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Posted On: 03-03-2026
91. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 13.02.2026)

A. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – State continuing to extract regular work while denying regularization on grounds of lack of sanctioned posts or inability of employee to meet educational qualifications for regular post -- Such an approach would be violative of fundamental rights of the temporary employees enshrined in Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Temporary employees cannot be forced to bear the brunt of lack of financial resources with the State – Respondents directed to regularize services of petitioners within six weeks, failing which petitioners shall be deemed to be regularized – Petitioners entitled to consequential benefits including counting of past service.

(Para 5-8)

B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16, 21 -- Service Law -- Regularization -- Long-term Ad hoc/ Contractual Employees – Perennial Nature of Work – Punjab and Haryana tend to formulate policies in order to circumvent implementation of judgments rendered by the Constitutional Courts -- More often than not, the claim for regularization is neither accepted nor denied and the applicant is kept in limbo unnecessarily -- Extended ad-hocism of keeping daily wage workers or contractual employees on temporary rolls for decades while extracting regular work is not only unconstitutional but undermines equality and dignity -- State and its instrumentalities being model employer can’t perpetuate such exploitation and use excuses like financial constraints, non-availability of sanctioned post, and lack of qualification or decision in Umadevi’s case (2006) 4 SCC 1 as talisman to deny well deserved regularisation on account of their perennial nature of long periods of work at par with their counterparts working on regular posts.

(Para 7, 8)

Posted On: 01-03-2026
102. (SC) (Decided on: 26.02.2026)

A. Construction of contract / deed -- If the words in a contract/deed are clear, there is very little the courts must do in the construction of the contract in determining the intention of the parties -- In furtherance of determining the intention, the deed must be read as a whole to ascertain the true meaning of its clauses, and the words of each clause should be interpreted harmoniously -- This intention must be derived directly from the plain and ordinary meaning of the text itself -- Furthermore, these words should be understood exactly as the intended parties would commonly use them -- The covenants must be applied precisely as written, neither diluted into irrelevance nor stretched beyond their original scope -- If the construction of the contract/deed, through its words and context, does not provide the court with the parties’ intention, the court may have regard to the circumstances surrounding its creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended to apply.

(Para 19)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52, 106, 111 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 62 -- Unilateral Termination of lease – Permissibility of – Subsequent purchaser’ right -- Construction of contract / deed -- Nomenclature alone of the document is not the decisive factor of the nature of a document; it is the text and the context that point to the obligations undertaken by the parties to a written document – Document’s nomenclature, text and context lead to only one conclusion: that Defendant No. 1 entered into a 99-year lease deed -- Thus, the unilateral cancellation is illegal, and it should be understood as having interfered with the right of the Plaintiff to remain in possession of the Plaint Schedule Property for 99 years – Rights which are preserved and protected in favour of the lessor are allowed to be enjoyed by subsequent purchasers. 

(Para 21, 22)

Posted On: 01-03-2026
104. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 10.02.2026 Decided on: 19.02.2026)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Power of State -- While it is settled law that mere participation in a selection process does not vest an indefeasible right to appointment, the State’s power to cancel such a process is not absolute and must be grounded in justifiable reasons -- Constitutional Courts, in the exercise of judicial review, are empowered to scrutinize an employer's decision to abandon a recruitment process, particularly when it has reached an advanced stage of conclusion -- If such a decision is found to be arbitrary or lacks a rational nexus with the intended objective, the Court may issue appropriate directions to provide relief.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Abandonment/ Scrapping of selection process – Right to appointment – Selection process cancelled at an advanced stage -- Communication indicates that the selection process was scrapped solely to facilitate a transition to online recruitment -- Abandoning a nearly-concluded selection for a mere procedural change, without any allegation of irregularity, constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power -- Decision is legally flawed and lacks a rational nexus to the objective of fair recruitment -- Cancellation is both unreasonable and unsustainable in the eyes of law – Four posts are presently lying vacant, the appellants can conveniently be accommodated against those vacancies, which would effectively resolve the controversy without causing prejudice to the respondents – Writ petition disposed of.

(Para 13-24)

Posted On: 01-03-2026
109. (J&K&L HC) (Reserved on: 06.02.2026 Decided on: 13.02.2026)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 309 – Airman in Airforce -- Appointment in State Administrative Service – Petitioner participated in the selection process for selection to the J&K Administrative Services and at the time of applying for the same, he had sought permission from the relevant authorities of the Air Force, however, the said permission was rejected on the ground that the post for which he had applied did not fall in Group-A :

-- Petitioner belongs to a far flung village, that was militancy infested at the time when he was undergoing schooling – Pleaded that both his parents were uneducated hailing from an economically weaker background as such he has undergone studies after facing acute hardships and difficulties -- It is because of these adverse conditions that the petitioner could not continue the studies in a college in a regular mode and instead he had to join employment with Indian Air Force so as to feed himself and his family -- Due to his brilliance, the petitioner without any formal coaching and without any regular studies, obtained the requisite merit in the Combined Competitive Examination and made it to J&K Administrative Service -- This attitude of the petitioner and his urge to attain higher goals and excellence in his career is required to be appreciated and encouraged.

-- Even while performing his duties with Air Force, the petitioner had shown great dedication -- Petitioner had no disciplinary violations in his service meaning thereby that while performing the job as an Airman, he has not given scope for any complaints.

-- Petitioner has potential to attain great heights in his career, denying him permission to continue his service as an Officer of the J&K Administrative Service would work very harshly against him and in fact would discourage and dishearten him immensely, that would lead to wastage of a great talent.

Writ petition disposed of with a direction to the respondents to issue NOC and discharge certificate in favour of the petitioner subject to deposition of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) with the Air Force authorities within two months.

(Para 11-24)

Posted On: 26-02-2026
110. (P&H HC) (Reserved on 03.12.2025 Decided on: 20.02.2026)

Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016), Section 5, 15 -- Haryana Law Officers (Engagement) Rules, 2016 -- Contractual engagement of Deputy Advocate Generals (DAGs) and Assistant Advocate Generals (AAGs) -- Entitlement of medical reimbursement, LTC facility and other pensionary benefits including the earned leave -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation :

Whether the petitioners, in light of the nature of their duties and conditions of service, can be denied core service benefits solely on the nomenclature of “contractual engagement” ?

To restrict their entitlements on the basis of nomenclature alone would be arbitrary, undermine the dignity of the profession, and contravene the principles of equality, consistency, and legitimate expectation inherent in constitutional governance -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation comes into play -- Petitioners as AAG/DAG are performing duties with higher responsibility and quantum of work than the other Law Officers working in various departments of the State Government -- Being deprived of their private practice, the denial of such benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other emoluments tantamount to putting them at discrimination with the Law Officers such as ADAs, DDAs and DAs deputed in Government Departments -- Respondents directed to release benefits like LTC, Medical reimbursement and other benefits/emoluments to the officers appointed as AAG/DAG including the petitioners.

(Para 18-34)

Posted On: 25-02-2026
115. (P&H HC) (Reserved on: 07.11.2025 Decided on: 17.11.2025)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 9 -- Necessary parties -- Partition proceedings involved more than 177 kanals of land distributed among all village proprietors -- Certain proprietors were allotted portions of the suit land now claimed by the plaintiffs as part of the bachat land -- All proprietors who were parties to the original partition proceedings constitute necessary parties to the present suit -- If the partition is flawed qua any of the proprietors, it is flawed in its entirety and must be re-conducted, thereby directly impacting the rights of those not impleaded herein -- Consequently, the finding of the learned Civil Judge that all proprietors were not necessary parties is manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.

(Para 12-12.2)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 22 -- Suit against dead person – Maintainability of -- A suit cannot be instituted against a dead person, for such a proceeding is a nullity, being void ab initio -- A dead person is a juridical non-entity, and the law does not recognize the institution of a suit either by or against a party who ceased to exist prior to its filing -- The only legally permissible course in such a situation is to implead, the legal heirs or successors-in-interest in their own independent capacity, failing which the suit suffers from a foundational defect -- Order XXII is wholly inapplicable -- Principle actus curiae neminem gravabit has no application, because the defect is inherent and incurable -- Suit having been instituted against a deceased defendant, was inherently defective and non-maintainable, and any decree founded thereon is inexorably rendered coram non judice and unenforceable.

(Para 13-14.5)

C. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158(1)(xvii) – Partition proceedings -- If the plaintiffs were genuinely aggrieved, the statutory route under the Act was the ‘sine qua non’ for redress, and their failure to adopt it is fatal to the suit -- Their attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in conscious disregard of the statutory framework, amounts to a clear circumvention of the legislative scheme -- A suit instituted in violation of such a statutory bar is not merely irregular but fundamentally unsustainable.

(Para 15.1)

D. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13, 16, 111-121, 158 – Partition proceedings – Jurisdiction of civil court -- Maintainability of suit -- When a statute expressly creates rights, prescribes obligations, and provides a special forum for adjudication, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts stands ousted by necessary implication -- In such a scenario, the principle of ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ operates only within the contours of the statutory framework, and parties must exhaust the remedies provided therein -- Any decree passed by a Civil Court in derogation of such statutory bar is ‘void ab initio’, attracting the maxim ‘coram non judice’ an act done by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law -- Plaintiffs’ conscious awareness of the statutory mechanism, coupled with their deliberate omission to invoke it, renders the suit inherently non-maintainable under Section 158 of the Act -- A party aggrieved by an order passed by a Revenue Officer must avail the statutory remedy of appeal or revision under the Act, and a civil suit challenging such proceedings is not maintainable.

(Para 15.2, 15.3)

E. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz – Presumption -- Wazib-ul-Arz constitutes an integral component of the record-of-rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 -- Consequently, a statutory presumption of truth attaches to it under Section 44 -- Wazib-ul-Arz produced on the record stands duly proved, and the contention that it required further formal proof, or that any interpolation had occurred, is devoid of substance. Gram Panchayat of Village Tulewal’ case 2014(11) RCR (Civil) 2674 relied.

(Para 16.4)

Posted On: 25-02-2026
116. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 09.07.2025)

A. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6, 10, 51 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Suspension of Sarpanch – Proposal of Acting Sarpanch passed in favour of petitioner -- No-confidence motion – Requirements of – BDPO directed the petitioner to handover the charge to some other Panch -- Petitioner cannot be held to be a duly elected Sarpanch as envisaged u/s 6 of the 1994 Act read with Rule 4 of 1995 Rules; therefore the provisions contained under Section 10 of the 1994 Act which provides for ‘No Confidence Motion’ against a duly elected Sarpanch, is not attracted -- Contention of the petitioner that he cannot be removed from post of Acting Sarpanch without following process/procedure as envisaged under Section 10 of 1994 Act rejected – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 2, 8-11)

B. Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (11 of 1994), Section 6 – Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995, Rule 4 -- Casual filling of vacancy – Sarpanch/ Panch -- If a casual vacancy has arisen, then in that eventuality, the authorities are required to elect a Sarpanch, panch, etc., in the manner as may be prescribed and any person elected to fill up a vacancy under Section 6 of 1994 Act, is to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term for which the person in whose place he is elected would have otherwise continued in office -- Manner prescribed for filling of a casual vacancy is envisaged under Rule 4 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Rules, 1995.

(Para 12)

Posted On: 20-02-2026
125. (P&H HC) (Decided on: 03.02.2026)

A. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Literate candidate – Requirement of -- Appellant is not literate as he has passed only 6th standard -- Once, under the notification dated 02.06.2008 of the Government of Haryana, the Lambardar should be literate and preferably middle pass; the same has to be followed and candidates are to be adjudged accordingly – Respondent No.4 is 9th pass – Appointment of respondent no. 4 cannot be treated as arbitrary, illegal or perverse to the facts or the law.

(Para 5)

B. Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 13 -- Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar -- Preference of Revenue authorities – Choice of Collector -- Choice of Lambardar should be left to the discretion of the authorities -- Tehsildar and the SDM had recommended the case of respondent No.4 for appointment as Lambardar -- Once, the initial preference was given to the respondent No.4 and he was appointed by the Collector same position has been restored by the learned Single Judge, coupled with the fact that no disqualification has been attached with the candidate so appointed as Lambardar -- No interference is called for.

(Para 6)

C. Haryana Land Revenue Rules, Rule 15 -- Appointment of Lambardar – Hereditary claim -- Merely that the father and the grandfather of the appellant was Lambardar, the same cannot be a ground to appoint the appellant as Lambardar in case any better candidate suited for the job was available, as no hereditary right exists with the appellant.

(Para 8)