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Posted On: 08-03-2026
653. (SC) (Decided on: 18.11.2025)

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Permanent Lok Adalat award deemed to be a decree -- Execution objections cannot be treated as an efficacious alternative remedy to challenge the award -- Writ petition challenging the award maintainable.

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A. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Challenge – Maintainability of writ petition -- Every award of a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court -- It shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and that no appeal shall lie against it – Award cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding -- Writ petition challenging the award was maintainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Objection in Execution – Writ -- Maintainability -- Treating the filing of objections in such execution as an “efficacious alternative remedy” for challenging the award is inconsistent with the statutory scheme -- Decree in such a case owes its force not merely to the CPC but to the special statute which deems the award to be a decree only for the limited purpose of execution -- Statutory structure is the same whether the aggrieved person is a party to the award or is a third party who claims to be affected by it -- In either case, if the validity of the award is to be examined at all, it is to be tested in writ proceedings before the High Court and not by expanding the scope of execution or by encouraging independent civil suits.

(Para 11-13)

Posted On: 07-03-2026
658. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 24.02.2026)

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NRI landlord -- Leave to defend -- Tenant entitled to leave to defend only upon disclosing, through a duly sworn affidavit, facts that would disentitle the landlord to eviction, confined to whether the landlord is an NRI, owns the premises, and has a genuine and bona fide requirement.

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NRI landlord -- Collection of rent by power of attorney holder on behalf of the landlord residing abroad does not dilute his status as landlord.

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NRI landlord -- Bona fide necessity -- Landlord’s intention to return to India to personally care for his ailing mother cannot be characterised as mala fide or a mere pretext.

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A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B, 18A -- NRI landlord -- Leave to defend -- Object -- A special and expeditious remedy has been conferred upon Non-Resident Indians intending to return to India, enabling them to recover possession of one residential building for their genuine and bona fide need u/s 13-B of the Act -- Legislative intent underlying the said provision is to provide a swift mechanism, subject to limited grounds of contest.

-- Under Section 18-A of the Act, the tenant’s right to contest is circumscribed. Leave to defend may be granted only where the tenant, by way of a duly sworn affidavit, discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. The scope of defence is confined to the parameters of Section 13-B, namely: (i) that the landlord is not an NRI; (ii) that he is not the owner of the premises; or (iii) that his requirement is not genuine or bona fide.

(Para 7, 7.1)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B -- NRI Landlord -- Contention that rent was collected by power of attorney holder of the respondent, does not dilute the respondent’s status as landlord, particularly when he resides abroad and the rent is received on his behalf.

(Para 7.3)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13B, 18A -- NRI landlord – Leave to defend -- Bona fide necessity – Ailing mother in India -- If the respondent-landlord, being her son, intends to return to India to personally attend to and care for his ailing mother, such requirement cannot be characterized as mala fide or a mere pretext – Leave to defend rightly declined.

(Para 7.4, 7.5)

Posted On: 06-03-2026
661. (SC) (Decided on: 08.10.2025)

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 2(17), 3, Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 -- Stamp duty – Nomenclature/ substance of document – Mortgage deed -- In matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies -- Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument.

-- Appellant executed a “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” in favour of the MDA -- Instrument fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed -- In substance and effect, the deed confers a right over specified properties in favour of the Meerut Development Authority to secure performance of an obligation, while preserving the appellant’s interest until full discharge of obligation -- Nomenclature “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” is, therefore, inconsequential.

(Para 14-17)

B. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Section 2(17), 3, Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 126 -- Stamp duty – Nomenclature -- Surety bond/ Mortgage deed -- Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act operates in two distinct limbs -- The first limb covers security bond or mortgage deed executed by way of security for the due execution of office, or to account for money or other properties received by virtue thereof -- The second limb, demarcated by the words “or executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract”, is restricted in its application to the execution of security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations -- The term “surety” must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

(Para 20-22)

C. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899), Schedule 1-B, Article 40, 57 -- Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed -- Deed was not executed by a surety but by the principal debtor/appellant, the company, through its director -- Company itself mortgaged the properties and not the director in his individual capacity -- This firmly establishes that the properties were not mortgaged by a third party, but by the principal debtor itself, which, does not attract Article 57 -- Deed executed by the appellant cannot be termed as a security bond -- It, however, fulfils all the requirements of a mortgage deed, falling under the ambit of Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act.

(Para 25, 26)

Posted On: 06-03-2026
662. (SC) (Decided on: 10.11.2025)

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Rejection of Plaint – Decree – An order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC finally decides the lis and constitutes a decree

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Rejection of Plaint – Commercial Suit – Maintainability of Appeal – An appeal against an order rejecting a plaint for non-compliance with mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is maintainable under Section 13(1A).

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Return of Plaint – Commercial Suit – Maintainability of Revision – An order rejecting applications under Order VII Rules 10 and 11(d) CPC may be challenged through a revision or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

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A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2(2), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Decree -- An order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC decides the lis finally and would tantamount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC.

(Para 14)

B. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 12A, 13(1A) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Commercial suit -- Rejection of plaint – Application seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the appellant-company had not undertaken the mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement (PIMS) as contemplated u/s 12A of the CCA, 2015 – Trial court accepted the application and rejected the plaint -- High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable u/s 13(1A) of CCA, 2015 – Held, appeal preferred by the appellant-company in the High Court is maintainable and hence, restored to its file and original number.

-- Section 13(1A) of the CCA, 2015, is in two distinct parts -- Main provision contemplates appeals against ‘judgments’ and ‘orders’ of the Commercial Court to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court -- The proviso, operating as an exception, must be construed harmoniously with the main provision and not in derogation thereof -- The proviso merely restricts appeals against interlocutory orders to those specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(Para 6, 14-21)

C. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), Section 13(1A) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 11(d), Order 43 --  Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Commercial suit – Return of plaint – Maintainability of revision -- An order rejecting application(s) under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, are not enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC -- Such an order would not be amenable to an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the CCA, 2015, and rather, can be challenged by filing a revision or a petition/application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 19)

Posted On: 06-03-2026
663. (All. H.C.) (Reserved on 19.02.2026 Decided on: 26.02.2026)

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 -- Statement -- Confession statement -- Object of --  Primary purpose of Section 183 of B.N.S.S. is to provide a safe voluntary and judicially supervised mechanism for recording confessions (by the accused) and statements (witnesses or the victims) during a criminal investigation or even afterwards before inquiry or trial begins and this ensures that these statements or confession are made freely and without coercion and it carries higher reliability and evidentiary values as compared to ordinary police statements recorded under Section 180 B.N.S.S.

(Para 10)

B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 -- Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Police officer cannot record confessions even though may be adorned with magisterial powers -- Only a Judicial Magistrate can record a statement u/s 183 B.N.S.S. -- Magistrate must ensure voluntariness on part of the person making the statement -- Magistrate must explain to the person making a confession or a statement that the person is not bound to confess or give the statement and he must warn him prior to the recording of the statement that it may be used as evidence against them -- Section 183 BNSS acts as a judicial filter between police investigation and trial evidence, thereby capturing important statements/confessions in a protected, verifiable manner to aid truth-finding while safeguarding against abuse of power -- It balances effective prosecution with protection of individual rights, with BNSS adding digital and victim-focused enhancements over the old CrPC framework.

(Para 11)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 180, 183 -- Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Multiple Statements – Permissibility of -- Provision does not contemplate or authorize "second" or repeated statements under this section as a standard procedure -- Purpose is to record a reliable, voluntary statement/confession once, with evidentiary value -- Police statements under Section 180 BNSS (old Section 161 CrPC) can be recorded multiple times if needed during investigation, but magisterial statements under Section 183 BNSS are exceptional and meant to preserve evidence with higher reliability.

(Para 12)

D. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183 – Statement/ Confession before Magistrate – Discretion of Investigation officer – Power of High court -- Power to record a statement u/s 183 B.N.S.S. is discretionary and is typically initiated by- (i) the investigating officer to producing the person (witness/victim or accused) and (ii) the person voluntarily approaching the Magistrate -- High Court can in appropriate cases exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to direct a fresh recording of statement before the Magistrate and the power is not a routine or an automatic power but is exercised by High Court or Supreme Court to prevent abuse of process, to secure ends of justice or rectify grave procedural irregularities that could lead to miscarriage of justice.

(Para 14-16)

Posted On: 06-03-2026
664. (Patna HC) (Decided on: 07.04.2025)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ib) -- Desertion – Divorce – Desertion is not withdrawal from a particular place, but it is withdrawal from a particular state of things i.e., cohabitation – Desertion is a continuing course of conducts and not a single act – Desertion is deemed complete when the period prescribed in law expires, and a petition for remedy is filed on its ground – However, if the deserter returns before the expiry of the prescribed period, the desertion stands terminated.

(Para 12)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ib) -- Desertion – Permanent breakdown of marriage -- Divorce – Marriage was solemnized in the year 1997 and conjugal relationship between the parties has been snapped since 2002 – Respondent-husband filed divorce case in the year 2007 – Parties never resumed the cohabitation after the year 2002 and during last more than two decades efforts to restore their conjugal relationship failed -- A case of complete breakdown of marriage -- Judgment and decree of divorce passed by the learned Family Court requires no interference.

(Para 13)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 25 -- Permanent alimony – Object -- Primary objective of granting permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not left without any support and means after the dissolution of the marriage. It aims at protecting the interests of the dependent spouse and does not provide for penalizing the other spouse in the process.

(Para 15)

D. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 25 – Permanent alimony – Parties living separately from 23 years -- Appellant-wife is unemployed having no independent income and is solely dependent upon the alimony -- She is residing in her parental house and her female child has completed B.Tech on student loan of Rs.4,00,000/- -- Male child has also completed B.Tech and M.Tech -- Educational expenses were borne by the appellant-wife with help of loan and other acquaintances -- Respondent-husband is earning Rs.3,20,000/- per annum having a small plot of land residing in a house constructed by his father -- Respondent-husband solemnized his second marriage and have been blessed with two children – Permanent alimony to the tune of Rs.18 Lakhs awarded to be paid by the respondent-husband as one time settlement to the appellant-wife.

(Para 21)

Posted On: 06-03-2026
666. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 24.02.2026 Decided on: 05.03.2026)

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Maintenance – Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are summary in nature, and detailed examination of matrimonial disputes or determination of fault is unnecessary, the provision being intended to prevent destitution and ensure a life of dignity for the wife.

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Maintenance – Earning Wife – Maintenance is not determined by clubbing the parties’ incomes or awarding a fixed proportion of the husband’s salary, but by considering their respective incomes, expenses and circumstances.

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A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. -- Nature -- Proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. are summary in nature, as such, the minute details of the matrimonial dispute between the husband and wife need not be examined -- It is not necessary to ascertain as to who was in the wrong -- Salutary purpose behind Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to prevent the wife from being subjected to adversities of vagrancies and to ensure that she is not left to lead a life of indignity.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125 – Maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Earning wife -- It is not the law that income of both the sides should be clubbed together to be divided by two or that a fixed proportion of income of the husband be awarded to the wife -- It is also not the law that the wife should get half or even a substantial portion of the husband’s salary, who is earning more -- As per affidavit of income and assets filed by the wife, her monthly expenses are Rs.60,000/- -- Expenses of husband are Rs.95,000/- per month -- Wife earning Rs.79,000/- per month – Husband earning Rs.1,80,000/- -- Maintenance allowance reduced from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.25,000/- per month.

(Para 16-22)

Posted On: 05-03-2026
673. (SC) (Decided on: 23.01.2026)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, Order 7 Rule 7 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Relief -- Grant of lesser relief -- When a suitor claims a larger or wider relief than what he is entitled to, his claim (be it a writ petition or a suit) cannot be dismissed by the court on that ground -- Should the court find the suitor entitled to a lesser relief than the larger or wider relief claimed, there is no bar in granting such lesser relief – However, a court cannot grant a larger or wider relief to the suitor than that claimed by him.

(Para 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction – Multiple reliefs – Maintainability of writ -- Even if multiple relief in a single prayer has been claimed and if at all the High Court was of the view that relief should have been claimed separately, liberty to that extent by way of a correction of the prayer clause could have been granted.

(Para 10)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Writ jurisdiction – Defective prayer – Amendment – If the prayer clause be found defective in any manner or not in the form required by the writ rules of the High Court, amendment of the prayers could have been permitted by the High Court to ensure that they conform to the writ rules -- This would have been in consonance with the norms for amendment of pleadings, envisaged in Order VI Rule 17, CPC -- Even, moulding of relief without insisting on amendment of the prayer clause, should a case be set up therefor, is not unknown to writ jurisprudence.

(Para 10)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment of parties – Role of Registry of Court – Appellant/ writ-petitioner is dominus litis -- It is for him to decide who is to be joined as a party and who is not to be joined -- Registry cannot make inroads into areas within the exclusive domain of the judiciary and seek clarification as to why a particular party has been joined as a respondent.

(Para 1, 11)

Posted On: 05-03-2026
676. (SC) (Decided on: 07.10.2025)

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Minor’s Property – Transfer of -- Prior permission of the court is mandatory for a natural guardian to transfer a minor’s immovable property under Section 8(2), and any transfer made in contravention of the statutory requirements is voidable at the instance of the minor.

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Power-of-Attorney Holder – Evidentiary Value – A power-of-attorney holder cannot depose on matters beyond his personal knowledge or concerning facts personally known to the plaintiff.

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A. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 8(1)(2)(3) -- Transfer of minor’s property – Authority of natural guardian -- Necessity of permission of court -- Prior permission of the court is a sine qua non for a guardian of a minor to transfer the property of the minor in any of the manners provided under sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act -- If the natural guardian or a minor disposes of the immovable property of a minor in contravention of section 8(1) and 8(2), particularly without the permission of the court, such a transaction would be voidable at the instance of the minor.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 8 – Sale of minor’s property without permission of court – Voidable at the instance of the minor – Not necessary to file suit for cancellation -- Held, a voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the same by his unequivocal conduct -- It is not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for cancellation of a voidable sale transaction executed by his guardian on attaining majority within the limitation provided and that such a transaction can be avoided or repudiated by his conduct.

(Para 13, 32, 33)

C. Evidence law -- Evidence either ocular or documentary cannot travel beyond the pleadings.

(Para 38)

D. Evidence law – Witness of power of attorney – Evidential value -- Power-of-attorney holder of the plaintiff was not competent to depose or to prove anything which was not within his personal knowledge or was otherwise personally known to the plaintiff – Testimony of such a witness is inadmissible with regard to the facts within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff who has failed to enter the witness box.

(Para 39 )

Posted On: 03-03-2026
682. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 19.02.2026 Decided on: 27.02.2026)

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Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court – High Court may intervene under Article 227 where a subordinate Civil Court fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, ensuring that the court acts within its lawful authority and prevents injustice caused by inaction or neglect.

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Third-Party Objection – Maintainability of Appeal/ Revision – An order deciding a third-party objection on merits under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC has the force of a decree and is appealable under Rule 103 -- Revision petition is not maintainable.

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A. Constitution of India, Article 227 – Revisional powers – Object -- Where a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court fails to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, the High Court possesses the power to intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution of India -- This principle ensures that subordinate courts act within their lawful mandate and that parties are not deprived of justice due to inaction or neglect by such courts.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 97, 103 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 – Third-party objection -- Summary adjudication -- Appealable order -- Maintainability of revision -- Mere fact that the order was passed summarily does not amount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, as the Executing Court has examined the objection and rendered a decision on its merits – Resulting order is deemed to have the force and effect of a decree and is, therefore, appealable -- Revision petition not maintainable.

(Para 8-10)

Posted On: 03-03-2026
688. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 13.02.2026)

A. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – State continuing to extract regular work while denying regularization on grounds of lack of sanctioned posts or inability of employee to meet educational qualifications for regular post -- Such an approach would be violative of fundamental rights of the temporary employees enshrined in Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Temporary employees cannot be forced to bear the brunt of lack of financial resources with the State – Respondents directed to regularize services of petitioners within six weeks, failing which petitioners shall be deemed to be regularized – Petitioners entitled to consequential benefits including counting of past service.

(Para 5-8)

B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – Punjab and Haryana tend to formulate policies in order to circumvent implementation of judgments rendered by the Constitutional Courts -- More often than not, the claim for regularization is neither accepted nor denied and the applicant is kept in limbo unnecessarily -- Extended ad-hocism of keeping daily wage workers or contractual employees on temporary rolls for decades while extracting regular work is not only unconstitutional but undermines equality and dignity -- State and its instrumentalities being model employer can’t perpetuate such exploitation and use excuses like financial constraints, non-availability of sanctioned post, and lack of qualification or decision in Umadevi’s case (2006) 4 SCC 1 as talisman to deny well deserved regularisation on account of their perennial nature of long periods of work at par with their counterparts working on regular posts.

(Para 7, 8)

Posted On: 02-03-2026
695. (SC) (Decided on: 27.02.2026)

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Arbitration -- Pendente Lite Interest – Contractual Bar – Where Clause 64(5) of the General Conditions of Contract prohibits interest until the award, the arbitral tribunal cannot grant pre-award or pendente lite interest, even as compensation, contrary to the parties’ agreement.

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Arbitration – Post-Award Interest – In the absence of an express contractual bar on post-award interest, the statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) prevails, entitling the awarded sum to interest from the date of the award until payment.

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A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 28(3), 31(7)(a) -- Interest pendente lite -- Clause 64(5) of the General Conditions of Contract bars interest “till the date on which the award is made” -- The provisions of the Act of 1996, including provisions contained in Section 31(7)(a) give paramount importance to the contract entered into between the parties and categorically restrict the power of an arbitrator to award pre-award/ pendente lite interest when the parties have themselves agreed to the contrary -- Thus, the AT cannot award pre-award/pendente lite interest, even in the form of compensation.

(Para 45)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31(7)(b) – Post award interest – Permissibility of -- Clause 64(5) does not prohibit interest for the period subsequent to award -- With regard to the post-award interest, Section 31(7)(b) of the Act provides that unless the award otherwise directs, the sum awarded shall carry interest from the date of the award till payment -- There is no provision in the General Conditions of Contract which expressly bars the grant of post-award interest -- In the absence of such an express exclusion, the statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act must prevail.

(Para 47-50)

Posted On: 01-03-2026
699. (SC) (Decided on: 26.02.2026)

A. Construction of contract / deed -- If the words in a contract/deed are clear, there is very little the courts must do in the construction of the contract in determining the intention of the parties -- In furtherance of determining the intention, the deed must be read as a whole to ascertain the true meaning of its clauses, and the words of each clause should be interpreted harmoniously -- This intention must be derived directly from the plain and ordinary meaning of the text itself -- Furthermore, these words should be understood exactly as the intended parties would commonly use them -- The covenants must be applied precisely as written, neither diluted into irrelevance nor stretched beyond their original scope -- If the construction of the contract/deed, through its words and context, does not provide the court with the parties’ intention, the court may have regard to the circumstances surrounding its creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended to apply.

(Para 19)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52, 106, 111 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 62 -- Unilateral Termination of lease – Permissibility of – Subsequent purchaser’ right -- Construction of contract / deed -- Nomenclature alone of the document is not the decisive factor of the nature of a document; it is the text and the context that point to the obligations undertaken by the parties to a written document – Document’s nomenclature, text and context lead to only one conclusion: that Defendant No. 1 entered into a 99-year lease deed -- Thus, the unilateral cancellation is illegal, and it should be understood as having interfered with the right of the Plaintiff to remain in possession of the Plaint Schedule Property for 99 years – Rights which are preserved and protected in favour of the lessor are allowed to be enjoyed by subsequent purchasers. 

(Para 21, 22)