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Posted On: 05-05-2026
552. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 12.03.2026 Decided on: 10.04.2026)

Liability of insurer -- Compensation in motor Vehicle accident case -- Fare-paying passenger -- Onus lies on insurer -- A mere reference to statements in the FIR or presumptions regarding payment of fare cannot be treated as sufficient discharge of this burden -- Liability fastened on insurer.

Interest -- Compensation in motor Vehicle accident case -- Interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of its realization allowed.

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation -- Liability of insurer – Deceased as passenger -- Breach of policy -- Onus of proof -- Onus to prove breach of policy conditions lies squarely upon the insurance company -- A mere reference to statements in the FIR or presumptions regarding payment of fare cannot be treated as sufficient discharge of this burden -- Insurance company failed to adduce any cogent or reliable evidence to establish that the deceased was a fare-paying passenger or that there was any wilful violation of the policy terms by the insured -- Liability fastened on insurer.

(Para 13-17)

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 – Compensation – Tailoring work -- Housewife -- Notional income assessed at Rs.9,000 per month.

(Para 22-25)

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Enhancement of compensation – Interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of its realization allowed.

(Para 27, 28)

Posted On: 05-05-2026
553. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 09.04.2026 Decided on: 17.04.2026)

Regular Second Appeal -- In Punjab & Haryana, second appeals lie under S.41 of 1918 Act and not S.100 CPC, hence no substantial question of law required.

Family settlement -- Spes successionis -- Settlement not confined to persons having existing title -- Can validly include persons with semblance of claim, expectancy or chance of succession -- Even contingent/ prospective right sufficient juridical basis -- Children/grandchild having expectancy in intestate succession held competent parties -- Family settlement upheld on such foundation.

Compromise decree/Family settlement -- Where decree merely recognizes and formalizes pre-existing rights arising from prior family settlement, does not require compulsory registration.

Fraud/misrepresentation — Allegations must be pleaded with specific and detailed particulars as to manner and circumstances and proved by cogent evidence; bald and omnibus assertions are insufficient in law.

Family settlement/ transfer -- Minor as beneficiary -- Family settlement conferring share on a minor not void merely due to minority, being distinct from a contract and aimed at preserving family harmony and equitable distribution.

Mutation -- Any error in the mutation entries does not, ipso facto, divest the appellants-plaintiffs of their rightful share in the property.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Regular Second Appeal -- Scope -- Applicability of Punjab Courts Act, 1918 vis-à-vis Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -- In States of Punjab & Haryana, second appeals governed by Section 41 of 1918 Act and not by Section 100 CPC -- No requirement to frame substantial question of law. Position settled by Pankajakshi’s, (2016) 6 SCC 157, Kirodi’s  (2019) 11 SCC 317 = (2019) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14222 and Satender’s case, 2022 (12) Scale 92.

(Para 6)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Spes Successionis -- Nature of property/ right to be included – Family settlement is not circumscribed to parties possessing an existing legal title in the property – Law recognizes that such a settlement may validly be arrived at even amongst persons having a semblance of a claim, a possible expectancy, or a mere chance of succession – It has been unequivocally held that even a prospective or contingent right to succeed to property constitutes a sufficient juridical basis for entering into a family arrangement -- Children and grandchild of the appellants-plaintiffs, possessed a legitimate expectation or chance of succession in the event of intestate devolution -- Consequently, the existence of such a potential claim furnishes an adequate legal foundation for the family settlement.

(Para 12, 12.1)

C. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 – Compromise decree/ Family settlement – Requirement of Registration -- Decree merely formalized and recognized the pre-existing rights which had already accrued to the respondents-defendants pursuant to the family settlement effected in the year 1989 -- In such circumstances, the decree falls within the category of declaratory recognition of antecedent rights and, therefore, does not attract the requirement of compulsory registration.

(Para 12.4)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 4 -- Fraud / misrepresentation -- Pleading and proof – Allegations must be pleaded with specificity and particularity -- Full particulars of fraud, undue influence, and misrepresentation has to be clearly set out in the pleadings -- Allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence must be pleaded with precision and specificity, detailing the manner, circumstances, and particulars thereof -- A bald and omnibus assertion, devoid of material particulars, does not satisfy the statutory requirement -- Moreover, such allegations are required to be substantiated by cogent, convincing, and reliable evidence.

(Para 12.6, 16, 16.1)

E. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 11 -- Transfer / Family Settlement – Minor is beneficiary -- Validity -- Family settlement, wherein a minor member of the family is conferred a share in immovable property, cannot be rendered null and void merely on account of the minority of such beneficiary -- Jurisprudential foundation of a family settlement is fundamentally distinct from that of a contractual arrangement inter se parties -- A family settlement, being an arrangement intended to preserve harmony, avoid disputes, and secure equitable distribution of property within the family, cannot be invalidated solely on the ground that one or more beneficiaries had not attained the age of majority at the relevant time.

(Para 18)

F. Mutation -- Nature and effect -- Mutation entries, being fiscal in nature, neither confer nor extinguish title -- Respondents-defendants derive their title not from the mutation, but from the judgment and decree -- Consequently, any error in the mutation entries does not, ipso facto, divest the appellants-plaintiffs of their rightful share in the property.

(Para 18.5)

G. Limitation -- Suit for possession based upon title – There is no limitation for seeking possession on the basis of title.

(Para 18.6)

Posted On: 04-05-2026
555. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 17.04.2026)

***

Additional evidence (SPA) at appellate stage cannot be permitted in absence of due diligence and explanation for non-production at trial, as it would amount to filling lacunae – Application dismissed.

Registered Sale Deed carries presumption of validity – Allegation of fraud not proved as plaintiff failed to depose – SPA holder cannot depose on behalf of principal on personal facts – Adverse inference drawn – Appeal dismissed.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27(1), (1)(aa) – SPA in additional evidence at appellate stage – Permissible only on proof of due diligence and inability to produce evidence at trial despite best efforts –Applicant has not exercised due diligence and cannot be permitted at this stage to improve his case or fill up lacunae in his case by leading additional evidence -- Application dismissed.

(Para 1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 3 Rules 1 and 2, Section 100 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17, 60(2) -- Registered Sale Deed – Presumption of validity – Allegation of fraud – Burden of proof – Power of Attorney (SPA) – Scope of deposition – Second Appeal – Registered Sale Deed bearing thumb impression and photograph carries presumption of truth and validity – Allegation of fraud not proved as plaintiff failed to step into witness box and led no evidence – SPA holder cannot depose on behalf of plaintiff regarding facts within personal knowledge of principal – Non-examination of plaintiff warrants adverse inference – Contradictory pleas regarding sale consideration – NOC supports case of defendants – High Court in second appeal has limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Courts below – Appeal dismissed.

(Paras 15 to 32)

Posted On: 04-05-2026
558. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 22.04.2026)

Bail to child in conflict with law – Nomenclature of petition not decisive – Petition under Section 483 BNSS treated as appeal under Section 101 JJ Act against order declining bail.

Bail to child in conflict with law – POCSO -- Grant of bail is rule and denial is exception – Bail cannot be denied on gravity of allegations in absence of material attracting proviso to Section 12 – Order declining bail without cogent reasoning or supporting material not sustainable – Bail allowed.

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 101 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 -- Bail to child in conflict with law – Nomenclature of petition not decisive – Petition u/s 483 BNSS file instead u/s 101 of JJ Act -- Petition treated as appeal under Section 101 against order declining bail.

(Para 8)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 351(3) – POCSO -- Bail to child in conflict with law – Grant of bail is rule and denial is exception – Exceptions under proviso to Section 12 to be founded on reasonable grounds supported by material on record – Bail declined by trial Court on gravity of allegations, non-examination of witnesses and apprehension of association with criminals – Findings general in nature and mere reproduction of proviso – The statute does not contemplate denial of bail merely on the seriousness of the offence alleged, unless the case squarely falls within the exceptions provided in the proviso – The trial Court failed to record any cogent reasoning or refer to any specific material to show as to how release of the petitioner would defeat the ends of justice in the facts of the case -- No material pointed out to indicate that the petitioner is likely to come into association with any known criminal, nor to suggest that his release would expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger -- Observation that release of the petitioner would defeat the ends of justice is not supported by any substantive reasoning -- Such conclusions, in the absence of supporting material, cannot be sustained in law – Appeal allowed, petitioner/child in conflict with law is ordered to be released on bail.

(Paras 9 to 13)

Posted On: 24-04-2026
565. (SC) (Decided on: 09.04.2026)

Execution of decree -- Jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place of that expressed under the decree.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Executing Court is empowered to decide questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed -- It has to execute the decree as it is without changing the same -- Jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place of that expressed under the decree.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Executing Court has to strictly conform to the decree under execution and if the decree provides for reciprocal obligations, it must ensure compliance of those conditions by both the parties in pith and substance, unless the decree is a nullity.

(Para 27)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Compromise decree describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties -- Executing Court has to ensure that both the parties fulfil their obligations and exchange the land as per the decree and to see that the sale deed is executed as directed -- Merely for the reasons that exchange of some portions of the land may not be practicable for the reason that constructions on it are not as per the sanctioned map or that part of it has been sold off, are all immaterial.

(Para 30)

Posted On: 12-04-2026
566. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 30.01.2026)

Regular bail -- Attempt to murder – Alleged encounter with police – Petitioner named only in co-accused’s disclosure statement with weapon recovery based on such disclosure -- Though involved in five other cases, on bail in all except one FIR, all triable by Magistrate not convicted in any -- Custody for over one year with only 3 of 33 witnesses examined, role yet to be established and no injury caused to police officials – Bail allowed.

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 109(1), 111(2)(b), 111(5), 121(1), 132, 221 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25(1-B)a, 29, 54 – Regular bail – Attempt to murder – Criminal history -- Alleged encounter with police – Petitioner named only in disclosure statement of co-accused and recovery of weapon effected on basis of disclosure statement – Petitioner involved in two other cases under the Arms Act, third for the offence of theft, fourth under the Excise Act and last one is of cheating and fraud -- All these five cases are triable by the Court of Magistrate and the petitioner is on bail in all cases except one FIR -- Till date the petitioner has not been convicted in any of the cases registered against him – Petitioner in custody for more than one year and only 3 out of 33 prosecution witnesses examined – Role yet to be established and no injury caused to police officials – Bail allowed.

(Para 3-9)

Posted On: 12-04-2026
569. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 30.03.2026 Decided on: 08.04.2026)

***

Sanction for prosecution – Even if a public servant has exceeded his powers while discharging his official duties, Section 197 CrPC would come into play.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, Sections 342, 330, 34 – Sanction for prosecution of public servant – Police excess/ illegal custody – Complainant alleged that police officers including petitioner-SDPO kept him in illegal custody from 10.05.2005 to 01.06.2005 at different police stations and subjected him to third-degree torture causing serious injuries – Not only the acts which have been done by the public servant in exercise of his official duty but even the acts, which a public servant has done in purported exercise of official duty, would be covered under the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC, therefore, the test is whether there is a reasonable nexus between act done by public servant and his official duties -- Even if a public servant has exceeded his powers while discharging his official duties, Section 197 CrPC would come into play -- Section 197 CrPC, is a shield to the public servants, who cannot be removed from their services, without the sanction of the Govt. from their false and unwarranted prosecution, without a formal sanction to prosecute -- The idea is to protect them from any kind of harassment, at the hands of unscrupulous elements.

(Paras 15–21)

Posted On: 12-04-2026
570. (J&K&L HC) (Decided on: 23.03.2026)

***

Approver – Bail – Detention of an approver till conclusion of trial is not an absolute bar, and High Court in exercise of inherent powers can release the approver on bail in once he has made full disclosure and been examined as a witness.

***

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 306(4)(b), 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 343(4)(b), 528 – Approver – Release on bail pending trial – Provisions of Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C. requiring that an approver “shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial” do not operate as a blanket ban on his release – Provision is intended not to punish the approver but to protect him from possible indignation, rage and resentment of his associates and to prevent temptation of retracting from disclosure – Once an accused is tendered pardon and makes a full and true disclosure, he ceases to be an accused and becomes a witness for the prosecution – Custody of an approver is co-terminus with fulfilment of conditions of pardon – Section 306(4)(b) of the Code appears to be directory and not mandatory -- Such a person cannot invoke the provisions of Section 439 of the Code corresponding to Section 483 of BNSS -- Continued detention despite compliance with conditions of pardon may violate right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – High Court in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 BNSS) can enlarge an approver on bail even before culmination of trial where exceptional and reasonable circumstances exist – Where approver has been examined as prosecution witness, stood by his earlier disclosure without contradiction and seeks enlargement voluntarily, he deserves to be released on bail subject to reasonable conditions – Impugned order set aside and petitioner-approver admitted to bail.

(Paras 12–21, 26, 27)

Posted On: 11-04-2026
575. (SC) (Decided on: 26.02.2026)

Rape on false promise of marriage – Quashing – A married woman having consensual physical relationship with accused alleges rape on promise of marriage -- Consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant into a physical relationship -- FIR quashed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n), 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Rape on false promise of marriage -- Consensual relationship -- Quashing of FIR -- Complainant, a married woman and mother of two children, employed in a massage parlour and in charge of running the same, had a physical relationship with the appellant who visited the parlour as a customer – Relationship commenced in August 2023 and continued till March 2024 – Complainant informed appellant of pregnancy on 15.03.2024 – FIR lodged after appellant’s marriage on 12.03.2024 alleging rape on promise of marriage – No allegation that she was divorced from her husband or even separated from him – Held, there was a consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant into a physical relationship on the pretext of marriage – Even if FSL report establishes paternity, consent demolishes allegation of rape on promise of marriage – Order of High Court refusing to quash proceedings set aside and FIR quashed.

(Para 7 to 9)

Posted On: 11-04-2026
576. (SC) (Decided on: 08.04.2026)

Impleadment as party in writ proceedings -- A person directly affected by an interim order in writ proceedings impleaded as a proper party cannot be denied impleadment merely because he was not an original party.

In writ proceedings, the principles of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC guide impleadment.

Necessary and proper party – A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed and a proper party is one whose presence enables complete and effective adjudication.

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment in writ proceedings -- Necessary and proper party – High Court declined prayer of appellant to be impleaded in pending writ petition and also refused clarification/modification of interim order – Record showed that interim order passed in writ petition was relied upon by municipal authorities while dealing with appellant’s case and revised building plans were rejected on footing that operation of the 2025 Rules had been kept in abeyance – Held, where a person is directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order passed in writ proceedings, such person cannot be shut out merely because he was not an original party – At the least he is a proper party whose presence enables Court to effectively adjudicate consequences of its own order – High Court erred in holding that appellant had no lis – Order refusing impleadment set aside – Appellant directed to be impleaded in writ petition.

(Paras 7-18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Writ – Impleadment of Necessary/ Proper party -- Though proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are not to be controlled by the technicalities of pleadings as in an ordinary civil suit, the principles underlying Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC continue to furnish sound guidance -- A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed -- A proper party is one whose presence enables the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon the questions involved.

(Para 7)

Posted On: 10-04-2026
577. (SC) (Decided on: 08.04.2026)

Pension – Eligibility – Service for pension to be reckoned from date of confirmation/ admission to Pension Fund – Appellant completed only 19 years, 9 months and 25 days of service – Case was of voluntary abandonment of service and not voluntary retirement – Conditions under Rules 22(i)(a) and 22(i)(c) of SBI Employees’ Pension Fund Rules, 1955 not fulfilled – Appellant not entitled to pension.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Section 33C(2) -- State Bank of India Employees’ Pension Fund Rules, 1955, Rule 22(i)(a)(c) -- Pension -- Entitlement under Pension Fund Rules – Voluntary retirement vs voluntary abandonment of service – Appellant claimed pensionary benefits relying on Rule 22(i)(c) of Pension Fund Rules contending that he had completed more than 20 years of service – Record showed that service for purpose of pension is to be reckoned from date of confirmation and admission to Pension Fund – On calculation, service of appellant after completion of probation came to less than 20 years i.e. 19 years, 09 months and 25 days – Further, case was not of voluntary retirement but of voluntary abandonment of service as appellant remained absent for long period and services were declared voluntarily abandoned – Conditions under Rule 22(i)(c) not satisfied – Even under Rule 22(i)(a), appellant had neither completed 20 years of qualifying service nor attained age of 50 years – Hence, appellant not entitled to pension under Pension Fund Rules – Appeal dismissed.

(Paras 23-26, 30-32)

Posted On: 09-04-2026
579. (SC) (Decided on: 11.03.2026)

Dying declaration – If the Court is satisfied of the fit state of mind of the injured from the evidence on record, a contrary medical opinion or an absence of it will be inconsequential.

Acquittal -- Murder -- Investigation is grossly deficient, dying declarations are doubtful and incriminating circumstances are not properly put to the accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C., Acquittal, upheld.

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Evidentiary value – A dying declaration is a very important species of evidence capable of proving the crime proper and identifying the accused, an exception to hearsay having been provided by Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act -- Court should be satisfied it is made by the deceased without any prompting or tutoring or coercion or is a mere figment of imagination -- Then conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration and there is no requirement of any corroboration.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Form of declaration -- It can be reduced to writing or can be oral, as testified by reliable witnesses -- It can be one or numerous and if more than one; exculpatory and inculpatory, it is for the Court to find out which is believable -- It can be a lengthy one or a short one, so far as the crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator comes through -- It can be a single narrative or in a question and answer form -- It can either have a history of the rancour between the perpetrator and the victim or can be merely the brief statement of the incident.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Medical condition/ opinion -- The capacity of the injured to make the statement, both physical and mental, need not be necessarily certified by a doctor and would rest again on the satisfaction of the Court on an analysis of the testimony of the various witnesses and the other evidence coming forth in trial -- If the Court is satisfied of the fit state of mind of the injured from the evidence on record, a contrary medical opinion or an absence of it will be inconsequential.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Where to made -- It can be made before a Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, a Doctor, a Police Officer, a relative or a third party whose presence is not doubtful -- The desire of the declarant to live, through the truth despite fear of imminent death cannot be easily brushed aside.

(Para 13)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Murder – Son and daughter-in-law accused of murder – Acquittal – Lapses in investigation and trial – Non-compliance with Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Investigation found to be grossly deficient – Scene mahazar not drawn, no forensic examination conducted at the scene of crime and no independent witnesses examined – Cause of fire not investigated and presence of the accused near the crime scene not established – Delay in registration of FIR despite prior information received at the police station and presence of police officials at the scene constituted a serious lapse – Manner in which the FIS was recorded cast doubt on the conduct of the Investigating Officer – Dying declarations ought to have been recorded with greater caution and preferably in the presence of a doctor with certification – Incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence must be put to the accused in their entirety under Section 313 Cr.P.C., a duty cast upon both the Court and the Prosecutor – Failure to do so may vitiate the prosecution case – Acquittal recorded by the High Court upheld.

(Para 21-32)

Posted On: 09-04-2026
580. (SC) (Decided on: 09.03.2026)

Quashing of criminal proceedings – General and omnibus allegations against in-laws -- Court cannot apply different standards while allowing quashing of criminal proceedings against sister-in-law and dismissing for other-in-laws -- Relief extended to one similarly placed accused must equally extend to the others.

Quashing of criminal proceedings – Delay in complaint -- Though delay in lodging a criminal complaint in matrimonial disputes may not by itself justify quashing, when coupled with absence of specific allegations against the in-laws, it may indicate that the proceedings are a counter-blast to divorce proceedings initiated by husband and thus unsustainable.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 323, 498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – General and omnibus allegations against in-laws -- High Court quashed proceedings against sister-in-law but declined similar relief to other in-laws – FIR disclosed that allegations against appellants and sister-in-law were identical – No specific overt act, date or place attributed to appellants – Mere allegation that appellants used to quarrel does not constitute ingredients of offences alleged – Applying different standards to similarly placed accused held erroneous – Where allegations against accused persons stand on identical footing, relief granted to one accused on ground of general and omnibus allegations must equally extend to others – Different standards cannot be applied -- Proceedings against appellants also quashed.

(Paras 7, 10, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 323, 498-A, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Matrimonial dispute – Delay in lodging complaint – Counter-blast to divorce proceedings --  Marriage solemnised in July 2019 – Husband filed divorce petition in March 2021 – Criminal complaint against in-laws lodged in March 2022 – Though delay alone not sufficient ground for quashing, viewed in conjunction with the absence of any specific allegations attributable to them, the delay lends credence to the submission that the criminal complaint against the in-laws may have been instituted by way of a counter-blast to the divorce proceedings initiated by the husband -- When these two considerations are read together, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants cannot be sustained.

(Para 8)

Posted On: 08-04-2026
582. (SC) (Decided on: 02.04.2026)

Evidence -- Dying declaration – Reliable dying declaration recorded by Magistrate with medical certification and corroborated by medical evidence sufficient to sustain conviction even when eyewitnesses turn hostile.

Evidence – Dying declaration – A dying declaration, an exception to the rule of hearsay, carries special evidentiary value on the presumption that when a person is about to meet his maker is unlikely to speak untruth.

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 26 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Conviction based on dying declaration – Evidentiary value – Dying declaration recorded by Magistrate in question-answer form after medical certification of fitness –Plea of tutoring by relatives found to be a bald assertion – Though eyewitnesses turned hostile, medical evidence corroborated the dying declaration – Dying declaration found reliable and sufficient to sustain conviction – Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court not suffering from manifest error warranting interference – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6–13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023), Section 26 -- Dying declaration -- Generally speaking, these declarations enjoy a special position given the timing and the nature thereof -- This position rests on a philosophical understanding that when a person is about to meet his maker or in other words the oncoming of death and its finality is imminent, considerations which may force a person to speak other than the truth pale into insignificance and what does fall from them would, therefore, be only the truth – It is exception to the rule of hearsay and, if a Court finds it consistent, believable and free of tutoring, can convict the person named therein.

(Para 9)

Posted On: 08-04-2026
584. (SC) (Decided on: 06.04.2026)

Obscene – Bastard -- Mere use of the word “bastard” during a heated conversation does not by itself amount to obscenity -- Conviction u/s 294(b) IPC set aside.

Common intention -- A-1 only caused simple injuries to PW-4 and there was no evidence that he exhorted or participated in the fatal assault by A-2 on the deceased -- Conviction of A-1 u/s 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC set aside.

Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – A-2 inflicted a single blow with a log on the head of the deceased during a sudden quarrel arising out of a boundary dispute, resulting in skull fracture and death -- incident is of the year 2014, occurred in the heat of the moment and only a solitary blow was inflicted with a log picked from the spot, sentence reduced from 5 years to 3 years R.I. u/s 304 Part II of IPC.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 292, 294 -- Obscene words – Acquittal -- Mere use of the word ‘bastard’, by itself, is not sufficient to arouse prurient interest of a person -- More so, when such words are commonly used in modern era during heated conversations -- Conviction of the appellants for offence punishable u/s 294(b) IPC is not sustainable, set aside.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 324, 304 Part II – Common intention – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- A-1 charged on the deceased by taking an Aruval in his hand but, when PW-4 intervened, gave two blows to PW-4, which did not result in any grievous injury -- Testimony of PW-4 that A-2 took a log and gave a hard blow on the head of the deceased while uttering that all problems are because of the deceased and it is better that he dies, but this statement is not attributed to A-1 -- Besides, there is no evidence that A-1 exhorted A-2 to strike the deceased -- No reliable evidence to show that A-1 had beaten the deceased after he fell to the ground --  Not be safe to hold that A-1 shared common intention with A-2 to cause such bodily harm to the deceased as is likely to cause his death -- Conviction of A-1 u/s 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC set aside -- However, conviction of A-1 for causing injury to PW-4 and thereby committing offence punishable under Section 324 IPC is confirmed.

(Para 21)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304 Part II – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Section 304 Part II IPC – A-2 took a log and gave a hard blow on the head of the deceased while uttering that all problems are because of the deceased and it is better that he dies – Injury sustained by the deceased discloses fracture of the skull and there were blood clots in the brain -- No evidence that the death had occurred on account of improper treatment – Conviction of A-2 under Section 304 Part II IPC confirmed -- Having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 2014 and was preceded by an altercation between neighbours, who are close relatives, arising from a boundary dispute, and injury was not caused by using a dangerous weapon, but by a log lying on the spot, and only a solitary blow was inflicted in the heat of the moment – Sentence reduced to 03 years from 05 years R.I.

(Para 21-28)

Posted On: 08-04-2026
585. (SC) (Decided on: 02.04.2026)

Disciplinary Proceedings – Judicial Review of Punishment – Courts ordinarily should not interfere with punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, being the best judge of misconduct, unless the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, amounting to using a “sledgehammer to crack a nut”.

Disciplinary Proceedings – Parity in punishment – Harsher punishment imposed on a higher-ranking officer (Senior Manager) as compared to co-delinquents holding lower posts is justified as higher rank entails greater responsibility and accountability.

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Judicial Review of Punishment – Scope of Interference by Courts – Normally, in exercise of the power of judicial review, courts should not interfere with the punishment imposed on a delinquent employee by the competent disciplinary authority or substitute their own judgment for that of the authority – The disciplinary authority is the best judge, interference is warranted only where the punishment is so disproportionate that it appears the disciplinary authority has “used a sledgehammer to crack a nut” – A punishment that is strikingly or shockingly disproportionate and not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct proved would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Doctrine of Proportionality – Parity in punishment – Higher-ranking officer vis-à-vis subordinates – Respondent, a Senior Manager (MMGS-III), dismissed from service for misconduct, while co-delinquents (officer and gunman) were awarded lesser punishment – High Court interfered granting parity – Held, impermissible – Higher rank carries greater responsibility, trust and accountability – Therefore, harsher punishment for a higher-ranking official cannot be equated with punishment imposed on lower-ranking employees – Grant of parity solely on the ground that co-delinquents received lighter punishment is misconceived -- High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority’s decision – Punishment of dismissal restored – Appeal allowed.

(Para 10-18)

Posted On: 06-04-2026
592. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 13.01.2026)

Injunction against co-owner -- A co-owner who has himself raised construction on a portion of joint land cannot restrain other co-owners from doing the same.

Admission in earlier suit -- That the suit land already stood partitioned and the parties were in exclusive possession of their respective portions disentitles the petitioner from claiming injunction over the joint property.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary Injunction – Co-sharers – Construction on joint property – Equity – A co-owner who has himself raised construction on a portion of the joint land cannot seek injunction to restrain other co-owners from exercising similar rights over the joint property – Principle that one who seeks equity must act equitably applies.

(Para 6.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 5 -- Admission in earlier suit – Effect – Admission that suit land already stood partitioned and parties were in exclusive possession of their respective portions disentitles the petitioner from claiming injunction over the joint property.

(Para 6.1)

C. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Revision – Interference with appellate order – Additional District Judge has interfered with the trial court’s order on sound reasoning, no illegality, arbitrariness or jurisdictional error -- Consequently, no interference is warranted in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The instant revision petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

(Para 6.2)

Posted On: 05-04-2026
594. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 22.01.2026 Decided on: 24.02.2026)

Specific performance decree – Court must specify time for deposit of balance sale consideration; where no time is fixed, decree holder must deposit the amount within a reasonable period.

Specific performance decree – Time limit for deposit – Where trial court decree fixing time is challenged in appeal and appeal is dismissed, doctrine of merger applies and the appellate decree prevails.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- It obligatory for the Court to specify, the date by which, the purchase money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee -- If the Court had failed to stipulate any particular time period, then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same, within a reasonable period of time.

(Para 19, 25)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- Delay in deposit of balance sale consideration – Deposit was to be made within a period of two months, from the date of decree -- Trial Court decree challenged in appeal – Stay application was also filed therein, which was not decided -- Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed – An application for seeking deposit of the balance sale consideration file after the decision of the appeal, soon thereafter and by application of doctrine of merger, the appellate decree is to be given effect to, as the time limit is no longer an essence, for the execution of the decree, as such, earlier passed by the trial Court.

(Para 4, 26-29)

Posted On: 05-04-2026
595. (SC) (Decided on: 26.02.2026)

Limitation for cognizance – Limitation begins from the date when identity of offender becomes known under Section 469(1)(c) Cr.P.C.

Complaint by public servant – Magistrate is not required to examine the complainant or witnesses before issuing process.

Quashing -- Misbranded drug – Whether directors were in charge of and responsible for conduct of company’s business is a question of fact to be decided at trial; quashing of complaint by High Court set aside.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 468, 469, 473 -- Limitation for taking cognizance – Misbranded drug complaint – Where identity of accused emerges during investigation, limitation begins from the date when identity of offender becomes known u/s 469(1)(c) Cr.P.C. – Complaint filed within three years from such date held within limitation.

(Para 26-36)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 – Complaint by Public servant -- Magistrate is not required to examine the complainant and the witnesses, if a public servant is acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty or a Court has made the complaint -- An official complaint was made on authorisation by the State Government -- In this factual setting, Section 202 of the Code would necessarily have to be construed harmoniously with Section 200 of the Code when considering postponement of the issue of process.

(Para 40)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 17(b)(c), 18(a)(i), 27(d) -- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Rule 96  -- Misbranded drug complaint – High Court’s quashed the complaint -- Respondents-Directors were in the accused-Company’s management, whether or not, they were ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company’ are questions of fact -- These questions are best left to be determined by the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage -- Impugned Judgment, set aside.

(Para 58, 59)

Posted On: 05-04-2026
596. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 30.01.2026 Decided on: 20.03.2026)

SARFAESI / Debt Recovery Tribunal – Contempt jurisdiction – DRT, being a Tribunal and not a court, has no statutory power to initiate contempt proceedings; however, it may enforce compliance of its orders by exercising powers u/s 19(25) of the 1993 Act.

SARFAESI / Debt Recovery Tribunal – Jurisdiction – DRT cannot regulate the relationship between bank and borrower or direct operation of cash credit limits, its jurisdiction being confined to adjudicating the validity of actions taken by banks under the SARFAESI Act.

SARFAESI / Debt Recovery Tribunal – DRT, while enforcing its orders, must record reasons showing non-compliance before summoning any bank official.

A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 17 -- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 19(25) -- Debt Recovery Tribunal – Contempt jurisdiction – DRT is not a court but Tribunal exercising limited jurisdiction without having common law jurisdiction, no statutory power to initiate contempt is available either under 1993 Act or under SARFAESI Act -- Debt Recovery Tribunal has no power to initiate contempt proceedings -- Order initiating contempt proceeding quashed – Debt Recovery Tribunal is free to exercise its powers to implement its orders as per Section 19(25) of 1993 Act.

(Para 22, 23, 30)

B. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 17 -- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 19(25) -- Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal – Scope – Debt Recovery Tribunal has ordered petitioner-bank to allow operation of cash credit limit to the extent of Rs.30,00,000/- -- Held, Debt Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to regulate relationship of bank and borrower – Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal in this regard is limited one -- It can only adjudicate acts of bank under provisions of SARFAESI Act and declare the same to be void/valid.

(Para 26-31)

C. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), Section 17 -- Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), Section 19(25) -- Implementation of order of DRT – Summoning of Bank official -- Before summoning of any person while exercising powers u/s 19(25) for implementation of orders, Debt Recovery Tribunal is required to give reasons as to how its order has not been implemented and justification/ reasons for summoning any person for implementation of its orders.

(Para 31)

Posted On: 05-04-2026
597. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 13.03.2026)

S. 311 Cr.P.C. -- Belated stage – Power u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is very wide and can be exercised at any stage of trial.

S. 311 Cr.P.C. -- Summoning of handwriting and fingerprint expert – Government FSL report already on record – Permitting examination does not cause prejudice to the accused as its evidentiary value remains subject to cross-examination and appreciation at final adjudication.

S. 311 Cr.P.C. -- Non-recording of statement u/s 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or non-mention in list of witnesses is no ground to reject application.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Summoning of handwriting and fingerprint expert -- Belated stage -- Power u/s 311 Cr.P.C. is of a very wide amplitude and can be exercised by the Court at any stage of inquiry or trial if the evidence sought to be adduced appears to be necessary for the just decision of the case -- Merely because the application was moved at a later stage of the trial would not by itself render the order illegal.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 -- Summoning of handwriting and fingerprint expert – Government FSL report already on record – Effect -- Evidentiary value of such testimony would always remain subject to cross-examination and appreciation at the stage of final adjudication -- No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner merely by permitting the examination of the said expert.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 311 – Summoning u/s 311 Cr.P.C – No statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. earlier – Effect -- Proposed witness was not cited in the list of witnesses or that his statement was not recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be accepted as a ground to disallow the application -- Object of Section 311 Cr.P.C is to enable the Court to summon any person as a witness if his evidence appears to be essential for the just decision of the case -- Provision is not restricted only to those witnesses whose statements were recorded during investigation -- Trial Court, in its discretion, is competent to summon any such witness if the circumstances of the case so warrant.

(Para 11)

Posted On: 30-03-2026
599. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 16.03.2026 Decided on: 27.03.2026)

***

Multiple cheque bounce complaints -- Each dishonour constituting a distinct cause of action – Filing of two separate complaints held maintainable despite common transaction; conviction upheld and sentences directed to run concurrently.

***

Security cheque given by husband – Cheque bounce complaint -- Loan liability of wife -- Drawer cannot escape from its liability merely on ground that debt was not personally incurred -- Conviction upheld.

***

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Two separate complaints – Maintainability of -- Common financial transaction -- Seven cheques issued towards repayment of loan – Two cheques issued jointly by both accused while remaining five issued solely by one accused – Cheques dishonoured on different dates and followed by separate statutory notices – Each dishonour giving rise to a distinct cause of action under Section 138 NI Act – Filing of two separate complaints based on different drawers of cheques held legally permissible – Mere fact that cheques arose out of a common transaction not rendering separate complaints impermissible – Conviction upheld, sentences of imprisonment awarded to revisionist in both complaint cases ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 14, 15, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – Security cheque -- Liability of drawer – Loan by wife – Cheque by husband as security – Accused admitted signatures on cheques and admitted handing over cheques for repayment of loan – Presumption under Section 139 NI Act operating in favour of holder – Drawer issuing cheque towards discharge of liability of another person cannot escape liability merely on ground that debt was not personally incurred – Plea of “security cheque” insufficient in absence of credible rebuttal evidence – Conviction upheld.

(Para 16)