Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 37 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – NDPS Case -- Commercial quantity -- Recovery of 3 Kg 500 grams of Sulfa (charas) – Regular bail -- FIR on secret information -- Alleged recovery from the public place -- Petitioner is behind bars for 01 year, 05 months and 02 days -- No criminal antecedents as he is not involved in any other case – Accused has a right of speedy trial -- Only 02 prosecution witnesses have been partially examined, out of total 17 prosecution witnesses -- Veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after the conclusion of the trial – Bail allowed.

(Para 4-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 173, 199 – FIR for defamation – Permissibility of -- Whether there can be a Chargesheet u/s 500 IPC -- Procedure for initiating any Complaint for defamation, has been specifically provided u/s 199 Cr.P.C – FIR could not have been registered u/s 500 IPC, in view of the express bar u/s 199 Cr.P.C. -- Cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC could have been undertaken only on a Complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C filed by the “Person Aggrieved”; no cognizance for the offence u/s 500 IPC can be taken on an FIR -- Furthermore, even the contents of the Complaint do not prima facie establish any case of defamation -- Summoning Orders set aside.

(Para 38-43, 57, 58)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 199 – FIR for defamation – Offences under other Sections also – Permissibility of -- Irrespective of there being other Sections involved in the FIR or not, the cognizance u/s 500 could have been only on the Complaint and not on the FIR.

(Para 45)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 -- Defamation -- In order to constitute “defamation? u/s 499, there must be an “imputation” with the “intention” to harm the reputation of the person about whom such imputation is made -- It would have to be shown that the accused intended or knew or had the reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant or that he would be directly or indirectly suffered by it.

(Para 52)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Abatement of suicide – Discharge of accused -- No normal person could have imagined that a scolding, that too based on a complaint by a student, would result in such tragedy due to the student so scolded taking his own life -- No mens rea can be attributed to the appellant much less, with regard to abatement of suicide committed by the deceased -- Appeal allowed, order framing charge against the appellant under Section 306 of the IPC set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22 – Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- NDPS – PMLA – Discharge in NDPS case – Continuity in Money laundering offence – Permissibility of -- Money laundering itself is a separate crime, distinct from the original (or scheduled) offence like corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. -- Even if the scheduled offence is tried under Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Act, etc., money laundering is prosecuted separately under PMLA -- Offence u/s 3 is dependent on the scheduled offence, but it is a separate and independent offence once the activity of laundering begins -- Mere discharge or quashing  of a FIR by a competent court does not automatically result in the quashing of an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 -- Discharge in the predicate offence may influence the procedures under the PMLA; however, it cannot be regarded as an automatic or definitive basis for nullifying the ECIR.

(Para 30, 40, 41)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- PMLA – Not an accused in scheduled offence – Effect of -- A person can be prosecuted for money laundering even if they are not directly involved in the commission of the scheduled offence, so long as they are involved in the laundering process -- A person accused of an offence u/s 3 PMLA need not necessarily be shown as an accused in the scheduled offence.

(Para 31, 32)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- Discharge in the predicate offence -- Summon u/s 50 of PMLA – Nature of -- Enforcement Directorate's authority to summon individuals u/s 50 is intended for the acquisition of factual evidence pertaining to money laundering offences; obtaining a summons under this section does not inherently indicate that one is an accused in a money laundering investigation -- This indicates that the individual may have information or documents pertinent to the investigation -- Issuance of summons is a fundamental component in the execution of a fair and unbiased investigation -- It affords the relevant parties an opportunity to be heard, to articulate their case, and to address the allegations levied against them -- Issuance of summons under the PMLA should be regarded as an essential element of due process, intended to advance the rule of law and bolster public trust in the legal system -- Discharge in the predicate offence, albeit substantial, does not, as a legal principle, impact the ongoing validity of the summons -- Mere discharge of the petitioner concerning the predicate offence does not, in itself, grant the Court the power to annul the summons.

(Para 34-39)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1(d) -- Criminal misconduct by public servant – Corruption case -- No allegation in the chargesheet that the appellant obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage -- No allegation that the appellant agreed to accept or accepted any gratification -- No allegation that he had agreed or accepted any valuable thing or had dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use any property entrusted to him – Held, the ‘criminal misconduct’ as provided in Section 13(1) is not attracted -- Direction to frame charge for the offences u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act set aside.

(Para 14, 15)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 20 -- Corruption case – Presumption – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification -- Just because money changed hands, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the same was pursuant to a demand -- For conviction under the Act, an entire chain, beginning from demand, acceptance, and recovery has to be completed -- When the initial demand itself is suspicious, even if the two other components of payment and recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain would not be complete -- Since the factum of demand itself has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the acquittal of the Respondent by the Impugned Judgment cannot be termed perverse or unwarranted – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 25-27)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135 – Theft of electricity – Penalty – Fine – Compensation -- Section 135(1)(a)(b) of ‘the Act’, gives discretion to the learned Trial Court either to impose upto one year imprisonment or fine of Rs.5,000/- -- Trial Court did not sentence the Appellant to any term as imprisonment, it imposed an amount of Rs.2,70,000/- towards fine and default imprisonment -- In an audit an amount of Rs.44,850/- was arrived, as appellant has indulged in power pilferage – Held, section 135(1)(a)(b) of ‘the Act’ does not confer imposition of Rs.2,70,000/- towards fine -- Petitioner has been in jail for the past fifteen days, he is aged about 84 years at present -- If an amount of Rs.20,000/- is directed to be paid towards compensation to the Corporation, it would meet the ends of justice – After the compensation of Rs.20,000/- is paid by the Appellant, Appellant be released forthwith.

(Para 5-7)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017), Section 132(1)(a), 132(1)(i), 132(5) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Offence under GST law – Regular bail – Onerous condition – Condition to deposit Rs.2.5 crores after release on bail -- When attempts are made to foreclose consideration of bail application on merits by voluntarily offering deposits of amounts and thereafter reneging on it by stating that a counsel had no authority and/or that the condition is onerous – Court strongly deprecated this practice -- Today the petitioner is approbating and reprobating, Court cannot allow parties to play ducks and drakes with the Court -- Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits -- Ordinarily the consequence would have been to put the petitioner back in jail -- However, considering the averments made in the modification application, Court granted a limited interim protection to the petitioner from surrendering.

(Para 4-11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), (2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 109 -- Disproportionate of assets to the income -- Even a non-public servant can be convicted u/s 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

(Para 15)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), (2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 108, 109 -- Disproportionate of assets to the income -- Appellant’s husband acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name – It is not clear, whether the appellant and her husband entered into a prior conspiracy to amass a huge bulk of wealth through bribery, but there is no doubt that after such disproportionate wealth was amassed, the appellant has been actively involved in concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name -- By doing so, the appellant is guilty of offence of abetment falling u/s 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

(Para 14, 15)

A. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- UAPA Case – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Regular bail – Delay in trial – Effect of -- Scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence -- The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable -- Rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive -- However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case

(Para 23, 24)

B. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), Section 17, 18, 22C, Section 43D(5) -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS/ UAPA Case – Regular bail – Despite no direct recovery of contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of narcotics concealed as talc -- Investigative narrative does not rest solely on physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and facilitation – Absence of direct seizure is not dispositive, particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious entities, and barter-based compensation – Bail declined.

(Para 25-27, 35)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341, 323, 307, 302, 120B, 147, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 3, 25, 5, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Murder – Conspiracy -- Regular bail -- Common intention – Overt Act -- Merely because no overt act was attributed to the respondent/ accused in the F.I.R., the same cannot be the sole consideration for grant of bail -- First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia of facts -- An FIR is a starter point to set the investigation in motion -- Respondent/accused hatched a conspiracy so as to eliminate the victim and engaged a contract killer to kill the victim  -- High Court failed to consider that the accused are the main accused in the matter and cannot be enlarged on bail because the other co-accused persons have been granted bail -- High Court order granting bail set aside.

(Para 16-20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379B, 325, 341, 34 – Appeal against conviction – Compounding after conviction in snatching case – Matter has been amicably settled between the parties -- Appeals allowed, as a result of compounding, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence under Sections 379-B, 325, 341, 34 IPC, whereby appellant sentenced to RI for five years and a fine of Rs. 10,500/- along with all consequential proceeding quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 14, 15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- M.P. Mineral (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2022, Rules 3, 4 – Quashing of FIR -- Theft – Excavation of sand by Panchayat -- Exception under Rule 4 granted to the Gram Panchayat for transportation and storage of minor minerals quarried from the Government lands for public works -- This rule cannot be interpreted to the extent that the Gram Panchayat can commit theft or can illegally excavate the sand -- State Government is the owner of every mineral and therefore the illegal excavation of the same would amount to commission of theft -- It is not the case of applicant that the sand was purchased by the Gram Panchayat and the sand in question was quarried from Govt. land in legal manner -- Court can quash the proceedings only if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence -- Application dismissed.

(Para 5-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 324 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Offence under other sections 323, 504, 427, 447 and 506 of the IPC are compoundable as per Section 320 of the CrPC -- In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the offences alleged against the appellant u/s 307 and 324 IPC shall also be quashed as the other offences alleged against the appellant are compoundable u/s 320 of the CrPC – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Scope of – Nature of -- The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that emerges in Court -- It is an exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material now available, appears to share criminal liability -- Power is extraordinary and therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must act.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Summoning as additional accused – Challenge to -- Plea of alibi by accused -- An alibi, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused -- Parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip, have yet to be formally proved -- Until that exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces of paper -- Abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a single moment -- It may consist of a build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction, and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it occurs – Order of the Trial Court summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC revived.

(Para 9-17)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS -- Search by temporary charge of SHO – Legality of -- SHO was absent on the relevant date and therefore, he has handed over the charge of the SHO to the Circle Inspector (Sub-Inspector) who has carried out the search -- Person holding temporary charge as Station House Officer at the relevant time is competent to carry out the search -- Submission that the Officer ought to be actually posted as SHO and not as In-Charge SHO is of no substance and cannot be accepted -- High Court manifestly erred in interpreting Section 42 of the Act and in holding that the In-Charge SHO was not competent to conduct the search -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and the trial is directed to continue in accordance with law, expeditiously. Bheru Lal’s case (2013) 11 SCC 730 relied.

(Para 8-11)

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Corruption case -- In a case of alleged criminal conspiracy, the prosecution is duty bound to prove by cogent, credible, and admissible evidence that the accused persons had a meeting of minds and participated in a common design.

(Para 14)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Corruption case – Demand and acceptance of bribe -- In the absence of demand and acceptance, the presumption u/s 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise and conviction cannot be thus sustained.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B – Corruption case – Conspiracy – Presumption – Reversal of burden -- Tehsildar, who employed co-accused BK and was shown to be one of the primary beneficiaries, was not accorded sanction and therefore, did not face trial -- Appellants, despite not being shown to be actual beneficiaries or participants, were convicted on a generalized theory of “connivance” – Held, mere association or presence of a person in a place where a crime is committed does not ipso facto establish participation or conspiracy -- Reversal of burden, in a trial u/s 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and Section 120-B of the IPC, where prosecution has not discharged its primary burden is certainly not permissible in law – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- In a case of gang rape u/s 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention -- Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) -- Gang rape – Common intention -- Abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant along with J.K. acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’ -- Sentence u/s 376(2)(g) of IPC reduced from life imprisonment to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default sentence.

(Para 24, 45)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Acquittal -- No evidence to establish the fact that the victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence -- Appellant acquitted from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act.

(Para 44)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust – Cheating – Civil dispute -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the FIR, the goods were to be exported out of India -- Respondent no. 2, since did not possess an import/export license, the appellant had asked respondent no. 2 to export the goods through M/s. Oswal Overseas -- Respondent no. 2 has in all exported sarees worth Rs. 34,71,344/- -- U/s 482 of the Code, Court will examine the crux of the complaint -- Question is whether such non-payment of the sale price can be an offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating at the hands of the second respondent -- Answer is clearly no -- Continuation of the FIR against the appellant is an abuse of the process of law, and at best, the non-payment of the sale price could be a civil dispute – Appeal allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 407, 420 – Cheating – Sentence of imprisonment reduced -- Appellant is a 71-year-old individual who is afflicted with various age-related ailments -- Medical documentation further reveals that the Appellant is a diabetic person and has a history of having suffered three heart attacks -- That apart, the incident is of the year 1994 i.e. more than 30 years old causing mental trauma and agony as faced by the Appellant -- All these factors in the facts and circumstances of this case persuade Court to take a lenient view -- Sentences imposed u/s 407 and 420 of IPC reduced to 2 years and 6 months of rigorous imprisonment from 5 years with fine and default punishment unchanged.

(Para 29, 30)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 415 -- NDPS case – Appeal from conviction – Sentence reduced -- Recovery of 500 grams of opium -- Appellant convicted for having in possession of contraband, attracting the offence for which no minimum punishment has been prescribed -- Appellant has already undergone actual sentence of 01 year 08 months and 12 days -- FIR was lodged on 30.04.2019 and the appellant has been suffering the agony of trial for last about 06 years and desires to live a peaceful life – Sentence reduced to already undergone.

(Para 8-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A -- Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal -- PW.1/ complainant deposed the driver of the car was speeding, however, nowhere stated that the accused’s driving involved traces of rash and negligent disposition -- Accident occurred on the left side of the road and the car in question was found on the right direction almost left side of the road -- Deceased was inebriated and under the influence of alcohol when he rode the motorbike -- Mere driving of vehicle in high speed neither amounts to negligence nor rashness in itself -- Degree of negligence of the accused cannot be ascertained on applying the ‘Principle of Foreseeability and Proximity’ since the accused was driving his vehicle in right direction – Conviction order set aside.

(Para 15-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Statements recorded u/s 161 of CrPC cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed u/s 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court u/s 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on the statement u/s 161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 54)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 84, 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention -- Plea taken by the appellant/ accused that she was under the influence of some invisible power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death -- Following aspects considered:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such motivating factor.

In the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the present case -- Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime -- Case falls under “culpable homicide of the third degree” – Conviction of the appellant converted under Part II of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, reduced to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

(Para 57-61)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Mens-rea – Intention – Duty of Trial Court -- Trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened -- Certain circumstances which are beyond his/ her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed decision -- It may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

(Para 63, 64)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Refusal to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Relationship was not merely of knowing each other but of living together as a couple under one roof in a rented accommodation -- FIR does not allege that physical relationship was established only because there was a promise of marriage -- Besides, physical relationship continued for over two years without a complaint in between -- A presumption would arise of there being a valid consent – In a long drawn live-in relationship, occasions may arise where parties in that relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or wish, by itself would not be indicative of relationship being a consequence of that expression of desire or wish – On ground of refusal to marry, the appellant cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence of rape -- First information report and the consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 10-18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Promise to marry – Intention -- To establish a false promise, it would have to be demonstrated that the maker of the promise had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making the promise.

(Para 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- Jurisprudence regarding the offence of abetment to suicide u/s 306 of the IPC is settled that the offence requires an active act or omission which led the deceased to commit suicide, and this act or omission must have been intended to push the deceased into committing suicide -- Deceased was repeatedly tortured and abused by the accused on account of dowry demand to the extent that the deceased had to return to her parental home seeking refuge -- Went back to her matrimonial home hoping that the events would take an upturn -- However, the abuses hurled at the deceased by the appellant on the day of the incident, acted as a straw that broke the camel’s back and led her to committing suicide -- Guilt of the appellant u/s 306 of the IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment upheld.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Acquittal -- Delay of 5 days in FIR – Non providing of ownership of mobile -- Appellants were not named in the FIR – No Test identification parade/ TIP – If no test identification parade is held, then it will be totally unsafe to rely upon the bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court -- Small recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- -- Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police -- Recovery of money is not sufficient to prove the allegations of snatching -- Held, the trial Court had committed a grave error in convicting the appellants-accused – Conviction and sentence u/s 379-A read with Section 34 of IPC set aside.

(Para 11-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case -- Identity of snatchers – Proof of -- PW-2, stated that accused present in the Court were the persons who had snatched his mobile phone, but he had not given details of physical description of the snatchers like their complexion, height or features or about the clothing as worn by them in the complaint -- Occurrence took place at 11 PM and it was dark at the time -- It was not explained by this witness as to what was the basis on which he could identify the accused persons -- Possibility of this witness having seen the miscreants and identifying them in dark seems very remote -- Identification of the accused persons not established beyond doubt and this fact has created a serious dent in the story of the prosecution with regard to the involvement of the accused in the subject crime.

(Para 17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Recovery of small amount – Identity of currency notes -- Recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- at instance of accused --  Not proved to be having any specific identification mark -- Small amount could easily be planted -- Alleged recovery was effected on 28.07.2020 whereas the occurrence had taken place on 09.07.2019 -- It does not appeal to reason that the appellants would keep such small amounts of money for such a long time with them fully knowing that the same being incriminating piece of evidence could be used against them for proving commission of the subject crime -- Such like currency notes could be easily available in market -- Recovery of money at the instance of the accused could not be considered to be a circumstance sufficient to prove that the appellants had snatched any mobile phone.

(Para 18, 19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a)(b)(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of defamation complaint – Appellant-homebuyers, dissatisfied with the services provided by developer, erected a banner detailing their grievances -- Peaceful and orderly protest made without using offensive or abusive language -- It could not be said that the appellants transgressed into the offending zone -- Their case wholly falls within the sweep, scope and ambit of exception 9 to Section 499 -- Their peaceful protest is protected by Article 19(1)(a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India -- Criminal proceedings levelled against them, if allowed to continue, will be a clear abuse of process -- Complaint along with the order issuing summons to the appellants u/s 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC quashed and set aside.

(Para 30-35)

Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (3 of 1984), Section 3, 5 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Damages to public property – Encroachment over Gram Panchayat land – Adjudication of rights -- Necessity of -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- As far as criminal proceeding for illegal encroachment, damage or trespass over the land belonging to Gram Sabha is concerned, the same can be undertaken but it would be subject to the adjudication of rights of the parties over the land in dispute as the said determination can be done only by the revenue court -- Continuation of criminal proceedings, being an abuse of process of the Court, ends of the justice requires that the said proceedings be quashed -- Entire proceedings of the Criminal Case quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 204, 438 -- Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 212(6), 447 -- Anticipatory bail – Serious Economic offences – SFIO investigated over 125 companies and filed a criminal complaint involving Rs. 4120 crores in fraudulent loans -- The Special Court issued bailable and later non-bailable warrants against the accused, many of whom deliberately evaded service -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 CrPC were initiated -- Despite prior knowledge of the case many accused concealed themselves and avoided appearance -- High Courts granted anticipatory bail to several accused.

Held, High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering the anticipatory bail application of such accused -- As per Section 212 (6), the offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act not entitled to be released on bail or on his bond, unless twin conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. The twin conditions are:-

(i) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

These twin conditions are mandatory in nature.

Economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside.

(Para 23-26, 31)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(j) (ii), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties have settled the dispute amicably and have also verified the contents of the compromise -- Cognizance/ summoning order, charge-sheet as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 – Dowry case -- Summoning of additional accused – Quashing of -- Acquittal of main accused – Effect of -- If main accused are acquitted, no criminal proceedings can be sustained against other co-accused on the same set of witnesses – Whenever, there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction valuable time of the Court should not be wasted -- Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue – Petition allowed, summoning the accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. for facing trial quashed.

(Para 8-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 120B – Acquittal of main accused – Trial of co-accused u/s 120B IPC -- Quashing of -- Main accused persons acquitted of the charges levelled against them u/s 386 and 120B IPC -- Applicant charge-sheeted only for the offence u/s 120B IPC for the same incident -- No fruitful purpose would be served, if the trial is proceeded against the present applicant -- Petition allowed -- Summoning order as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 5-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 457, 427, 323, 504, 506, 448, 511, 120B -- Cognizance by court -- Summoning order in printed form – Effect of -- Summoning order passed in a printed proforma by filing up the blanks reveals that the Trial Court has not applied its judicial mind and in a very cursory manner the Trial Court took cognizance -- Summoning order is cryptic -- Cognizance/ summoning order quashed, Trial Court directed to exercise discretionary power and decide afresh while taking cognizance on the charge sheet after taking into consideration the entire materials and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 499, 500 – Defamation – Essential proof – To attract the offence of defamation there must be publication of imputation intending to harm reputation of the person who felt defamed -- The person, involving whom such publication is made, must prove that in estimation of others his moral or intellectual character is lowered down as a result of such false imputation -- Further, to prove the said aspect it is the duty cast on the complainant to lead all necessary evidence before whom his image is ill-effected and lowered -- Albeit the complainant-PW.1 in his private complaint and the evidence stated that, the imputations as per Exs.P1(a) to P1(d) sullied his reputation, however, that in itself would not suffice to attract the offence under Section 499 of IPC -- The damage of the reputation can be ascertained and determined by other persons’ estimation.

(Para 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder of wife – Plea of alibi -- Circumstantial evidence -- Acquittal of husband by Trial court -- High Court emphasized that the accused and the deceased were living together and hence, the accused should have an explanation regarding the death of his wife u/s 106 of the Act, 1872 reversed the acquittal without anything other than a finding on alibi having not been proved -- The alibi being a possible and probable explanation, the accused cannot also be found to be in the teeth of Section 106 of the Evidence Act -- Not enough material to upset the order of acquittal of the Trial Court, especially when there was also no evidence led regarding the death being a result of homicide -- No circumstance leading to the guilt of the accused -- Order of the High Court set aside -- Order of acquittal of the Trial Court restored.

(Para 5, 6, 9, 10, 12-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Last seen theory -- Prosecution relied on last seen evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and circumstantial evidence including recovery of articles and fingerprints –PW-2 (alleged eyewitness) and PW-12 (last seen witness) disbelieved due to delayed statements – Extra judicial confessional statements disbelieved by High court – Recovery of slippers and a wheel spanner with alleged fingerprints of the accused was held insufficient to establish guilt in absence of a complete and credible chain of circumstantial evidence – Benefit of doubt extended to appellant – Conviction u/s 302 IPC set aside, holding prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence.

(Para 6, 7, 19-25)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2)(a), 173 -- Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), Section 3, 4, 5 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120B – Default bail after 60 days – Non-prescribing of minimum punishment/ maximum upto 14 years -- Non-filing of challan -- Effect of – Section 3 of the Act though, prescribes maximum punishment up to 14 years, there is no minimum punishment provided under the said provision -- Punishment prescribed for the offence punishable u/s 5 of the said Act is maximum up to three years -- Since, the investigation was not completed in sixty days, the Respondent had become entitled to the default bail under Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C -- High Court has rightly followed the Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 case and released the Respondent on bail.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Prosecution of Public servant – Sanction from Government – Requirement of -- Alleged offence must have been committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their official duties -- Protective mantle of Section 197 of the CrPC is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto -- Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not attract the bar imposed u/s 197 of the CrPC.

(Para 30)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (4 of 1964), Section 170 -- Prosecution of Public servant/ police officers – Sanction from Government not taken – Ground of – Quashing of summoning order:

(1) abuse of official authority by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or vendetta;  

(2) physical assault and ill-treatment of the complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged police excess;  

(3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and  

(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.

Allegations levelled against the accused persons, though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of the CrPC respectively -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 37-42)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Mere breach of promise to repay per se does not infer dishonest intention -- Appellant had clarified he had suffered continuous business setbacks -- Due to losses, he was unable to pay the 2nd non-applicant -- He had sold the coal to a brick manufacturer and suffered losses thereto -- Failure to pay due to unfortunate business losses cannot be clothed with culpability and the process of criminal law utilized to recover outstanding dues -- Proceeding arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 17-23)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR -- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC.

-- It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.

-- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

(Para 42(i)(ii))

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196, 197, 299, 302 – Promoting enmity – Prejudicial to national integration – Intent to insult religion feelings -- Registration of FIR – Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- Police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out -- Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence -- Same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of BNS -- To ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words -- This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

(Para 42 (iii))

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 – Life and liberty – Freedom of speech – Reasonable restrictions – Preliminary enquiry for FIR -- Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression -- Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution -- Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution -- They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens -- Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 -- If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) -- When an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused -- This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected -- Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

(Para 42(iv)(v))

D. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity – When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds -- The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

(Para 42(vi)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is at a nascent stage -- There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS --   When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage -- It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence -- There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage.

(Para 42(vii)

F. Constitution of India, Article 19(1(a) -- Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society -- Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution -- In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view -- Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected -- Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India -- If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights -- There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

(Para 42(viii)

G. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity/ hatred – It cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities -- Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.

(Para 42(ix)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Interested witness -- First cousin’s witness -- It is settled position of law that merely because the witnesses are relatives of the deceased and as such are interested witnesses, that alone cannot be a ground to discard their testimony -- The only requirement is that the testimony of such witnesses has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception IV, 302, 304, Part 1 -- Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Place of incident is near the house of accused persons -- Possibility of a quarrel taking place on account of previous enmity between the accused persons and the deceased; and in a sudden fight in the heat of the moment, the appellant along with the co-accused assaulting the deceased cannot be ruled out -- Weapons used are a stick and the blunt side of the axe, these tools are easily available in any agricultural field -- It therefore cannot be said that there was any premeditation -- Case would not fall under the ambit of Section 302 of IPC and the appellant would be entitled to benefit of Exception IV of Section 300 of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone the sentence of 6 years 10 months – Appellant sentenced to the period already undergone.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436, 332 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting – Bystander -- Appellants were residents of the same village where riots broke out, therefore their presence at the spot is natural and by itself not incriminating -- More so, because it is not the case of the prosecution that they came with arms or instruments of destruction -- In these circumstances, their presence at the spot could be that of an innocent bystander who had a right to move freely in absence of prohibitory orders -- In such a situation, to sustain their conviction, the prosecution ought to have led some reliable evidence to demonstrate that they were a part of the unlawful assembly and not just spectator -- Here no evidence has come on record to indicate that the appellants incited the mob, or they themselves acted in any manner indicative of them being a part of the unlawful assembly – Appellants’ arrest from the spot is not a guarantee of their culpability -- Mere presence of the appellants at the spot, or their arrest therefrom, was not sufficient to prove that they were a part of the unlawful assembly comprising of more than a thousand people – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 15-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 378 – Appeal against conviction/ Acquittal -- Huge pendency of criminal appeals in High Courts – Preference of hearing -- Priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison -- The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat -- However, a right balance has to be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail -- If the appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail and especially where a life sentence has been imposed are heard after a decade or more from its filing, if the appeal is dismissed, the question arises of sending the accused back to jail after a long period of more than a decade -- Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority.

(Para 15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 193 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 227, 229 – Maintenance proceedings -- Perjury – False affidavit in court – Burden of proof – Affidavit by wife that she is not gainfully employed -- Petitioner/ husband to prove that she was gainful employee refers to Annexures, however, they relates to the period commencing from 05.04.2013 to 17.05.2024, however, duly sworn affidavit was filed on 27.05.2024 -- No averment that as on the date of filing of the affidavit, respondent No.1/ wife was gainfully employed -- Her past employment would not come in the way of said affidavit -- Burden was on the petitioner to prove the said fact that on the date of giving of the affidavit, respondent No.1/ wife was a gainful employee which is not proved -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 304, Part II – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge -- Accidental death – Causing death by negligence -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Allegations that accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc. -- Two deceased employees were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop -- As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level -- While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death -- It was purely accidental -- On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC – Discharge application allowed.

(Para 13-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Discharge – Nature of -- At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal -- Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused -- Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.

(Para 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 419, 420, 467, 468, 20B – Rajasthan Public Examination (Measures for Prevention of Unfair Means in Recruitment) Act, 2022 (6 of 2022), Section 3, 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Dummy candidate in recruitment competitive exam -- Regular bail -- Since there must have been thousands of people who appeared for the exam, and the respondent-accused persons, for their own benefit, tried to compromise the sanctity of the exam, possibly affecting so many of those who would have put in earnest effort to appear in the exam in the hopes of securing a job – Respondents are not entitled to the benefit of bail – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside -- Respondent-accused to surrender to surrender before the concerned Court in two weeks.

(Para 3, 11-14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- NDPS – Commercial quantity – Pregnancy of wife -- Interim regular bail -- Recovery of 478 grms of heroin from pocket of petitioner -- Challan has not been presented and petitioner is inside jail since 11.10.2024 -- Wife of the petitioner is pregnant and she requires someone very close to her, who can take care of her physical and mental health, at the time of need -- Only person, in house is stated to be the grandmother of the petitioner, who herself is aged about 80 years -- Petition allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on interim regular bail from 15.03.2025 to 23.5.2025.

(Para 3-7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003) – Direction to register HECIR -- High Court had no reason to pass a drastic order of directing the Enforcement Directorate to register an ECIR only because the High Court prima facie came to a conclusion that a predicate offence exists -- ECIR registered on the basis of the impugned judgment quashed and set aside – Left open for Enforcement Directorate to take a call on the question of initiating proceedings under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002.

(Para 5)