Cr.P.C. Digest

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)

Section 164, 164-A, 173 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Rape case Guidelines -- Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka by Nonavinakere Police vs. Shivanna alias Tarkari Shivanna, (2014) 8 SCC 913 exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution issued interim directions in the form of mandamus to all the Police Stations-in-Charge in the entire country to follow: “10.1. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the investigating officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. A copy of the statement under Section 164 CrPC should be handed over to the investigating officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 CrPC should not be disclosed to any person till charge-sheet/report under Section 173 CrPC is filed. 10.2. The investigating officer shall as far as possible take the victim to the nearest Lady Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate. 10.3. The investigating officer shall record specifically the date and the time at which he learnt about the commission of the offence of rape and the date and time at which he took the victim to the Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate as aforesaid. 10.4. If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking the victim to the Magistrate, the investigating officer should record the reasons for the same in the case diary and hand over a copy of the same to the Magistrate. 10.5. Medical examination of the victim : Section 164-A CrPC inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in CrPC imposes an obligation on the part of investigating officer to get the victim of the rape immediately medically examined. A copy of the report of such medical examination should be immediately handed over to the Magistrate who records the statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC.” Supreme Court gave suggestion to every High Court that the appropriate modifications/amendments be made to the Criminal Practice/Trial Rules incorporating provisions consistent with the directions issued in the decisions in Shivanna’s case (2014) 8 SCC 913.

(SC) Decided on: 01.11.2022

Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Inherent power of High Court -- Complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act pending -- After a period of three months, an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR – Ld. Magistrate declined to order registration of FIR and decided to inquire into the matter by treating the same as complaint case -- Ld. Sessions Judge remanded back the matter to the learned Magistrate with directions to pass a speaking order – Thereafter, after a period of two years, impugned FIR against the appellants with police station with the similar contents and allegations which were levelled in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C – Complainant is not proceeding further with his application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending since last five years – In the FIR, no reference of application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. and complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act – Held, impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law and can be said to be filed with a view to harass the appellants -- High Court ought to have exercised the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India/482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have quashed the impugned FIR to secure the ends of justice – Appeal allowed, impugned criminal proceedings/FIR registered u/ss 420/406 IPC quashed.

(SC) Decided on: 01.03.2021

Section 57, 167, 438 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 94 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 341, 120-B, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 29 – Murder case -- Anticipatory bail – Interim bail -- Juvenile-petitioner’s reliance upon birth certificate and matriculation certificate -- Without commenting anything as regards the genuineness of the documents, petition disposed of with the directions: (i) The petitioner to surrender before the Juvenile Justice Board within 10 days and upon the petitioner so surrendering, the Juvenile Justice Board shall release the petitioner on interim bail subject to his furnishing requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Board. (ii) The Board shall conduct an inquiry as regards the juvenility of the petitioner. If the petitioner is found to be juvenile, the Board shall consider his release under Section 12 of the Act and pass an appropriate order. (iii) The petitioner to be present before the Board on the day his bail application is to be heard and on the day when the order on his bail application is to be pronounced or on any other day as directed by Board. (iv) If the Board, upon inquiry regarding age comes to conclusion that the petitioner is not a juvenile, he shall be produced before Illaqa Magistrate who shall proceed further in accordance with law. The petitioner shall appear before the Board on all the dates unless specifically exempted. (v) The interim bail shall come to an end if petitioner is not found to be juvenile or in case his application is dismissed under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

(P&H HC) Decided on: 27.11.2020

Section 439 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 61, 85, 37 -- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985, Rule 66 -- NDPS case – Commercial quantity – Regular bail -- Recovery of commercial quantity of 70 injections of Pheniramine Maleate 10 ml Avil and 70 injections of Buprenorphine Rexogesic 2 ml each – Contention that the same would not constitute an offence as the same was required to be used for personal medical use (although recovery denied) – Provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are mandatory in nature, however, departure can certainly be made in case the conditions contained in the aforesaid section itself are satisfied -- First condition being that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application and Second condition being that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable doubts for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and both these conditions are co-existent -- State was granted opportunity and time was also granted for filing of reply but the same was not filed -- So far as the condition of existence of any reasonable ground for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence is concerned, would be a debatable issue as it is also subject to fulfillment of ingredients of first proviso to Rule 66(2) of NDPS Rules. In case Rule 66(2) of NDPS Rules is applied in the case then the same would be a reasonable ground and something more than prima facie ground to believe at this stage that the petitioner is not guilty of the alleged offence -- Apart from this, the fact that the petitioner is in custody for more than two years and is not involved in any other case at present is also a relevant factor. Keeping in view the above facts and totality of circumstances of case and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the petition allowed -- Petitioner granted the concession of regular bail.

(P&H HC) Decided on: 10.11.2020

Section 167 (2) – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 36A (4) -- Default bail – Compulsive bail – In common legal parlance, the right to bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) is commonly referred to as ‘default bail’ or ‘compulsive bail’ as it is granted on account of the default of the investigating agency in not completing the investigation within the prescribed time, irrespective of the merits of the case. Held, Once the accused files an application for bail u/s 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency -- The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court -- However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC -- Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid.

(SC) Decided on: 26.10.2020

Section 389(1) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Cancellation of -- Death took place within 7 or 8 months and there is oral evidence of the parents of cruelty and torture immediately preceding the death -- Also evidence of payment of Rs.2,50,000/- to the Respondent-Accused by the victim’s brother -- Respondent No.2-accused has not been able to demonstrate any apparent and/or obvious illegality or error in the judgment of the Sessions Court, to call for suspension of execution of the sentence. Held, in considering an application for suspension of sentence, the Appellate Court is only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in the order of conviction that renders the order of conviction prima facie erroneous -- Where there is evidence that has been considered by the Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under Section 389 to re-assess and/or re-analyze the same evidence and take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release the convict on bail -- Appellant spent money beyond his financial capacity, at the wedding of the victim and had even gifted an I-10 car -- Failure to lodge an FIR complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim is inconsequential -- Parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete breakdown of the marriage by lodging an FIR against the Respondent No.2 and his parents, while the victim was alive. Impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender for being taken into custody -- The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

(SC) Decided on: 14.08.2020

Section 482 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Offence against Director of Company – Issuance of process – Quashing of Complaint -- Supreme Court summarized the law as follows: a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Director; b) If a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the Director. c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do so having come across some unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is merely an arm-twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such case unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case being there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed; d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court’s powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but, nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director.

(SC) Decided on: 17.10.2014

Section 482 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (1 of 1986), Section 22-A – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Dishonour of Cheque -- Prosecution of the Company/ Directors – Company declared Sick -- Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- In a case in which the BIFR has submitted its report declaring a company as ‘sick’ and has also issued a direction u/s 22-A restraining the company or its directors not to dispose of any of its assets except with consent of the Board then the contention raised that a criminal case for the alleged offence u/s 138 NI Act cannot be instituted during the period in which the restraint order passed by the BIFR remains operative cannot be rejected outright -- Whether the contention can be accepted or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case -- For instance, before the date on which the cheque was drawn or before expiry of the statutory period of 15 days after notice, a restraint order of the BIFR u/s 22-A was passed against the company then it cannot be said that the offence u/s 138 NI Act was completed -- In such a case it may reasonably be said that the dishonoring of the cheque by the bank and failure to make payment of the amount by the company and/or its Directors is for reasons beyond the control of the accused -- In such circumstances it would be unjust and unfair and against the intent and purpose of the statute to hold that the Directors should be compelled to face trial in a criminal case.

(SC) Decided on: 23.02.2000