Search By Topic: Constitution of India

103. (H.P. HC) 03-04-2025

A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 33, 33A – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Loss of confidence in employee – Pleadings – Requirement of -- Illegal discharge/ dismissal from service – Effect of -- Findings with regard to the loss of confidence in an employee can be returned by the learned Labour Court provided it is pleaded and proved by the employer that :

(a) the workman is holding a position of trust and confidence;

(b) by abusing such position, he commits acts which result in forfeiting the same;

(c) to continue him in service would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer or would be detrimental of the discipline or security of the establishment.

No such pleading that there was a loss of confidence in the employee -- Court is a slave of pleadings and adjudication has to be within the ambit of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence which is led by the parties to substantiate the pleadings --  Conclusions cannot be drawn by the Court in air on its own whims and fancies without taking into consideration the respective contentions and stand of the parties – Findings returned to this effect by learned Labour Court are perverse, bad, beyond the pleadings and not sustainable in law – Writ allowed, petitioner is deemed to have continued in service as from the date of his illegal dismissal, entitling him to all benefits available, monetary and otherwise.

(Para 16-26)

B. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 33, 33A – Loss of confidence in employee – Non-approval by Labour Court -- Discharge/ Dismissal from service – Effect upon -- If the approval sought by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not granted by the learned Labour Court, then nothing more is required to be done by the employee as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal was never passed and consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to be in continuous service, entitling him all the benefits.

(Para 24)

106. (SC) 28-03-2025

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Cognizable offence – Registration of FIR -- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC.

-- It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter.

-- Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

(Para 42(i)(ii))

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196, 197, 299, 302 – Promoting enmity – Prejudicial to national integration – Intent to insult religion feelings -- Registration of FIR – Preliminary enquiry – Requirement of -- Police officer to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made out -- Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence -- Same is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of BNS -- To ascertain whether the information received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words -- This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.

(Para 42 (iii))

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 – Life and liberty – Freedom of speech – Reasonable restrictions – Preliminary enquiry for FIR -- Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and expression -- Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution -- Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution -- They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens -- Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 -- If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) -- When an allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused -- This will ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected -- Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

(Para 42(iv)(v))

D. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity – When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds -- The effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.

(Para 42(vi)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of FIR -- Investigation is at a nascent stage -- There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS --   When the High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent stage -- It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence -- There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage.

(Para 42(vii)

F. Constitution of India, Article 19(1(a) -- Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society -- Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution -- In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view -- Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected -- Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India -- If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights -- There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

(Para 42(viii)

G. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 196 – Promoting enmity/ hatred – It cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities -- Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society.

(Para 42(ix)

114. (SC) 18-02-2025

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- When the Presiding officer's opinion is sought, the Presiding Officer must submit his opinion at the earliest considering the fact that the issue of liberty of the convict is involved.

(Para 20)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release -- Duty of Government -- It is the obligation of the appropriate Government to consider cases of all convicts for grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the policy -- It is not necessary for the convict or his relatives to make a specific application for grant of permanent remission -- District Legal Services Authorities shall maintain the relevant date of the convicts and as and when they become eligible to a consideration for grant of premature release, they shall do the needful -- The State Legal Services Authorities shall endeavour to create a portal on which the data as aforesaid can be uploaded on real time basis.

(Para 21(a)(g))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Policy for -- States and Union Territories that do not have a policy dealing with the grant of remission in terms of Section 432 of the CrPC or Section 473 of the BNSS to formulate a policy within two months.

(Para 21(b))

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Speaking order -- Communication of -- Order granting or refusing the relief of permanent remission must contain brief reasons -- The order containing reasons should be immediately communicated to the convict through the office of the concerned prison -- The copies thereof should be forwarded to the Secretaries of the concerned District Legal Services Authorities -- It is the duty of the prison authorities to inform the convict that he has the right to challenge the order of rejection of the prayer for the grant of remission.

(Para 21(d))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 473 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Pre-mature release – Remission – Cancellation of – Opportunity of hearing -- An order granting permanent remission cannot be withdrawn or cancelled without giving an opportunity of being heard to the convict -- An order of cancellation of permanent remission must contain brief reasons.

(Para 21(e))

121. (P&H HC) 27-01-2025

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Policy of regularization is applicable in rem and benefits admissible to each individual, who is similarly placed, had to be extended by the respondent-State without any discrimination -- Such employees ought not be forced to seek identical reliefs by way of filing separate writ petitions and that a holistic approach is required to be taken by the State Agencies as well as employer to extend the benefits to all similarly placed persons irrespective of the fact whether they have taken recourse to institution of a separate litigation or not.

(Para 23-25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Regularization Policy of the year 1996 dated 18.3.1996 (Haryana) – Regularization of daily wages employee -- Dealy and laches – Arrears of monetary benefits – Restriction upon -- Certain other persons approached this Court for seeking the benefit in the year 2014, which such writ petitions were allowed in the year 2022 -- The issue of delay and laches/ estoppel did not stand in the way of extending the said benefits, the monetary benefits restricted to a period of 38 months prior to filing of the writ petition(s) to balance the equities – Petitioners held entitled for all consequential benefits including notional fixation of pay and seniority -- However, the financial benefits restricted upto 38 months prior to the filing of the present writ petition.

(Para 24-29)

122. (SC) 24-01-2025

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Writ jurisdiction -- Instrumentality of State -- For issuing writ against a legal entity, it would have to be an instrumentality or agency of a State or should have been entrusted with such functions as are Governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence Governmental.

-- A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State Government; (ii) Authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any Statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.

(Para 10 (1)(2))

B. Constitution of India, Article 12, 226 – Writ against Non-Banking Companies – Maintainability of -- Although a non-banking finance company like the Muthoot Finance Ltd. is duty bound to follow and abide by the guidelines provided by the Reserve Bank of India for smooth conduct of its affairs in carrying on its business, yet those are of regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guideline and not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the company -- Writ petition rejected on the ground of maintainability .

(Para 10-12)

123. (SC) 22-01-2025

A. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of 2006), Section 18 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34, 80 – Order/ Award of Micro and Smal enterprises Facilitation (MSEFC) – Challenge to – Alternative remedy of arbitration – Writ jurisdiction :

Following questions referred to a larger Bench of five Judges, namely:

(i) Whether the ratio in M/s India Glycols Limited (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1852) that a writ petition could never be entertained against any order/award of the MSEFC, completely bars or prohibits maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court?

(ii) If the bar/prohibition is not absolute, when and under what circumstances will the principle/restriction of adequate alternative remedy not apply?

(iii) Whether the members of MSEFC who undertake conciliation proceedings, upon failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the MSMED Act read with Section 80 of the A&C Act?

The first and second question will subsume the question of when and in what situation a writ petition can be entertained against an order/award passed by MSEFC acting as an arbitral tribunal or conciliator.

(Para 2, 19)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Alternative remedy -- Existence of the statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ -- The writ jurisdiction being discretionary by policy, the writ courts generally insist that the parties adhere to alternative statutory remedies, as this reinforces the rule of law -- However, in exceptional cases, writ jurisdiction can still be exercised as a power to access the court for justice and relief.

(Para 15)

127. (SC) 17-01-2025

A. Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Transfer of prisoner from one jail to another – Challenge to -- It is lucid that transfer of convict prisoner from one prison to another is purely an administrative decision and hence, the same cannot be interfered with by the court unless it is arbitrary and contrary to law.

(Para 15)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Right of prisoner – Dignify life -- It is imperative on the part of the prison authorities to rehabilitate the prisoners into law abiding citizen, besides maintaining security and rule of law in the prison -- Prison administration needs to be reformed for creating a better environment and prison culture to ensure the prisoners enjoy their right to dignified life under Article 21 -- It is essential to continuously monitor the physical conditions prevailing in the prison, compliance with basic and fundamental rights of the prisoners, etc. -- State recognizes that a prisoner loses his right to liberty but still maintains his right to be treated as a human being and as person -- His human dignity shall be maintained and all basic amenities should be made available to him -- Discipline and order shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life, with due regard to the maintenance of the rights of prisoners -- Thus, the objective of reforms and rehabilitation of the prisoners has to be pursued diligently.

(Para 3, 17.2)

129. (H.P. HC) 10-01-2025

***

SARFAESI Act -- NBFCs -- Outstanding debt below Rs 20 lakhs threshold prescribed by Notification dated 12-2-2021 -- SARFAESI proceedings without jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy no bar where challenge raises pure question of law -- Writ petition maintainable -- Demand and possession notices quashed.

***

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Ss. 2(1)(m)(iv), 13(2) and 13(4) -- Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) -- Recovery proceedings -- Invocation of SARFAESI Act -- Central Government Notification dated 12-2-2021 issued under S. 2(1)(m)(iv) prescribing minimum debt threshold of Rs 20 lakhs for notified NBFCs/finance companies -- Outstanding debt below prescribed threshold -- Recourse to measures under Ss. 13(2) and 13(4) without jurisdiction -- Demand notice and possession notice quashed -- Respondents restrained from taking coercive measures except in accordance with law.

(Paras 20-23)

B. Constitution of India -- Art. 226 -- Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 17 – Writ jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy -- Availability of remedy before Debt Recovery Tribunal -- Challenge raising pure question of law relating to jurisdiction and competence of finance company to invoke SARFAESI provisions -- Alternative remedy no bar to exercise of writ jurisdiction -- Writ petition held maintainable.

(Paras 12-15)

142. (SC) 08-11-2024

Constitution of India, Article 30(1) – Minority educational Institution – Legislative/ Administrative Power to change -- Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision -- A legislation or an executive action which discriminates against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions is ultra vires Article 30(1).

-- Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established  the educational institution for the community to be a minority educational institution for the purposes of Article 30(1);

-- The right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before the commencement of the Constitution;

-- The right under Article 30(1) is guaranteed to minorities as defined upon the commencement of the Constitution. A different right-bearing group cannot be identified for institutions established before the adoption of the Constitution;

-- The incorporation of the University would not ipso facto lead to surrendering of the minority character of the institution. The circumstances surrounding the conversion of a teaching college to a teaching university must be viewed to identify if the minority character of the institution was surrendered upon the conversion. The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation; and

The following are the factors which must be used to determine if a minority ‘established’ an educational institution:

i. The indicia of ideation, purpose and implementation must be satisfied. First, the idea for establishing an educational institution must have stemmed from a person or group belonging to the minority community; second, the educational institution must be established predominantly for the benefit of the minority community; and third, steps for the implementation of the idea must have been taken by the member(s) of the minority community; and

ii. The administrative set-up of the educational institution must elucidate and affirm (I) the minority character of the educational institution; and (II) that it was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority community.

The view taken in Azeez Basha’ case AIR 1968 SC 662 that an educational institution is not established by a minority if it derives its legal character through a statute, is overruled -- The question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution must be decided based on the principles laid down in the judgment.

(Para 160, 161)

Reference answered with majority opinion

143. (SC) 07-11-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Compromise acquittal/ quashing of FIR in POCSO – Challenge by private party – Locus standi -- A private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution if the judgment of acquittal led to serious miscarriage of justice -- Such right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.

(Para 20-22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 354A, 342, 509, 504 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) – POCSO – Compromise quashing of FIR – Quashing by High Court – Challenge to -- Before exercising the power u/s 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime -- Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society -- Allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the same -- Order passed by High Court quashed -- Consequently, the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law.

(Para 25-33)

144. (SC) 07-11-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 309 -- Recruitment process -- Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies.

(Para 42(1))

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 -- Eligibility criteria – Change in midway – Permissibility of -- Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit -- Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness.

(Para 42(2))

C. Constitution of India, Article 309 – Select list – Right to be appointed -- Decision in K. Manjusree (2008) 3 SCC 512 lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220  -- Subash Chander Marwaha deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree deals with the right to be placed in the Select List -- The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues.

(Para 42(3))

D. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 – Recruitment rules/ procedure – Deviation from – Permissibility of -- Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved -- Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility -- However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps.

(Para 42(4(5))

E. Constitution of India, Article 14, 16, 309 –  Select list – Right to be appointment -- Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment -- State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies -- However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.

(Para 42(6)

149. (SC) 25-09-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

150. (SC) 24-09-2024

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Promotion during pendency of criminal case -- DPC – Charge-sheet thereafter – Putting the result in sealed cover – Legality of -- Disciplinary/ criminal proceedings can be said to be initiated against the employee only when a charge memo is issued to the employee in a disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet for a criminal prosecution is filed in the competent Court -- Sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after issuance of the charge-memo/ charge-sheet -- Pendency of investigation and grant of prosecution sanction will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure.

-- Charge sheet was filed by CBI, after completion of investigation on 25th October, 2008, whereas the DPC to consider the promotion of Additional Commissioners of Income Tax was convened on 22nd February, 2007, wherein the sealed cover procedure was adopted qua the respondent.

-- It is thus clear that the charge sheet against the respondent was filed well after the meeting of the DPC was convened.

Hence, it could not be said that the prosecution for a criminal charge was pending against the respondent when the DPC was convened -- Therefore, the move on the part of DPC to resort to the sealed cover procedure was unjustified and unsustainable on facts and in law -- The ‘Sealed Cover’ wherein the assessment of the respondent was considered by the DPC was opened in court -- Letter shows that the DPC assessed the respondent to be ‘FIT’ for promotion -- Consequential steps in light of the above recommendations shall follow.

(Para 24-29)