word ‘may’ when used in a legislation by itself does not connote a directory meaning -- If in a particular case, in the interests of equity and justice it appears to the court that the intent of the legislature is to convey a statutory duty, then the use of the word “may” will not prevent the Court from giving it a mandatory colour.

(Para 77)

G. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15 – Child in conflict with law -- Preliminary assessment -- Task of preliminary assessment u/s 15 of the Act, 2015 is a delicate task with requirement of expertise and has its own implications as regards trial of the case -- It appears expedient that appropriate and specific guidelines in this regard are put in place -- Without much elaboration, Court left it open for the Central Government and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights and the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights to consider issuing guidelines or directions in this regard which may assist and facilitate the Board in making the preliminary assessment under section 15 of the Act, 2015.

(Para 87)

28. (P&H) 27-11-2020

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 94 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 57, 167, 438 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 341, 120-B, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 29 – Murder case -- Anticipatory bail – Interim bail -- Juvenile-petitioner’s reliance upon birth certificate and matriculation certificate -- Without commenting anything as regards the genuineness of the documents, petition disposed of with the directions:

(i) The petitioner to surrender before the Juvenile Justice Board within 10 days and upon the petitioner so surrendering, the Juvenile Justice Board shall release the petitioner on interim bail subject to his furnishing requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Board.

(ii) The Board shall conduct an inquiry as regards the juvenility of the petitioner. If the petitioner is found to be juvenile, the Board shall consider his release under Section 12 of the Act and pass an appropriate order.

(iii) The petitioner to be present before the Board on the day his bail application is to be heard and on the day when the order on his bail application is to be pronounced or on any other day as directed by Board.

(iv) If the Board, upon inquiry regarding age comes to conclusion that the petitioner is not a juvenile, he shall be produced before Illaqa Magistrate who shall proceed further in accordance with law. The petitioner shall appear before the Board on all the dates unless specifically exempted.

(v) The interim bail shall come to an end if petitioner is not found to be juvenile or in case his application is dismissed under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

(Para 4)

30. (SC) 07-10-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 --  Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15 -- Life sentence affirmed by High Court – Juvenile in conflict with law – Declaration of – Stage of -- Supreme court at this stage can decide and determine the question of juvenility of appellant, notwithstanding the fact that appellant was not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on the date of the offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult when the 2000 Act was enforced – Appellant was less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.1981, he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act -- Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than 2 years – Sentence of life imprisonment set aside, matter remitted to the jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions u/s Section 15 of the 2000 Act including the question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and the compensation to be awarded to the family of the deceased.

(Para 17-22)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000), Section 15 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 25 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 6 -- Juvenile in conflict with law – An accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than eighteen years of age at the time of commission of the offence, a right which he acquired and has fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001 -- In terms of Section 25 of the 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the proceedings which were pending when the 2015 Act was enforced.

(Para 18)

36. (P&H) 13-07-2020

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8, 12 -- Juvenile/ Child in conflict with law – Right of Bail –Duty of Juvenile Justice Board:--

-- Very constitution of a Juvenile Justice Board, headed by a Metropolitan Magistrate with at least three years’ experience, is with the intention that such an experienced judicial officer, assisted by two social workers, would be conscious of their pious duty to ensure protection of the rights of juveniles.

-- Manifest in no uncertain terms the duty cast upon the Juvenile Justice Board to implement the letter of the law in true spirit, keeping in mind the ultimate interests of the child.

Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that grant of bail to the child in conflict with the law should be the norm and the proviso thereto requires denial of such bail only if release of the child is likely to bring him or her into association with known criminals or expose him/her to moral, physical or psychological danger or defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 5)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8, 12 -- Juvenile/ Child in conflict with law – Right of Bail –Duty of Juvenile Justice Board – Juvenile Justice Board declined the bail lackadaisically recorded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that if the petitioner was released on bail, it was likely to bring him into association with a known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger – Ld. Principal Magistrate further recorded that his release would defeat the ends of justice -- This mechanical reproduction of the legal provision was mere lip service by the learned Principal Magistrate to the legal requirement but is of no avail -- This is not the level of care or the approach expected of a Magistrate heading a Juvenile Justice Board -- Very purpose of constituting such Boards would be defeated by such uncaring and inept discharge of functions by judicial officers entrusted with the duty of giving effect to this welfare legislation -- Revision allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on bail forthwith without sureties.

(Para 6-8)

43. (P&H) 11-10-2018

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8(3), 14,15, 18(3) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, Rule 10, 10A – Juvenility of accused – Heinous offence – Trial as Adult or not -- Preliminary Assessment -- Section 15 is required to be strictly followed and determined so as to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the child is to be tried as an adult or not -- That exercise is called as `PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT' -- Said parameters are as under :-

(i)  mental and physical capacity to commit such offence;

(ii) ability to understand the consequences of the offence;

(iii)            the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence.

Parameters (i) and (ii) are inter-related as the ability to understand the consequences of the offence would only be there in case the child has the mental capacity to do so -- For assessing the mental capacity, the Board has been given the liberty to take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts -- Preliminary assessment is not a trial;

--     Child has to be presumed to be innocent and bereft of any criminal intent upto the age of 18 years and would have the right to be heard and participate in all procedures and decisions effecting his best interest with due regard to his age and maturity;

--     No list of witnesses and documents were supplied to the petitioner or his parents or guardian, which itself shows that the Board as well as the Appellate Court have decided the case without any application of mind and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

(Para 8-17)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8(3), 14,15, 18(3) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, Rule 10, 10A – Juvenility of accused – Heinous offence – Trial as Adult or not -- Preliminary Assessment – Assessment based on inappropriate tests, namely, coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) and Malin's Intelligence Scale for India Children (MISIC) meant for children between the ages of 5-11½ and 5-15 whereas child is 16½ years – Petitioner wanted to cross examine the psychologist regarding the same but his request was declined – Copies of the tests, in question, were not provided to the petitioner/parents/guardian but were shown just prior to the hearing of arguments -- Since the petitioner was 16.75 years old, when these tests were conducted on him, which were not correct tests and have resulted in wrong results -- Said expert himself stated in his report that it would be appropriate that further assessment be made by a higher authority – Orders set aside, case remanded back to the Board for afresh consideration after assessing the intelligency, maturity, physical fitness as to how the juvenile in conflict with law was in a position to know the consequences of the offence.

(Para 18-25)

C. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8(3), 14,15, 18(3) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, Rule 10, 10A – Juvenility of accused – Heinous offence – Trial as Adult or not -- Preliminary Assessment – IQ test of the petitioner was conducted when he was more than 16 years and 9 months of age -- An IQ of 95 at the age 16.75 would necessarily translate to 15.67 years, going by the formula for determining the mental age of any child, which is mental age/Biological Age x 100 -- This means that the petitioner-child has been determined to have a mental age of less than 16 years as per the report of socalled expert -- Even as per said report, the petitioner had to be necessarily treated to be below 16 years.

(Para 18)

D. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8(3),14,15 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, Rule 10, 10A – Juvenility of accused – Heinous offence – Trial as Adult or not -- Preliminary Assessment -- Non giving of any statement of witnesses or documents etc. to the petitioner/guardian/parent, is absolutely in contradiction with the provisions of Rule 10(5) read with Sections 3(iii) and (xvi) read with Section 8(3) of the Act -- Plea of confidentiality is actually for the protection of the child from third party by considering the privacy of the child -- It cannot be interpreted that a delinquent child would not get a fair hearing, whereas, it is the requirement of Section 8(3) of the Act that the participation of the child and the parent or guardian is to be at every step of the process.

(Para 20-22)

E. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15, 102 – Revisional power -- As per provisions of Section 102 of the Act, in case, there is any illegality and perversity or there is non-compliance of mandatory provisions, High Court has a power to exercise the revisional jurisdiction.

(Para 24)

44. (SC) 11-10-2017

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 15(3) -- Marital rape with girl child -- Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age is rape? – Held, Sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not -- Exception carved out in the IPC creates an unnecessary and artificial distinction between a married girl child and an unmarried girl child and has no rational nexus with any unclear objective sought to be achieved -- Artificial distinction is arbitrary and discriminatory and is definitely not in the best interest of the girl child -- Artificial distinction is contrary to the philosophy and ethos of Article 15(3) of the Constitution as well as contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution and our commitments in international conventions -- Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC to now be meaningfully read as: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”

 (Para 1, 105)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(12, 2(14) -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 3 -- Marital rape/ Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Harmonious and purposive interpretation -- Entire issue of the interpretation of the JJ Act, the POCSO Act, the PCMA and Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC can be looked at from the perspective of purposive and harmonious construction of statutes relating to the same subject matter – There seems to be no reason to arbitrarily discriminate against a girl child who is married between 15 and 18 years of age -- Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC is to be read in a purposive manner to make it in consonance with the POCSO Act, the spirit of other pro-child legislations and the human rights of a married girl child -- To harmonize the system of laws relating to children and require Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC to now be meaningfully read as: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”

(Para 99, 103, 105,108)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 –Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 -- Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Marital rape with girl child below 18 years -- Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC in so far as it relates to a girl child below 18 years is liable to be struck down on the following grounds:–

(i)      it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and violative of the rights of the girl child and not fair, just and reasonable and, therefore, violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India;

(ii)     it is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and;

(iii)    it is inconsistent with the provisions of POCSO, which must prevail.

Therefore, Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC is read down as follows:

“Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being 18 years, is not rape”.

This judgment will have prospective effect.

(Para 195)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, Exception 2 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198(6) -- Sexual inter-course with wife aged 15 to 18 years – Martial rape with wives below 18 years – Cognizance of -- Section 198(6) of the Code will apply to cases of rape of “wives” below 18 years, and cognizance can be taken only in accordance with the provisions of Section 198(6) of the Code.

(Para 196)