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653. (SC) 04-05-2022

A. Evidence law -- Circumstantial evidence -- In order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent and coherent -- Inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused -- Circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder of children of A-1 -- Proximity between A-1 and A-2 – Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution has not even established the motive of the crime beyond reasonable doubt -- A1 and A2 talked on call, only proves that they shared a close relationship -- However, what these records do not prove, is that the murder was somehow in furtherance of this alleged proximity between A1 and A2 -- High Court’s inference in this regard was a mere dubious conclusion in absence of any cogent or concrete evidence -- High Court itself based its inferences on mere probability when it held that “It is quite probable that A2 would have through that the minor children had been a hurdle for his close proximity with A1” -- Prosecution has also failed to establish by evidence the supposed objective of these murders and what was it that was sought to be achieved by such an act -- Court observed that the act of A2 was inspired by the desire to “exclusively possess” A1 -- However, it seems improbable that A2 would murder the minor children of PW5 and A1 to increase or protect his intimacy to A1 rather than eliminate the husband of A1 himself -- Conviction cannot be upheld.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65A, 65B – Call records – Certification of electronic evidence – Requirement of -- Electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law -- Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.

(Para 21)

662. (SC) 01-04-2022

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – As per the dying declaration recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer, six/seven persons attacked the deceased -- Even in the F.I.R., lodged by PW-5, it was specifically mentioned that six persons attacked his brother, who assaulted him with hockey stick and knife -- PW-5-informant turned hostile, however, no reason to doubt the dying declaration.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Recording of -- Danger to life – Serious condition -- Extreme emergence – Requirement of -- As the deceased was having a stab injury by a knife, there was a possibility of danger to his life and therefore, by way of prudence, if the dying declaration was recorded, there is no reason to doubt the dying declaration, which was recorded by Assistant Divisional Transport Officer.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Unlawful assembly – Proof of – Dying declaration – Reliance upon -- From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including respondent -- Prosecution held to be successful in establishing and proving that respondent was present at the time of the incident; he was part of the unlawful assembly and that he participated in the commission of offence.

(Para 6.1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 228, 464 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 146, 148, 149 -- Framing of charge – Defective framing of charge – Effect of -- Respondent/ accused was not specifically charged u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 302 r/w Section 149 and Section 148 of IPC were specifically brought to the notice of the accused -- At the most, it can be said to be a defective framing of the charge by not specifically charging u/s 149 IPC -- Therefore, section 464 Cr.P.C. is attracted to the case -- Ingredients of Section 149 IPC are satisfied -- It cannot be said that the accused is prejudiced by non-mention of Section 149 IPC in the charge.

(Para 7, 8)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Non recovery of weapon – Effect of -- Merely because the weapon used is not recovered cannot be a ground not to rely upon the dying declaration, which was recorded before the Executive Magistrate, which has been proved by the prosecution.

(Para 9)

F. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 141, 149 – Dying declaration – Unlawful assembly – Act of other person – Liable for -- Not proved, who actually inflicted the knife blow -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Respondent was specifically named in the dying declaration, therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 10)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 302, 304 Part 1 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Deceased sustained an injury by knife blow, which is inflicted by one of the six to seven persons, who participated in commission of the offence -- Role attributed to the respondent-accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick --Deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days – Conviction u/s 302 r/w Section 149 IPC is not warranted -- Respondent/ accused held guilty for the offence under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for the offence u/s 148 IPC – Respondent/ accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further six months R.I. – Respondent/ accused also sentenced to undergo three years R.I. for the offence u/s 148 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo further two months R.I. -- Both the sentences to run concurrently.

(Para 10-13)

H. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148 – Unlawful assembly of six to seven persons – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Three accused charge-sheeted, charged and tried – Acquittal of two accused – Effect of -- Involvement of six to seven persons in commission of the offence has been established and proved -- Merely because three persons were charge-sheeted/ charged/ tried and even out of three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot be a ground to not to convict the respondent/ accused u/s 148 IPC.

(Para 12)

I. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 148 – Unlawful assembly – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon -- Accused armed with hockey, deceased died due to knife injury – Effect of -- Six to seven persons were part of the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly, the respondent/  accused can be held to be guilty for the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence as a member of such an unlawful assembly -- Respondent was rightly convicted by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.

(Para 12.1)

669. (J&K&L HC) 17-03-2022

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Stop payment – Account closed -- Not only the cases of dishonour of cheques on account of insufficiency of funds or on account of exceeding of arrangement but the cases involving dishonour of cheques on account of “stop payment” and “account closed” have also been brought within the ambit of offence under the aforesaid provision.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Difference in signature -- Contention of the petitioner that in the case offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is not constituted because the cheque was dishonoured on account of difference in signatures and not for the reason of insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement, deserves to be rejected.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Even if cheque issued as a security, still then it cannot be stated that no offence is made out, once the cheque issued by him has been dishonoured by the banker.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonour of cheque -- Security cheque -- Whether the petitioner had issued the cheque as a security and whether at the time when the cheque was presented for its payment, it was not for discharge of any debt or any other liability cannot be determined either by the trial Magistrate at the time of taking of cognizance or by High Court in these proceedings -- These are defences available to the accused/ petitioner, veracity whereof can be determined during the trial of the case -- Trial Magistrate directed to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.

(Para 20, 21)

685. (SC) 24-08-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – First Information Report/ FIR – Nature of -- FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness statements as they progress further into the investigation and unearth the specific roles of accused persons -- FIR as is known, only sets the investigative machinery, into motion.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B, 147, 148, 324 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Conviction in murder case – Test Identification Parade/ TIP -- Two courts have concurrently concluded that appellant’s name not being specifically mentioned in the FIR, would not justify his acquittal as he was specifically identified by PW2, PW4, & PW6 -- In view of his positive identification by the eye witnesses, the TIP not being conducted, was held to be immaterial -- Eye witnesses here have ascribed the same specific role to the appellant and narrated the events in same chronology, without material discrepancies – Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this case involves multiple persons attacking in a group with deadly weapons and it is not reasonable to expect recollection of every minute details by the eyewitnesses -- Prosecution has produced cogent evidence of the appellant being part of a conspiracy by all the accused in the assault, which led to the death of BM and injuries to PW1 and others -- As such, the conviction of the appellant by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, cannot be faulted.

(Para 15-18)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade/ TIP – Requirement of -- Identity of the appellant/accused was known to the witnesses and he was specifically identified by PW1, and PW2 as the person who wielded the sword and inflicted the injuries -- TIP was unnecessary in the case -- In the face of appellant’s such identification by name in the testimony of the eye witnesses, it can, be safely concluded that the failure to conduct the TIP for the appellant will not vitiate his conviction.

(Para 17)

691. (SC) 11-08-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

697. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)