***

Consent decree -- Article 142 cannot be employed to supplant the concluded and acted upon terms of a consensual arrangement between the parties.

***

Execution of consent decree -- Scope of enquiry remains a limited one -- It cannot be made a vehicle for rewriting the terms of a settlement which the parties themselves arrived at and acted upon.

***

A. Constitution of India, Articles 136, 142 -- Scope of interference -- Concurrent findings -- Creation of corpus -- Family Court and the High Court, on a concurrent appreciation of the same material, placed upon the settlement a construction which is natural, harmonious and fortified by the conduct of the parties -- No interference warranted -- Prayer for creation of a corpus towards higher education in exercise of powers under Article 142 cannot be acceded to, as issuance of such a direction would, in substance, amount to recasting a settlement which stands performed and discharged and undertaking, in execution, a fresh determination of the quantum of maintenance -- The jurisdiction under Article 142, wide as it is, cannot be employed to supplant the concluded and acted upon terms of a consensual arrangement between the parties.

(Para 33 and 34)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 10 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Sections 13-B and 28-A -- Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), Section 7 -- Execution of consent decree -- Scope of executing court -- Where an execution petition is instituted for enforcement of a specific covenant of a concluded consent decree, the enquiry remains a limited one, namely, whether on a true construction of the settlement, the obligation stated to have been left unsatisfied subsists and remains enforceable, and not whether a larger or a different provision ought now to be made -- Where, on its true construction, the covenant stands satisfied, a general obligation to maintain cannot be invoked in execution to revive a discharged term or to substitute therefor a fresh and larger provision -- The general principle, whatever be its content, cannot be made a vehicle for rewriting the terms of a settlement which the parties themselves arrived at and acted upon.

(Paras 24 and 32)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 21 Rule 10 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Execution of decree -- Conduct of parties -- Relevance of delay -- Held, where the entire amount under Clause 8 stood paid and no demand was raised towards payment of twenty per cent of the annual income during the intervening period of nearly five years, such silence reinforces the construction that the income-linked obligation stood discharged -- Delay was noticed not as a ground of limitation but as a circumstance illuminating the common understanding of the parties with regard to the meaning and operation of the settlement.

(Para 28 and 29)

D. Interpretation of Deeds -- Canons of construction -- Harmonious construction -- Rule of repugnancy -- Held, an interpretation which renders an express clause otiose is to be eschewed in favour of the one which gives effect to the instrument as a whole -- The rule of construction that an earlier clause prevails over a later one is attracted only where two clauses are so repugnant to each other that they cannot possibly be reconciled.

(Paras 26 and 31)

***

Arbitration -- Limitation -- Application under Section 33 -- Commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) -- Limitation for filing application under Section 34 commences only from date of disposal of proceedings under Section 33 -- Maintainability or ultimate success of application under Section 33 irrelevant.

***

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Sections 33 and 34(3) -- Limitation -- Commencement -- Request under Section 33 for correction, interpretation or additional award -- Section 34(3) expressly provides that limitation for challenge to award runs from date of disposal of request under Section 33 -- Provision does not distinguish between applications allowed or dismissed nor confine benefit to applications ultimately found maintainable.

(Paras 13-15)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Sections 33 and 34(3) – Limitation -- Arbitral award -- Challenge thereto -- Pendency of proceedings under Section 33 -- Parties not required to institute proceedings under Section 34 during pendency of Section 33 proceedings merely by way of abundant caution -- Limitation under Section 34(3) commences only upon disposal of proceedings under Section 33 -- Starting point of limitation under Section 34(3) is date of disposal of proceedings under Section 33 and not date of original award.

(Paras 14-20)

C. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Sections 33 and 34(3) -- Abuse of process -- Sham, frivolous or mala fide applications under Section 33 filed solely to defeat limitation under Section 34(3) -- Courts may impose exemplary and punitive costs.

(Para 17)

***

Adverse possession -- State cannot claim adverse possession over private property without acquisition or payment of compensation.

***

Constitution of India, Article 300-A -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Sections 26 and 27 -- Adverse possession -- State as welfare State -- Suit for possession based on title -- Land utilised for distributary without acquisition -- Compensation not paid -- State cannot dispossess citizen of property except by authority of law -- Right to property a constitutional and human right -- State cannot perfect title by invoking doctrine of adverse possession over citizens' land -- Limitation under Article 65 not attracted where State remains in illegal possession without due process of law -- Land used for public purpose cannot be retained without payment of compensation -- Landowners entitled to fair market value with all statutory benefits by treating acquisition as deemed acquisition.

(Paras 17 to 26)

***

Adverse possession – Mere long and continuous possession does not ripen into ownership unless possession is proved to be hostile, open and in denial of title of true owner.

***

Adverse possession – Pleadings -- Absence of specific pleadings regarding hostile possession fatal to plea of adverse possession.

***

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Nature -- Pleadings -- Mere possession, irrespective of its duration, does not ipso facto mature into ownership unless such possession is proved to be open, continuous, hostile, and unequivocally adverse to the true owner -- Doctrine of adverse possession necessarily postulates a clear denial of the title of the lawful owner coupled with an assertion of hostile animus – Absent a clear and hostile animus to possess, the mere occupation of the land does not ripen into legal ownership -- It is a fundamental tenet of civil jurisprudence that a claim for adverse possession must be supported by precise averments regarding the date of commencement and the nature of the hostile occupation.

(Para 15-17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Section 115 --  Rejection of plaint -- Scope -- Consideration confined to plaint averments alone -- Defence pleas impermissible at threshold stage -- Allegations of fraud, mistake and rectification specifically pleaded in plaint -- Limitation involving question of knowledge of fraud held to be mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence -- Suit not ex facie barred by limitation -- Trial Court rightly declined rejection of plaint -- Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC not attracted in absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 5-10)

***

Benami transaction -- Burden to prove benami transaction lies heavily upon person asserting same and mere payment of consideration by another does not establish benami nature of transaction unless intention to retain beneficial ownership is proved.

***

Adverse possession -- Permissive possession -- Mere long possession does not mature into ownership -- In absence of clear pleadings and cogent proof regarding hostile animus, plea of adverse possession is untenable.

***

A. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65, Section 27 -- Benami transaction -- Adverse possession -- Burden of proof -- Plaintiff sought possession after termination of licence granted to defendant-brother -- Defendant claimed that property though purchased in plaintiff’s name was actually purchased by father and sale deed was benami -- Mere proof that consideration proceeded from father not sufficient to establish benami transaction -- Intention of person supplying consideration held determinative test -- Evidence on record established that father intended to purchase property in plaintiff’s name and confer title upon him -- Plea of adverse possession untenable as possession was permissive in inception and no evidence led regarding point of time when possession became hostile to knowledge of true owner -- Repairs, reconstruction and long possession do not by themselves constitute adverse possession -- Concurrent findings of Courts below upheld -- RSA dismissed.

(Paras 12.1 to 14)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65, Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- It is trite that where possession is permissive in its inception, the person in possession must not only assert but also clearly establish the point of time at which such possession became hostile to the knowledge of the true owner -- In the absence of any such specific pleading or proof, the claim of adverse possession is rendered wholly untenable.

(Para 13.3)

***

Rejection of plaint -- Adverse Possession -- Whether property was privately partitioned and title perfected by adverse possession are triable issues not liable to be decided under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(a) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 -- Title by adverse possession -- Rejection of plaint -- Cause of action -- Co-owners -- Plaint rejected on the ground that plaintiffs, being co-owners, could not claim title by adverse possession -- Plaint specifically pleaded private partition pursuant to an arbitral award and exclusive, open, peaceful, continuous and hostile possession since 1982, maturing into adverse possession in 1994 -- Whether the property stood privately partitioned and whether plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession are triable issues involving mixed questions of fact and law requiring evidence -- While considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(a), Court is required to examine only the averments contained in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs to ascertain whether a cause of action is disclosed -- Even if the plea of adverse possession ultimately fails, the suit for permanent injunction to protect admitted possession remains maintainable -- A plaint cannot be rejected partially -- Order rejecting plaint set aside and matter remanded for trial.

(Paras 11 to 19)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- If it is shown from the averments made in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiff, which are to be taken as true at their face value, that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree as prayed in the suit, the plea of a defendant for rejection of the plaint has to be turned down.

(Para 11)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(a) – Rejection of plaint -- While dealing with an application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts have to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by carefully scrutinizing the averments made in the plaint together with the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs.

(Para 11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166, 173 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 136 -- Execution of decree – MACT award -- Limitation of 12 years -- Where the award dated 24.04.2000 was challenged in appeal and the FAO was decided on 14.01.2014, the execution petition filed on 16.03.2016 cannot be said to be barred by limitation -- When an Appellate Court passes a decree irrespective of the fact whether the Appellate Court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial Court, the decree of the trial Court merges with the decree of the Appellate Court – Executing Court rightly dismissed the objections regarding limitation, and the impugned order does not warrant interference.

(Para 5-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 468, 469, 473 -- Limitation for taking cognizance – Misbranded drug complaint – Where identity of accused emerges during investigation, limitation begins from the date when identity of offender becomes known u/s 469(1)(c) Cr.P.C. – Complaint filed within three years from such date held within limitation.

(Para 26-36)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 – Complaint by Public servant -- Magistrate is not required to examine the complainant and the witnesses, if a public servant is acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty or a Court has made the complaint -- An official complaint was made on authorisation by the State Government -- In this factual setting, Section 202 of the Code would necessarily have to be construed harmoniously with Section 200 of the Code when considering postponement of the issue of process.

(Para 40)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 17(b)(c), 18(a)(i), 27(d) -- Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Rule 96  -- Misbranded drug complaint – High Court’s quashed the complaint -- Respondents-Directors were in the accused-Company’s management, whether or not, they were ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company’ are questions of fact -- These questions are best left to be determined by the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage -- Impugned Judgment, set aside.

(Para 58, 59)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- It obligatory for the Court to specify, the date by which, the purchase money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee -- If the Court had failed to stipulate any particular time period, then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same, within a reasonable period of time.

(Para 19, 25)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- Delay in deposit of balance sale consideration – Deposit was to be made within a period of two months, from the date of decree -- Trial Court decree challenged in appeal – Stay application was also filed therein, which was not decided -- Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed – An application for seeking deposit of the balance sale consideration file after the decision of the appeal, soon thereafter and by application of doctrine of merger, the appellate decree is to be given effect to, as the time limit is no longer an essence, for the execution of the decree, as such, earlier passed by the trial Court.

(Para 4, 26-29)

A. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4-24, 29(2) -- Appeal u/s 74 of  Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion -- Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law -- The 2013 Act does not take away from its purview the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act – The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview – Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act.

(Para 62, 76, 77)

B. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6, 11, 54 -- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 24(1)(a), 74 -- Acquisition of land under 1894 Act – Award after commencement of 2013 Act – Appeal u/s 74 of 2013 Act will lie -- Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applicable to all those cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act -- For passing the award under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the 2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements -- The first appeals before the High Courts should be treated as ones under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

(Para 97 (i)-(iii))

C. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), Section 74, 103 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5, 29(2) – Appeal u/s 74 of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Limitation – Condonation of delay -- Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act -- Consequently, all the applications seeking condonation of delay in preferring the first appeals before the High Courts u/s 74 of the 2013 Act stand allowed -- High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.

(Para 97 (iv)-(viii))

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166(3) -- Claim petition under Motor vehicle Act – Limitation – Interim order / No Claim Petition should be dismissed as time barred -- During the pendency of SLP, the tribunal and the High Courts directed not to dismiss the claim petitions on the ground of such petitions as barred by limitation as prescribed under sub-Section (3) or Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Matters ordered to re-list on 25.11.2025.

(Para 5, 6)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession against private person – Protection of possession -- Writ jurisdiction -- Petitioners are claiming that they have perfected their title over the land in question by way of adverse possession -- All these pleadings are in the realm of Civil Court and if the owner of the land or some other person, may be at his behest or otherwise, is trying to disturb their possession, as is alleged, the petitioner can always go to the Civil Court and seek appropriate reliefs including police assistance -- Writ petition is not maintainable, the same is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to approach the Civil Court for the redressal of their grievance.

(Para 5-7)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Foundation for the plea of adverse possession must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried -- A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of trial would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

(Para 19)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- Adverse possession – Plea of -- Plea of adverse possession is not always a legal plea -- It is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved -- A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued -- He must also show whether his possession was open and undisturbed -- These are all questions of fact and unless they are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them -- Therefore, in normal cases an appellate Court will not allow the plea of adverse possession to be raised before it.

(Para 20)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 – Adverse possession – Nature of -- Ordinarily, the question of adverse possession is one of fact, resting upon proof of numerous circumstances which go to establish the several elements, indicating adverse character of the possession -- In certain cases, it may be a question of law, or, a mixed question of law and facts as, where the decision rests upon inferences to be drawn from facts which are admitted or established.

(Para 27)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34(3) – Objection u/s 34 of Arbitration Act -- Limitation of three calendar months as opposed to 90 days -- Statutory language of Section 34(3) clearly stipulates the limitation period as “three months”, as opposed to the condonable period as “thirty days” -- This difference in language unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intent that the limitation period is 3 calendar months as opposed to 90 days -- Argument that 3 months must be read as 90 days in the context of Section 34(3), rejected.

(Para 13, 14)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4, 12  -- Objection u/s 34 of Arbitration Act – Limitation -- Exclusion of days -- Respondent received a signed copy of the award on 09.04.2022, this date must be excluded and the 3-month limitation period must be reckoned from 10.04.2022 -- This expires on 09.07.2022, which happened to be a second Saturday when the court was not working -- Hence, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act will inure to the benefit of the respondent -- Respondent’s application u/s 34, which was filed on 11.07.2022, i.e., the next working day of the court, must be considered as being filed within the limitation period.

(Para 13, 14)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Limitation -- Registered sale deed constitutes constructive notice to the world -- Partition took place way back in the year 1968 -- Suit is filed in the year 2023, i.e. after a period of 55 years -- Further, many of the family members had executed registered sale deeds in the year 1978 – It can be assumed that the predecessors of the plaintiffs had notice of the registered sale deeds -- Plaintiffs cannot reignite their rights after sleeping on them for 45 years -- Trial Court rightly allowed the application of the defendants/appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was a meaningless litigation, that it did not disclose a proper cause of action and was barred by limitation.

(Para 9-17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Regular Second Appeal – Condonation of delay -- State cannot be given any undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant, especially in matters of limitation -- All parties, whether or not State under Article 12 of the Constitution, are required to act with due diligence and promptitude.

(Para 13)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 21 -- Consumer – Privity of contract -- Tripartite Agreement would lead to the conclusion that the essential transaction of sale was between the complainant-respondent and the borrower who was the buyer of the flat of the complainant-respondent for an agreed consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- -- Complainant-respondent, having no privity of contract with the appellant, cannot be termed a ‘consumer’ under the Act.

(Para 17)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 24A – Limitation to file complaint – Condonation of delay -- NCDRC is competent to condone any period of delay in filing a complaint beyond two years from the date when the cause of action arises, the discretion is circumscribed by twin conditions: (i) that the complainant satisfy the NCDRC that he had sufficient cause for not filing his complaint within such period, and; (ii) that the NCDRC record the reasons for condoning such delay -- Neither reasons nor a formal order condoning delay is forthcoming, either in the order-sheets or in the Impugned Order -- Despite the appellant raising the issue of limitation, the Impugned Order is silent on the said score – NCDRC ought to have passed a reasoned order condoning the delay or refusing to condone the delay.

(Para 21-23)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d), 17 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14 -- Consumer – Commercial transaction – Maintainability of complaint -- If the machine is purchased for self-employment purposes, it cannot be categorized as “commercial purpose’ -- Petitioner/ complainant was already running a business as a commercial venture and he purchased the machine to expand his business -- Petitioner himself was not operating the machine, but he had employed workmen who were doing the job for him -- No matter how small the venture is, it cannot be called ‘self-employment’ for the purposes of the Act – Order of dismissal of complaint on the ground that he was not a ‘consumer’, upheld -- In case the petitioner moves a Civil Suit within four weeks, he would be at liberty to rely upon Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with law.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (13 of 1985), Section 21 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5, 14 – Condonation of delay in OA – Time spent in wrong Forum/ RTI information – Consideration of -- Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable for condonation of delay -- It is a settled law that if a wrong remedy has been taken up by any litigant, the period spent for pursuing the wrong remedy can be condoned, in terms of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act -- O.A. field after obtaining documents under the RTI Act said to be bona fide -- Petitioner had suffered serious accident and had also subsequently remained hospitalized on account of heart ailment – Delay deserved to be condoned -- Since the order of termination is an issue before the Court, the same has to be examined on merits – Matter remitted back to Central Administrative Tribunal and directed to decide the OA afresh on merits.

(Para 9-12)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Condonation of delay – Challenge to -- Discussion on merit in appeal – Scope of -- Scope of the appeal before the High Court was limited to examining the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, declining condonation of delay -- When merits of the orders impugned in the appeal was not touched upon by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court ought not to have commented on the merits -- Merits of the order could be examined by the Appellate Court.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Municipal records – Ownership -- Municipal record cannot be treated as ownership.

(Para 10)

B. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 65 – Suit for possession – Limitation -- Suit for possession of immovable property can be filed within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiff – No specific date and time of dispossession has been specified in the pleadings and no evidence regarding the same has been adduced – Plaintiff during his cross-examination stated that defendants are in possession of the suit property for the last 30-35 years – Suit held to be filed beyond the period of limitation.

(Para 11)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 4-24 -- General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), Section 10 -- Objection to arbitration award – Limitation – Extended period – Exclusion of holiday – Permissibility of :

(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the ACA.

(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

(Para 1.1)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 31(7) --  Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 14 – Arbitration award – Interest upon delayed period -- Delay attributed to claimant -- Time spent in wrong Forum – Ends of justice would be met if the appellant-insurance company is directed to pay interest as directed by the Arbitral Tribunal @ 12% per annum with effect from 06^th March, 2010 as it was on this date that the Arbitral Tribunal held the claims to be within time after excluding the time spent by the respondent-claimant in pursuing its remedy before the N.C.D.R.C. u/s 14 of the Limitation Act.

(Para 1-4)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay --  Liberal approach -- Concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation – Question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration -- Rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity -- No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.

(Para 13-17)

Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), Section 14(2), 17 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 119(b) – Arbitration award -- Limitation for filing objections – Starting date -- The trigger for the limitation to start running is the date of service of notice of the filing of the award –  Word ‘notice’ is that the parties merely reach a state of awareness about the award and plan their next steps accordingly, and not the imposition of another procedural step -- Date of receiving a copy of the award is not the requirement of Section 14(2), but merely awareness that it is available to the parties -- This holding signifies that the parties have to take steps to scrutinise the award themselves -- Any contrary interpretation will give a licence to the award-debtor to delay the arbitration by insisting on procedural nuances despite of being aware that an award exists and that its contents are accessible to it.

(Para 14-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366, 376 (2)(n) – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Rape -- Appeal against conviction – Delay of 1637 days -- Condonation of delay – High Court dismissed the appeal on delay – Held, right to appeal, particularly when it concerns the liberty of an individual, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution -- High Court's order dismissing the appeal solely due to delay, without properly examining the reasons for the delay warrants reconsideration – Dismissal of the appeal was erroneous -- Delay of 1637 days condoned -- High Court requested to dispose of the Criminal Appeal on merits in accordance with law.

(Para 5-8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(d) -- Rejection of plaint – Limitation – Ground of -- Where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court.

(Para 26)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Condonation of delay – Fault of Advocate – Ground of – Delay of 536 days in filing appeal -- Entire blame thrown on the head of the advocate -- Even if the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance -- Litigant, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

(Para 10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 5 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Pleadings – Plea of Adverse possession – Admission of title -- Appellants did not specifically deny the plaintiffs' ownership of the suit property -- Instead, they primarily relied on the plea of adverse possession -- Allegations of fact not denied specifically are deemed to be admitted -- By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs' title.

(Para 8.1)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 35 – Presumption of revenue record -- Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness -- While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.

(Para 8.2)

C. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession – Onus of proof -- In a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership -- Plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries – Appellants/ defendants failed to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically and instead relied on adverse possession, the burden has shifted to the appellants/ defendant to prove their adverse possession.

(Para 9)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession of State -- It is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens -- Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government -- Therefore, the State/ appellants' plea of adverse possession is untenable in law.

(Para 10, 11)

E. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- Placing bitumen drums, erecting temporary structures, and constructing a boundary wall in 1980 do not constitute adverse possession -- Adverse possession requires possession that is continuous, open, peaceful, and hostile to the true owner for the statutory period.

(Para 12)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Suit for specific performance of agreement -- Evidence of attorney -- One of the purchasers and plaintiff in his suit for specific performance throughout present in the transaction held the Power of Attorney from the other plaintiffs – He was examined as PW-1 in each of the suits whether in his capacity as plaintiff or as Power of Attorney from other plaintiffs -- It was not necessary for each of the plaintiffs in separate suits to appear and prove the transaction -- Trial Court had examined this aspect and had found favour with the plaintiffs – Adverse inference drawn by the High Court for the reason that the plaintiffs did not enter the witness box to prove the Agreement to Sell, was completely misplaced.

(Para 28)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Suit for specific performance of agreement – Limitation -- Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.1990 did not mention any date for the performance, nor did owner refused at any point of time and soon after the death of owner in December 1992, the plaintiffs having come to know of the mutation proceedings by her legal heirs, they proceeded to file the suit, after giving notice in May 1995, which was well within a period of three years -- Second part of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would be applicable once there was no date fixed for performance in the Agreement to Sell.

(Para 27, 30)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) -- Agreement to sell – Possession with original title deed – Effect of -- A purchaser who has paid the full consideration and received the original title deeds from the seller would have taken possession under normal circumstances -- Any possession taken by any other party thereafter would be unauthorised and illegal.

(Para 32)

D. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) -- Violation of Injunction order – Alienation of the property in violation of the injunction order -- Sale deed would be a void document. 

(Para 33)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 16 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 – Suit for specific performance – Limitation -- Limitation prescribed by Article 54 sets in from the date when the petitioner received the reply refusing performance.

(Para 31)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10, 16(c) – Specific performance of agreement – Readiness and willingness – Purchaser paid a sum of Rs.11,30,00 as earnest money and paid Rs.13,00,000 on the same day by cheque and paid another Rs. 5,00,000 by Demand Draft -- If the petitioner was unwilling to perform the contract, he would not have paid nearly 75 percent of the sale consideration -- Petitioner with the payment of the additional sum above the earnest money, has proved his readiness and willingness to perform the contract -- Fit case for to exercise discretion to direct specific performance.

(Para 42)

C. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 – Lis panders -- Doctrine of lis pendens that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property during the pendency of litigation -- The only exception to the principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms imposed by it -- Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or proceeding.

(Para 47)

D. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 – Object of doctrine of lis pendens -- Purpose of lis pendens is to ensure that the process of the court is not subverted and rendered infructuous --  In the absence of the doctrine of lis pendens, a defendant could defeat the purpose of the suit by alienating the suit property.

(Para 49)

E. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 – Lis pendens – Review -- Pendency means -- Review proceedings were “instituted” within the period of limitation of thirty days –  Doctrine of lis pendens kicks in at the stage of “institution” and not at the stage when notice is issued by this Court -- Argument of the respondents that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply because the petition for review was lying in the registry in a defective state cannot be accepted.

(Para 49)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Adverse possession against co-sharer -- Possession of the plaintiffs was in a representative capacity being co-sharer -- Merely because a particular co-sharer is not in possession and is residing out of the village is not sufficient to prove ouster -- Concurrent findings of fact with regard to plaintiffs' failure to prove their ownership by way of adverse possession not interfered – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 12)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 65 -- Suit for specific performance -- Agreement to sell -- Adverse possession – Plea of – Permissive possession -- Once the defendant himself pleaded that he is in possession under the agreement to sell and to retain possession relies on the part performance of contract to sell, he cannot plead adverse possession – Held, possession of a proposed vendee  under agreement to sell always is a permissive possession under the vendor till he pleads and proves that he gave up the permissive possession and re-entered into possession which was open and hostile to the knowledge of the true owner.

(Para 3, 28)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18, 19 -- Offer of possession made on 04.02.2014 -- ADA issued reminders to the appellant on 22.09.2014, 21.11.2014 and 17.01.2018 -- Additionally, ADA accepted the appellant's payment of Rs. 3,43,178/- on 20.06.2019 without any reservations -- NCDRC correctly applied Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which extend the limitation period where part payments or acknowledgments are made -- Consequently, the cause of action continued to exist, and the filing of the complaint in July 2020 is within the limitation period.

(Para 16)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Pecuniary jurisdiction -- Respondent ADA challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the NCDRC, contending that the total payment made by the appellant amounted to Rs. 59,97,178/-, which was less than Rs. 1 crore -- Claim made by the appellant also included compensation for mental agony, harassment, and loss of income, which brought the total claim well above Rs. 1 crore -- In consumer disputes, the value of the claim is determined not just by the amount deposited but by the aggregate relief sought, which includes compensation and other claims -- NCDRC rightly held that it had the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and this Court affirms that finding.

(Para 18, 19)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 19(10) -- Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 (U.P. Act No. 16 of 2010), Section 4(5) -- Offer of possession -- Completion certificate -- Firefighting clearance certificate – Requirement of -- A developer must obtain these certificates before offering possession -- Possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances -- ADA’s failure to provide the required certificates justifies the appellant’s refusal to take possession --  Entire amount deposited by the appellant ordered to be refunded with interest 9% per annum from the date of complaint till the date of refund, the ADA is directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) to the appellant.

(Para 20-23)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Compensation in motor vehicle accident case – Limitation of six months – Minor claimant – Effect upon -- Date of the accident 20.07.2020 -- Respondent/ claimant had attained the age of majority on 06.03.2023 and that the petition was filed on 25.04.2023 i.e. within one and a half month after attaining the age of majority – Tribunal allowed the claim as the claim petition cannot be stated to be time barred.

-- No law cited to show that in case a person is a minor at the time of the accident and is therefore incompetent to file a claim petition, then, he/she cannot file the same within a period of six months of his/her attaining the age of majority.

-- Additionally, Section 166(3) of the MV Act made applicable from 01.04.2022 and were not in force on the date when the accident took place i.e. 20.07.2020 -- No judgment cited to show that the said provisions would also apply to a case where the accident had taken place prior to the date when the said provisions had come into force.

Impugned order is in accordance with law and deserves to be upheld.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ – Delay and laches – Seniority list challenged after 13 years – Petitioner is seeking entitlement to agitate his belated claim on the strength of directions issued by the Court in other case -- Assertion of petitioner that he has a fresh cause of action for filing the instant petition after judgment cannot be sustained -- Unexplained delay and laches in invoking Article 226 jurisdiction has repeatedly been held to be a serious impediment for grant of relief -- Claim of the petitioner suffers from delay and laches and cannot be entertained – Writ dismissed.

(Para 11-23)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Schedule - Article 54 -- Specific performance of contract – Limitation -- In the agreement dated 17.12.1989, it is specifically mentioned that the sale deed would be executed within one month from the date of the said agreement -- One month would expire on 16.01.1990, limitation period would be three years from the said date, which would expire on 16.01.1993 – Suit filed  in September, 1993 -- Suit liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone – Advance of Rs. 80,000/- ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs along with 12% simple interest.

(Para 9-12)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ claiming promotion after retirement – Delay and laches -- No one can claim promotion after he/ she already stood retired from service -- Petitioner retired from service on 30.06.2018 and after a period of 06 years, the petitioner is claiming promotion -- Petition dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.

(Para 17, 18)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 9 -- Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 51 – Civil suit for possession of agricultural land -- Ejectment of tenant -- Denying title of landlord – Effect of – Jurisdiction of civil Court -- If defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement by taking a specific plea to the effect, that will be sufficient to hold that they had denounced the title of the plaintiff -- Civil Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession.

(Para 10)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 9 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), Section 51 – Tenancy of agricultural land – Adverse possession – Plea of -- Effect of – Finding beyond pleadings – Permissibility of -- At no point of time, defendants ever claimed to be tenants on the suit land -- Their consistent stand taken in the written statement is that they are in possession of the suit land and had perfected their title by way of adverse possession -- Their plea of adverse possession has not been found as correct -- The First Appellate Court on its own, made out a new case for the defendants by holding them to be tenants on the suit land -- The First Appellate Court could not travel beyond the pleadings of the parties -- Even the evidence, led beyond the pleadings of the parties, could not be appreciated in that direction -- Suit decreed.

(Para 11, 13)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Arbitration award – Challenge to – Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act -- Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to challenging an arbitral award u/s 34 of the Act – It can be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days -- The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 makes it clear that extension cannot be beyond thirty days.

(Para 4)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18 – Recovery suit -- Acknowledgement of debt – Cheque dishonored – Postdated cheques -- Extension of limitation -- Payment made by the petitioner/ defendant through cheques, which got dishonoured, would tantamount to an acknowledgment of debt and liability and the period of limitation would stand extended by virtue of Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1963 -- Plea taken by the petitioner/ defendant that certain postdated cheques issued to the respondent/ plaintiff have been misused, does not cut much ice.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Limitation – Duty of court -- Even if the plea of limitation is not set up as a defence, the Court has to dismiss the suit if it is barred by limitation.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), Section 42(c) – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 113 -- Death of partner – Dissolution of Firm -- Rendition of account – Limitation -- Period of limitation for filing a suit for rendition of account is three years from the date of dissolution -- Firm dissolved in year 1984 by virtue of death of partner and thus, the suit could only have been instituted within a period of three years from that event -- Suit filed in the year 1996 was clearly time-barred.

(Para 20)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 19 -- Recovery suit – Time barred debt -- Extension of limitation -- Part payment after expiry of limitation -- Last delivery of the goods took place on 04.07.1988 -- Period of three years would come to an end on 04.07.1991 -- Any payment alleged to have been made beyond the said period would not restart the limitation period u/s 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

(Para 8)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Objections against award of Arbitration -- Condonation of delay – Whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to objections filed under the Act of 1996 – Held, application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, is ousted by proviso to Sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Suit for compensation – Limitation – Rejection of plaint -- Exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are drastic ones and a duty is caste on the Court to determine as to whether the plaint, on a plain reading along with document annexed thereto, discloses a cause of action -- No other document is to be seen at this stage -- Question of limitation would be a mix question of law and fact, the same cannot be decided in an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8 and Rule 9 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Dismissed in default – Delay in Restoration application supported by affidavit – Condonation of delay without application – Ld. trial Court, after considering the averments of the parties and guided by the basic tenets of law that the rights of the parties should be examined on merits and not fettered by technicalities, and to advance the cause of justice, allowed the application and restored the suit – Held, Ld. trial Court adopted a correct and judicious approach, by permitting the parties to have their rival claims decided on merits.

(Para 9-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction -- Delay and laches -- Delay defeats equity -- Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India -- Ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Allotment of distributorship – Writ jurisdiction – Delay and laches -- Writ petitioner was a rival applicant for grant of LPG distributorship – Appellant was held to be successful by and allotted distributorship by virtue of draw of lots in 2014 – Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away -- Being no stiff opposition or strong resistance to the alternate land offered by the appellant not being as per the specifications indicated in the advertisement, no reason to substitute the court’s view to that of the experts/ Corporation which has in its wisdom has exercised its discretion – Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, LPA Bench allowed the writ – Order of the Learned Division Bench set aside and order of Ld. Single Judge restored.

(Para 6, 11-14)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27, Article 64, 65 -- Suit for possession – Limitation of 12 years -- Adverse possession -- Defendant/ appellant has not set up the plea that his possession was adverse -- In the earlier case, defendant took the plea that suit property was given by his father in the family settlement, which, he failed to prove -- Possession of defendant is permissive possession and suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation -- An owner of the property cannot be deprived to get possession of the property.

(Para 19)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), Section 4, 6 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Acquisition of land – Right of subsequent purchaser – Adverse possession – Plea of -- Award was announced on 22.01.1992 -- Possession of the acquired land including the disputed land was taken over by HSVP vide Rapat dated 26.01.1992 -- Petitioner purchased the disputed land vide sale deed dated 15.04.1997 -- Sale transaction after finalization of the acquisition proceedings would not confer any right or benefit on the petitioner -- Any transaction thereafter would be void ab initio – Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the plea of adverse possession once he claims ownership/ title on the basis of sale deed -- Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 5-10)