Search By Topic: Limitation Law

52. (J&K&L HC) 22-12-2023

A. Constitution of India, Article 300A -- Land acquisition case – Compensation – Limitation -- Whether taking over of possession of the land way back in the year 1969 disentitles the petitioners from claiming compensation – Held, no amount of delay can come in the way of the petitioners to approach this Court for enforcement of their constitutional right to property – Respondents are liable to pay compensation to the petitioners in terms of the award already passed by the Collector – Writ petition allowed.

(Para 14-23)

B. Constitution of India, Article 31, 300A, 370 – Right to property – Delay in claiming compensation -- Right to property was a fundamental right in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir prior to abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, as such, it cannot be stated that the petitioners have waived their right to property – At present, the right to property may not be a fundamental right, but it is certainly a Constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which provides that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law -- Even if the right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right, still then it continues to be a legal and constitutional right and no person can be deprived of his property except by authority of law -- Denial of this right to a person constitutes a continuing cause of action and, therefore, no amount of delay and laches would extinguish the right to property of a person.

(Para 18)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession by State – Permissibility of -- State cannot claim adverse possession in respect of the property belonging to private persons -- Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to say that the property in question has vested in them because of their long possession over the same.

(Para 19)

66. (SC) 18-05-2023

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 137 -- Appointment of Arbitrator -- Limitation -- Cause of action -- If an infringement of a right happens at a particular time, the whole cause of action will be said to have arisen then and there -- In such a case, it is not open to a party to sit tight and not to file an application for settlement of dispute of his right, which had been infringed, within the time provided by the Limitation Act, and, allow his right to be extinguished by lapse of time, and thereafter, to wait for another cause of action and then file an application u/s 11 of the Act 1996 -- In such a case, such an application would mean an application for revival of a right, which had long been extinguished under the Act 1963 and is, therefore, dead for all purposes -- Such proceedings would not be maintainable and would obviously be met by the plea of limitation under Article 137 of the Act 1963.

(Para 58)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 137 -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Limitation -- Cause of action – Extension of limitation -- Disputes arose between the parties in relation to the wrongful encashment of bank guarantee vide letter dated 16.02.2016 and for wrongful imposition of liquidated damages -- Respondent on 26.09.2016, deducted the amount towards recovery of the liquidated damages -- Requisite amount was credited into the Government account -- This was the end of the matter -- To say that even thereafter, the petitioner kept negotiating with the respondent in anticipation of some amicable settlement would not save the period of limitation -- When the bank guarantee came to be encashed in the year 2016 and the requisite amount stood transferred to the Government account that was the end of the matter -- This “Breaking Point” should be treated as the date at which the cause of action arose for the purpose of limitation.

(Para 59-62)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 11(6) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 137 -- Appointment of Arbitrator – Limitation -- Cause of action – Negotiation will not postpone cause of action -- Negotiations may continue even for a period of ten years or twenty years after the cause of action had arisen -- Mere negotiations will not postpone the “cause of action” for the purpose of limitation -- The Legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of a claim and this statutory time period cannot be defeated on the ground that the parties were negotiating.

(Para 63)

80. (SC) 31-01-2023

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 149 – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 4 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay in appeal – Condonation of delay – Insufficient funds for court fee – Ground of -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed as insufficient funds could not have been a sufficient ground for condonation of delay -- It would have been entirely a different matter had the appellant filed an appeal in terms of Section 149 CPC and thereafter removed the defects by paying deficit court fees.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (8 of 1974), Section 2(4), 118 – Sale of agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh -- Private company is not an ‘agriculturist’ -- Approval was not given by the State Government and then the Company assigned his right to the plaintiff who thereafter filed the suit for specific performance -- No specific clause in the “Agreement to Sell”, which says that in case the purchaser fails to obtain required permission from the State Government, it could assign its rights to an agriculturist of Himachal Pradesh and the seller therefore would not have any objection in executing the Sale deed in favour of such an assignee -- No question of granting a decree of Specific Performance in favour of the plaintiff – Dismissal of suit upheld.

(Para 11-16)

C. Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (8 of 1974), Section 118 -- Sale of agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh -- Whole purpose of Section 118 of the 1972 Act is to protect agriculturists with small holdings -- Land in Himachal Pradesh cannot be transferred to a non-agriculturist, and this is with a purpose to save the small agricultural holding of poor persons and also to check the rampant conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes.

(Para 17)

87. (P&H HC) 20-12-2022

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 – Notice without Domestic incident report -- Domestic incident report is not mandatory -- Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate has not committed any illegality or irregularity by issuing notice to the petitioner without waiting for the report of Protection Officer.

(Para 13)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 125, 127 -- Acquittal u/s 498A IPC – Award of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. – Acquittal u/s 498A IPC will not create a bar for his wife to seek relief under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -- Payment of maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. or other application u/s 127 Cr.P.C. will not effect the application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as the respondent can claim maintenance under the one case subject to adjustment of maintenance already paid by him.

(Para 14, 15)

C. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 12, 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Application u/s 12 of DV Act, 2005 after more than 8 years – Limitation -- Violation of any order passed under the DV Act is punishable u/s 13 of D.V. Act, 2005 -- Mere filing of complaint u/s 12 of Domestic Violence Act not barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C -- This section will come into operation when any order passed u/s 12 of the Act is violated – Petition seeking quashing of complaint u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 dismissed. Kamatchi’s case 2022(2) L.A.R. 222 = (2022) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 16975 relied.

(Para 16-19)

94. (SC) 19-09-2022

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7,9,61 – Liability acknowledged in 2013 -- Pendency of Winding up proceedings under Companies Act 1956 in High Court – Limitation for proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC --  On 30th March 2018, the Respondent filed petition u/s 9 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in the NCLT -- Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejected the application as barred by limitation – Respondent appealed to the NCLAT u/s 61 of the IBC -- By the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT set aside the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejecting the application of the Respondent u/s 9 of the IBC and has remitted the case to the Adjudicating Authority for admission after notice to the parties. Held,

--       For the purpose of limitation, the relevant date is the date on which the right to sue accrues which is the date when a default occurs.

--       Pendency of the proceedings in a parallel forum, invoked by the Respondent, is not sufficient cause for the delay in filing an application u/s 9 of the IBC -- By the time the application was filed, the claim had become barred by limitation.

--       Madras High Court neither suffered from any defect of jurisdiction to entertain the winding up application nor was unable to entertain the winding up application for any other cause of a like nature – Limitation for initiation of winding up proceedings in the Madras High Court stopped running on the date on which the Winding Up petition was filed -- Initiation of proceedings in Madras High Court would not save limitation for initiation of proceedings for initiation of CIRP in the NCLT u/s 7 of the IBC -- A claim may not be barred by limitation -- It is the remedy for realisation of the claim, which gets barred by limitation.

Impugned order of the NCLAT is unsustainable in law, set aside  -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 6-30)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay -- NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation -- Condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation -- Condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause -- Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case -- There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the Appellant/applicant for the delay in taking steps.

(Para 14-16)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Relevant date for limitation -- Date of enforcement of the IBC and/or the date on which an application could have first been filed under the IBC are not relevant in computation of limitation -- It would be absurd to hold that the CIRP could be initiated by filing an application u/s 7 or Section 9 of the IBC, within three years from the date on which an application under those provisions of the IBC could have first been made before the NCLT even though the right to sue may have accrued decades ago -- What is material is the date on which the right to sue accrues, and whether the cause of action continuous.

(Para 17, 18)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7, 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14, 18 -- Proceedings u/s 7 and 9 of the IBC – Exclusion of time – Acknowledgment of liability – Fresh period of limitation -- It is now well settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the IBC as far as may be -- Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation in certain circumstances – Similarly, u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgment is signed -- However, the acknowledgment must be made before the period of limitation expires -- Proceedings in good faith in a forum which lacks jurisdiction or is unable to entertain for like nature may save limitation.

 (Para 23-25)

97. (SC) 13-06-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Long years living as husband and wife – Birth of child – Presumption of -- It is well settled that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock -- Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act -- Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

(Para 15)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Partition suit – Preliminary Decree – Final Decree – Role of -- Preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of the parties to the partition -- Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of the divided property, then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry, a final decree shall be passed.

(Para 29, 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 – Preliminary decree -- Final decree – Limitation – Nature of -- Final decree proceedings can be initiated at any point of time -- There is no limitation for initiating final decree proceedings -- Either of the parties to the suit can move an application for preparation of a final decree and, any of the defendants can also move application for the purpose -- By mere passing of a preliminary decree the suit is not disposed of.

(Para 31)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 18 -- Preliminary decree – Final decree – Directions issued to Trial Courts -- Once a preliminary decree is passed by the Trial Court, the court should proceed with the case for drawing up the final decree suo motu -- After passing of the preliminary decree, the Trial Court has to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC -- The courts should not adjourn the matter sine die -- There is also no need to file a separate final decree proceedings -- In the same suit, the court should allow the concerned party to file an appropriate application for drawing up the final decree – Suit comes to an end only when a final decree is drawn – Directions given to Trial Courts to list the matter for taking steps under Order XX Rule 18 of the CPC soon after passing of the preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of the property, suo motu and without requiring initiation of any separate proceedings.

(Para 32, 33)