Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act --  West Bengal to Kerala -- Petitioner states that the entire transaction of loan, for which the cheque was alleged to have been issued, had taken place at Calicut, Kerala – Jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court at Calcutta (Kolkata), West Bengal is invoked as the cheque was presented in a Bank, which was within the jurisdiction of that Court – In such circumstances, it would be expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the complaint to the Court at Kerala – Petition allowed.

(Para 2-7)

A. Abatement – Abate – Meaning of -- Term ‘abatement’ or ‘abate’ has not been defined in Cr.P.C. -- Its dictionary meaning has to be looked into – In criminal proceedings ‘discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings’.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 394 -- Abatement of appeal – Acquittal -- Abatement is different from acquittal.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abatement of appeal – Effect on other accused – Unlawful assembly -- Mere fact that seven out of the ten convicts died, either during the pendency of Appeal before the High Court or during the pendency of this appeal, could not be a reason, by that itself, to canvass non applicability of the provision for constructive/vicarious liability.

(Para 16)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 149 – Murder – Unlawful assembly -- Vicarious liability -- Appellant was not charged with offence punishable u/s 302, IPC simpliciter, he was convicted u/s 302 and Section 149 -- Appellant cannot escape from the constructive/vicarious liability for the act committed by any one of the members of that assemblage by virtue of Section 149, IPC if the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and not causing grievous injury.

(Para 17)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 149 – Unlawful assembly -- Object of Section 149 is to make specific that person whose case comes within its gamut cannot be permitted to put forth a defence that he did not, with his own hand, commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

(Para 17)

F. Evidence law -- Effect of non-recovery of weapons – Held, non-recovery of the weapons cannot be a ground to discard the evidence of the injured eye witnesses.

(Para 19)

G. Evidence law – Witness of sons of deceased -- Evidence of injured witnesses cannot be disbelieved or brushed aside solely because they are the sons of the deceased.

(Para 19)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- In order to make culpable homicide as murder the act by which death is caused should fall not only under any one or more of clauses firstly to fourthly under Section 300, IPC but they should also not fall under any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC.

(Para 21)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 – Culpable homicide – Murder -- Appellant failed to bring the case within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC -- Absolutely no question of considering the contentions that the offence of culpable homicide falls either under 304 (Part I) or 304 (Part II).

(Para 21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Goods purchased by petitioner and cheque was also issued by him – Change in management by agreement and previous liability taken over by someone – Petitioner seeking quashing on the ground of change in management – Held, shifting of liability after issuance of the cheque has no significance, since penal provisions would attack against the person who issued the cheque -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 3-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Complaints in Punjab, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan -- Case of the petitioner that the complaints have been filed u/s 138 at different places by the respondents who are total strangers -- According to her, it is an offshoot of a matrimonial dispute and it is her case that the complaints have been orchestrated by her husband – Cases transferred to the competent Court at New Delhi.

(Para 6-8)

A. Circumstantial evidence -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused – A very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) – Murder -- Confession before police – Videography of statement by police – Recovery therefrom -- Evidential value – Conviction by Session Court affirmed by High Court – Setting aside of -- Entire case of the prosecution is built upon the confessional/voluntary statements made by the accused persons before the police and the recovery of the alleged weapon of murder recovered at the pointing out of the accused and the recovery of alleged stolen gold material from a jewelry shop, again, on pointing out of the accused – They confessed to as many as 24 crimes committed by them -- Their confessions of how they planned and executed the murders has been captured on a video, which was also exhibited before the court – Session Court and High Court taken this evidence of voluntary statements made by the accused and hence admitted it as evidence -- Held, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the accused and their videography statements -- Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself -- Again, under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confessional statement given by an accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence -- Appeals allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge and the High Court set aside, the appellants ordered to be released from jail.

(Para 13, 17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 309 – Examination-in-chief of witness – Postponement of cross-examination – Power of Trial Court -- Mandate of law postulate that examination-in-chief followed with cross-examination is to be recorded either on the same day or on the day following -- In other words, there should not be any ground for adjournment in recording the examination-in-chief/cross-examination of the prosecution witness, as the case may be. Vinod Kumar’s case (2015) 3 SCC 220 relied.

(Para 2)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO matter -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Subsequent to the registration of the FIR and after attaining the age of majority, the petitioner has solemnized marriage with the victim/respondent no.3 -- FIR and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, however, qua the petitioner.

(Para 1-3, 13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Violation of District Magistrate order – Contempt of lawful authority of public servant -- Cognizance on police report – Cognizance on complaint by public authority -- Since the violation of the prohibitory order issued by the District Magistrate, did tantamount to contempt of lawful authority of public servant(s), thereupon an offence constituted u/s 188 of the IPC, became aroused resultantly fall within the ambit of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. – Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, could not take cognizance, upon the police report, but could assume cognizance only on a complaint in writing being made before him, by the public servant concerned, and/or by some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 3)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195, 468, 473 – Cognizance on complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. – Limitation – Institution of a complaint on 15.05.2018, u/s 195 of the Cr.P.C., and, that too, after more than one year elapsing since the crime event taking place, at the crime site, did within the ambit of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., completely oust the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to either assume cognizance thereons, and/or to issue summons, upon the petitioners, to face a charge for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 188 of the IPC -- Though, the above period of limitation is condonable within the domain of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., but impugned summoning order does not reveal, that the prosecution adopted the above provision, resultantly the delay remained unexplained -- Petition allowed, proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Deposition of wife – Non-cross-examination by husband – Effect of -- Right of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses of the appellant-original applicant was closed, as he had failed to appear before the Family Court despite the issuance of warrants -- Allegations made by the appellant-wife in her evidence before the Court had remained unchallenged and, therefore, there was no reason for the Family Court to disbelieve her version -- Family Court could not have passed the order believing the oral submissions of the respondent.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance – Able-bodied husband -- Respondent being an able-bodied, he is obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child -- Rs.10,000/- per month awarded to the appellant-wife from the date of filing maintenance petition over and above the maintenance allowance of Rs. 6,000/- granted by the Family Court to the son.

(Para 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 342, 323, 506, 182 -- Acquittal by Trial Court – Leave to appeal -- Delay in lodging complaint -- Statement to the police after a delay of four days -- Similarly, the instant complaint was filed before the trial Court after a period of about 18 days -- Applicant/complainant could not offer any explanation with regard to delay -- In the investigation, it was found that the injuries suffered by the applicant/complainant were self-inflicted and the version put-forth by the complainant was found to be false and unbelievable -- As a consequence thereof, a calendra u/s 182 IPC was registered against the present applicant/complainant -- In initial version, the applicant/complainant stated that he was caused injury only with one blow of 'dattar' and there was no reference of the second blow, whereas in the complaint he alleged that NS gave two 'dattar' blows -- Complainant could not withstand the test of cross-examination -- Acquittal order liable to be affirmed -- Leave to appeal is declined.

(Para 4-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Regular bail – Parity -- High Court proceeded to grant bail to the respondent No. 2 only for the reason that identically placed co-accused persons had already been granted bail -- Order granting bail to the co-accused met with its strong disapproval by Supreme Court – High Court granted bail to the co-accused while ignoring the relevant considerations and with a mere reference to the mandate of Article 21 -- Impugned order set aside.

(Para 12-14, 20)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Regular bail – Custody period – Relevancy of -- Gruesome day-light murder of the son of the appellant with 8 grievous injuries, including those of incise wounds and stab wounds on and around the neck and the chest -- Respondent No. 2 had been in custody since 02.09.2019 or that he had no negative antecedents, by themselves, do not make out a case for grant of bail – Respondent No. 2 has specifically been named in the FIR as one of the assailants; and looking to the nature of the accusations and the nature of injuries, the prosecution case, prima facie, cannot dubbed as fanciful or improbable – Bail by High Court -- Impugned order set aside.

(Para 15-20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 155, 156, 157, 173 -- Same incident/ FIR/ Complaint – Different co-accused -- Two investigation agencies – Permissibility of -- There cannot be two investigating agencies with respect to the same FIRs/complaints arising out of the same incident/occurrence with respect to different co-accused.

(Para 5)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Recalling of witness -- In case the evidence sought to be brought on record is essential to the issue involved, the powers u/s 311 Cr.P.C. must be invoked.

(Para 1, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Rape -- Recalling of witness – In cross-examination of the victim no question was put regarding the charge against the accused -- Though, change of counsel in a case cannot always be ground for recalling and re-examination of witness, more so, in cases of sexual offences, however, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before deciding an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 12)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 33(5) – Rape -- Recalling of witness – Bar under 33(5) of POCSO Act -- Issue concerning determination of the age of the victim as well as cross-examination of the victim regarding the allegations leveled against the accused is essential, as only that can unfold the truth -- Fair trial demands that opportunity to defend the accused be afforded -- Section 33(5) cannot be read alone, as a balance of rights u/s 33(5) and Section 311 Cr.P.C. needs to be maintained -- Right to fair trial as well as the bar under Section 33(5) both need to be looked into while deciding such application, depending upon facts of each case – It is not a case of the prosecution that the witness has been repeatedly called for cross-examination -- Application moved on the first available opportunity to the accused/ applicant who, was in judicial custody -- Application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. allowed.

(Para 16-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XXXIX – Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Bangalore to Delhi – Case of the petitioners that they have to first go to Delhi and then travel to the said place where the trial is currently being held and they would have to bring their witnesses, on the other hand, respondent has a corporate office at New Delhi – Held, interest of justice would be subserved if the cases are transferred to the competent Court in New Delhi -- Cases transferred from Bangalore to Delhi.

(Para 2-7)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Cheque bounce case –  Additional evidence -- Section 311 can be exercised at any stage of the trial -- Only test prescribed as to whether such evidence which is being sought to be produced by resorting to Section 311 of the Code is essential to the just decision of the case or not – Trial Court has not given any finding as such – Impugned order set aside, Trial Court directed to decide the application afresh by testing the application on the touchstone of 'whether the evidence sought to be produced is essential for the just decision of the case or not'.

(Para 11,12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145(1) – Affidavit of accused in evidence -- Permissibility of -- An offence u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 is in the nature of a civil wrong which has been accorded criminal overtones – Application preferred by the petitioner to exhibit evidence in the form of an affidavit allowed – Ld. Court below shall admit the affidavit of the petitioner, on the record, and the same shall be treated as the statement of the petitioner.

(Para 1, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 336, 323, 506, 148, 149, 307, 395 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Section 307 (Attempt to murder) – Section 395 (Dacoity) – Compromise quashing of FIR – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8,9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 340, 195 – Complaint u/s 195 of Cr.P.C. -- Preliminary Enquiry – Opportunity of hearing – Scope of:

(i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court?

(ii) what is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry?”

Held, law as enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case, (2005) 4 SCC 370 is in line with what was observed in Pritish’case, (2002) 1 SCC 253 -- Both the judgments in Pritish’s case and the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case have not been noted in order passed in Sharad Pawar’s Case (2010) 15 SCC 290 -- Answer thus to the first question raised would be in the negative – Insofar as the second question is concerned, the scope and ambit of such a preliminary inquiry, also stands resolved in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case as referred to aforesaid. Reference answered accordingly.

(Para 1-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 – Complaint by Director of Company – Authorisation of Company – Requirement of -- Company is a legal entity and any prosecution before a Court shall be by a person duly authorized by the said company – 2nd respondent has described himself as the Director of Private Limited company, no authorization of company filed -- Though no authorization was initially filed, still a company can at any stage rectify the defect -- Grounds raised by the petitioner/ accused are not tenable. M.M.T.C’s case, (2002) 1 SCC 234 relied.

(Para 4-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Quashing of Charge-sheet – Compassionate appointment based upon forged degree – Role of Selection Committee -- Abuse of the process of law – Appellants are implicated, being the members of the Selection Committee, who without any verification on the assumption that the documents being genuine, recommended co-accused case for appointment – No prima facie evidence on record which implicate the appellants directly/indirectly connected to the commission of crime -- Not the case of the respondents that the appellants, in any manner, have facilitated co-accused either in creating or in fabricating the alleged forged degree for seeking compassionate appointment -- Criminal proceedings qua the appellants quashed and set aside.

(Para 5-10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 386 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 147, 148, 323, 302, 34 – Conviction in murder case  -- Minimum sentence u/s 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life and fine -- High Court reduced the sentence to sentence already undergone (appox. seven years and ten months) – Punishment which is less than imprisonment for life shall be contrary to Section 302 IPC and is unsustainable – Judgment and order of High Court set aside – Judgment and order of Trial Court imposing the life imprisonment restored.

(Para 1-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Delhi to Madhya Pradesh -- Alleged transactions took place in the district of Raisen in the State of Madhya Pradesh -- Cheques were also drawn in Madhya Pradesh – Ends of justice would be served if the complaints pending before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Central District, Tis Hazari, Delhi transferred to the Competent Court in District Raisen, Madhya Pradash.

(Para 2, 3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Cause of action – Time barred complaint -- Delay of 7 days in complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate -- No petition filed for condoning the delay -- It is settled law that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date of which the cause of action arose -- Hence, summoning order and revisional order confirming the cognizance taken by Magistrate are erroneous and  contrary to law, set aside.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Tamil Nadu to Haryana -- Sole-respondent is shown to be a resident of Delhi and his office address is indicated as being situated in Haryana -- Keeping in view the fact that the transfer of the petitions would be to the convenience of both the parties, the prayer of the petitioner is accordingly accepted – Complaint transferred.

(Para 1-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 391 – Appeal against acquittal – Application for additional evidence – Law on remand back – Lower Appellate Court while allowing the application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. cannot ask the Magistrate’s Court to decide the matter afresh -- That option would be open in a case where arguments have been heard in the appeal on merits after examining the additional evidence and the Lower Appellate Court finds it to be a case wherein the judgment of the Trial Court ought to be set aside – In such a scenario, the Lower Appellate Court has the power to set aside the judgment and order rehearing -- However, in the present case, the facts are slightly different, no arguments advanced on merits and the Additional Sessions Judge, has simply allowed the application u/s 391 Cr.P.C. and set aside the judgment of acquittal and remanded the case back – Impugned order set aside and the case is remanded back to the Additional Sessions Judge for a fresh decision on merits.

(Para 12-15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 (2)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act against Proprietor -- Proprietorship Firm not made party – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order – Statutory signification assigned to a 'Company', does visibly cover not only any corporate body, but also covers a firm, or other association of individuals -- Held, Sole proprietary entity though is obviously solitarily owned, yet, the said juristic person, or, legal entity rather becomes 'a person' committing an offence u/s 138, and, besides the said juristic person, is also a 'Company' – Therefore, not only the juristic entity concerned, was amenable for being arrayed as an accused in the petition complaint, but also all those persons responsible to the sole proprietary concern , for the conduct of its business -- Complaint reveals that the sole proprietary concern has not been arrayed as an accused, but only its sole proprietor has been arrayed as an accused – Petition allowed complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act as well as, the summoning order both are quashed and set aside.

(Para 12-17)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 21, 22 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 -- Two FIRs – Quashing of Second FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Second FIR nearly four years after the first FIR – Multiple FIR by the same person against the same accused for same set of facts and allegations is nothing but abuse of the process of law -- Act of the registration of such successive FIRs on the same set of facts and allegations at the instance of the same informant will not stand the scrutiny of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India – Appeal must succeed, FIR, charge sheet and the summoning order quashed and set aside.

(Para 11-13)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – POCSO case – Age of victim – Determination of – Stage of case -- Proof or determination of age of the victim in a POCSO case is foundational and for such an important issue, the same can be raised at any stage of the lifetime of the case, even before the appellate forum -- Impugned judgment and sentence set aside and quashed -- Matter remanded to the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO), to determine the age of the victim and to pass the final order upon appreciation of evidence under the changed circumstances.

(Para 15-21)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7, 8 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 – Age of the victim – Determination of -- Nothing on record to indicate the actual age of the victim either by medical or documentary evidence -- Special Court directed to take up the exercise of determination of the age of the victim in accordance with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and to allow the parties to produce relevant documents, examine and cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard on the issue and thereafter to decide on the issue.

(Para 16-19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance -- Objective of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to ensure financial support to the estranged wife -- Further, the objective behind granting maintenance is not to punish a person but rather support the relations who have a moral right to be supported -- The most important precondition for Section 125 Cr.P.C. to become operative is the condition that the wife is unable to maintain herself and that the husband has neglected or refused to maintain his wife.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 127, 125 -- Alteration of maintenance – An adjudicated order u/s 125 Cr.P.C. is a precondition for making an application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. -- Once an application has been filed u/s 125 and a maintenance amount has been granted, an application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. can be filed to claim alteration of the maintenance so awarded owing to change in circumstance -- Section 127 Cr.P.C. is not a stand-alone provision as the same requires a decision granting maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C.

(Para 6)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 127, 125 -- Alteration of maintenance – Change in circumstances -- Term “change in circumstances” as referred to in Section 127(1) not only includes a change in the financial circumstances of the husband or wife but may also include other circumstantial changes in the husband’s or wife’s life which have arisen since the maintenance was first awarded.

(Para 6)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127 – Maintenance -- Res judicata -- Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. will be covered by the principle of res judicata -- In order to avoid re-adjudication of the same issue, the legislature has enacted Section 127 Cr.P.C. to deal with change in circumstances after passing of an order granting maintenance.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Gujarat to Mumbai -- Trial at fag end – Complaint in 2016, thereafter, the respondent has filed a suit for recovery of the amount subject matter of the cheque in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and one more suit for injunction in a Court in Mumbai – Trial in the complaint has substantially progressed and even a statement of the petitioner u/s 313 of the Cr.PC has been recorded – At this stage, the prayer for transfer of the complaint cannot be entertained.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Incorrect address -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174-A IPC -- Despite of providing repeated opportunities to complainant to file the correct address, needful was not done -- An application was filed that there is no other address except the one mentioned in the complaint -- Without therebeing any basis, to conclude that petitioner was avoiding service the court proceeded to issue warrant of arrest and thereafter passed the impugned order for registration of FIR – Petition allowed, impugned order set aside.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 438 – Attempt to murder -- Summoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C. -- Anticipatory bail – Prosecution agencies did not consider it appropriate to arraign the petitioner as an accused -- Thus, a view favouring the petitioner exists, and on this ground alone, the petitioner is entitled to bail.

(Para 1-3)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cause of action – Pre-mature complaint – Second complaint -- Demand notice period of 15 days not expired -- Complaint filed before fifteen days -- In view of the legal bar created by Section 142 of the NI Act, taking of cognizance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable -- Respondent would be at liberty to institute a fresh complaint and to seek the benefit of the proviso by satisfying the trial court of sufficient cause for the delay in instituting the complaint.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Cheque bounce case – Presumption as to issuance of cheque in discharge of debt or other liability -- Admission of issuance of cheque and signature -- Presumption envisaged u/s 118 read with Section 139 of NI Act would operate in favour of the complainant – Presumption is one of law and there under the court shall presume that the instrument was endorsed for consideration -- In absence of contrary evidence on behalf of the petitioner/ accused, the presumption under section 118 and 139 of the NI Act, goes in favour of the complainant.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce case – Presumption as to issuance of cheque in discharge of debt or other liability -- Wrong cheque number in legal notice/ complaint – Effect of -- Original cheque was placed before the trial court and the same was exhibited -- Cheque as well as the signature has been accepted by the petitioner -- Thus, the presumption u/s 139 would operate and the wrong number of the cheque in the complaint and/or in the legal notice would not make any difference and has to be taken as typographical error.

(Para 11, 12)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Conviction in cheque bounce case – Long pendency of case – Sentence of compensation -- Ld. Appellate Court has sustained the compensation amount of Rs.9 lakhs and sentenced of S.I. for a period of 1 year -- Having regard to the facts of the case and looking to the continuity of litigation, since the case is of the year 2009 and 13 years have elapsed; interest of justice would be sufficed if the sentence part is modified in lieu of compensation itself -- Sentence of one year modified to an amount of Rs.1 lakh over and above 9 lakhs compensation – Petitioner directed to pay the amount within a period of 10 weeks’, failing which the trial court shall proceed in accordance with law.

(Para 13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 301 – Summoning of witness – Bar of Section 301 Cr.P.C. -- Application for the summoning of witness and for production of the decoding register was submitted by the State -- Hence, the bar contained in Section 301 does not stand in the way.

(Para 27)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91, 207 – Criminal proceedings -- Production of documents – Summoning of person -- Section 91 CrPC empowers inter alia any Court to issue summons to a person in whose possession or power a document or thing is believed to be, where it considers the production of the said document or thing necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC -- Section 207 which provides for the supply to the accused of a copy of the police report and other documents in any case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report -- Both operate in distinct spheres.

(Para 33, 34)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 91, 311 – Summon to person/ witness -- Decoding registers are sought to be produced through the representatives of the cellular companies in whose custody or possession they are found -- Summons to produce a document or other thing u/s 91 can be issued where the Court finds that the production of the document or thing “is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, trial or other proceeding” under the CrPC -- Power u/s 311 to summon a witness is conditioned by the requirement that the evidence of the person who is sought to be summoned appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case -- Relevance of the decoding register clearly emerges from statement of PW-41 -- Hence, the effort of the prosecution to produce the decoding register which is a crucial and vital piece of evidence ought not to have been obstructed -- In terms of the provisions of Section 311, the summoning of the witness for the purpose of producing the decoding register was essential for the just decision of the case – Application filed by the prosecution for the production of the decoding registers and for the summoning of the witnesses of the cellular companies for that purpose is allowed.

(Para 35-37, 44)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summoning of additional witness -- Filling up lacunae -- Objection of the respondents that the application should not be allowed as it will lead to filling in the lacunae of the prosecution’s case -- Said reason cannot be an absolute bar to allowing an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C.

(Para 38)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Closing of evidence -- Summon and examine or recall and re-examine any material witness – Power of -- Court is vested with a broad and wholesome power, in terms of Section 311 of the CrPC, to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any material witness at any stage and the closing of prosecution evidence is not an absolute bar.

(Para 42)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act --  Upheld by Supreme Court – Compromise/ Settlement between parties – Recalling of order -- In view of the statement made and as full payment has been made along with compensation, order recalled and the special leave petition restored to its original number – Leave granted, impugned order upholding the conviction of the appellant would be treated as settled and compounded -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 2-7)

A. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Commercial transaction – Criminal proceedings against large incorporates -- Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same -- Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run -- Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.

(Para 29)

B. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Constitution of India, Article 14 – Action against company – Duty of SEBI -- Rule of natural justice -- SEBI is a regulator and has a duty to act fairly, while conducting proceedings or initiating any action against the parties -- Being a quasi-judicial body, the constitutional mandate of SEBI is to act fairly, in accordance with the rules prescribed by law -- Duty to act fairly by SEBI, is inextricably tied with the principles of natural justice, wherein a party cannot be condemned without having been given an adequate opportunity to defend itself.

(Para 42, 43)

C. Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 77 – Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995, Regulation 3, 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 129 – Non-supply of documents, reports, Legal opinion, Fact finding investigation by SEBI -- Impugned action of the appellant hails back to the year 1994 -- Investigation report by SEBI in 2005 was inconclusive about the alleged offence -- Minister of Corporate Affairs, Union of India recommended closure of the case – SEBI’s action to initiate a criminal complaint without providing the appellant an adequate opportunity to defend itself by releasing necessary Reports and other documents, cannot be appreciated -- Respondents relied on litigation privilege u/s 129 of the Evidence Act, 1872 -- Simple test in this case is whether SEBI has launched the prosecution on the basis of the investigation report alone -- Answer seems to be ‘No’ by SEBI’s own admission -- That being the case, further Reports and opinions obtained, from whomsoever it may be, are only an extension of the investigation to help SEBI as a Regulator to ascertain the facts and reach conclusions for prosecution or otherwise – Defence taken by SEBI that they need not disclose any documents at this stage as such a request is premature in terms of the CrPC, cannot be sustained -- SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part -- Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking -- Appeal allowed, direction given to SEBI to furnish a copy of documents to the appellant forthwith.

(Para 45-59)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397(2), 482 – Criminal case -- Permission to go abroad declined  -- Interlocutory order – Revisional jurisdiction – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.c. -- Impugned order whereby application for permission to travel abroad has been declined, would qualify as an interlocutory order and fall within the ambit of Section 397(2) of the Code -- As revision against such an order is barred, an aggrieved person has no other remedy, but to invoke the inherent powers of High Court.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 406 – Criminal case – Permission to go abroad -- Considering that the petitioner is an Engineer, who had returned from Australia earlier, as also that he has an employment offer in hand, which stands duly verified, order passed by the Trial Court rejecting his application for permission to travel to Australia is not sustainable and the impugned order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, deserves to be set aside -- Petitioner granted permission to travel to Australia for a period of six months subject to the conditions -- In case the petitioner does not return to India within the time granted by this Court, the Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed in terms of the undertaking given before it.

(Para 10-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Murder -- Conspiracy – Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- Only eye-witness is domestic servant present in the house of the deceased -- She neither in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. nor u/s 164 Cr.P.C. stated anything about the involvement of the appellant, rather she categorically stated in the statement that at the instance of the deceased, the wife of the deceased called the appellant for help and further stated that the appellant took the deceased to the hospital in his car -- Some evidence ought to have emerged or the prosecution could have brought on record some prima facie material whereby the appellant along with the accused persons had prior meeting of mind to execute the alleged offence -- In the given facts and circumstances, there is no justification for the appellant to undergo the agony of facing trial, to which the appellant is not even prima facie connected -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 12-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Murder -- Conspiracy -- Prima facie material -- Discharge of accused -- There is no iota of evidence which, in any manner, connect the appellant with the commission of crime -- Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has even taken pains to look into the record as to whether there is any oral/documentary evidence which in any manner connect the appellant with the alleged incident of crime – Held, in the absence of even a prima facie material, oral/documentary, being placed by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, the trial Court as well as the High Court have committed serious error in framing charge against the appellant -- Impugned orders passed by the High Court as well as the Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside and the appellant stands discharged from the charges framed against him.

(Para 15, 16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings – Stay of investigation – High Court passed ex-parte ad-interim order directing that no coercive steps be taken against the accused -- Said interim order was quashed by Supreme Court by a detailed judgment -- Despite this, High Court again granted the impugned interim reliefs staying further criminal proceedings and resultantly staying further investigation – Stay should only be in rarest of rare cases -- Impugned order was in teeth of and contrary to not only the earlier judgment but also to decision in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure’s case AIR 2021 SC 1918 -- Impugned interim order quashed and set aside.

(Paras 5-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Goods were entrusted with the company, the Managing Director of the said company cannot be prosecuted without the company as an accused -- In the absence of any specific overt act on the part of the petitioner, no offence u/s 406 of IPC can be made out against the petitioner/ Managing Director – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- An indirect act of incitement to the commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of the IPC.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Abetment of suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR – Financial settlement -- FIR u/s 306 of the IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been compromised -- Impugned orders of the High Court set aside.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In exercise of power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

(Para 49)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time -- Report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C., rather within a period of 180 days, since the opening of the investigations, becomes meted strictest compliances -- Very rarely any occasion, arises for the jurisdictionally empowered Court, becoming led to, on valid, and, cogent reasons, make reliance, upon the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, necessarily for enabling, that with a supplementary challan, the report of the FSL becomes appended, and, also becomes instituted before the learned trial Judge concerned, for hence the earlier purported defective report, as filed within 180 days, rather not, becoming purportedly vitiated and, stained.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time – Heaviness of docket rather precluding the FSL concerned, to make examination of the stuff, inside a cloth parcel, may not always be a truthful projection, for the relevant leave, rather within the ambit of the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, being asked for, by the learned Public Prosecutor concerned, from the jurisdictionally empowered Court, rather it may be surmisal -- Therefore, the strength of the Chemical Examiners, at all the FSLs concerned, if is deficit, and, leads to the above crises, thereupon, the above shortfalls be ensured to be forthwith made good, through prompt deployments of Chemical Examiners, at all the FSLs concerned, within the States of Punjab, Haryana, and, U.T. Chandigarh, and, in the above regard all concerned, directed to take the promptest measures.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A(4) – NDPS case – Challan within 180 days – Delay in FSL report -- Extension of time – Court gave directions, both upon the Secretary Home, Punjab, and, upon, the DGP Punjab, and, also upon the Secretary Home, Haryana, and, DGP Haryana, as well as the, upon, the Administrator U.T. Chandigarh, besides, upon, the DGP, U.T. Chandigarh.

i)       They shall ensure that all the investigating officers holding investigations into the NDPS cases, hence ensure theirs making the earliest, and, promptest, despatches of the sealed sample cloth parcels, through validly drawn road certificate, to all the FSLs concerned. The FSLs concerned, to which the sample cloth parcels are sent, be ensured to be adequately manpowered, to deal with the heavy docket, if any.

ii)      However, since surmisal reasons with respect to heaviness of dockets do emerge, and, hence lead to delayed reports being made, upon the stuff inside sample cloth parcels, as sent to the FSLs concerned. Therefore, for obviating the above, this Court deems fit, and, just, to hence constitute a Regulatory Mechanism rather imperatively for obviating the emergence of the above stated conundrum. Consequently, this Court directs the Governments of Punjab, Haryana, and, also the U.T. Chandigarh, to constitute in their respective States/Territories, a Steering Committee, headed by an officer not less than the rank of a Secretary, for not only drawing statistics, in respect of the heaviness of dockets at the FSLs concerned, but also to quarterly garner statistics, from their respective FSLs concerned, about the volume of work pending at the respective FSLs concerned, and, to ensure that promptest opinions, are made by the Chemical Analysts', at the respective FSLs concerned, on the stuff sent to the FSLs' concerned, for theirs' making examinations, and, also opinion(s)' thereons. The respectively constituted Steering Committees, shall also keep track of the relevant despatches, rather through the respective Superintendents of Police of police districts concerned, and, shall also keep track that with respect to the seizures, the investigating officers concerned, not later than two weeks since the making of the relevant seizure, depositing them, in the malkhanas concerned, and, shall also ensure that within a week thereafter, the sample parcels are sent for examinations, of the stuff inside the sample parcels, to the respective FSLs concerned.

iii)     The above data be shared with the prosecuting agency, and, if yet, it makes unfoldments, that despite sufficiency of manpower, the load of stuff to be examined inside the sample cloth parcels concerned, is immense, thereupon the prosecution may, within the ambit of the proviso underneath sub-Section 4 of Section 36A of NDPS Act, and, obviously on the above prima-facie credible, and, weighty reason, hence seek the leave of the Court, to grant extension, for filing of a supplementary report, before the learned jurisdictionally empowered Court, necessarily for ensuring the appendings therewith, the report of the FSLs concerned.

Report of the Steering Committees concerned, and, also the action taken thereons, after every 6 months' hereafters', be intimated to the Registry of High Court.

(Para 20, 21)