Search By Topic: Penal Laws

1. (Gauhati HC) 02-06-2025

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187, 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest of accused – Non-production before Magistrate – Regular bail – Right of -- Petitioner admitted in hospital for last 45 day after the date of his arrest – His status is not of a free person but of an arrestee -- No order u/s 187 BNSS was passed by the Magistrate -- In absence of any order of remand beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in custody -- Since such non-production of the petitioner, even through video conferencing mode, beyond 24 hours in custody amounts to violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, his fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also violated and, on that count, the petitioner is entitled to go on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 14-18)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 57, 187 – Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 (2) – Arrest – Production before Magistrate -- Arrestee shall have to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours -- Where the arrestee is injured and requires urgent medical care have to be rushed to the hospital for providing urgent medical treatment -- However, in such cases also the Magistrate may ascertain the condition of the arrestee through video conferencing or personally visiting such arrestee -- After the arrest of a person if he is not released on bail, an order for remand to judicial custody has to be made -- Magistrate may authorize his detention either in judicial or in police custody -- Unless, such an order is passed, the initial arrest of the petitioner beyond the period of 24 hours from the time of his arrest, would become illegal.

(Para 15, 16)

2. (SC) 30-05-2025

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Relevant fact – Absconding of accused – Effect of -- Mere absconding by itself does not constitute a guilty mind as even an innocent man may feel panicky and may seek to evade the police when wrongly suspected of being involvement as an instinct of self-preservation -- But the act of abscondence is certainly a relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence and is a conduct u/s 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which points to his guilty mind -- Needle of suspicion gets strengthened by the act.

(Para 10.9.2)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive is something that is very difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the deep recess of the mind of the person concerned and in the absence of any open declaration by the person concerned himself, the motive has to be inferred from the activities and conduct of the person -- While proof of motive certainly strengthens the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, failure to prove the same cannot be fatal.

(Para 10.11.2, 10.11.3)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, Court see no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Onus of proof -- Recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Prosecution cannot depend on the false alibi or unproven defence plea since the onus is always on the prosecution to prove the prosecution case and the onus never shifts to the accused – If weapon of crime was traced to the accused, it was incumbent upon the appellant/ accused  to explain the circumstances of the recovery of the weapon with which a linkage has been established with the injury suffered by the deceased through scientific evidence -- Apart from claiming ignorance and denying the various incriminating evidence presented during the trial, the appellant chose not to adduce any evidence to explain these circumstances -- Silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution.

(Para 10.15)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- If upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with understandable and socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused person, no reason why it should not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct to fasten criminal liability on the accused -- If such an inference is sought to be assailed on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a reasonable one consistent with human behaviour under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful, abstract speculation or imagination.

(Para 10.12.1)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Non-explanation of evidence by accused -- Adverse inference -- Examination of an accused u/s 313 CrPC is to enable the accused to prepare and strategize his defence – Accused will have all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution witness or question any evidence and lead his defence evidence if any -- Despite the incriminating evidence which has come up against him has been pointed out to him by the Court, he has not explained any of these but merely denied or feigned ignorance to which necessary inference can be drawn against him.

(Para 10.16.1, 10.16.2)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory – Dead body of the deceased was recovered in a decomposed state, three days after the deceased was last seen together with the appellant -- As per postmortem, the death occurred 3/4 days before the postmortem examination -- Dead body was discovered with gunshot wounds on the head -- A double barrel gun with 2 spent and 1 live cartridges were recovered at the instance of the appellant -- As per the opinion of the ballistic expert, the gun showed signs of discharge and was in working condition, pellets and wads were recovered from the brain/ skull of the dead body, and these could have been fired through the gun examined and the double-barrel gun could be dismantled. Following circumstances and acts of the appellant strengthens the linkage.

(i) The appellant remained hidden from 11.07.2006 till 22.07.2006. He was arrested on 22.07.2006 after extensive search on numerous locations after the identification of the identity of the dead body on 14.07.2006.

(ii) The appellant had misled his friends, his family members and that of the deceased.

(iii) Personal effects of the deceased like gold chain was recovered from the appellant.

Appellant’s silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the Prosecution -- Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court which the High Court upheld does not warrant any interference.

(Para 10, 11)

6. (Delhi HC) 22-05-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 173, 199 – FIR for defamation – Permissibility of -- Whether there can be a Chargesheet u/s 500 IPC -- Procedure for initiating any Complaint for defamation, has been specifically provided u/s 199 Cr.P.C – FIR could not have been registered u/s 500 IPC, in view of the express bar u/s 199 Cr.P.C. -- Cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC could have been undertaken only on a Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C filed by the “Person Aggrieved”; no cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC can be taken on an FIR -- Furthermore, even the contents of the Complaint do not prima facie establish any case of defamation -- Summoning Orders set aside.

(Para 38-43, 57, 58)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 199 – FIR for defamation – Offences under other Sections also – Permissibility of -- Irrespective of there being other Sections involved in the FIR or not, the cognizance u/s 500 could have been only on the Complaint and not on the FIR.

(Para 45)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Defamation -- In order to constitute “defamation? u/s 499, there must be an “imputation” with the “intention” to harm the reputation of the person about whom such imputation is made -- It would have to be shown that the accused intended or knew or had the reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant or that he would be directly or indirectly suffered by it.

(Para 52)

8. (J&K&L HC) 22-05-2025

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22 – Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- NDPS – PMLA – Discharge in NDPS case – Continuity in Money laundering offence – Permissibility of -- Money laundering itself is a separate crime, distinct from the original (or scheduled) offence like corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. -- Even if the scheduled offence is tried under Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Act, etc., money laundering is prosecuted separately under PMLA -- Offence u/s 3 is dependent on the scheduled offence, but it is a separate and independent offence once the activity of laundering begins -- Mere discharge or quashing  of a FIR by a competent court does not automatically result in the quashing of an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 -- Discharge in the predicate offence may influence the procedures under the PMLA; however, it cannot be regarded as an automatic or definitive basis for nullifying the ECIR.

(Para 30, 40, 41)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- PMLA – Not an accused in scheduled offence – Effect of -- A person can be prosecuted for money laundering even if they are not directly involved in the commission of the scheduled offence, so long as they are involved in the laundering process -- A person accused of an offence u/s 3 PMLA need not necessarily be shown as an accused in the scheduled offence.

(Para 31, 32)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- Discharge in the predicate offence -- Summon u/s 50 of PMLA – Nature of -- Enforcement Directorate's authority to summon individuals u/s 50 is intended for the acquisition of factual evidence pertaining to money laundering offences; obtaining a summons under this section does not inherently indicate that one is an accused in a money laundering investigation -- This indicates that the individual may have information or documents pertinent to the investigation -- Issuance of summons is a fundamental component in the execution of a fair and unbiased investigation -- It affords the relevant parties an opportunity to be heard, to articulate their case, and to address the allegations levied against them -- Issuance of summons under the PMLA should be regarded as an essential element of due process, intended to advance the rule of law and bolster public trust in the legal system -- Discharge in the predicate offence, albeit substantial, does not, as a legal principle, impact the ongoing validity of the summons -- Mere discharge of the petitioner concerning the predicate offence does not, in itself, grant the Court the power to annul the summons.

(Para 34-39)

12. (SC) 13-05-2025

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- UAPA Case – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence -- The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable -- Rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive -- However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case

(Para 23, 24)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS/ UAPA Case – Regular bail – Despite no direct recovery of contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of narcotics concealed as talc -- Investigative narrative does not rest solely on physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and facilitation – Absence of direct seizure is not dispositive, particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious entities, and barter-based compensation – Bail declined.

(Para 25-27, 35)

16. (SC) 08-05-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

18. (SC) 06-05-2025

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Scope of – Nature of -- The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that emerges in Court -- It is an exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material now available, appears to share criminal liability -- Power is extraordinary and therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must act.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Summoning as additional accused – Challenge to -- Plea of alibi by accused -- An alibi, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused -- Parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip, have yet to be formally proved -- Until that exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces of paper -- Abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment -- It may consist of a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs – Order of the Trial Court summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC revived.

(Para 9-17)

20. (P&H HC) 03-05-2025

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Corruption case -- In a case of alleged criminal conspiracy, the prosecution is duty bound to prove by cogent, credible, and admissible evidence that the accused persons had a meeting of minds and participated in a common design.

(Para 14)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Corruption case – Demand and acceptance of bribe -- In the absence of demand and acceptance, the presumption u/s 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise and conviction cannot be thus sustained.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B – Corruption case – Conspiracy – Presumption – Reversal of burden -- Tehsildar, who employed co-accused BK and was shown to be one of the primary beneficiaries, was not accorded sanction and therefore, did not face trial -- Appellants, despite not being shown to be actual beneficiaries or participants, were convicted on a generalized theory of “connivance” – Held, mere association or presence of a person in a place where a crime is committed does not ipso facto establish participation or conspiracy -- Reversal of burden, in a trial u/s 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and Section 120-B of the IPC, where prosecution has not discharged its primary burden is certainly not permissible in law – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

26. (SC) 28-04-2025

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 3.4 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

29. (P&H HC) 24-04-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Acquittal -- Delay of 5 days in FIR – Non providing of ownership of mobile -- Appellants were not named in the FIR – No Test identification parade/ TIP – If no test identification parade is held, then it will be totally unsafe to rely upon the bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court -- Small recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- -- Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police -- Recovery of money is not sufficient to prove the allegations of snatching -- Held, the trial Court had committed a grave error in convicting the appellants-accused – Conviction and sentence u/s 379-A read with Section 34 of IPC set aside.

(Para 11-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case -- Identity of snatchers – Proof of -- PW-2, stated that accused present in the Court were the persons who had snatched his mobile phone, but he had not given details of physical description of the snatchers like their complexion, height or features or about the clothing as worn by them in the complaint -- Occurrence took place at 11 PM and it was dark at the time -- It was not explained by this witness as to what was the basis on which he could identify the accused persons -- Possibility of this witness having seen the miscreants and identifying them in dark seems very remote -- Identification of the accused persons not established beyond doubt and this fact has created a serious dent in the story of the prosecution with regard to the involvement of the accused in the subject crime.

(Para 17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Recovery of small amount – Identity of currency notes -- Recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- at instance of accused --  Not proved to be having any specific identification mark -- Small amount could easily be planted -- Alleged recovery was effected on 28.07.2020 whereas the occurrence had taken place on 09.07.2019 -- It does not appeal to reason that the appellants would keep such small amounts of money for such a long time with them fully knowing that the same being incriminating piece of evidence could be used against them for proving commission of the subject crime -- Such like currency notes could be easily available in market -- Recovery of money at the instance of the accused could not be considered to be a circumstance sufficient to prove that the appellants had snatched any mobile phone.

(Para 18, 19)

32. (SC) 09-04-2025

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 204, 438 -- Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(6), 447 -- Anticipatory bail – Serious Economic offences – SFIO investigated over 125 companies and filed a criminal complaint involving Rs. 4120 crores in fraudulent loans -- The Special Court issued bailable and later non-bailable warrants against the accused, many of whom deliberately evaded service -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 CrPC were initiated -- Despite prior knowledge of the case many accused concealed themselves and avoided appearance -- High Courts granted anticipatory bail to several accused.

Held, High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering the anticipatory bail application of such accused -- As per Section 212 (6), the offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act not entitled to be released on bail or on his bond, unless twin conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. The twin conditions are:-

(i) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

These twin conditions are mandatory in nature.

Economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside.

(Para 23-26, 31)

44. (SC) 07-03-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 304, Part II – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge -- Accidental death – Causing death by negligence -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Allegations that accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc. -- Two deceased employees were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop -- As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level -- While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death -- It was purely accidental -- On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC – Discharge application allowed.

(Para 13-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge – Nature of -- At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal -- Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.

(Para 16)

46. (SC) 04-03-2025

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)